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THESIS	ABSTRACT	
The	ambitious	16+	GW	new	nuclear	programme	 in	Britain	marks	 a	distinctive	
low-carbon	 energy	 pathway.	 The	 proposed	 new	 build	 projects	 are	
megainvestments	instituting	novel	ways	of	governance	and	public	engagement	
with	striking	contrasts	to	previous	constructions.	To	probe	into	this	new	era	of	
nuclear	 megainvestments,	 the	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 proposed	 £14bn	 Wylfa	
Newydd	 project	 on	 Anglesey,	 on	 the	 northwest	 fringe	 of	 Wales.	 In	 the	
intersection	 of	 sociotechnical	 transitions,	 human	 geography,	 and	 science	 and	
technology	studies	 (STS)	 literatures,	 the	case	study	addresses	 the	geographies	
of	energy	transitions,	the	politics	of	governing	low-carbon	investments,	and	the	
changing	 participation	 in	 large-scale	 infrastructural	 projects.	 The	 multi-scalar	
ethnographic	study	included	both	living	in	local	communities	and	engaging	with	
stakeholder	 organisations,	 from	 local	 councils	 to	 Whitehall	 ministries	 and	
multinational	 investors,	through	interviewing,	document	analysis,	and	meeting	
participations.	
Based	on	the	findings,	 the	thesis	claims	that	the	new	nuclear	project	 is	better	
characterised	 as	 a	 megainvestment	 assembled	 together	 from	 diverse	 issues	
across	 multiple	 scales,	 from	 Welsh	 language	 protection	 to	 supply	 chain	
development,	than	as	a	technological	object,	an	energy-generating	source,	or	a	
financial	 megaproject.	 The	 megainvestment	 is	 transformative	 well	 beyond	
Anglesey	 with	 distinct	 practices	 and	 visions	 tied	 to	 the	 investment	 across	
various	 geographic	 scales.	 The	 governance	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 blurring	 the	
boundaries	 between	 public	 and	 private	 organisations	 with	 a	 shift	 towards	
collaborative	 platforms	 and	 coproduction	 of	 specialist	 knowledge.	 The	 public	
consultations	displace	the	political	controversies	to	legal	wrangles	and	disputes	
on	 (geographic)	 boundaries	 by	 fragmenting	 affected	 publics	 and	 customising	
issues.	 In	 summary,	 this	 transformative	 project	 marks	 a	 new	 era	 of	 doing	
megainvestments	 on	 multiple	 geographic	 scales,	 with	 shifts	 in	 particular	
towards	 collaborative	 evidence-based	 governance	 and	 customised	 public	
consultations.	
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CHAPTER	 1.	 INTRODUCTION:	 RESEARCHING	 AN	 ENERGY	
TRANSITION	FROM	THE	GROUND	
1.1	A	MEGAINVESTMENT	ON	THE	FRINGE	OF	BRITAIN	
The	 documentary	 Nuclear	 Cathedral	 depicts	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Wylfa	
nuclear	 plant	 on	 the	 remote	 island	 on	 Anglesey	 on	 the	 northwest	 corner	 of	
Wales	 (Nuclear	Cathedral	1968).	The	ambition	of	 the	construction	was	 indeed	
comparable	 to	 a	 medieval	 cathedral.	 It	 is	 breathtaking	 to	 see	 the	 enormous	
structures	mushrooming	out	of	the	fields	on	the	rugged	coast,	the	hundreds	of	
workers	 working	 on	 the	 ground	 and	 on	 vertiginous	 heights,	 and	 scale	 of	
transformation	 in	 the	 area.	 Hundreds	 and	 hundreds	 of	 lives	 were	 arranged	
around	 the	 ambition	 of	 constructing	 the	 plant	 through	 difficulties	 in	working	
conditions,	supply	of	materials,	and	consortium	working.	The	construction	took	
place	half	 a	 century	 ago	 in	 an	era	of	 strained	 industrial	 relations,	 poor	 safety	
standards,	and	secretive	industry	culture.	When	Wylfa	A	was	completed,	it	was	
the	largest	nuclear	plant	in	the	world,	now	both	of	its	reactors	are	undergoing		
decommissioning.		
The	 planned	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 plant	 will,	 however,	 dwarf	 its	 predecessor.	 The	
peak	construction	workforce	will	be	around	10,720	people	(Horizon	NP	2016c:	
29)	compared	to	the	mere	2600	working	on	the	first	station	(Gwynedd	County	
Council	 1976;	 see	 also	 Wassink	 1987).	 Similarly,	 the	 2700	 MW	 generation	
capacity	exceeds	the	980	MW	of	the	existing	plant	by	far.	Wylfa	Newydd	is	one	
of	 constructions	 of	 the	 ambitious	 nuclear	 new	 build	 programme	 in	 the	 UK	
(BERR	2008;	DECC	2009).	Wylfa	Newydd	can	even	become	the	flagship	project	
in	the	near	future	 in	 light	of	the	political,	 financial	and	technical	problems	the	
leading	 Hinkley	 Point	 C	 construction	 faces	 (NAO	 2016).	 These	 new	 series	 of	
nuclear	power	plants	will	 cost	 each	around	double	 the	budget	of	 the	 London	
Olympics.	Wylfa	Newydd	is	a	£14bn	megainvestment.	During	the	construction,	
around	5,300,000	tonnes	of	material	will	be	moved	to	site	(Horizon	NP	2016d:	
336),	 including	more	 than	 three	million	 tonnes	of	 concrete	and	around	half	 a	
million	tonnes	of	steel	(Horizon	NP	2016d:	346).	This	necessitates,	for	example,	
a	custom-built	harbour	(MOLF)	and	80	HGV	deliveries	per	hour	at	peak	(Horizon	
NP	 2016d:	 336).	 The	 600-tonne	 reactor	 pressure	 vessel	 will	 take	 a	 couple	 of	
weeks	to	be	moved	from	the	MOLF	to	the	site,	even	with	the	world’s	 largest,	
200-meter	high	crane	(Stacey	2016).	There	will	be	hundreds	if	not	thousands	of	
supply	chain	companies	involved	in	the	construction,	from	high-quality	welders	
to	caterers.	We	are	arriving	to	a	new	era	of	nuclear	megainvestments.		
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The	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 project	 is	 currently	 on	 paper	 at	 most,	 the	 first	 nuclear	
concrete	will	not	be	poured	until	2020	(Horizon	NP	2016d:	125).	On	Anglesey,	
however,	 harbingers	 of	 the	 coming	 transformations	 are	 already	 visible.	 Here	
the	numbers	translate	into	everyday	lives.	My	seven-months	Anglesey	fieldwork	
was	an	eye-opener.	Seemingly	insignificant	trifles	on	paper	became	alive	during	
my	 stay.	 The	 demolition	 of	 a	 few	 derelict	 houses	 on	 the	 site,	 for	 example,	
seemed	an	obsolete	 technical	detail	on	paper.	 In	 the	social	 fabric	of	Anglesey	
villages,	 the	 nameless	 buildings	 turned	out	 to	 be	homes	with	 names,	 such	 as	
Tyn	 yr	 Alt,	 often	 denoting	 their	 former	 residents.	 The	 demolition	 of	 these	
homes	meant	an	erasure	of	memories	of	peoples	and	their	stories,	a	chunk	of	
local	 cultural	heritage.	 The	existing	Wylfa	plant	 is	 also	embedded	 in	 this	 local	
heritage,	 having	 provided	 prosperity	 and	 identity	 for	 the	 villages	 for	 two	
generations,	but	also	cultural	frictions	with	the	incoming	workers.	
In	the	area,	the	decommissioning	of	Wylfa	A	also	converts	 into	individual	 lives	
with	losses	of	livelihoods,	challenges	of	outmigration,	and	withering	of	skills	and	
social	bonds,	all	exacerbated	with	the	delays	in	the	new	build	project.	While	the	
island	 is	 very	much	 entrenched	 in	 its	 omnipresent	 past,	 the	 new	build	 shows	
the	 future	 of	 becoming	 the	 Energy	 Island.	 To	 symbolise	 this	 connection,	 the	
new	plant	was	given	the	name	Wylfa	Newydd,	new	Wylfa	in	Welsh,	instead	of	
the	industry	standard	naming	Wylfa	B	(Horizon	NP	2013b).	Local	residents	and	
stakeholders,	from	council	officials	to	the	developer	company’s	consultants,	try	
to	 put	 together	 the	 vast	 puzzle	 of	 the	 transformations	 catalysed	 by	 Wylfa	
Newydd	 from	 these	 kinds	 of	 fine	 details.	 The	 sheer	 extent	 of	 movement	 of	
materials	 and	people	 culminate	 in	 immense	 transformations	across	 the	 island	
well	more	 than	a	demolition	of	 a	 few	buildings.	 There	 is	much	 speculation	 in	
grappling	 these	 enormous	 changes.	 The	 construction	 will	 mean	 new	
(temporary)	housing	estates,	changed	road	infrastructures,	reshaping	the	local	
education,	from	primary	schools	to	the	local	college.	The	incoming	around	8000	
transient	 workers	 (Horizon	 NP	 2016c:	 31),	 for	 example,	 will	 need	 housing,	
transportation	 to	 work,	 groceries,	 pubs,	 healthcare	 provision,	 education	 for	
their	 children,	 and	 so	on.	My	 fieldwork	was	 just	 a	 snapshot	of	 understanding	
these	 transformations	 at	 the	 time	 when	 the	 first	 major	 public	 engagement	
exercise	about	the	plant	was	conducted.	
Wylfa	 Newydd,	 however,	 is	 not	 just	 transformative	 in	 this	 far	 off	 corner	 of	
Wales.	These	nuclear	megainvestments	on	remote	nuclear	sites	mark	the	new	
ways	of	governing	low	carbon	Britain.	Therefore	this	thesis	is	not	simply	about	
how	 a	 megainvestment	 is	 transforming	 a	 few	 dozen	 thousand	 lives	 on	 the	
fringe	 of	 the	 country,	 but	 about	 how	 a	 new	 era	 of	 ‘nationally	 significant	
infrastructure	 projects’	 marks	 the	 novel	 practices	 of	 governance	 and	
democratic	 politics	 in	 Britain.	 The	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 cuts	 across	 multiple	
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geographic	scales.	The	megainvestment	is	as	much	about	making	a	new	Britain	
as	 about	 transforming	 local	 communities,	 from	 establishing	 new	 ways	 of	
governance	 across	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sector	 on	 various	 levels	 to	 shifting	
how	democratic	politics	works	in	consulting	about	megainvestments.		
Wylfa	Newydd	 is	 a	 governance	 experiment	 across	multiple	 geographic	 scales.	
The	governance	of	 the	megaproject	 cuts	across	 the	established	boundaries	of	
state	 and	 the	 market.	 Collaborative	 platforms,	 such	 as	 the	 Energy	 Island	
Programme,	 facilitate	 not	 just	 different	 public	 and	 private	 organisations	
working	 together	 but	 the	 exchange	 of	 best	 practices,	 co-production	 of	
knowledge,	 and	 personal	 networks.	 The	 Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council,	 for	
example,	 has	 been	 restructuring	 its	 functioning	 from	 autonomous	 service	
provision	 and	 statutory	 functions	 to	 responding	 to	 the	 developers’	 needs	 in	
order	 to	 maximise	 community	 benefits.	 Collaborative	 platforms,	 such	 as	 the	
Energy	 Island	Programme,	play	an	essential	part	 in	 facilitating	 the	 investment	
through	knowledge	production	 ‘in	partnership’.	On	 the	other	hand,	 there	 is	 a	
‘battle	of	evidence’	 in	the	statutory	process	over	the	allocation	of	prospective	
costs	and	benefits	between	stakeholders	and	the	developer	company	with	the	
mobilisation	of	extensive	documents,	troops	of	consultants,	and	the	prospect	of	
legal	wrangles.	
There	 is	 a	 profound	 shift	 in	 democratic	 practices	 marked	 by	 the	
megainvestment,	especially	in	contrast	with	the	big	public	inquiries	of	previous	
nuclear	 construction	 era	 in	 the	 UK	 a	 generation	 ago	 (Johnstone	 2013;	
O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	 1988;	Wynne	 2011).	 The	 current	 differentiated	
public	 consultations	 create	 fragmented	 publics,	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 with	 a	
national	 monolith	 public	 inscribed	 in	 the	 historical	 nuclear	 inquiries.	 The	
nuclear	 megainvestment	 is	 broken	 up	 into	 disjointed	 issues	 by	 drawing	
geographic	boundaries,	and	by	segregating	nuclear	and	non-nuclear	elements,	
as	well	 as	 technical	 and	generic	 concerns.	 The	public	 consultation	discussions	
are	personalised	through	one-to-one	drop-in	sessions	and	targeted	stakeholder	
meetings,	 in	 contrast	 to	 general	 public	meetings	 and	 hearings.	 This	 results	 in	
the	 absence	 of	 an	 explicit	 political	 controversy,	 where	 differences	 are	
articulated	 through	 legal	wrangles	on	 the	boundaries	of	geographies	of	affect	
and	 negotiations	 of	 nuclearities.	 The	 consultation	 practices	 of	 the	 ‘nationally	
significant	infrastructure	project’	highlight	a	broader	shift	from	mass	democracy	
to	 a	 customised	 democracy	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 connection	 to	 major	 infrastructural	
investments.	
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1.2	ELECTRICITY	SYSTEMS	IN	TRANSITION:	SPACES	OF	EXPERIMENTATION	
Electricity	seems	such	a	routine	part	of	our	modern	lives	that	we	often	take	it	
for	granted	from	putting	the	kettle	on	in	the	morning	to	walking	past	the	poles	
along	 the	 street.	 The	 unfolding	 ‘third	 industrial	 revolution’	 (Rifkin	 2011),	
however,	might	 fundamentally	 transform	the	ways	electricity	 is	produced	and	
consumed.	 The	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 megainvestment	 sheds	 some	 light	 on	 the	
particular	ways	of	how	energy	futures	are	envisioned	and	made	in	the	junction	
of	 reshaping	 local	 communities,	 creation	 of	 a	 novel	 Energy	 Island	 initiative,	
devolution	 of	 Wales,	 remaking	 a	 neoliberal	 UK	 state,	 and	 building	 up	 a	
multinational	consortium.	
The	foundations	of	the	current	UK	electricity	system	solidified	mainly	after	the	
second	 world	 war.	 In	 the	 inter-war	 period,	 a	 national	 electricity	 system	 was	
already	 established	with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	National	Grid	 from	disconnected	
municipal	 systems	 (Hannah	1979;	Hughes	 1993).	 After	 the	war,	 however,	 key	
principles	 of	 the	 still	 existing	 electricity	 system	 have	 consolidated,	 such	 as	
universal	 service,	 the	 increasing	 size	 of	 power	 stations	 providing	 baseload	 or	
peak	load	electricity,	and	building	capacities	in	response	to	anticipated	demand	
increases.	 These	 contours	 of	 the	 electricity	 system	 are	 similar	 in	 Western	
countries.	 Though	 electricity	 sector	 liberalisation	 marked	 a	 substantial	 turn,	
most	foundations	of	the	model	remained	solid	until	now	(Helm	2009).	
The	 foundations	 of	 this	 model	 of	 electricity	 generation,	 however,	 are	
increasingly	 challenged.	 First,	 the	 ever-growing	 anticipated	 demand	 as	 an	
exogenous	driver	for	new	power	stations	has	gradually	slowed	down	since	the	
1970s,	similarly	to	most	other	industrialised	countries,	from	previously	doubling	
in	every	decade	in	the	UK.	In	the	last	decade,	electricity	demand	even	started	to	
shrink	 (DUKES	 2015).	 Second,	 the	 centralised	 national	 infrastructures	 based	
around	large	power	stations	are	making	ways	for	more	decentralised	systems,	
such	as	 solar	panel	powered	buildings	or	 local	electricity	networks,	 as	well	 as	
for	extensive	supranational	and	continental	electricity	systems,	exemplified	by	
the	 DESERTEC1	initiative.	 Third,	 new	 business	 models	 are	 emerging	 alongside	
the	 traditional	 vertically	 integrated	 national	 monopolies	 and	 multinational	
companies,	from	specialised	electricity	trading	companies	in	the	global	markets	
to	 local	 energy	 cooperatives.	 Fourth,	 the	 distinction	 between	 baseload	 and	
																																																						
1	DESERTEC	 is	 an	 ambitious	 private	 consortium	 to	 create	 an	 integrated	 European	 electricity	 system	
supplied	by	electricity	from	vast	solar	panel	farms	in	the	Sahara.		
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peak	 load	 becomes	 increasingly	 empty	 due	 to	 the	 intermittency	 of	 several	
renewable	sources,	the	boost	of	storage	capacity	potentially	stimulated	through	
the	 spread	of	electric	 cars,	and	 the	 sophistication	of	 computational	modelling	
and	 financial	 pricing	 capabilities.	 Fifth,	 electricity	 consumption	 is	 no	 longer	 a	
proxy	of	switching	electrical	devices	on	or	off,	from	the	telly	in	the	living	room	
to	a	whole	aluminium	smelter.	Both	home	and	industry	electricity	systems	are	
becoming	integrated	into	complex	ICT	systems	with	the	spread	of	smart	grids,	
‘the	internet	of	things’,	and	automation.	These	developments	pave	the	way	for	
previously	 inactive	 users	 to	 become	 ‘prosumers’.	 This	 tendency	 is	 further	
strengthened	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 demand	 side	 management	 (DSM).	 Sixth,	 the	
universal	 service	 imperative	 was	 first	 eroded	 by	 liberalisation,	 and	 then	 the	
growing	 spatial	 differences	 often	 linked	 to	 technical	 means	 (e.g.,	 pre-paid	
meters)	to	the	current	customisation	of	electricity	provisions.	Last	but	not	least,	
the	current	high-carbon	infrastructures	of	electricity	have	been	pushed	towards	
low-carbon	 transitions.	 While	 modern	 Britain	 has	 been	 made	 through	
‘carbonisation’,	 the	 coming	 transformations	 do	 not	 necessarily	 reverse	 the	
levels	of	CO2	emissions.	Decarbonisation	is	rather	a	normative	expectation	than	
an	 inevitable	 trend.	 These	 are	 just	 some	of	 the	 key	 challenges	 to	 the	 current	
model	 of	 electricity	 generation,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 single	 blueprint	 of	 this	
transformation.	There	is	a	diversity	of	potential	pathways,	some	of	these	might	
be	even	hard	to	imagine	at	the	moment.	
This	 energy	 transition	 is	 a	 geographic	 process.	 Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 (2013)	
develop	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘spaces	 of	 experimentation’	 by	 linking	 regime	
destabilisation	 to	 territorial	 arrangements	 in	 conceptualising	 the	 diverse	
pathways	of	how	low	carbon	Britain	 is	made,	such	as	Scotland	as	“low	carbon	
Saudi	 Arabia”	 or	 Greater	 London	 as	 a	 neoliberalised	 low	 carbon	 megacity.		
These	spaces	of	experimentation	highlight	how	alternatives	 to	 the	current	UK	
electricity	 system	 emerging	 on	 various	 scales.	 The	 potential	 changes	 in	 the	
spatial	 pattern	 of	 electricity	 provision	 are	 in	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 ongoing	
transformations	(Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Hansen	and	Coenen	2015).	These	spaces	of	
experimentations	 can	 range	 from	 autonomous	 local	 initiatives,	 such	 as	 the	
Centre	 for	 Alternative	 Technology	 (CAT)	 in	Mid-Wales,	 to	 large-scale	 national	
experiments,	such	as	the	German	Energiewende.2	There	is	a	particular	interest	
																																																						
2	The	 German	 Energiewende,	 literally	 ’energy	 turn-around’,	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 the	 boom	 of	
decentralised	generation	in	the	country,	mainly	onshore	wind	turbines	and	solar	panels,	often	in	the	hands	
of	 citizens,	 farmers,	 cooperatives	 and	 municipalities,	 together	 with	 the	 phrase-out	 of	 nuclear	 power	
plants.	
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in	 regions	 and	 cities	 as	 places	 of	 energy	 transition	 (Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 2010;	
Bulkeley,	Castán	Broto,	and	Maassen	2010;	Hodson	and	Marvin	2010;	Monstadt	
2009).	 Examples	 include	 the	 greening	 of	 cities,	 such	 as	 London	 and	 Freiburg	
(Bulkeley	et	al.	2010;	Hodson,	Marvin,	and	Bulkeley	2013;	Rohracher	and	Späth	
2014);	 high-tech	 and	 low-carbon	 city	 visions,	 such	 as	 Masdar	 City	 near	 Abu	
Dhabi;	 and	 ‘energy	 regions’,	 such	 as	Murau	 in	 Austria	 (Späth	 and	 Rohracher	
2010)	or	Orkney	in	Scotland	(Watts	2009).	These	spaces	of	experimentation	on	
different	scales	can	be	well	aligned	or	in	conflict	with	each	other.		
The	United	Kingdom	is	a	crucial	place	to	understand	novel	emerging	models	of	
energy	 transitions.	 The	 country	 was	 oriented	 to	 become	 a	 global	 leader	 in	
decarbonising	economies	in	the	2000s	(Climate	Change	Act	2008;	DECC	2009).	
While	the	political	ambition	has	faded	in	the	recent	years,	a	particular	approach	
towards	 decarbonising	 the	 energy	 system	 has	 been	 formed	 on	 the	 national	
level.	 This	 is	 a	particular	decarbonisation	pathway	 characterised	by	neoliberal	
market-based	 restructuration,	 big	 technological	 solutions,	 and	 low-carbon	
financial	 engineering.	 The	 United	 Kingdom	 is,	 however,	 far	 from	 a	 singular	
homogenous	 space	of	experimentation	 (Hodson	and	Marvin	2013).	 There	 is	 a	
hotchpotch	 of	 spaces	 of	 experimentation	 on	 various	 scales,	 such	 as	 the	
Electricity	Market	Reform	(EMR)	designed	Westminster,	the	‘low-carbon	Saudi	
Arabia’	of	devolved	Scotland,	and	the	transition	town	of	Totnes	in	Devon.	
Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 at	 the	 juncture	 of	 spaces	 of	 experimentation	 on	 multiple	
geographic	 scales,	 such	 as	 the	making	 of	 Anglesey	 Energy	 Island,	 a	 devolved	
low-carbon	 Wales,	 and	 a	 neoliberal	 low-carbon	 governance	 of	 the	 United	
Kingdom.	 The	 megainvestment	 offers	 a	 unique	 window	 on	 understanding	
sociotechnical	transitions	as	envisioned	differently	across	geographic	scales.	 In	
the	 local	 communities,	 the	 proposed	 investment	 is	 transformational	 in	
rearranging	cultural	patterns,	especially	in	connection	to	Welsh	language	usage,	
and	socioeconomic	infrastructures,	from	road	networks	to	healthcare	provision.	
For	the	community	councils,	the	challenge	is	both	to	cope	with	the	scale	of	the	
investment	 and	 to	 attract	 community	 benefit	 contributions.	 For	 the	 isle	 of	
Anglesey,	 it	marks	a	new	vision	for	the	locality	under	the	label	‘Energy	Island’,	
and	 a	 change	 for	 the	 county	 council	 from	 service	 provision	 to	 project	
management	 in	 partnership.	 For	 the	 recently	 devolved	 Welsh	 Government,	
advancing	 the	Wylfa	 Newydd	 investment	 is	 a	 test	 case	 of	 statecraft	 and	 the	
capability	 of	 knitting	 together	 a	 modern	 nation.	 For	 Britain,	 it	 is	 a	 flagship	
project	of	reindustrialisation	by	attracting	global	investment	in	large-scale	low-
carbon	 infrastructure	 and	 developing	 a	 novel	 neoliberal	 governance	
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arrangement	 based	 on	 the	 partnership	 between	 private	 and	 public	
organisations.	For	the	nuclear	industry,	the	UK	has	been	established	as	a	global	
showcase	for	different	nuclear	designs,	such	as	Hitachi’s	Advance	Boiling	Water	
Reactor	 (ABWR)	 technology,	 where	 a	 successful	 regulatory	 approval	 and	 a	
construction	 on	 time	 and	 budget	 is	 expected	 to	 provide	 ways	 to	 deploy	 the	
technology	 in	 other	 developed	 and	 emerging	 markets.	 These	 spaces	 of	
experimentation	 on	 different	 scales	 are	 intersecting	 in	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
megainvestment,	but	not	without	tensions	between	the	different	visions.	
Among	 these	 spaces	 of	 experimentation,	 the	 Anglesey	 Energy	 Island	 is	
particularly	 intriguing.	 The	 programme	 is	 both	 a	 development	 plan	 for	 the	
county	with	 the	 lowest	Gross	Value	Added	 (GVA)	 in	 the	UK	and	a	governance	
platform	 involving	 private	 and	 public	 sector	 organisations.	 The	 Energy	 Island	
Programme	(EIP)	bundles	together	low-carbon	investments	on	the	island,	such	
as	 a	 tidal	 current	 demonstration	 zone	 near	 Holyhead	 by	 Minesto,	 and	 it	 is	
dominated	 by	 the	 Wylfa	 megaproject.	 The	 programme	 also	 provides	 an	
interface	 between	 local	 and	 regional	 stakeholders,	 from	 local	 education	
providers	 to	 the	 project	 team	 at	 Natural	 Resource	 Wales,	 to	 form	 a	 shared	
vision,	 enhance	 inter-organisational	 communication	 and	 arrange	 activities	
together.	As	a	new	way	of	governing	economic	development,	the	Energy	Island	
was	widely	acclaimed	as	a	best	practice	(CREW	Regeneration	Wales	2014;	LCEE	
2014;	 RTPI	 Cymru	 2013).	 The	 approach	 replicated	 in	 the	 North	Wales	 region	
with	the	establishment	of	the	Snowdonia	Enterprise	Zone,	centred	around	the	
Trawsfynydd	 nuclear	 site,	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 North	 Wales	 Economic	
Ambition	Board.	
The	multifaceted	character	of	 the	megainvestment	across	multiple	geographic	
scales,	however,	calls	for	a	novel	methodological	approach.	This	case	study	is	a	
multi-scalar	ethnography.	The	geographies	of	 the	megainvestment	project	are	
at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 research	 design,	 especially	 the	 differences	 across	
geographic	 scales.	 Therefore	 the	 research	 aims	 to	make	 use	 of	 the	 empirical	
sensitivity	 of	 ethnographic	 research,	 while	 overcoming	 the	 limitations	 of	
traditional	 ethnographies	 associated	 with	 the	 isolation	 of	 a	 bounded	 place	
(Burawoy	2000a;	Gille	and	Ó	Riain	2002;	Marcus	1995)	and	the	overreliance	on	
participant	 observation	 over	 other	methods,	 such	 as	 formal	 interviewing	 and	
document	 analysis	 (Gusterson	 1997).	 Ethnography	 is	 a	 novel	 way	 to	 study	
energy	transitions	(Morton	and	Müller	2016).	This	case	study	of	Wylfa	Newydd	
aims	to	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	spaces	of	experimentations	from	the	
ground.	
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1.3	ENERGY	TRANSITIONS,	GEOGRAPHIES,	AND	POLITICS	
In	the	wake	of	radical	energy	system	transformations	and	climate	change,	there	
is	a	rising	social	science	 interest	 in	energy	research,	a	field	 long	dominated	by	
engineers	 and	 economists	 (Sovacool	 2014).	 The	 study	 of	 transitions	 of	
sociotechnical	systems,	energy	in	particular	(Verbong	and	Loorbach	2012),	 is	a	
burgeoning	 interdisciplinary	 social	 science	 research	 field	 (Foxon	 et	 al.	 2013;	
Geels	 2010,	 2005,	 2004,	 2002;	 Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2010c;	 Markard,	
Raven,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	 Bergh,	 Truffer,	 and	 Kallis	 2011).	 Sociotechnical	
transitions	 are	 (a)	 co-evolutionary,	 (b)	 multi-actor,	 (c)	 long-term	 processes	
resulting	in	(d)	radical	shifts	from	one	configuration	to	another	(e)	on	the	large-
scale	 level	 (Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2010c;	Verbong	 and	 Loorbach	2012:	 7).	
The	fundamental	claim	of	the	academic	subfield	is	that	“transitions	result	from	
the	 interaction	 between	 innovative	 practices	 at	 the	 micro-level,	 incremental	
change	induced	by	actors	who	operate	what	we	call	the	meso-	or	regime-level,	
and	quasi-autonomous	macro-dynamics.”	(Grin	et	al.	2012:	324).	The	interplay	
between	 micro-,	 meso-,	 and	 macro-level	 processes	 is	 central	 to	 transition	
research.	
At	 the	 core	of	 transition	 research	 is	 the	dynamics	of	obduracy	and	 change	of	
technologies	 (Geels	 2002;	 Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2010c;	 Rip	 and	 Kemp	
1998).	 The	 trajectory	 of	 individual	 technologies	 is	 understood	 through	 the	
analysis	 as	 part	 of	 a	 system	 rather	 than	 simply	 through	 technology-specific	
characteristics.	 The	 approach	 is	 rooted	 in	 an	 understanding	 of	 technological	
change	centred	around	 the	concept	of	meso-level	 sociotechnical	 regimes	 that	
provide	 stability,	 while	 radical	 innovations	 emerge	 in	 protective	 micro-level	
niches	 (Rip	 and	 Kemp	 1998).	 The	 relationship	 between	 the	 sociotechnical	
regime	and	niches	 creates	dynamism	between	path-dependence	 (lock-in)	 and	
path	 creation	 (innovation).	 Obduracy	 of	 technologies	 goes	 beyond	 just	
technological	 lock-in	 (Arthur	 1989;	 David	 1985;	 Unruh	 2000),	 it	 also	 contains	
political	 and	 organisational	 commitments	 (Walker	 2000,	 1999)	 and	 dominant	
cultural	 meanings	 and	 expectations	 (Borup	 et	 al.	 2006;	 Brown	 and	 Michael	
2003;	van	Lente	1993;	van	Lente	et	al.	1998).	
There	 are	 three	 more	 or	 less	 coherent	 approaches	 to	 transitions	 (Grin,	
Rotmans,	and	Schot	2010c;	Markard,	Raven,	and	Truffer	2012;	van	den	Bergh,	
Truffer,	and	Kallis	2011):	the	multi-level	perspective	or	MLP	(Geels	2011,	2010,	
2004,	2002),	technological	innovation	systems	or	TIS	(Bergek	et	al.	2015,	2008;	
Carlsson	et	al.	2002;	Jacobsson	and	Bergek	2011),	and	transition	management	
or	TM	(Grin	2010;	Kemp,	Loorbach,	and	Rotmans	2007;	Loorbach	2009,	2007;	
Rotmans,	Kemp,	and	van	Asselt	2001;	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	2010).	The	multi-
level	 perspective	 (MLP)	 is	 particularly	 prominent	 in	 transition	 research.	 The	
	 9	
formal	 analytical	 approach	 provides	 a	 heuristic	 framework	 to	 study	 the	
transitional	dynamics	between	the	micro	or	niche,	meso	or	regime,	and	macro	
or	landscape	levels	(Geels	2010,	2004).	With	regards	to	the	research	project,	it	
is	particularly	useful	in	connecting	micro-,	meso-	and	macro-level	processes	and	
by	 highlighting	 the	 patterns	 of	 stability	 and	 change	 in	 the	 sociotechnical	
regimes,	where	nuclear	power	is	situated	in.	The	regime	is	the	central	concept	
of	 the	 transitions	 literature.	 It	 provides	 the	 stability	 of	 sociotechnical	
configurations	 through	 incremental	 innovations	 (Geels	 2002).	 Regime	 is	 a	
reference	 to	 “semi-coherent	 set	 of	 rules	 carried	 by	 different	 social	 groups”	
(Geels	 2002:	 1260)	 with	 seven	 dimensions:	 “technology,	 user	 practices	 and	
application	domains	(markets),	symbolic	meaning	of	technology,	infrastructure,	
industry	structure,	policy	and	techno-scientific	knowledge.”	(Geels	2002:	1262)	
More	 recently,	 a	 regime	 is	 seen	 as	 being	 constituted	 from	 three	 interrelated	
analytic	dimensions:	sociotechnical	systems,	actors	and	institutions/rules	(Geels	
2004,	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2007,	 2010).	 In	 contrast,	 niches	 provide	 protective	
spaces	 for	 innovation,	 the	 roots	 of	 technological	 change.	 The	 sociotechnical	
landscape	 provides	 the	 wider	 context	 for	 regime	 dynamics,	 from	
macrostructural	factors	to	unanticipated	accidents.	
How	does	the	multi-level	perspective,	the	dominant	analytical	framework	in	the	
blossoming	 field	 of	 transition	 studies,	 resonate	 with	 the	 Wylfa	 new	 nuclear	
project?	 There	 is	 certain	 ambivalence	 in	 applying	 the	 abstract	 analytical	
perspective	 of	 MLP	 to	 the	 empirical	 richness	 provided	 by	 the	 Anglesey	
megainvestment.	 On	 the	 positive	 side,	 the	 MLP	 is	 productive	 in	 drawing	
attention	to	the	dynamic	patterns	of	change	and	obduracy,	the	multiple	levels	
of	 structuration	 in	 sociotechnical	 change,	 together	 with	 the	 manifold	
dimensions	 of	 transition	 from	 technological	 to	 cultural.	On	 the	 negative	 side,	
however,	it	is	difficult	to	squeeze	in	a	substantial	part	of	the	bountiful	questions	
raised	by	the	megainvestment	to	the	neat	MLP	framework.	
The	issues	raised	by	this	multi-scalar	ethnography	of	the	Wylfa	megainvestment	
often	correspond	with	 the	 ‘blind	spots’	of	 transition	research	 identified	 in	 the	
literature	(Geels	2011;	Markard,	Raven,	and	Truffer	2012;	STRN	2010).	First,	the	
conceptualisation	 of	 the	 different	 levels	 is	 fuzzy	 and	 empirically	 problematic,	
particularly	 the	 empirical	 application	 of	 regime	 (Berkhout,	 Smith,	 and	 Stirling	
2004;	 Geels	 2011;	 Holtz,	 Brugnach,	 and	 Pahl-Wostl	 2008;	 Rotmans	 and	
Loorbach	2010;	Shove	2012;	van	der	Vleuten	and	Högselius	2012).	Second,	the	
geographies	 of	 transitions	 have	 been	 neglected	 for	 long,	 and	 issues	 such	 as	
spatial	 embeddedness,	 geographical	 scaling,	 or	 territoriality,	 are	 still	
undertheorised	 (Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	
Truffer,	Murphy,	and	Raven	2015).	Third,	while	there	is	a	recent	uptake	of	the	
politics	of	energy	transitions,	it	still	feels	an	afterthought	without	endeavouring	
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into	the	multidimensionality	and	deep-rootedness	of	the	political	(Avelino	and	
Rotmans	 2009;	 Berkhout,	 Smith,	 and	 Stirling	 2004;	 Geels	 2014;	Meadowcroft	
2011,	2009;	Shove	and	Walker	2007;	Smith,	Stirling,	and	Berkhout	2005;	Smith	
and	 Kern	 2009;	 Stirling	 2014).	 In	 this	 research	 I	 elaborate	 on	 these	 issues	 by	
confronting	 those	 with	 the	 ethnographic	 findings	 about	 the	 megainvestment	
and	 also	 by	 reaching	 to	 the	 conceptual	 frameworks	 provided	 by	 other	
disciplines,	 in	 particular	 human	 geographies	 and	 strands	 of	 science	 and	
technology	studies	(STS,	also	known	as	science,	technology	and	society).	
First,	the	in-depth	ethnographic	approach	challenges	the	analytical	separability	
of	 the	 three	 levels	 by	 highlighting	 the	 difficulties	 of	 defining	 a	 regime	
empirically.	The	research	uses	the	geography	literature	on	scale	to	rethink	the	
nested	 hierarchies	 of	 niche,	 regime	 and	 landscape	 in	 a	 more	 relational	 way	
(Jessop,	 Brenner,	 and	 Jones	 2008;	 Marston	 2000;	 Massey	 2010,	 2005;	
Swyngedouw	 1997).	 Also,	 turning	 the	 attention	 to	 infrastructures	 offers	 new	
ways	of	approaching	scale	as	well	as	change	and	obduracy.	On	this	foundation,	
the	 research	 conceptualises	megainvestments	 by	 embracing	 the	multifaceted	
and	multi-scalar	character	of	Wylfa	Newydd	project	as	shown	in	Chapter	5.	
Second,	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 highlights	 various	 geographic	 aspects	 of	 transitions,	
including	 the	 importance	 of	 landscape,	 the	 spatial	 embeddedness	 of	 nuclear	
power	 in	 the	 locals	 communities,	 the	connections	between	 territorialities	and	
technological	 visions,	 and	 the	 scalar	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 power.	 Human	
geography	 literatures	 contribute	 to	 elaborating	 these	 aspects	 of	 the	
megainvestment	(Barry	2001;	Devine-Wright	2015;	Massey	2010;	Swyngedouw	
1997).	
Third,	 the	 ethnographic	 research	 revealed	 the	 mundane	 politics	 in	 energy	
transitions	 well	 beyond	 the	 grand	 notions	 of	 power	 and	 agency.	 These	
mundane	 aspects	 were	 concentrated	 on	 the	 production	 and	 negotiation	 of	
political	and	expert	knowledge,	or	the	practices	of	public	consultations.	In	these	
regards	 STS	 literatures	 provide	 more	 nuanced	 understandings	 of	 expert	
knowledge	in	governance	(Ezrahi	1990;	Jasanoff	2004;	Wynne	1996,	1992b)	or	
public	participation	practices	(Felt	and	Fochler	2010;	Laurent	2011;	Lezaun	and	
Soneryd	 2007;	 Marres	 2007;	 Marres	 and	 Lezaun	 2011;	 Stirling	 2008)	 with	 a	
sensitivity	 to	 formation	 of	 knowledge,	 the	 entangled	 materialities,	 and	 the	
ingrained	technopolitical	agendas.		
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1.4	RESEARCH	AIM	AND	QUESTIONS	
Based	on	the	above	considerations,	this	study	has	one	overarching	research	aim	
and	three	derived	research	questions.	
The	overarching	research	aim	(subsequently	RA)	is	the	following:	
• To	characterise	the	current	era	of	nuclear	programme	in	the	UK	through	
the	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment.	
There	are	three	research	questions	derived	from	the	research	aim:	
• Research	question	1	(subsequently	RQ1):	 	
How	 is	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 megainvestment	 made	 on	 different	
geographic	scales?	 		
• Research	question	2	(subsequently	RQ2):	 	
How	is	Wylfa	Newydd	governed	as	a	megainvestment	project?	 	
• Research	question	3	(subsequently	RQ3):	 	
How	is	democratic	politics	enacted	in	practice	in	the	public	consultations	
and	engagement	of	Wylfa	Newydd?	 	
The	overall	research	has	been	driven	by	the	above	research	aim,	and	the	thesis	
is	 organised	 around	 answering	 these	 questions.	 The	 research	 aim	 is	 situated	
against	 the	 background	 of	 the	 history	 of	 nuclear	 constructions	 in	 the	 UK.	 A	
diverse	 set	 of	 relevant	 literatures	 is	 identified	 to	 develop	 the	 conceptual	
language	 for	 responding	 to	 the	 above	 questions	 by	 addressing	 the	 strengths	
and	 gaps	 in	 the	 social	 science	 literature	 on	 nuclear	 power	 and	 in	 transition	
studies	in	energy	together	with	insights	from	mainly	human	geography	and	STS	
to	address	these	gaps.	The	methodology	multi-scalar	ethnography	is	introduced	
to	address	the	research	aim.	The	three	research	questions	will	be	covered	in	a	
full	 detailed	 empirical	 chapter	 each	 with	 support	 of	 rich	 fieldwork	 data.	 The	
thesis	will	be	concluded	with	concise	responses	on	the	research	aim	and	each	of	
the	three	research	questions.	
1.5	OVERVIEW	OF	THE	THESIS	
The	 overall	 thesis	 is	 organised	 around	 responding	 to	 the	 above	 research	 aim	
and	the	respective	research	questions.	In	Chapter	2,	I	provide	a	background	of	
the	 case	 study	 by	 outlining	 three	 eras	 of	 nuclear	 constructions	 in	 the	 UK	 in	
interconnection	with	local	histories	on	Anglesey.	The	section	sets	the	scene	for	
the	overall	research	aim	by	characterising	the	current	era	of	megainvestments.	
In	 Chapter	 3,	 I	 provide	 a	 literature	 review	by	outlining	 and	 critically	 engaging	
with	the	social	science	approaches	on	nuclear	power	and	energy	transitions.	In	
reflecting	 on	 the	 blind	 spots	 in	 transitions	 literature,	 the	 politics	 and	
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geographies	of	transitions	in	particular,	I	draw	concepts	from	human	geography	
and	 science	 and	 technology	 studies.	 This	 chapter	 provides	 the	 conceptual	
language	 to	 answer	 the	 three	 research	 questions.	 In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 outline	 the	
methodology	of	the	research	by	using	ethnography	as	a	novel	and	underutilised	
approach	to	understand	energy	transitions	with	a	focus	on	the	multiple	scales	
of	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 megainvestment.	 The	 key	 empirical	 sources	 of	 the	
research	 are	 interviews,	 meetings,	 documents,	 and	 complementary	 sources.	
The	 empirical	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 are	 presented	 in	 Chapters	 5	 to	 7.	 In	
Chapter	 5,	 I	 outline	 the	 different	 places	 and	 scales	 of	 how	Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	
envisioned	 and	made,	 responding	 to	 RQ1.	 I	 highlight	 that	 the	 negotiation	 of	
these	geographies	is	central	to	the	megainvestment.	In	Chapter	6,	I	address	the	
megainvestment	as	a	governance	experiment	changing	how	public	sector	works	
through	 three	 in-depth	 case	 studies,	 from	 the	 County	 Council	 to	 the	 now	
defunct	Department	of	Energy	and	Climate	Chang,	responding	RQ2.	These	case	
studies	highlight	the	importance	of	collaborative	platforms,	the	production	and	
contestation	 of	 specialist	 knowledge,	 and	 the	 shifting	 boundaries	 between	
private	and	public	sector	organisations.	In	Chapter	7,	I	address	how	democracy	
is	practiced	in	the	formal	public	consultations	and	informal	public	engagements	
in	 relation	 to	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 responding	 to	 RQ3.	 I	 outline	 a	 shift	 from	 the	
historical	big	public	inquiries	to	the	current	public	consultations	by	highlighting	
the	fragmentations	of	publics,	the	customisation	of	consultation	events	as	one-
to-one	 sessions,	 and	 the	 ways	 information	 is	 presented	 in	 consultation	
documentations	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 broader	 shift	 of	 local	 engagement	 of	
becoming	 a	 ‘good	 neighbour’.	 In	 Chapter	 8,	 I	 draw	 some	 conclusions	 by	
addressing	the	overall	RA	and	the	three	research	questions,	and	by	highlighting	
the	 limitations	 of	 the	 current	 research	 and	 the	 need	 for	 social	 sciences	 in	
diverse	disciplines	to	deepen	our	understanding	of	megainvestments	in	general.	
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CHAPTER	 2.	HISTORIES	 OF	 THE	UK	NUCLEAR	 INDUSTRY	 AND	
ANGLESEY	
2.1	THE	HISTORY	OF	A	NATIONAL	INDUSTRY	FROM	THE	GROUND	
Wylfa	 Newydd	 defines	 a	 new	 era	 of	 nuclear	 constructions,	 along	 with	 the	
Hinkley	Point	C	and	Moorside	projects.	These	megainvestments	are	taking	place	
in	 very	 different	 contexts	 than	 previous	 nuclear	 constructions.	 This	 sounds	
evident	but	 it	 is	 important	to	highlight	these	differences.	On	Anglesey,	quite	a	
number	 of	 people	 expressed	 similar	 views	 to	 “I	 don’t	 think	 it	 will	 be	 much	
different	from	the	1960s,	the	original	build”	(Interview	31),	probably	with	more	
migrant	workforce	 from	 outside	 the	 British	 Isles	 compared	 to	Wylfa	 A	 in	 the	
1960,	which	was	often	 referred	 as	 “built	 by	 the	 Irish	 [navvies]”	 (Interview	4).	
Similarly,	 much	 of	 the	 anti-nuclear	 activism	 and	 critical	 social	 science	
scholarship	on	nuclear	power	in	the	UK	roots	back	to	the	height	of	the	nuclear	
controversy	around	the	1980s	with	strong	resonances	of	the	themes	from	that	
era,	such	as	the	secretive	and	crony	nuclear	politics	(Cave	and	Rowell	2014)	or	
nuclear	 weapons	 and	 pacifism	 (Cox,	 Johnstone,	 and	 Stirling	 2016;	 Johnstone	
and	Stirling	2015).	While	parallels	can	be	made,	and	I	will	make	in	the	coming	
chapters,	here	I	would	like	to	emphasise	the	differences.	This	chapter	provides	
the	 background	 to	 understand	 the	 overall	 research	 aim	 (RA)	 of	 the	 thesis,	
namely	to	characterise	the	current	era	of	nuclear	programme	in	the	UK	through	
the	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment.	
The	core	of	this	chapter	is	to	characterise	three	different	eras	in	the	intersected	
histories	of	nuclear	power.	The	‘white	heat’	era,	when	the	existing	Wylfa	station	
was	built	in	the	1960s,	was	filled	with	enthusiasm	for	nuclear	power.	The	‘white	
elephant’	 era,	however,	 seemed	 to	many	 the	end	of	nuclear	dream	 in	Britain	
(Helm	2009).	The	contentious	 first	Wylfa	B	proposal,	 for	example,	was	one	of	
the	construction	plans	revoked	in	1989.	The	ongoing	‘white	paper’	era	gradually	
introduced	a	novel	governance	framework	for	a	nuclear	new	build	programme,	
including	 the	 current	 plans	 for	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Energy	 Island	
scheme.	 The	 underlying	 idea	 of	 this	 chapter,	 and	 indeed	 the	 entire	 thesis,	 is	
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that	a	perspective	of	a	 specific	nuclear	 site	enriches	 the	understanding	of	 the	
‘national’	history	of	nuclear	power.	3	
There	are	at	least	three	reasons	why	history	is	crucial	to	understand	the	current	
new	 nuclear	 projects.	 First,	 the	 future	 is	 entrenched	 in	 the	 past,	 not	 just	 in	
technological	systems	(Arthur	1989;	Cowan	1990;	Unruh	2000)	but	also	in	social	
institutions	(Berkhout	2002;	Geels	2004;	Verbong	and	Geels	2007;	Walker	1999)	
and	political	cultures	(Borup	et	al.	2006;	Felt	2015;	Jasanoff	and	Kim	2009).	This	
relationship	 is	 far	 from	 deterministic.	 The	 conceptual	 question	 is	 how	 new	
patterns	emerge.	Second,	 the	comparison	offered	by	previous	eras	of	nuclear	
investment	results	in	a	better	characterisation	of	the	current	era	by	recognising	
the	similarities	and	differences.	Third,	a	historical	overview	offers	an	illustration	
of	 how	 geographic	 scales,	 as	 well	 as	 technological,	 economic,	 cultural	 and	
political	aspects	are	intertwined	
This	characterisation	of	historical	eras	is	not	an	all-encompassing	typology.	The	
three	 eras	 illustrate	 the	 remarkable	 changes	 in	 nuclear	 constructions,	
juxtaposing	 socioeconomic,	 political	 or	 technological	 issues.	 The	 temporal	
boundaries	 between	 the	 eras	 are	 especially	 blurry.	 The	 interwoven	 changes	
leading	from	the	white	heat	to	the	white	elephant	era,	for	example,	took	place	
on	 somewhat	 different	 timescales.	 In	 the	 early	 1980s,	 the	 prospect	 of	
privatising	nuclear	industries	was	hardly	imaginable,	while	anti-nuclear	protests	
had	already	been	there	for	a	few	years,	and	the	reactor	choice	controversy	 in	
the	industry	for	an	even	longer	timescale.	This	typology	reflects	nuclear	power	
construction	programmes.	Some	aspects	of	the	nuclear	 industry,	 like	the	front	
end	 of	 the	 nuclear	 fuel	 cycle	 (e.g.,	 uranium	mining,	 fuel	 fabrication)	 and	 the	
back	 end	 (e.g.,	 decommissioning,	 nuclear	waste,	 reprocessing)	 or	 the	 nuclear	
weapons	industry	feature	less	prominently	in	the	typology.	Other	realms	of	the	
electricity	 industry	 are	 similarly	 out	 of	 scope,	 such	 as	 non-nuclear	 power	
generation,	 or	 changes	 in	 demand	 patterns.	 I	 deliberately	 use	 this	 rather	
innocent	 term	 ‘era’	 to	 highlight	 the	 changing	 sociotechnical	 configurations,	
																																																						
3	This	 chapter	 is	based	on	both	primary	and	secondary	 sources.	National	and	 industry	aspects	are	often	
informed	 by	 secondary	 sources,	 with	 an	 addition	 of	 policy	 papers	 and	 occasionally	 news	 articles,	
memoires,	parliamentary	debates	and	papers,	and	research	interviews.	In	local	histories	I	relied	more	on	
primary	sources,	especially	archival	items	and	research	interviews,	together	with	oral	histories.	In	addition,	
I	also	made	great	use	of	a	 report	and	consultation	on	the	 impact	of	Wylfa	on	the	wider	area	 (Gwynedd	
County	 Council	 1978,	 1976)	 and	 an	 anthropology	 dissertation	 on	 Cemaes	 village	 (Wassink	 1987).	 The	
historiography	on	nuclear	power	and	electricity	in	Britain	generally	focuses	on	decision-making	of	top-level	
politicians,	managers	and	engineers	(Gowing	1974a,	1974b;	Hannah	1982;	Helm	2009;	O’Riordan,	Kemp,	
and	Purdue	1988;	Williams	1980;	Wynne	2011),	and	also	less	often	on	popular	culture	(Hogg	2016;	Hogg	
and	 Laucht	 2012;	 Jolivette	 2014).	 The	 very	 places	 configuring	 histories	 of	 nuclear	 power	 in	 Britain	 are	
often	highlighted,	like	nuclear	sites	(Davies	2012;	Eiser	and	Pligt	1995;	Welsh	1993;	Wynne,	Waterton,	and	
Grove-White	 1993),	 nuclear-free	 cities	 (Hogg	 2015)	 or	 protest	 camps	 (Welsh	 2003).	 Nuclear	 sites	 are	 a	
distinctive	feature	of	the	industry	with	their	mainly	remote	locations.	
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rather	than	a	more	developed	concept,	like	sociotechnical	regime	(Geels	2011,	
2004,	 2002),	 technopolitical	 regime	 (Hecht	 2009),	 or	 simply	 nuclear	 regime	
(Gille	2010,	2007).	Adopting	the	 lens	of	a	more	mature	conceptual	framework	
highlights	additional	richness,	but	also	directs	attention	to	certain	ways.		
This	chapter	outlines	 the	different	eras	of	nuclear	constructions,	and	provides	
some	background	on	the	UK	nuclear	 industry,	Anglesey,	and	the	Wylfa	site.	 In	
section	2.2,	 I	 outline	 the	 short	history	of	electrification	 in	 the	UK	prior	 to	 the	
civil	 nuclear	 programme.	 In	 the	 subsequent	 section,	 I	 briefly	 characterise	
Anglesey	 as	 a	 place,	 especially	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Cemaes	 area	 before	 the	
Wylfa	 construction.	 The	 meat	 of	 this	 chapter	 comes	 in	 sections	 2.4	 to	 2.6	
describing	 the	 three	 historical	 eras	 of	 nuclear	 investments	 in	 the	 UK	
respectively.	 The	 three	 sections	 are	 structured	of	 three	 subsections	 sketching	
the	 ‘national’	 contexts,	 the	 domestic	 nuclear	 industry	 settings,	 and	 lastly	 a	
picture	of	Anglesey	and	the	site	in	the	respective	era.	Section	2.4	discusses	the	
‘white	heat’	era	of	nuclear	power	with	special	focus	to	the	construction	of	the	
current	 Wylfa	 nuclear	 plant.	 Section	 2.5	 sketches	 the	 ‘white	 elephant’	 era,	
especially	 the	controversies	around	 the	proposed	Wylfa	B	 station.	Section	2.6	
introduces	us	to	the	current	‘white	papers’	era,	including	some	background	for	
the	Wylfa	Newydd	proposal	on	Anglesey.	In	the	final	section	2.7,	I	make	some	
conclusions	by	summarising	the	key	characteristics	of	the	three	eras.	
2.2	BUILDING	 THE	BACKBONE	OF	A	NATION:	FROM	STREETLIGHTS	 TO	A	NATIONAL	
INDUSTRY	(1870S-1950S)	
‘In	reproaching	“traditional	history”,	Paul	Valéry	has	cited	“the	conquest	
of	 the	 earth”	 by	 electricity,	 as	 an	 example	 of	 one	 of	 those	 “notable	
phenomena”	 which	 it	 neglects,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 have	 “more	
meaning	and	greater	possibilities	of	shaping	our	immediate	future	than	
all	political	events	combined”.’	
(Marc	Bloch	in	1941,	cited	among	others	by	Weightman,	2011:	ix)	
“The	differences	found	in	the	evolving	regional	[electricity]	systems	–	the	
essence	of	style	–	stemmed	mostly	from	the	nontechnological	factors	of	
the	 cultural	 context.	 These	 differences	 and	 their	 causes	 need	 to	 be	
emphasised	because	they	are	often	overlooked	in	our	era,	which	tends	to	
advocate	 a	 superior,	 advanced	 technology	 –	 “the	 best	 way”	 –	 a	 way	
what	transcends	regional	and	national	differences.”	
(Hughes	1993:	405)	
The	classic	book	of	Hughes	(1993)	reveals	that	electrification	wasn’t	simply	an	
expansion	 of	 electricity	 systems,	 but	 a	 history	 of	 different	ways	 of	 electricity	
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provision	 (and	use).	 In	 the	previous	 chapter,	 I	 noted	 that	 the	 cornerstones	of	
our	current	electricity	system	are	not	taken	for	granted	but	historically	formed.	
The	 history	 of	 electrification	 in	 Britain	 provides	 reminders	 for	 both	 historical	
momentariness	and	entrenchment.	Electricity	provision	is	not	taken	for	granted	
but	difficult	to	change.	This	section	provides	an	overview	of	the	history	of	how	
the	 foundations	 of	 a	 national	 electricity	 system	 were	 laid	 down,	 which	 was	
suitable	for	large-scale	nuclear	generation.	
The	 industrial	 revolution	was	 fuelled	by	coal	 (Mitchell	2013).	For	much	of	 the	
18th	 century,	 electricity	 was	 a	 curiosity	 of	 a	 handful	 of	 scientists-inventors,	
sometimes	 dazzling	 the	 public	 through	 dramatic	 displays.	 At	 least	 22	 people	
patented	the	incandescent	light	bulb	before	Thomas	Edison	in	1878	(Friedel	and	
Israel	1987),	but	he	was	the	first	 to	design	a	system	of	 lighting	 (Hughes	1993:	
21).	 Soon,	many	municipalities	 adopted	electric	 streetlight	 systems	 to	 replace	
over-priced	 gas	 light	monopolies,	 but	 the	 bubble	 collapsed	 in	 a	 few	 years	 as	
investors	pulled	out	(Weightman	2011:	56).	
The	 ‘war	of	 currents’	wasn’t	 simply	 a	 technical	 choice	between	alternate	 and	
direct	current	(AC	and	DC)	to	be	standardised.	It	was	rather	a	‘war	of	systems’	
between	two	fundamentally	distinct	ways	of	electricity	provision,	centralised	or	
universal	electricity	systems	(Hughes	1993).	Two	rival	systems	evolved	parallel	
to	 each	 other,	 most	 intensely	 in	 the	 late	 1880s.	 In	 London,	 for	 example,	
centralised	DC	and	universal	AC	electricity	systems	existed	simultaneously	well	
into	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 (Hughes,	 1983:	 81),	 “AC	 was	 for	 large	
numbers	 of	 not	 so	 well-off	 customers,	 DC	 for	 compact	 wealthy	 districts.”	
(Weightman,	 2011:	 74).	 The	 first	 station	 on	 Anglesey	 in	 1906	 was	 also	 DC,	
providing	250	kW	power	to	light	up	the	streets	and	wealthy	homes	of	Holyhead	
(Richards	1972:	147).	
In	 1914,	 the	 ‘second	 industrial	 revolution’,	 powered	 by	 electricity,	 was	 well	
underway	in	industrialised	Berlin	and	Chicago,	while	61%	of	the	electricity	was	
still	 used	 for	 lighting	 in	 London	 (Hughes,	 1983:	 260).	 Gradually,	 however,	
streetcars	transformed	British	cityscapes	and	electricity	became	widely	used	by	
industry	machinery.	Also,	the	municipal,	often	single-station,	electricity	systems	
were	gradually	 integrated	 into	regional	networks.	 In	1931,	 for	example,	North	
Wales	 Power	 Company	 was	 formed	 connecting	 Holyhead,	 Menai	 Bridge,	
Llangefni,	 Amlwch	 and	 Cemaes	 through	 an	 overhead	 line	 across	 Anglesey	
(Richards	1972:	147).	
The	 National	 Grid	 was	 established	 in	 the	 late	 1930s	 after	 a	 series	 of	
unsuccessful	efforts.	It	was	part	of	the	complete	reorganisation	of	the	industry,	
including	standardising	voltage,	establishing	a	strong	regulator,	and	bringing	the	
often	parallel	but	unconnected	lighting	and	power	systems	to	an	end.	Between	
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1919	 and	 1935,	 the	 portion	 of	 electrified	 households	 rose	 from	 6%	 to	 70%	
(Hannah	 1979:	 304).	 The	 ideal	 of	 the	 ‘all-electric	 house’,	 however,	 remained	
unfulfilled	for	a	few	more	decades:	most	working	class	families	used	electricity	
only	for	lighting,	ironing,	and	later	listening	to	the	radio	(Weightman,	2011).	
The	post-war	nationalisation	of	the	electricity	industry	in	1947	inscribed	a	novel	
industrial	ethos.	It	marked	a	radical	expansion	of	the	industry,	both	in	terms	of	
rural	electrification	programme	and	 the	widespread	use	of	electric	 appliances	
(Weightman	 2011).	On	Anglesey,	 all	 farms	 and	 small	 villages	 (Richards	 1972),	
like	Llanfechell	(Interview	8),	were	electrified	by	the	1960s.	The	everyday	lives	
in	the	remote	corners	of	the	island	became	part	of	a	national	infrastructure.	
As	 the	 nationalised	 electricity	 industry	was	 formed	 among	dramatic	 publicity,	
the	 nuclear	 weapons	 industry	 was	 established	 in	 extreme	 secrecy.	 After	
decades-long	 scientific	 fascination	with	 radiation	and	 ‘the	atom’	 (Willis	1995),	
Hiroshima	 and	 Nagasaki	 was	 a	 turning	 point.	 Nuclear	 facilities	 were	 set	 up,	
staffed	 by	 the	 sidelined	 British	 scientists	 in	 the	 Manhattan	 Project,	 and	
bolstered	 by	 the	 Cabinet’s	 geopolitical	 aspirations	 (Gowing,	 1974a,	 1974b;	
Hennessy,	2003).	The	civil	nuclear	programme	was	established	a	decade	after	
the	start	of	the	military	programme.	
In	 summary,	 this	 short	 history	 is	 a	 reminder	 that	 some	 of	 the	 core	
characteristics	 of	 electricity,	 which	we	 tend	 to	 think	 of	 as	 taken	 for	 granted,	
represent	 a	 historical	 stage,	 thus	 subject	 to	 change.	 The	 historically	 changing	
characteristics	 of	 the	 electricity	 systems	 include	 the	 very	 use	 (e.g.,	 scientific	
curiosity,	 system	 of	 lighting,	 electric	 devices),	 the	 geographic	 pattern	 (e.g.,	
municipality,	nation),	 the	social	organisation	 (e.g.,	municipal	 socialism,	private	
entrepreneurship),	and	the	materialised	cultural	ideas	(e.g.,	modernity,	national	
identity).	 Large	 baseload	 power	 stations,	 like	 current	 nuclear	 designs,	 fit	 to	
certain	kinds	of	electricity	provision.	
Sociotechnical	 change	 is	 often	 also	 geographical,	 not	 just	 temporal.	 To	
understand	 the	 coming	 of	 the	 ‘atomic	 age’	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 first	
Wylfa	station,	 it	 is	crucial	to	characterise	Anglesey	as	a	place	and	 its	histories.	
Anglesey	 provides	 a	 background	 to	 appreciate	 the	 changes	 with	 the	 first	
nuclear	power	programme.	Before	moving	to	sketch	the	first	white	heat	era	of	
nuclear	constructions	in	Britain,	therefore,	 I	sketch	Anglesey	as	a	place	and	its	
histories	before	the	power	plant.	 	
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2.3	ANGLESEY,	MOTHER	OF	WALES	
	“The	fieldwork	gave	colour	to	the	documents	I	have	read	in	advance.	[…]	
When	actually	 taking	 the	bus	on	 the	narrow	 roads	of	North	Anglesey	 I	
realised	 what	 change	 the	 new	 transport	 infrastructure	 for	 the	 [Wylfa	
Newydd]	 construction	 means,	 why	 these	 associated	 investments	 were	
discussed	 so	 much	 in	 length	 in	 the	 council	 documents.	 Similarly,	 I	
understood	more	why	 job	 creation	 is	 both	 an	 opportunity	 to	 keep	 the	
young	 people	 on	 the	 island,	 especially	 the	 ones	who	 are	 talented	 and	
have	 an	 affinity	 towards	 technical	 issues,	 and	 a	 challenge	 to	 their	
everyday	 life	 and	 identity	 by	 potentially	 accommodating	 even	 a	 few	
thousand	non-Welsh	speaking	construction	workers	in	this	remote	area.	
Needless	to	say,	the	Welsh	language	issue	was	also	very	evident.	Not	to	
mention	among	these	everyday	experiences	that	how	fascinated	 I	have	
become	 with	 the	 island	 from	 the	 very	 first	 moment	 I	 approached	 the	
area	first	by	train	to	Bangor,	then	by	bus	through	Menai	Bridge.	I	got	a	
sense	about	the	cultural-economic	geography	of	the	island.	The	well-off	
suburban	 feeling	 of	 the	Menai	 Bridge	 area,	 the	 in-betweenness	 of	 the	
market	 town	 Llangefni,	 a	 segment	 of	 an	 imperial	 and	 military	 British	
state	enclaved	in	[Royal	Air	Force	base]	RAF	Valley,	the	ambiguity	(both	
well-connected	 and	 lonely)	 of	 the	 post-industrial	 and	 commercial	
Holyhead,	the	community	spirit	and	dynamic	tourism	heritage	of	Cemaes	
Bay,	 the	 little	 depressiveness	 of	 Amlwch,	 and	 the	 obvious	 charm	 and	
character	of	small	inland	farms	and	tiny	coastal	villages.”	
Field	notes	from	my	preparatory	visit	to	Anglesey,	17-20	March	2014	
The	isle	of	Anglesey,	or	Ynys	Môn,	is	situated	on	the	northwest	fringe	of	Wales,	
separated	from	the	mainland	by	the	narrow	Menai	Straits,	against	the	backdrop	
of	the	mountain	ranges	of	Snowdonia.	In	March	2014,	upon	my	first	visit,	I	was	
following	the	footsteps	of	thousands	of	passengers	accessing	the	island	across	
the	Menai	Suspension	Bridge.	The	picturesque	bridge	was	built	in	the	1820s	to	
make	connection	easier	with	Ireland	by	avoiding	the	dangerous	ferry	crossing	of	
the	 Straits.	 Looking	 at	 the	 histories	 of	 the	 island	 both	 before	 and	 after	 the	
construction,	 remoteness	 has	 been	 a	 recurring	 feature,	 with	 interwoven	
patterns	of	isolation	from	the	mainland	and	connectedness	to	the	sea.	
All	places	have	histories,	what	makes	Anglesey	different?	Even	small	villages	on	
the	 island,	 like	 Cemaes	 or	 Llanfechell,	 have	 their	 own	 local	 history	 societies.	
There	is	something	more	behind	the	local	stories	told	to	me	during	my	stay,	or	
the	 plethora	 of	 available	 local	 history	 books,	 both	 in	 Welsh	 and	 English.	
Anglesey	 doesn’t	 just	 have	 histories,	 but	 the	 island	 lives	 in	 its	 past.	 Standing	
stones	(menhirs)	across	the	green	ripple	of	fields	mark	the	once	stronghold	of	
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Celtic	druids,	and	shipwrecks	along	the	rocky	coast	the	trade	connections	across	
the	 Atlantic.	 The	 island	 has	 played	 a	 key	 part	 in	 Welsh	 history	 as	 the	
breadbasket	of	the	country	since	at	least	the	12th	century	Kingdom	of	Gwynedd.	
Hence	 its	 name,	 Môn	 Mam	 Cymru,	 or	 Anglesey	 Mother	 of	 Wales.	 The	
remainders	 of	 the	 historical	 windmills	 are	 still	 important	 features	 of	 the	
landscape.	There	were	at	 least	49	of	them	in	the	19th	century.	Currently	there	
are,	 rather,	 sheep	 grazing	 around	 the	 green	 fields,	 dotted	 by	 boulders	 and	
outcrops.	 While	 Anglesey	 is	 still	 dominantly	 rural,	 it	 is	 a	 diverse	 landscape.	
There	 are	 small	 industrial	 towns,	 like	 Holyhead	 port	 or	 Amlwch,	 the	 once	
copper	 town.	 Also,	 several	 villages	 have	 become	 seaside	 resorts	 with	 many	
retirees;	Benllech	or	Trearddur	Bay	can	easily	be	called	“Liverpool-on-Sea”.	
Cemaes	 is	 a	 village	 in	 one	 of	 the	 sheltered	 harbours	 on	 the	 rugged	 northern	
coast	 of	 the	 island.	 Before	 the	 power	 station	 coming,	 it	 was	 similar	 to	 other	
coastal	villages	on	the	island	(Senior	2007:	141).	In	my	conversations,	a	‘pattern	
of	life’	or	‘way	of	life’	in	the	area	before	the	power	station	was	often	called	to	
mind.	These	 reminiscences,	 together	with	memories	of	places,	characters	and	
stories	are	part	of	everyday	discussion,	and	subjects	of	the	meetings	of	the	local	
history	society	at	the	Village	Hall	and	posts	of	the	‘Cemaes	Bay	in	days	gone	by’	
Facebook	 group4,	 having	 almost	 as	 many	 members	 as	 the	 village	 itself.	 This	
cultivated	memory	of	the	pattern	of	life	is	crucial	in	how	the	construction	of	the	
current	 Wylfa	 plant	 is	 remembered	 in	 the	 communities,	 and	 also	 how	
expectations	are	formed	about	the	current	new	build	project	as	well.	In	one	of	
my	 interviews,	 a	 reverend	 and	 local	 historian	 recalled	 the	 village	 before	 the	
construction:	
	“I	can	go	back	enough	to	remember	Cemaes	without	the	power	station.	
[…]	A	 small	 little	village,	a	 fishing	village,	 right	by	 the	 sea.	Most	of	 the	
people	would	have	little	boats	and	if	not	a	boat	a	fishing	rod,	because	it	
was	 a	 fishing	 [village].	 People	 in	 the	 old	 days	 used	 to	 live	 on	 that	
[fishing].	Another	aspect	to	the	village	and	to	the	life	of	the	community	
was	the	small	 farmers.	Small	 farms	[were]	 the	old	pattern	 in	Anglesey.	
Little	farms	of	up	to	40	acres	where	a	man	and	his	family	could	live	on	
them.	That	was	the	pattern	of	the	 life	of	 the	villages,	and	Cemaes	was	
the	 same.	 The	 centre	 of	 the	 community	would	 be	 the	 church	 and	 the	
chapels.	Life	would	turn	around	these	establishments.	And	going	back	a	
100	 years,	 religion	was	 the	main	 thing	 in	 these	 little	 villages.	 Another	
centre	was	 the	 community	 centre,	what	 they	 call	 the	Village	Hall.	And	
Cemaes	was	very	fortunate.	One	of	the	people,	David	Hughes	of	Wylfa	
[Manor]	who	went	to	Liverpool	and	made	a	fortune,	and	he	presented	
																																																						
4	It	has	recently	been	renamed	’Cemaes	Bay	–	Yesterday,	Today,	Forever!’.	
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his	village	with	a	Village	Hall.	That	was	another	centre	of	communities	of	
the	people.	That	was	the	pattern,	that	was	the	life	of	the	village.	In	1962	
the	nuclear	power	station	was	built	here.	
MF:	What	activities	were	in	the	Village	Hall?	
All	sorts	of	activities.	During	the	summer,	[there	were]	dances,	because	
there	 would	 be	 visitors.	 [Hosting	 visitors]	 was	 another	 activity	 of	 the	
village	by	the	sea,	the	beach	would	be	full	of	visitors	for	the	summer.	All	
sort	 of	 activities	 and	 entertainments	 were	 arranged	 for	 them.	 One	 of	
them,	the	main	one,	would	be	dance.	There	were	also	arrangements	in	
the	chapels	to	have	an	English	service,	especially	 for	these	visitors.	 […]	
That	was	the	 life.	There	were	small	builders,	 joiners	and	all	 the	rest	of	
them,	 but	 it	 was	 a	 very-very	 small	 community.	 And	 a	 very	 close	 one,	
everybody	knew	one	another,	depend	on	one	another.”	(Interview	1)	
This	 pattern	 of	 village	 life	 turned	 upside	 down	 with	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
power	plant	(Gwynedd	County	Council	1976;	Wassink	1987).	These	histories	of	
the	place,	however,	are	still	 ingrained	 in	discussions,	materialised	by	artifacts,	
evoked	in	the	talks	of	the	local	history	society	and	exhibited	in	the	community	
centre.	During	my	fieldwork,	for	example,	events	in	the	village	and	elsewhere	–	
from	the	Cemaes	carnival	to	the	Anglesey	(Agricultural)	Show	and	the	national	
Eisteddfod	–	were	reminders	of	these	old	Welsh	patterns	of	life.	This	section	is	
not	 just	about	 this	 romanticised	past,	but	also	highlighting	how	Anglesey	as	a	
place	is	changing,	interconnected	and	diverse.	Anglesey	is	a	place	that	has	both	
connected	 and	 isolated	 by	 the	 sea	 over	 the	 history	 in	 manifold	 ways.	 These	
histories	 of	 the	 place	 are	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 transformation	 the	
construction	of	the	power	plant	meant	for	these	sleepy	North	Anglesey	villages.	
2.4	WHITE	HEAT	TRANSFORMING	THE	FRINGE	OF	BRITAIN	(1950S-1970S)	
“[The	ongoing	scientific	and	technological]	 revolution	cannot	become	a	
reality	 unless	 we	 are	 prepared	 to	 make	 far-reaching	 changes	 in	
economic	 and	 social	 attitudes	 which	 permeate	 our	 whole	 system	 of	
society.	The	Britain	 that	 is	going	 to	be	 forged	 in	 the	white	heat	of	 this	
revolution	 will	 be	 no	 place	 for	 restrictive	 practices	 and	 outdated	
methods	on	either	side	of	the	industry.”	
Speech	 opening	 the	 Science	 debate	 of	 the	 [Labour]	 Party’s	 Annual	
Congress,	Scarborough,	1963	(Wilson	1964:	27,	emphasis	added)	
“But	suddenly	there	came	a	change.	[…]	The	next	[nuclear	power	station	
in	 historic	 Gwynedd]	 will	 go	 up	 in	 Anglesey,	 in	 sight	 of	 the	 old	 Parys	
copper	mine.	By	man’s	invention,	the	whole	region	is	transfigured.	
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‘A	 minor	 industrial	 revolution	 is	 under	 way	 in	 Gwynedd’,	 said	 Mr.	
Goronwy	Roberts,	M.P.	to	the	pupils	of	Botwnnog	School	recently.	‘Soon	
about	2,000	jobs	need	to	be	filled	in	the	various	new	industries	which	are	
coming	here	[…]’.”	
Leaflet	for	the	‘Pattern	of	power’	public	exhibitions	about	the	proposed	
Wylfa	power	plant,	21	May	1962	(CEGB	1962).	
At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 famous	 ‘white	 heat’	 speech	 of	 the	 four-times	 British	 PM	
Harold	Wilson,	 half	 of	 the	 world’s	 nuclear	 power	 generating	 capacity	 was	 in	
Britain	 (IAEA	 2016).	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 largest	 nuclear	
power	 station	of	 its	 time	started	on	a	 remote	Welsh	 island.	The	Wylfa	power	
station	 wasn’t	 simply	 transformative	 for	 the	 island,	 but	 it	 also	 marks	 a	
distinctive	era	in	Britain.	
Nuclear	power	wasn’t	 just	a	technology,	 it	was	definitive	for	the	‘Atomic	Age’.	
At	 least	 since	 the	 opening	 of	 first	 commercial	 nuclear	 station	 in	 the	world	 at	
Calder	Hall	in	1956,	nuclear	power	was	a	symbol	of	the	ultimate	triumph	of	the	
capability	 of	 mankind,	 and	 thus	 a	 source	 of	 inevitable	 progress	 (Atomic	
Achievement	 1956).	 By	 the	 time	 of	 constructing	Wylfa,	 probably	 some	 of	 the	
naïve	and	excessive	idealism	about	the	Atomic	Age	had	faded	away,	but	it	was	
definitely	 an	 era	 of	 optimism	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 being	 on	 the	 way	 to	 a	 more	
prosperous	 world	 via	 the	 advancement	 of	 technology.	 The	 ‘white	 heat	 of	
technological	 revolution’	 resonated	 with	 this	 atmosphere,	 well	 beyond	 the	
Labour	 Party.	 This	 message	 about	 nuclear	 power	 was	 echoed	 in	 the	 public	
exhibitions	in	London	(Forgan	2003),	as	well	as	the	coming	transformations	on	
the	fringes	of	Britain,	on	Anglesey.	
This	chapter	outlines	the	white	heat	era	of	nuclear	constructions.	In	the	coming	
subsection	2.4.1,	I	address	how	the	first	nuclear	programme	was	decided	in	the	
top	echelons	of	government	and	nationalised	 industries.	 In	 subsection	2.4.2,	 I	
describe	the	atmosphere	of	the	construction	of	the	Wylfa	A	station.	In	the	final	
subsection	 2.4.3,	 I	 address	 the	 transformation	 in	 the	 area	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	
construction.	
2.4.1	THE	FIRST	PROGRAMME	OF	NUCLEAR	POWER	FROM	BEHIND	THE	SCENES	
“In	the	energy	sector,	for	much	of	the	post-war	period,	the	‘white	heat	of	
technology’	meant	nuclear	power.”	
(Helm	2009:	23)	
Wylfa	was	the	last	Magnox	design	nuclear	power	station.	The	already	ambitious	
plan	 to	 build	 1700	 MW	 nuclear	 capacity	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1965,	 set	 out	 by	 A	
Programme	of	Nuclear	Power	(UK	Ministry	of	Fuel	and	Power	1955),	trebled	in	
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two	years	time	to	5000-6000	MW	partly	in	response	to	the	Suez	Crisis	(Hannah	
1982:	181;	UK	Ministry	of	Power	1960).	
The	 picture	 behind	 the	 closed	 doors	 of	 government	 and	 boards	 of	 national	
industries	was,	however,	sometimes	at	odds	with	the	façade	of	the	Atomic	Age	
shown	 to	 the	 public.	 There	 was	 a	 bitter	 infighting	 in	 the	 higher	 echelons	 of	
politics	and	industry	about	the	scale,	and	later	also	about	the	reactor	design	of	
the	 proposed	 nuclear	 power	 station	 deployment	 (Hannah	 1982).	 The	
programme	grew	out	from	the	atomic	weapons	establishment.	The	UK	Atomic	
Energy	 Authority	 (UKAEA),	 responsible	 for	 the	 overall	 design	 of	 the	 reactors,	
was	 the	 primary	 driver	 behind	 an	 ambitious	 plan	 to	 construct	 nuclear	 power	
plans.	The	Central	Electricity	Generating	Board	(CEGB),	however,	together	with	
the	Treasury,	repeatedly	aimed	to	slow	down	the	programme.5	Magnox	nuclear	
power	 stations	under	development	were	2.5	 to	 4	 times	more	expensive	 than	
conventional	coal-fired	power	stations	(Hannah	1982).	
To	 establish	 the	 construction	 capabilities	 for	 this	 ambitious	 programme,	
eventually	 five	 consortia	 were	 established,	 consisting	 of	 manufacturing	
companies	 specialised	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 plants	 (Wearne	 2015;	Wearne	
and	 Bird	 2010).	 As	 a	 result,	 almost	 each	Magnox	 station	 has	 an	 idiosyncratic	
design	reflecting	the	learning	process	of	the	constructing	consortium.	Thus	the	
Magnox	 programme	 fell	 short	 of	 the	 expected	 cost	 improvements	 with	 the	
scaling	 up,	 and	 lagging	 behind	 the	 initial	 targets	 (Wearne	 2015;	Wearne	 and	
Bird	 2010).	 With	 the	 lack	 of	 orders,	 a	 bitter	 rivalry	 started	 between	 the	
consortia.	In	the	case	of	the	last	of	the	station	in	the	programme	Wylfa,	a	fierce	
debate	in	the	House	of	Lords	Nationalised	Industries	Committee	emerged	after	
CEGB	didn’t	contract	the	struggling	United	Power	Companies	(UPC),	which	was	
widely	 seen	 as	 the	weakest	 among	 the	 consortia	 (HoL	Debate	 1963;	 see	 also	
Williams	 1980:	 99-102).	 As	 problems	 persisted	 in	 the	 subsequent	 second	
nuclear	 programme	 (UK	Ministry	 of	 Power	 1964),	 with	 Advanced	 Gas-cooled	
Reactor	 (AGR)	 deployed	 mainly	 in	 the	 1970s,	 the	 number	 of	 consortia	 was	
gradually	 reduced	 to	 one	 through	 mergers	 and	 bankruptcy	 (Hannah	 1982;	
Williams	1980).	
	 	
																																																						
5	The	nuclear	programmes	of	 France	 (G.	Hecht	2009),	 the	Soviet	Union	 (Josephson	2005;	 Schmid	2015),	
and	 other	 countries,	 resulted	 in	 similar	 conflicts	 between	 the	 electricification	 programme	 of	 national	
utility	companies	and	the	nuclear	reactor	building	ambitions	of	the	military-rooted	nuclear	establishment.	
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2.4.2	BUILDING	A	NUCLEAR	CATHEDRAL	
The	size	of	Magnox	reactors	were	scaled	up	to	reach	greater	efficiency	in	rather	
big	 steps.	While	 Calder	Hall	 reactors	 produced	only	 60	MWe	after	 their	 1956	
construction	 (later	 reduced	 to	 50	MWe),	Wylfa	 was	 planned	 to	 produce	 595	
MW	 in	 each	 reactor	 (it	 was	 reduced	 to	 only	 420	 before	 operation	 started	 in	
1973	due	to	corrosion	problems,	but	later	increased	to	490	MWe).	This	was	an	
unprecedented	 scale	 at	 the	 time.	 The	 documentary	 A	 Nuclear	 Cathedral	
(Nuclear	 Cathedral	 1968)	 depicts	 the	 tremendous	 size	 of	 the	 construction.	 At	
least	half	a	dozen	cranes	around	the	vast	structures,	where	thousands	of	tonnes	
of	concrete	and	steel	was	built	in.	
During	 the	 peak	 construction	 time,	 2600	 people	 worked	 on	 site	 (Gwynedd	
County	 Council,	 1976:	 21;	 see	 also	Wassink,	 1987).	 In	 addition	 to	 about	 750	
locals	 (The	 Times	 1965),	 it	 was	 mainly	 transient	 workforce,	 many	 relocating	
from	previous	nuclear	constructions,	particularly	Sizewell	A	in	Sussex	(Interview	
11)	 and	 Trawsfynydd	 in	 Gwynedd	 (Gwynedd	 County	 Council	 1976).	 Locally,	
Wylfa	is	often	remembered	to	be	“built	by	the	Irish”	navvies	(Interview	4,	31).	
Many	 construction	 workers	 lived	 in	 the	 work	 camp	 on	 site.	 Some	 stayed	
elsewhere	 in	 the	 area	 in	 caravans,	 and	 in	 commercial	 or	 private	 rented	
accommodation.		
It	was	a	hard	but	well-paid	work.	The	workday	for	many	sub-contractors	started	
at	8	am	on	site	and	finished	at	6.15	pm	with	a	45	min	lunch	break.	Every	second	
weekend	they	worked	both	days	from	8	am	until	3.45	pm	(“Working	Hours	for	
Sub-Contractors”	n.d.).	Pictures	from	the	construction	reveal	that	workers	often	
worked	on	vertiginous	heights	without	any	protection,	like	a	safety	harness	or	a	
helmet.	 During	 the	 construction	 several	 fatalities	 happened. 6 	Industrial	
relations	had	key	importance	during	the	construction	(Gwynedd	County	Council	
1976;	 Nuclear	 Cathedral	 1968).	 The	 social	 life	 of	 the	 workers	 was	 primarily	
organised	around	the	unions.	Also,	churches	and	chapels	played	an	 important	
part.	 The	 Irish	 Catholic	 chaplain	 Father	 Taaffe	 addressing	 his	 congregation	 in	
the	back	of	the	pub	was	particularly	 inscribed	in	 local	memory	(e.g.,	 Interview	
34).		
	 	
																																																						
6	The	exact	number	is	ambiguous,	while	an	anniversary	article	(Daily	Post	2010)	mentions	6,	Interview	35	
insists	on	10	deaths	on	site.	
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2.4.3	BRINGING	MODERNITY	TO	THE	FRINGE	
“There	 could	 be	 no	 better	 symbolic	 link	 between	 the	 pomp	 of	 the	
medieval	past	and	the	human	hopes	for	a	brighter	 future	based	on	the	
peaceful	harnessing	of	the	world’s	destructive	potential.”	
(WM	2344/27	Newspaper	cutting:	Prince	of	Wales	possibly	open	Wylfa	
(late	1960s)	
	
“Workers	paid	 in	cash	at	 the	end	of	 the	week,	on	Friday	or	Saturday	–	
the	village	[Cemaes]	was	like	a	Wild	West	town,	people	drunk	and	fight,	
and	people	step	over	each	other	on	the	pavement.”	
(Interview	8)	
Wylfa	 power	 plant	 was	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 industrialisation	 programme	 of	 rural	
northwest	Wales.	It	responded	to	the	decline	of	small-scale	agriculture,	fishing	
and	 traditional	 industries,	 like	 brick	 and	 cloth	 (Pretty	 2005)	 on	Anglesey,	 and	
slate	 quarrying	 in	Gwynedd.	 The	whole	 region	 faced	unemployment	 and	out-
migration	with	 the	 lack	of	major	 employers.	 CEGB	was	 the	 largest	 investor	 in	
Britain	 at	 the	 time.	 In	 Snowdonia,	 the	 flagship	major	 industrial	 constructions	
were	Dinorwig	pumped	hydro	and	Trawsfynydd	nuclear	stations.	On	Anglesey,	a	
Special	Development	area	at	the	time,	Wylfa	was	constructed	around	the	same	
time	as	Anglesey	Aluminium	plant	on	the	outskirts	of	Holyhead.	The	aluminium	
smelter	 location	was	 established	with	 the	 prospect	 of	 using	 cheap	 electricity	
generated	by	Wylfa	via	direct	transmission	cable	connection.	
Local	 councils	were	keen	on	 these	 investments	but	were	only	 informed	when	
decisions	were	 taken.	 Carnarvonshire	 Council	 was	 disappointed,	 for	 example,	
when	 it	 was	 informed	 by	 the	 CEGB	 Northern	 Project	 Group	 that	 Wylfa	 on	
Anglesey	was	chosen	as	the	second	nuclear	station	site	in	North	Wales	over	the	
previously	preferred	Edern	site	on	the	Llŷn	Peninsula	(Carnarvonshire	Borough	
Council	1960).	Despite	the	overall	support,	however,	these	major	construction	
projects	 faced	 some	 objections	 from	 a	 rather	 unexpected	 direction.	 Recently	
established	amenity	bodies,	 like	the	Countryside	Council	or	the	National	Parks	
Commission,	 articulated	 concerns	 of	 ‘spoiling	 the	 countryside’	 by	 major	
industrial	 works.	 It	 was	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 SuperGrid	 expansion	 and	 power	
station	construction	plans	of	CEGB	in	various	localities	across	the	UK.	It	sparked,	
however,	 only	 a	 moderate	 debate	 over	 the	 above	 programme	 schemes,	
especially	 about	 Wylfa.	 The	 three-day	 public	 inquiry	 in	 Amlwch	 and	 the	
subsequent	public	exhibition	seemed	to	be	rather	an	afterthought	with	modest	
local	interest.	The	decision	was	already	made	in	Whitehall	and	CEGB	offices.	
The	 construction	 was	 an	 enormous	 transformation	 for	 the	 immediate	 area.	
Financially,	 in	 the	 peak	 year	 of	 construction	 alone,	 approximately	 £7.8m	 (at	
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mid-1974	 prices)	 was	 spent	 just	 on	 wages	 and	 salaries,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
approximately	 £1.7m	additional	 income	generated	 in	other	 sectors	 (Gwynedd	
Planning,	1976:	27-28).	The	construction	provided	well-paid	jobs	to	labourers	as	
well	as	many	professions.	Also,	people	earned	good	money	from	renting	out	a	
room	 or	 a	 caravan	 in	 the	 backyard.	 Various	 small	 businesses	 were	 thriving,	
many	families	made	“good	money”	that	time	(Interview	34).	On	the	downside,	
however,	various	existing	businesses,	especially	in	agriculture,	shut	down	their	
doors	 unable	 to	 compete	 with	 the	 attractive	 wages	 of	 the	 construction	
(Gwynedd	Planning,	1976:	23).	Due	to	this	displacement,	unemployment	levels	
on	 the	 island	 rose	after	 the	 few	 fat	years	of	 construction	 (Gwynedd	Planning,	
1976:	23-24).	Nevertheless,	 the	600-800	operational	 jobs,	many	of	 these	 local	
Welsh-speakers	on	the	shopfloor,	provided	long-term	high-paid	and	often	high-
skilled	jobs	for	the	area.	Not	to	mention	the	ripple	effect	that	the	Wylfa	money	
created	 to	 various	 local	 businesses.	 In	 Cemaes	 several	 housing	 estates	 were	
built,	 and	 the	 population	 doubled	 in	 a	 few	 years	 (Gwynedd	 County	 Council	
1976).	
The	 construction	 was	 also	 a	 major	 cultural	 change	 in	 the	 area	 (Gwynedd	
Planning,	 1976:	 32).	 The	 quiet	 Anglesey	 villages	 became	 a	 beehive	 as	 almost	
two	thousand	incomers	from	all	over	the	British	Isles	came.	On	the	narrow	High	
Street	 of	 Cemaes,	 every	 morning	 dozens	 of	 double	 decker	 buses	 rushed	
through	transporting	workers	from	the	wider	area	(Interview	8	and	11).	In	the	
evenings,	 often	 there	 were	 queues	 to	 get	 to	 the	 local	 pubs.	 For	 the	 closed	
chapel-going	 communities	 of	 Anglesey	 villages,	 the	 drinking	 culture	 of	 the	
incoming	 workers	 was	 particularly	 shocking	 (Interview	 34	 and	 35,	 see	 also	
quote	 above).	 Some	 village	 elders	 I	 talked	 to	 remembered	 how	 suddenly	 the	
local	Welsh	culture	and	traditional	“pattern	of	life’	was	replaced.	Some	others,	
however,	 remembered	 rather	 the	 excitement	 of	 the	 construction	 with	 new	
people	coming,	and	many	of	them	stayed	and	married	local	girls	(Interview	8).	
In	 summary,	 this	 section	highlighted	how	 the	 ‘white	heat’	 of	 the	 first	 nuclear	
programme	 transformed	 this	 remote	 corner	of	Wales	along	with	 the	 country.	
The	atmosphere	of	the	nuclear	industry	was	a	strange	mix	of	pride	and	secrecy	
in	 the	 face	of	major	 technological	 and	organisational	 challenges.	On	Anglesey	
this	meant	an	unprecedented	socioeconomic	and	cultural	transformation	in	the	
area.	 This	 upheaval	 and	 buzz	 is	 still	 well	 remembered,	 and	 shapes	 the	
expectations	towards	the	new	station.	While	the	nuclear	power	seemed	to	be	
the	 technology	of	 the	 future	 to	many	 in	 the	white	 heat	 era,	 the	next	 section	
outlines	how	this	prospect	was	challenged	just	in	a	decade	or	two.	
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2.5	WHITE	ELEPHANT	VS	RED	DRAGON	(1970S-1990S)	
The	very	first	CEGB	leaflet	on	Wylfa	proudly	stated	that	“The	[Trawsfynydd	and	
Wylfa]	stations	will	also	attract	tourists,	for	they	excite	wonder	wherever	they	
are.”	(CEGB	1962).	 Indeed,	at	the	time	of	the	construction,	Wylfa	was	a	major	
tourist	attraction	on	the	island.	The	visitor	centre	together	with	the	observation	
tower	 overlooking	 the	 site	 attracted	 around	 20,000	 people	 per	 year	 (CEGB	
1972).	 In	 a	 few	 years,	 however,	 the	 interest	 dramatically	 dropped,	 especially	
from	the	 late	1970s.	Wylfa	gradually	even	disappeared	from	tourist	brochures	
of	Anglesey.	Once	a	proud	 landmark	of	 technological	 achievement,	 it	became	
something	to	hide	by	the	early	1980s.	This	section	is	about	how	the	enthusiasm	
of	the	white	heat	era	was	replaced	by	a	sense	of	danger.	
The	disillusionment	in	nuclear	power	probably	reached	its	highest	points	in	the	
late	1980s,	at	least	on	Anglesey.	There	was	an	immense	public	outcry	across	the	
island	and	well	beyond	sparked	by	 the	Wylfa	B	proposals	announced	 in	1987.	
The	campaign	group	Pobol	Atal	Wyfa	B,	or	People	Against	Wylfa	B	(the	acronym	
PAWB	also	means	everybody	in	Welsh)	was	set	up	as	an	umbrella	organisation	
by	leftist,	environmentalist	groups	as	well	as	Welsh	nationalists.	Some	of	these	
activists	 knew	 each	 other	 from	 the	 local	 groups	 of	 Campaign	 for	 Nuclear	
Disarmament	(CND),	from	the	women’s	peace	camp	at	Greenham	Common,	or	
from	 the	 previous	 MAM	 campaign	 against	 depositing	 nuclear	 waste	 on	
Anglesey.	 The	 combination	 of	 anti-nuclear	 and	 Welsh	 nationalist	 issues	 was	
explosive.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 1988,	 thousands	 of	 postcards	 were	 sent	 out.	
Eventually	the	Wylfa	B	plans	were	dropped	in	1989	before	the	widely	expected	
launch	of	a	public	inquiry.	The	main	reason	putting	the	nuclear	programme	on	
hold	was,	however,	not	the	local	or	national	opposition	to	nuclear	power.	In	the	
wake	of	privatising	the	entire	electricity	 industry	by	the	Thatcher	government,	
the	economics	of	nuclear	new	build	turned	to	be	vastly	unfavourable.	In	short,	
nuclear	constructions	became	white	elephants.7	
In	this	section,	I	outline	the	white	elephant	era	in	Britain	that	seemed	to	have	
halted	 nuclear	 power	 constructions	 at	 least	 until	 now.	 In	 subsection	 2.5.1,	 I	
outline	 the	main	 factors	of	how	nuclear	power	became	a	politically	contested	
issue	 across	 the	 country,	 and	 in	Anglesey	 especially.	 In	 the	 next	 subsection,	 I	
describe	 the	 privatisation	 of	 the	 electricity	 and	 nuclear	 industries	 rendering	
nuclear	 constructions	 white	 elephants	 and	 meaning	 an	 end	 of	 the	 PWR	
programme.	 In	the	final	subsection,	 I	outline	how	 life	was	 in	the	communities	
																																																						
7	White	elephants	are	objects,	often	large	facilities,	whose	use	value	is	disproportionate	to	the	very	high	
construction	or	maintenance	costs.	The	expression	derives	to	the	tradition	of	ancient	Siamese	kings	who	
gifted	a	white	elephant	 to	 their	unwanted	 courtiers,	who	were	obliged	 to	maintain	 the	holy	possession	
often	by	financially	ruining	themselves.	
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around	the	Wylfa	plant,	especially	the	blossoming	of	Cemaes,	even	in	the	midst	
of	the	height	of	the	anti-nuclear	climate.	
2.5.1	TURBULENT	CHANGES	IN	POST-WAR	BRITAIN	
By	 the	 1980s	 the	 Campaign	 for	 Nuclear	 Disarmament	 became	 possibly	 the	
largest	 ever	 single-issue	 political	 organisation	 in	 Britain.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
90,000	 national	 members,	 there	 were	 250,000	 members	 in	 local	 branches	
(Hinton	1997),	including	around	50	in	the	Cemaes	and	Llanfechell	branch	(“List	
of	CND	Môn	Members,”	n.d.).	The	initial	CND	Easter	march	to	the	Aldermaston	
nuclear	weapons	facility	was	organised	in	1958	as	a	response	to	nuclear	testing.	
In	 the	 first	wave	 of	 the	 pacifist	movement	 (1958-1962),	 however,	 the	 civilian	
use	of	nuclear	power	was	off	the	radar.	This	gradually	changed	as	the	‘peaceful’	
use	 of	 nuclear	 power	 became	 also	 subject	 to	 environmental	 and	 safety	
concerns,	 especially	 after	 the	Three	Mile	 Island	 (1979)	 and	 later	 in	Chernobyl	
(1986)	nuclear	accidents.	While	the	second	wave	centred	on	the	replacement	of	
British	nuclear	 submarines	 in	 the	UK,	 the	movement	mobilised	much	broader	
concerns.	 The	 symbolism	 of	 nuclear	 power	 permeated	 popular	 culture	 (Hogg	
2016),	 and	 was	 associated	 with	 a	 secretive	 military-industrial	 complex	 (e.g.,	
Edge	of	Darkness,	1985;	WarGames,	1986),	the	prospect	of	nuclear	annihilation	
(e.g.,	Protect	and	Survive,	1976;	Threads,	1984;	When	 the	wind	blows,	1986).	
Contemporary	media	highlighted	the	radiation	leakages,	alleged	cancer	clusters	
around	nuclear	 plants,	 and	 even	 the	 Thatcherite	 cuts	 to	 public	 finances	were	
seen	in	contrast	to	the	Trident	nuclear	submarine	programme.	One	of	the	most	
immersive	experiences	of	my	 fieldwork	was	 to	understand	the	atmosphere	of	
this	era	by	going	through	the	vast	variety	of	brochures,	events,	and	artefacts	in	
the	local	archives,	from	‘Nuclear	power?	No	thanks	–	Ynni	niwclear?	Dim	diolch’	
stickers	to	a	‘roundneck	sweater	with	CND	logo’	knitting	manual,	in	the	heritage	
of	 local	 nuclear	 activists	 Megan	 Môn	 Prytherch	 and	 Nan	 Morgan.	 The	 first	
protest	 against	 a	 civil	 nuclear	 site	 reaching	 national	 publicity	 was	 the	 4000	
people	occupying	the	last	AGR	site	at	Torness,	East	Lothian,	Scotland,	in	1978.	
In	Wales,	 the	 anti-nuclear	 movement	 found	 an	 unlikely	 ally	 in	 the	 emerging	
nationalism.	 The	 Nature	 article	 ‘Gwynedd	 a	 developing	 county?’	 asserts	 that	
“Indeed,	 the	complaint	 that	Wales	 is	 treated	 like	a	colony	came	up	again	and	
again	 in	my	 discussions.”	 (Hanlon	 1978:	 304).	 Across	 Anglesey	 and	Gwynedd,	
the	 concern	 wasn’t	 just	 English	 people	 moving	 to	 the	 traditionally	 Welsh-
speaking	 areas,	 but	 the	 decisions	 about	 the	 area	 seemed	 to	 be	 taken	 in	
England.	‘Cofiwch	Dryweryn’	(Remember	Tryweryn)	was	an	influential	reminder	
about	the	drowning	of	a	small	Welsh-speaking	village	in	the	1960s	to	provide	a	
reservoir	for	Liverpool	area	despite	strong	Welsh	opposition.	A	Welsh-speaking	
nuclear	 engineer	 remembered	 that	 at	 the	 time	 also	 Wylfa	 was	 seen	 as	 an	
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outpost	of	CEGB,	based	in	London	and	Gloucester,	managed	by	predominantly	
English	people	and	serving	 the	 industrial	North	West	on	 the	other	side	of	 the	
border	rather	than	Wales	(Interviewee	15).	
The	post-war	consensus	became	broken	in	the	1980s.	The	defeat	of	the	1984-
1985	miners’	 strike	 was	 an	 emblematic	 turn.	 Nationalised	 utilities,	 especially	
the	coal	industry,	were	increasingly	seen	as	a	burden	both	on	the	economy	and	
on	democracy,	not	as	national	assets.	The	National	Union	of	Mineworkers	was	
famously	referred	to	as	the	“the	enemy	within”	by	Thatcher:	a	minority	interest	
group	 threatening	 the	 majority	 of	 society	 as	 the	 1974	 coal	 miners’	 strike	
brought	 down	 the	 democratically	 elected	 Conservative	 government.	 The	
preservation	of	uncompetitive	and	unproductive	 industry	 structures	was	 seen	
as	 a	 joint	 effort	 of	 unions	 and	 nationalised	 industry	 leaders.	 The	 government	
looked	for	an	alternative	to	reduce	the	dependence	on	coal,	accounting	for	85%	
of	 electricity	 generation	 in	 1980	 (DUKES	 2015).	 Not	much	 after	 the	 1970s	 oil	
crises,	and	still	 in	the	relative	beginning	of	North	Sea	oil	and	gas	explorations,	
the	viable	option	seemed	nuclear	power.	As	a	leaked	Cabinet	memo	explained	
“A	 nuclear	 programme	 would	 have	 the	 advantage	 of	 removing	 a	 substantial	
proportion	of	electricity	from	disruption	by	miners	and	transport	workers.”	(HC	
Deb	1980).	As	opposed	 to	 the	hundreds	of	 thousands	of	 coal	miners,	 nuclear	
power	plants	operate	with	a	 relatively	 small	 and	privileged	workforce.	 Strikes	
are	very	rare	in	nuclear	plants,	operational	safety	is	in	the	core	of	the	industry.	
The	third	nuclear	power	programme	was	announced	in	1979.	The	government	
remained	 committed	 to	 pursue	 the	 programme	 for	 a	 full	 decade,	 even	when	
the	privatisation	of	the	electricity	industry	was	well	on	its	way.	
2.5.2	ELECTRICITY	PRIVATISATION	AND	THE	END	OF	THE	NUCLEAR	DREAM	
The	programme	for	ten	new	reactors	aimed	to	end	a	two-decades	long	dispute	
within	 the	 nuclear	 industry	 centred	 around	 the	 choice	 of	 reactor	 (O’Riordan,	
Kemp,	and	Purdue	1988;	Williams	1980).	As	the	Magnox	reactor	constructions	
were	about	to	finish,	the	choice	was	 looming	essentially	between	the	Magnox	
successor	 Advanced	 Gas-cooled	 Reactors	 (AGR),	 the	 prototype	 Steam	
Generating	 Heavy	 Water	 Reactor	 (SGHWR),	 and	 the	 American	 design	
Pressurised	Water	Reactors	(PWR).	While	the	AGR	was	the	reactor	design	of	the	
second	nuclear	programme,	built	mainly	during	the	1970s	and	early	1980s,	the	
ongoing	debate	aggravated	tensions	not	only	between	advocates	of	developing	
domestic	 designs	 and	 of	 importing	 successful	 American	 designs,	 but	 also	 the	
engineering	 mind-set	 of	 the	 industry	 on	 expanding	 and	 advancing	 nuclear	
technology	 against	 the	 growing	 influence	 of	 economic	 considerations	 on	 cost	
efficiency	(Helm	2009;	Williams	1980).	
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The	 public	 inquiry	 upon	 constructing	 the	 first	 power	 station,	 Sizewell	 B,	 was	
about	to	settle	these	questions	for	the	third	programme	once	and	for	all.	The	
Sizewell	 Inquiry	 took	73	months	 and	£30m	 in	direct	 costs	 (DTI	 2006:	 121.)	 to	
produce	a	3,000-page	 report	 in	 favour	of	PWR	 (O’Riordan,	Kemp,	and	Purdue	
1988).	 Along	 with	 Sizewell	 B,	 three	 other	 stations	 were	 scheduled:	 Wylfa	 B,	
Sizewell	 C	 and	 Hinkley	 C.	 As	 the	 actual	 costs	 were	 gradually	 revealed	 in	 the	
blurry	 accounts	 of	 CEGB,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 the	 new	 build	 programme	
wouldn’t	 make	 the	 industry	 financially	 attractive	 without	 major	 public	
subsidies.	 Just	 after	 the	 Hinkley	 Inquiry	 in	 1989,	 the	 government	 put	 a	
moratorium	on	nuclear	new	build,	and	 then	eventually	cancelled	 that	 in	1994	
(DTI	1995).	The	construction	of	Sizewell	B	was	 finished	 in	1995	without	major	
additional	 costs	 or	 delays	 by	 taking	 the	 best	 people	 of	 the	 industry	 on	 site	
(Birmingham	Policy	Commission	2012;	RAE	2010).	
As	 the	 Thatcher	 government	 embarked	 on	 the	 privatisation	 of	 nationalised	
industries	 throughout	 the	1980s,	 the	electricity	 industry	was	 the	toughest	nut	
to	 crack	 in	 terms	of	 complexity	 and	 scale	of	 the	endeavour	 (Helm	2009:	125-
151).	One	of	 the	key	challenges	was	that	 the	nuclear	 fleet	 increasingly	 turned	
out	to	be	a	financial	liability	rather	than	an	asset	for	a	private	investor.	In	1989,	
first	 the	Magnox	 reactors,	 then	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 nuclear	 fleet	were	withdrawn	
from	privatisation	of	the	electricity	industry.	Two	key	steps	were	made	to	make	
the	 industry	 financially	 attractive.	 First,	 past	 liabilities	 were	 written	 off,	
including	 the	majority	of	waste	and	decommissioning	costs.	At	 least	 since	 the	
famous	 Flowers	 Report	 (RCEP	 1976),	 the	 issue	 was	 on	 the	 agenda,	 further	
highlighted	by	 the	 controversies	 around	 the	THORP	 reprocessing	plant	 (Kemp	
1983;	 Wynne	 2011)	 and	 the	 failed	 ambitions	 with	 the	 Fast	 Breeder	 Reactor	
(FBR).	Second,	the	existing	nuclear	operation	was	subsidised	from	an	effective	
nuclear	 tax,	 on	 the	 –	 now	 privatised	 –	 non-nuclear	 generation	 through	 the	
Fossil	 Fuel	 Levy	 (FFL)	and	Non	Fossil	 Fuel	Obligation	 (NFFO)	 (Helm	2009:	186-
203).	The	privatisation	of	 the	nuclear	 fleet	nevertheless	meant	the	end	of	 the	
nuclear	 dream,	 by	 the	mid-1990s	 industry	 hopes	 vanished	 about	 any	 nuclear	
new	build	project	(DTI	1995).	
2.5.3	AN	ISLAND	ON	FIRE,	A	VILLAGE	IN	BLOSSOM	
“The	 people	 of	 Ynys	 Mon	 feel	 very	 much	 like	 pawns	 in	 this	 power	
struggle	 [between	DoE	and	CEGB	on	 the	 privatization	 of	 the	 electricity	
industry]	–	and	as	any	chess	player	knows,	pawns	are	often	sacrificed	as	
either	 side	moves	 in	 for	 the	 kill.	My	 constituents,	 including	 those	who	
work	at	 the	present	power	station,	 feel	 that	 they	are	being	kept	 in	 the	
dark	with	 no	 power	 to	 influence	 events	 and	 decisions	 are	 being	 taken	
over	which	 they	 have	 no	 control.	 Eventually,	 decisions	 are	 taken,	 they	
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will	 be	without	 sufficient	 regard	 to	 their	 opinions,	 their	 jobs,	 and	 their	
welfare,	it	is	their	lives	that	the	Government/CEGB	are	playing	with,	their	
jobs,	their	safety,	and	yet	their	views	are	being	disregarded.”	
Letter	 of	 Ynys	 Môn	 MP	 Ieuan	 Wyn	 Jones	 to	 PAWB	 member	 Alon	
Prytherch	on	8	Dec	1988	(Ieuan	Wyn	Jones	1988)	
In	1976-1977,	Gwynedd	County	Council	 together	with	the	CEGB	conducted	an	
impact	 assessment	 (Gwynedd	 County	 Council	 1976)	 and	 a	 consultation	
(Gwynedd	County	Council	 1976)	on	building	a	new	nuclear	 station	on	various	
potential	sites,	including	Wylfa.8	None	of	the	four	constituent	borough	councils	
supported	 the	 plans,	 neither	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 community	 councils	
(Gwynedd	 County	 Council	 1978:	 9-10).	 The	 concerns	 were	 mixed,	 involving	
safety	 (operational	 safety,	 fuel	 transport),	 ecology	 (construction	 disturbance,	
radioactive	wastes),	 visual	 (buildings,	 transmission	 lines),	 and	 social/economic	
issues	(displacement	of	workers	from	existing	businesses,	 influx	of	non	Welsh-
speakers,	 tourism).	 The	 response	 of	 the	 Ynys	Môn	 Borough	 Council	makes	 it	
clear	that	the	community	was	“not	prepared	to	be	a	guinea-pig	area	[for	a	first-
of-a-kind	reactor].”	(Gwynedd	Planning,	1978:	30)	
Ten	 years	 later,	 when	 CEGB	 came	 out	 with	 a	Wylfa	 B	 proposal,	 anti-nuclear	
groups	 formed.	 First,	 the	 short-lived	 Anglesey	 Nuclear	 Concern	 (ANC),	
organising	 the	 allegedly	 first	 ever	 demonstration	 on	 the	 island,	 250	 people	
rallying	 from	 Cemaes	 to	Wylfa	 on	 14	 July	 1986	 (Wassink	 1987:	 94-95).	 Then	
PAWB	was	formed	with	a	stronger	focus	on	Welsh	language.	
The	 responses	 from	 the	 immediate	 vicinity	of	 the	existing	Wylfa	 station	were	
the	outliers	in	the	1977	consultation.	In	this	area,	most	of	the	councils	did	not	
respond	to	the	sensitive	question,	including	Llanbadrig	(Cemaes),	and	generally	
the	 responses	were	more	 balanced	 (Gwynedd	 County	 Council	 1978:	 12).	 The	
council	of	the	neighbouring	village	Llanfechell	stated,	 for	example,	that	“Need	
for	 a	 new	 reactor	 to	 replace	Wylfa	when	 decommissioned	 –	 but	 of	 a	 proven	
type	–	storage	of	irradiated	fuel	and	radioactive	waste	a	cause	of	concern	to	the	
Council.”	 (Gwynedd,	 1978:	 31).	 In	 the	height	 of	 the	overwhelming	opposition	
against	Wylfa	B,	Wassink	(1987:	96)	also	observes	that:	
	 	
																																																						
8	The	preferred	reactor	at	this	time	was	SGHWR,	but	by	the	time	publication	of	consultation	responses,	it	
was	already	dropped	in	favour	of	AGR	and	PWR	(Gwynedd	Planning	1978).	
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“The	 question	 remains,	 however,	 whether	 it	 was	 really	 due	 to	 a	
reluctance	 to	 protest	 that	 many	 locals	 [around	 40	 villagers]	 were	
present	 at	 the	 [July	1986]	 rally.	During	my	 stay	 in	 the	 village	 I	 got	 the	
impression	 that	 many	 villagers,	 perhaps	 even	 the	 majority,	 were	 in	
favour	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 second	 station	 at	Wylfa,	 despite	 some	
concerns	 about	 the	 events	 in	 Chernobyl.	 Several	 people	 I	 spoke	 with	
pointed	at	the	benefits	for	the	village	and	seemed	willing	to	accept	the	
possible	dangers	in	return.”	
Indeed,	in	my	conversations	and	interviews,	many	residents	recalled	this	era	as	
the	heyday	of	 the	village,	when	 the	village	was	alive,	 in	 large	part	due	 to	 the	
lavish	Wylfa	wages.	 The	 three	bustling	pubs	 for	 a	 small	 village,	 and	 the	 three	
bank	 branches	 and	 a	 building	 society	 on	 the	 High	 Street	 were	 remembered	
fondly	(Interview	4,	23,	34).	
In	summary,	this	section	highlighted	the	white	elephant	era,	which	seemed	to	
have	marked	the	end	of	nuclear	construction	on	Anglesey	as	well	as	in	the	UK.	
Nuclear	 power	 was	 both	 politically	 contested	 and	 economically	 troublesome	
issue	 that	did	not	have	 the	possibility	 to	be	built	 in	 the	 liberalised	market,	 at	
least	not	against	a	major	public	backlash.	Arriving	to	the	current	era	in	the	next	
section,	however,	shows	that	how	the	foundations	were	gradually	laid	down	for	
nuclear	power	to	become	an	‘ordinary’	electricity	generating	technology.	
2.6	WHITE	PAPERS	GIVING	RISE	TO	AN	ENERGY	ISLAND	(1990S-2010S)	
Currently	Britain	has	far	the	most	ambitious	and	substantial	nuclear	new	build	
programme	among	the	developed	countries.9	Recent	anti-nuclear	mobilisation	
has	 been	 relatively	 lukewarm	 compared	 to	 many	 other	 European	 countries,	
even	 after	 the	 2011	 Fukushima	 disaster	 (Wouter	 Poortinga,	 Aoyagi,	 and	
Pidgeon	 2013).	 A	 number	 of	 prominent	 environmentalists	 in	 the	 country	
publicly	 argued	 for	 nuclear.10	On	Anglesey,	 there	 is	 no	 sign	of	 a	 public	 outcry	
against	current	Wylfa	B	plans,	 renamed	to	Wylfa	Newydd	 in	2013,	 in	any	way	
comparable	to	the	late	1980s	proposal.	The	county	councils	in	North	Wales,	and	
																																																						
9	In	Western	Europe,	there	are	currently	two	reactors	constructed,	Olkiluoto-3	in	Finland	and	Flamanville-3	
in	France,	both	with	EPR	design.	In	Finland,	the	other	construction	plan	by	Fennovoima	is	currently	facing	a	
political	backlash.	In	addition,	several	Eastern	European	countries	have	intentions	to	build	a	nuclear	power	
station	(e.g.,	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Slovakia,	Bulgaria,	Romania,	Poland,	Lithuania).	In	the	US,	currently	
five	reactors	are	under	construction,	but	only	one	of	these	projects	started	 in	the	 last	30	years.	Also,	28	
license	applications	were	submitted	before	Fukushima,	but	mostly	cancelled	or	withdrawn	since	(WNISR,	
2015).	 
10	Among	 others,	 Guardian	 columnist	 George	Monbiot,	 climate	 change	 campaigner	Mark	 Lynas,	 former	
Greenpeace	UK	Executive	Director	Stephen	Tindale,	and	’Gaia	hypothesis’	author	James	Lovelock	argued	
for	nuclear	power	after	Fukushima.	
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the	community	councils	in	the	area	are	generally	supportive	of	the	nuclear	new	
build.	 Moreover,	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 central	 to	 the	 Energy	 Island	 Programme,	
both	a	 socioeconomic	 vision	 for	 the	 island	and	a	novel	 governance	approach.	
Similarly,	 Wylfa	 is	 one	 of	 the	 central	 projects	 of	 the	 North	 Wales	 Economic	
Ambition	Board,	a	collaboration	of	the	six	county	councils	of	the	wider	region.	
There	 is	 not	 just	 the	 political-cultural	 climate	 becoming	 more	 favourable	 to	
nuclear	power,	but	we	see	a	different	era	emerging	with	significant	changes	in	
the	 governance,	 industry	 structure	 and	 public	 engagement	 among	 other	
aspects.	 While	 industry	 efforts	 have	 been	 crucial	 in	 legitimising	 nuclear	 new	
build	nationally	and	locally,	a	series	of	white	papers	by	successive	governments	
are	 a	 key	 to	 characterise	 this	 novel	 framework	 of	 governing	 nuclear	
investments	 (BERR	2008;	BIS	&	DECC	2013d;	DECC	2011b,	2011c;	DECC	&	BIS	
2013;	DTI	2007,	2006,	2003).	
This	 section	 shows	 how	white	 papers	 paved	 the	way	 for	 the	 current	 nuclear	
programme.	In	subsection	2.6.1,	I	highlight	industry	and	government	efforts	to	
reframe	nuclear	power	construction	as	a	low-carbon	investment.	In	subsection	
2.6.2,	 I	 address	 the	 challenges	 the	 industry	 was	 facing	 with	 nuclear	
decommissioning	and	with	a	desperate	need	of	a	 ‘nuclear	renaissance’.	 In	the	
final	subsection,	I	outline	the	efforts	to	make	Anglesey	an	Energy	Island	to	host	
the	Wylfa	Newydd	station.	
2.6.1	DECARBONISATION	POLICIES	IN	A	LIBERALISED	MARKET	
“Nuclear	 power	 is	 currently	 an	 important	 source	 of	 carbon-free	
electricity.	 However,	 its	 current	 economics	 make	 it	 an	 unattractive	
option	 for	 new,	 carbon-free	 generating	 capacity	 and	 there	 are	 also	
important	 issues	 of	 nuclear	waste	 to	 be	 resolved.	 These	 issues	 include	
our	 legacy	waste	and	continued	waste	arising	 from	other	 sources.	This	
white	paper	does	not	contain	specific	proposals	for	building	new	nuclear	
power	stations.	However	we	do	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	at	some	
point	 in	 the	 future	 new	 nuclear	 build	might	 be	 necessary	 if	 we	 are	 to	
meet	 our	 carbon	 targets.	 Before	 any	 decision	 to	 proceed	 with	 the	
building	of	new	nuclear	power	stations,	there	will	need	to	be	the	fullest	
public	consultation	and	the	publication	of	a	further	white	paper	setting	
out	our	proposals.”	
Energy	 White	 Paper:	 Our	 energy	 future	 –	 Creating	 a	 low-carbon	
economy	(DTI	2003)	
“The	Government	believes	 that	nuclear	has	a	 role	 to	play	 in	 the	 future	
UK	generating	mix	alongside	other	low	carbon	generation	options.	
	 33	
Any	 new	 nuclear	 power	 station	 would	 be	 proposed,	 developed,	
constructed	 and	 operated	 by	 the	 private	 sector	 who	 would	 also	 meet	
decommissioning	 and	 their	 full	 share	 of	 long-term	waste	management	
costs.”	
Energy	Review:	The	Energy	Challenge	(DTI	2006)	
Reading	 between	 the	 lines,	 a	 sharp	 difference	 can	 be	 identified	 between	 the	
above	energy	policy	papers	of	the	UK	government.	Both	papers	seem	to	impose	
key	 conditions	 for	 any	 nuclear	 station	 to	 be	 built	 in	 a	 liberalised	 electricity	
market.	The	shift	from	“not	[ruling]	out	the	possibility”	to	“nuclear	has	a	role	to	
play	 in	 the	 future	 UK	 generation	 mix”	 (see	 above	 excepts),	 however,	 is	
remarkable.	 Several	 government	 policy	 papers	 gradually	 paved	 the	way	 for	 a	
new	nuclear	programme,	often	with	careful	twists	–	or	some	would	say	spins	–	
in	 the	wording	of	documents	 (see	more	details	of	UK	government	papers	and	
policy	 frameworks	 for	 new	 nuclear	 in	 Chapter	 5).	 This	 section	 outlines	 the	
context	of	how	this	shift	towards	a	new	nuclear	programme	took	place	in	which	
government	policy	papers	 reframed	 the	 role	of	nuclear	power	 in	a	 liberalised	
electricity	market	and	 in	 the	wake	of	 climate	change	 (BERR	2008;	DCLG	et	al.	
2007;	DECC	2011b;	DTI	2007,	2006,	2003)	
While	 the	 nationalised	 industries	 were	 often	 accused	 of	 overinvestment	 in	
generating	 capacity,	 in	 the	 liberalised	market	 the	 problem	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	
opposite.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 expectation	 of	 the	 architects	 of	 electricity	
privatisation,	 liberalisation	 did	 not	 result	 in	 the	 entry	 of	 innovative	 domestic	
competitors,	but	the	takeover	by	first	chiefly	American,	then	mainly	European	
multinational	 companies	 (Meek	 2012).	 Mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 eventually	
have	given	rise	 to	 the	Big	Six	energy	suppliers.	Privatisation	quickly	 led	 to	 the	
drop	 in	 wholesale	 electricity	 prices	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 cost-efficiency	
measures	and	increased	competition.	In	addition	to	the	sweating	of	the	assets	
inherited	from	the	CEGB	times,	new	investment	focused	on	easy-to-build	CCGT	
gas	plants.	This	‘dash	for	gas’	resulted	in	natural	gas	becoming	the	main	source	
of	 electricity	 from	 a	marginal	 ‘premium	 fuel’	 (Helm	 2009).	 The	 proportion	 of	
natural	 gas	 in	 electricity	 generation	 rose	 from	 0%	 in	 1990	 to	 46%	 in	 2010	
primarily	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 coal,	 but	 dropped	 to	 29%	 in	 2014	 as	 North	 Sea	
reserves	are	 running	out	 (DUKES	2015).	 In	 the	meantime,	political	discussions	
grappled	 around	 the	 role	 of	 energy	 policy	 for	 a	 liberalised	 electricity	market.	
While	 regulation	at	 the	beginning	of	privatisation	was	 rather	an	afterthought,	
the	 focus	 has	 gradually	 shifted	 from	 overcoming	 government	 failures	 to	
correcting	market	failures	as	well	(Helm	2009).	
After	privatisation,	energy	policy	priorities	moved	from	a	provision	of	electricity	
for	all	approach	to	other	issues,	too,	in	particular	environmental	emissions	and	
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climate	change.	 In	other	words,	energy	policy	has	become	 in	 large	measure	a	
vehicle	for	climate	and	environmental	policy,	especially	in	the	2000s.	The	2007	
White	 Paper,	 for	 example,	 identified	 the	 two	 major	 long-term	 energy	
challenges,	“Tackling	climate	change”	having	equal	status	to	“Delivering	secure,	
clean	energy	 at	 affordable	prices”	 (DTI	 2007).	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 focus,	 first	 a	
long-term	target	was	set	for	reducing	CO2	emissions	by	60%	by	2050	(DTI	2003;	
RCEP	 2000),	 then	 it	 was	 later	 raised	 to	 a	 statutory	 80%	 reduction	 (Climate	
Change	 Act	 2008).	 More	 recently,	 the	 challenge	 is	 rephrased	 to	 the	 ‘energy	
trilemma’,	 the	 trade-offs	 between	 sustainability,	 security	 and	 equity,	 as	
affordability	has	become	a	priority.	
In	 the	mid-2000s,	 intense	 policy	 debates	 started	 about	 the	 delivery	 of	 these	
aims,	 particularly	 whether	 renewables	 are	 enough	 to	 meet	 the	 two	 key	
challenges,	the	decarbonisation	targets	and	the	‘energy	gap’	resulting	from	the	
closure	of	the	aging	coal	and	nuclear	fleet	in	the	next	two	decades.	The	policy	
moved	from	keeping	the	nuclear	option	open	(DTI	2003,	see	quote	above)	to	a	
clear	commitment	to	a	nuclear	new	build	programme.	The	Energy	Review	(DTI	
2006)	 was,	 however,	 widely	 seen	 as	 a	 vehicle	 to	 bring	 nuclear	 back	 to	 the	
agenda.	The	consultation	was	ruled	as	‘legally	flawed”	by	a	High	Court	decision	
initiated	by	Greenpeace,	and	the	content	was	similarly	dismissed	by	the	House	
of	 Commons	 Environment	 Audit	 Committee.	 The	 subsequent	 consultation	 in	
the	 energy	 white	 paper	 (DTI	 2007)	 and	 nuclear	 white	 paper	 in	 result	 (BERR	
2008),	 however,	 set	 out	 a	 broad	 framework	 for	 ambitious	 nuclear	 new	 build	
programme.	A	novel	framework	for	the	nuclear	new	build	programme,	subject	
of	Chapter	5	 in	particular,	was	devised	through	 legislative	 (Planning	Act	2008)	
and	 regulatory	 changes	 (e.g.,	 Generic	 Design	 Assessment	 –	 GDA)	 and	 various	
policy	 papers	 resulting	 from	 government-industry	 collaboration	 (e.g.,	 BIS	 &	
DECC	2013d;	DECC	2011b,	2011c;	DECC	&	BIS	2013).	
The	nuclear	programme	was	intensely	debated	on	the	top	level	of	politics,	often	
in	 the	Cabinet	 itself,	 and	was	 a	 subject	 of	 a	 particularly	 fierce	 lobbying	 (Cave	
and	Rowell	2014:	101-106).	Political	mobilisation	has	been,	however,	relatively	
limited	 (Johnstone	 2014,	 2010).	 The	 reframing	 of	 nuclear	 power	 as	 a	 low-
carbon	technology,	partly	adopted	by	media	outlets	(Doyle	2011),	resulted	in	an	
often	‘reluctant	acceptance’	public	attitude	(Bickerstaff	et	al.	2008).	According	
to	 an	 anti-nuclear	 campaigner,	 the	 issue	 gradually	 lost	 its	 symbolic	 charge	
(Interview	 2).	 While	 national	 opinion	 polls	 reveal	 that	 most	 people	 prefer	
renewables	over	nuclear	in	the	context	of	decarbonisation	(Corner	et	al.	2011;	
Spence	et	 al.	 2010),	 the	end	of	both	Cold	War	and	 state	ownership	 loosened	
the	associations	of	the	industry	with	immanent	nuclear	annihilation,	the	secret	
state,	or	the	weapons	establishment.	
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2.6.2	NUCLEAR	RENAISSANCE	OR	NUCLEAR	RESTORATION?	
After	 Chernobyl,	 the	 new	 nuclear	 projects	 were	 practically	 halted	 in	 most	
countries.	Sizewell	B	was	the	one	of	last	nuclear	construction	to	be	finished	in	
Europe	 and	North	 America	 (WNISR	 2015).	 In	 addition	 to	 public	 opposition	 in	
many	 countries,	 electricity	 demand	 has	 been	 on	 hold	 in	 most	 developed	
countries,	and	alternative	 resources,	most	notably	oil	and	gas,	were	 relatively	
cheap.	 While	 the	 industry	 globally	 propagated	 a	 ‘nuclear	 renaissance’	 in	 the	
2000s,	 it	 was	more	 of	 a	 rhetoric	 than	 a	 tangible	 trend	 at	 least	 in	 developed	
countries.	 In	 several	 developing	 countries,	 most	 notably	 in	 China,	 however,	
nuclear	power	has	recently	become	a	key	response	to	the	energy	need	of	the	
growing	economy	and	a	demonstration	of	technological	and	scientific	prowess.	
In	 the	 UK,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 orders,	 nuclear	 construction	 supply	 chain	
companies	 disappeared.	 Also,	 the	 skilled	 workforce	 is	 shrinking	 and	 aging	
(HoHoL	 Science	 and	 Technology	 Committee	 2011;	 NIA	 UK	 2012).	
Decommissioning,	 however,	 opened	 up	 a	 new	 area.	 Recently,	 governments	
have	made	repeated	efforts	to	manage	the	vast	nuclear	legacy	of	the	previous	
eras	 (DEFRA	 et	 al.	 2008).	 The	 Sellafield	 nuclear	 complex	 is	 the	 largest	
environmental	clean-up	process	in	Europe	with	a	rising	enormous	budget,	and	
unprecedented	engineering	challenges.		
Site	selection	was	a	key	issue	in	the	policy	framework	set	by	the	energy	review	
(DTI	 2006)	 and	 the	 subsequent	 energy	 (DTI	 2007)	 and	 nuclear	 white	 papers	
(BERR	 2008).	 The	 eventual	 approach	 was	 to	 select	 only	 sites	 with	 existing	
nuclear	plants	(DECC	2011b)	with	established	infrastructures	(e.g.,	transmission	
cables,	 roads)	 and	 nuclear	 workforce	 but	 most	 importantly	 with	 generally	
higher	 levels	 of	 local	 support	 (Grimston,	 Nuttall,	 and	 Vaughan	 2014).	 Among	
these,	Wylfa	 had	 one	 of	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 local	 support	 (HoC	 Energy	 and	
Climate	 Change	 Committee	 2013:	 39).	 This	 section	 provides	 a	 brief	 factual	
overview	of	Wylfa	Newydd	and	the	other	ongoing	new	nuclear	projects.		
When	 the	 nuclear	 new	 build	 programme	was	 on	 sight	 in	 2009,	 EON	 UK	 and	
RWE	npower	already	formed	a	joint	venture,	Horizon	Nuclear	Power,	to	acquire	
two	 potential	 new	 nuclear	 sites.	 Both	 Wylfa	 on	 Anglesey	 and	 Oldbury-on-
Severn	in	South	Gloucestershire	were	successfully	selected	as	sites	for	the	new	
nuclear	 programme	 in	 2010	 (DECC	 2011b).	Wylfa	was	 selected	 as	 a	 lead	 site	
with	 an	 allegedly	 stronger	 local	 community	 support	 (HoC	 Energy	 and	 Climate	
Change	 Committee	 2013:	 39).	 Subsequently,	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 reactor	
technology	was	a	 lingering	issue	between	French	Areva	EPR	and	the	American	
Westinghouse	AP	1000.	 Both	 consortiums,	Areva-Siemens	 and	Nuclear	 Power	
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Delivery	UK,11	signed	preliminary	agreements	with	Horizon	in	the	hope	to	build	
the	new	stations.	In	March	2012,	however,	the	two	German	parent	companies	
decided	to	sell	 their	 joint	venture	after	 the	post-Fukushima	nuclear	phase-out	
decision	at	home	(HoC	Energy	and	Climate	Change	Committee	2013:	Ev	1).	After	
much	 speculation	 and	 uncertainty	 for	 six	 months,	 the	 Japanese	 corporation	
Hitachi	 bought	 Horizon	 for	 £700m.	 This	 also	 meant	 deploying	 the	 Advanced	
Boiling	 Water	 Technology	 of	 Hitachi	 GE	 Nuclear	 Energy	 (HGNE),	 which	 is	
currently	 undergoing	 the	 step	 4	 of	 the	 Generic	 Design	 Assessment	 (GDA)	
process	 and	 expected	 to	 receive	 design	 acceptance	 in	 December	 2017. 12	
Currently	 Horizon	 is	 going	 through	 the	 pre-application	 phase	 of	 the	 planning	
consent	 process,	 and	 building	 up	 the	 organisation.	 The	 pre-application	
consultation	stage	1	(PAC1)	was	held	in	September-December	2014	during	my	
fieldwork.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 submission,	 there	 is	 the	 second	 round	 of	 this	
consultation	 (PAC2).13	The	 headquarters	 of	 Horizon	 is	 in	 Gloucester	 with	 a	
recently	expanded	office	on	the	Wylfa	site.		
There	 are	 three	 ongoing	 nuclear	 projects	 in	 the	 UK,	 Wylfa	 Newydd,	 Hinkley	
Point	 C,	 and	 Moorside.	 Different	 companies	 own	 all	 these	 projects	 using	
different	 reactor	 technologies.	The	owner	of	Hinkley	Point	C,	EDF	Energy,	has	
already	 collected	 all	 statutory	 licenses	 and	 permits	 to	 proceed	 to	 build	 two	
French	EPR	 reactors,	but	 currently	 face	major	political,	 financial	 and	 technical	
controversies.	 The	 NuGenereation	 joint	 venture	 owns	 the	 Moorside	 site,	
adjacent	to	Sellafield.	In	2014,	Toshiba	acquired	sixty	percent	of	the	NuGen	to	
showcase	their	AP	1000	technology.	There	are	two	other	active	constructions	in	
Europe,	Olkiluoto	 3	 in	 Finland	 and	 Flamanville	 3	 in	 France,	with	 both	 an	 EPR	
design.	Both	constructions	are	getting	slowly	close	to	completion	after	serious	
delays	and	cost	overruns.	The	above	nuclear	constructions	inform	not	only	how	
Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 developed,	 but	 also	 my	 understanding	 a	 nuclear	
megainvestment	 and	 the	 UK	 nuclear	 programme.	 I	 will	 address	 these	
megainvestments	more	in	detail	in	Chapter	5.	
	 	
																																																						
11	The	consortium	comprised	of	Westinghouse	Electric	Company,	Shaw	Group,	Laing	O’Rourke	and	Toshiba	
12 	Details	 of	 the	 process	 are	 available	 on	 http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/UK-ABWR/index.htm	
(Accessed	on	21-09-2016).	
13	Details	of	the	process	are	available	on	http://consultation.horizonnuclearpower.com/	(Accessed	on	21-
09-2016).	
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2.6.3	ENVISIONING	ENERGY	ISLAND	
On	Anglesey,	the	momentum	from	‘white	heat’	industrialisation	is	coming	to	its	
end.	The	original	lifetime	of	Wylfa	was	extended	five	times	in	total	as	a	result	of	
immense	engineering	efforts.	Eventually	Wylfa	permanently	shut	down	as	 the	
oldest	operating	 station	 in	December	2015.	Anglesey	Aluminium,	another	 key	
employer	 on	 Anglesey,	 closed	 its	 doors	 in	 2009,	 as	 the	 discounted	 power	
contract	with	Wylfa	did	not	pass	the	EU	state	subsidy	legislation.	In	the	Amlwch	
area,	4	miles	west	from	Cemaes,	first	Octel	bromine	works	shut	down	in	2004,	
while	the	Shell	site	in	nearby	Rhosgoch	already	closed	down	in	1990.	
Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	 separated	 from	Gwynedd	 in	 1996	 to	 become	
the	 local	authority	with	the	 lowest	Gross	Value	Added	(GVA)	per	capita	 in	the	
entire	 UK.	 The	 Economic	 Development	 Unit	 (EDU)	 team	 of	 the	 council	
consciously	looked	for	economic	development	opportunities	from	around	2006	
to	 respond	 to	 the	 looming	 closure	 of	 the	 two	 key	 employers	 on	 the	 island,	
Anglesey	Aluminium	and	Wylfa	A	 (Interview	3).	 This	met	with	 a	 similar	 effort	
from	Wylfa	that	needed	to	provide	long-term	prospects	to	attract	young	people	
to	 replace	 the	 aging	workforce	 (Interview	 36).	 The	 Energy	 Island	 Programme	
was	 established	 in	 2010.	 The	 Council	 itself,	 however,	 had	 a	 reputation	 of	
infighting	 and	 corruption,	 which	 culminated	 in	 the	 Welsh	 Government	
appointing	 three	 commissioners	 in	March	 2011	 to	 retain	 executive	 functions,	
and	reforming	the	electoral	system	till	May	2013.	
In	the	response	to	the	backlash	of	the	first	Wylfa	B	plans,	the	power	station	put	
serious	efforts	in	embedding	itself	in	the	local	community,	to	become	not	just	a	
good	 employer,	 but	 also	 a	 good	 neighbour.	 As	 part	 of	 this	 effort	 the	 plant	
issued	 a	 regular	 local	 newsletter	 since	 1989,	 refurbished	 the	 visitor	 centre	 to	
attract	 tourists	 and	 to	 assure	 locals,	 organised	 schools	 outreach	 sessions,	
promoted	Welsh-speakers	 in	 the	 company,	 and	 financially	 sponsored	 various	
local	initiatives	and	events.	As	in	1980s	the	nuclear	industry	seemed	to	be	out	
of	touch,	now	many	local	people	rather	see	the	anti-nuclear	activism	of	PAWB	
as	a	remnant	of	the	past.	
In	summary,	this	section	outlined	the	current	era	in	which	white	papers	marked	
key	steps	towards	a	new	nuclear	programme.	This	was	just	a	brief	overview	of	
the	 historical	 change	 to	 highlight	 some	 of	 the	 differences	 compared	 to	 the	
previous	eras	of	nuclear	construction	in	the	UK.	The	section	sets	the	scene	for	
several	issues	to	elaborate	on	in	the	next	chapters,	such	as	government	policies	
and	industry	challenges	in	Chapter	5,	novel	governance	arrangements,	including	
the	Energy	Island	Programme,	in	Chapter	6,	and	the	shift	from	public	inquiries	
to	public	consultations	in	Chapter	7.	The	planned	construction	of	Wylfa	Newydd	
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is	 a	 crucial	 and	 often	 overlooked	 project	 in	 the	 nuclear	 programme,	marking	
this	new	era	of	nuclear	megainvestments.	
2.7	CONCLUSION:	SUCCESSIVE	ERAS	OF	NUCLEAR	INVESTMENTS	IN	THE	UK	
This	chapter	drew	the	contours	of	three	successive	eras	of	megainvestment	in	
the	UK	from	the	perspective	of	the	Wylfa	site.	The	white	heat	era	(1950s-1970s)	
characterised	 the	 first	 nuclear	 programme,	 including	 construction	 of	 Wylfa,	
which	 was	 socioeconomically	 and	 culturally	 transformative	 for	 Anglesey.	 The	
white	elephant	era	 (1970s-1990s)	was	 characterised	by	political	 contestations	
and	 economic	 problems	 for	 nuclear	 constructions,	 exemplified	 with	 the	
eventually	cancelled	Wylfa	B	proposal,	which	sparked	opposition	by	PAWB.	The	
ongoing	white	paper	era	 (1990s-)	 paved	way	 to	 a	new	nuclear	programme	 in	
the	 context	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 neoliberal	 governance.	 The	 key	
characterisations	of	the	three	eras	are	summarised	in	Table	4.1.	
The	historical	 outlook	of	 this	 chapter	provides	 the	background	 for	 the	overall	
research	 aim	 (RA)	 of	 the	 project	 by	 situating	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 investment	
historically	 and	 outlining	 the	 current	 era	 of	 megainvestments.	 Several	 issues	
introduced	here	with	 regards	 to	 the	white	 papers	 era	will	 elaborated	 later	 in	
detail,	such	as	the	novel	government	approach	to	new	nuclear	and	key	policies,	
the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Energy	 Island	 based	 on	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd,	 and	
industry	 strives	 for	 a	 ‘nuclear	 renaissance’	 in	 Chapter	 5;	 the	 collaborations	
between	 government	 and	 industry	 to	 devise	 a	 new	 approach	 to	 govern	 new	
nuclear	in	Chapter	6;	the	shift	from	public	inquiries	to	public	consultations,	and	
the	 changes	 in	 industry	 engagement	 locally	 in	 Chapter	 7.	 These	 chapters	will	
complete	 the	 picture	 about	 this	 novel	 era	 of	megainvestments	 introduced	 in	
this	chapter.	
	
	
39
	
Ta
bl
e	
4.
1.
	C
om
pa
ris
on
	o
f	t
hr
ee
	e
ra
s	o
f	n
uc
le
ar
	in
ve
st
m
en
t	i
n	
th
e	
U
K	
Er
a 
Na
tio
na
l s
et
tin
g 
Lo
ca
l s
et
tin
g 
Ci
vil
 n
uc
lea
r i
nd
us
try
 
Po
lit
ica
l 
de
cis
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
Pu
bl
ic 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
Na
tio
na
l 
pu
bl
ic 
op
in
io
n 
Ke
y 
na
tio
na
l 
dr
ive
rs
 
Ke
y 
na
tio
na
l 
co
nc
er
ns
 
Ke
y l
oc
al 
dr
ive
rs
 
Ke
y 
lo
ca
l 
co
nc
er
ns
 
Ce
m
ae
s 
Hi
gh
 S
t –
 o
 
– m
et
er
 
Lo
ca
l 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
El
ec
tri
cit
y 
in
du
st
ry
 
In
du
st
ry
 
cu
ltu
re
 
In
du
st
ry
 is
su
es
 
In
ve
st
or
 
Re
gu
lat
io
n 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
Su
pp
ly 
ch
ain
 
W
hi
te
 
he
at
 
(1
95
0s
)-
19
60
s-
(1
97
0s
) 
Ex
tre
me
ly 
ce
ntr
ali
se
d 
an
d 
se
cre
tiv
e, 
oft
en
 
pla
nn
ing
- 
an
d 
en
gin
ee
rin
g-
dr
ive
n 
Lo
ca
l 
pu
bli
c 
inq
uir
y, 
tec
hn
ica
l 
iss
ue
s 
foc
us
ed
, 
als
o 
pu
bli
c 
ex
hib
itio
ns
 
Op
tim
ism
 
El
ec
trif
ica
tio
n, 
tec
hn
olo
gic
al 
pr
og
re
ss
, m
od
er
n 
na
tio
na
l 
ide
nti
ty 
an
d g
eo
po
liti
cs
 
Pr
es
er
vin
g 
am
en
ity
, 
nu
cle
ar
 
dis
ar
ma
me
nt 
Jo
b 
cre
ati
on
, 
mo
de
rn
isa
tio
n, 
ind
us
tria
lis
ati
on
  
Sp
oil
ing
 
the
 
lan
ds
ca
pe
 
Ma
jor
 
ch
an
ge
, 
W
ild
 W
es
t 
Ad
 
ho
c 
en
ga
ge
me
nt,
 
su
pp
or
t 
tak
en
 
for
 
gr
an
ted
 
Na
tio
na
lis
ed
 
ele
ctr
ici
ty 
ind
us
try
 
(C
EG
B)
, 
At
om
ic 
En
er
gy
 
Au
tho
rity
 
W
hit
e 
he
at,
 
ind
us
tria
l 
re
lat
ion
s, 
pla
nn
ing
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
Ch
oic
e 
of 
re
ac
tor
 
tec
hn
olo
gy
, 
riv
alr
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
ns
or
tia
 
Se
ve
ra
l 
co
ns
or
tia
 
co
mm
iss
ion
ed
 
by
 C
EG
B 
W
ea
k 
re
gu
lat
ion
, 
oft
en
 
na
ïve
 
se
lf-
re
gu
lat
ion
 
Do
me
sti
c 
de
sig
n 
(M
ag
no
x, 
lat
er
 A
GR
) 
W
ho
le 
sc
op
e 
W
hi
te
 
ele
ph
an
t 
(1
97
0s
)-
19
80
s-
(1
99
0s
) 
Ce
ntr
ali
se
d, 
se
cre
tiv
e, 
oft
en
 
ec
on
om
ics
-
dr
ive
n 
Bi
g 
pu
bli
c 
inq
uir
y, 
ge
ne
ra
l 
sc
op
e 
An
tag
on
ism
 
De
pe
nd
en
ce
 
on
 
co
al 
ind
us
try
,  
Nu
cle
ar
 
ac
cid
en
t, 
ca
nc
er
 
clu
ste
rs,
 
mi
lita
ry-
ind
us
try
 
co
mp
lex
, 
se
cre
tiv
e 
sta
te,
 
fin
an
cia
l 
co
sts
 
(Jo
b c
re
ati
on
) 
W
els
h 
lan
gu
ag
e, 
en
vir
on
me
nta
lis
m 
He
yd
ay
 
Go
od
 
em
plo
ye
r, 
bu
t 
ba
d 
ne
igh
bo
ur
 
Gr
ad
ua
l 
sli
cin
g 
up
 
an
d 
pr
iva
tis
ati
on
 
Un
ion
s 
un
de
r 
pr
es
su
re
, 
pla
nn
ing
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
Re
gu
lat
or
y 
ap
pr
ov
al,
 
re
pr
oc
es
sin
g 
an
d 
nu
cle
ar
 
wa
ste
, 
ind
us
tria
l 
re
lat
ion
s 
Si
ng
le 
co
ns
or
tiu
m 
co
mm
iss
ion
ed
 
by
 C
EG
B 
Ind
ep
en
de
nt 
sa
fet
y 
re
gu
lat
ion
, 
str
ict
er
 c
os
t 
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
 
Na
tio
na
lis
ed
 
de
sig
n 
(P
W
R)
 
W
ho
le 
sc
op
e?
 
W
hi
te
 
pa
pe
rs
 
20
00
s-
20
10
s 
Mu
lti-
lev
el,
 
mo
re
 
tra
ns
pa
re
nt,
 
Ind
us
try
 
lob
by
ism
 
Pu
bli
c 
co
ns
ult
ati
on
s 
on
 
sp
ec
ial
ise
d 
top
ics
 
Re
luc
tan
t 
ac
ce
pta
nc
e 
Cl
im
ate
 
ch
an
ge
, 
en
er
gy
 
se
cu
rity
, 
re
ind
us
tria
lis
ati
on
, 
glo
ba
l c
om
pe
titi
on
 
Ec
on
om
ics
 
of 
nu
cle
ar
 
po
we
r, 
pu
bli
c 
su
bs
idi
es
 
Jo
b 
cre
ati
on
, 
re
ind
us
tria
lis
ati
on
, 
so
cio
ec
on
om
ic 
be
ne
fit 
co
ntr
ibu
tio
ns
 
La
nd
sc
ap
e, 
inf
lux
 
of 
wo
rke
rs 
Re
im
ag
ini
ng
 
a 
vil
lag
e 
Hi
gh
 S
t 
Go
od
 
ne
igh
bo
ur
 
Bi
g 
Si
x 
glo
ba
lis
ing
 
ma
rke
ts 
Co
rp
or
ate
 
ma
na
ge
ria
l 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
Ca
pit
ali
sa
tio
n, 
lac
k 
of 
or
de
rs,
 
dim
ini
sh
ing
 
co
ns
tru
cti
on
 
ca
pa
bil
ity
, 
de
co
mm
iss
ion
ing
 
an
d 
nu
cle
ar
 
wa
ste
 
Mu
ltin
ati
on
al 
nu
cle
ar
 
ve
nd
or
 
St
ro
ng
 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
nu
cle
ar
 
re
gu
lat
or
, 
GD
A,
 
ma
rke
t 
re
gu
lat
ion
, 
str
ict
 
wo
rk 
sa
fet
y 
Fo
re
ign
 
de
sig
n 
(E
PR
, 
AB
W
R,
 
AP
10
00
) 
Lim
ite
d 
sc
op
e 
	 40	
CHAPTER	 3.	 LITERATURE	 REVIEW:	 BEYOND	 ENERGY	
TRANSITIONS	
3.1	INTRODUCTION	
A	nuclear	construction	project	 is	an	unusual	research	topic.	 I	am	not	aware	of	
any	 social	 science	works	 on	 a	 nuclear	 construction	 projects,	 except	 for	 some	
quantitative	 socioeconomic	 assessments	 (Chadwick	 and	 Glasson	 1999,	 1999;	
Glasson	 2005;	 Glasson,	 van	 Der	 Wee,	 and	 Barrett	 1988)	 and	 ethnographies	
written	 by	 journalists	 about	 construction	workers	 at	 the	 Paks	 construction	 in	
the	 1980s	 in	 Hungarian	 (Vicsek	 1988)	 and	 at	 the	 more	 recent	 Olkiluoto	 3	
construction	 in	 Finnish	 (Kontula	 2010).	 Typing	 construction	 and	 nuclear	 in	
Google	scholar,	however,	provides	more	results	about	the	social	constructivist	
perspectives	on	nuclear	power	than	about	actual	constructions.	Looking	beyond	
just	nuclear,	there	are	only	a	handful	of	in-depth	social	science	case	studies	of	
megainvestment	 projects	 (Barry	 2013;	 Pink	 et	 al.	 2010).	 In	 the	 literature	 on	
nuclear	 power,	 construction	 projects	 are	 off	 the	 radar,	 and	 the	 focus	 is	
primarily	 on	 nuclear	 policies,	 operational	 nuclear	 plants,	 and	 resulting	
radioactive	 waste	 issues.	 Indeed	 there	 is	 not	 much	 ‘nuclear’	 in	 nuclear	
constructions	as	the	exceptionality	of	nuclear	power	is	primarily	associated	with	
radiation	 (Hecht	 2007,	 2006).	 Nuclear	 power,	 however,	 is	 unique	 among	
traditional	electricity	generating	technologies	 in	the	sense	that	the	discounted	
cost	 over	 the	 entire	 lifetime	 or	 the	 reactor	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 construction	
cost,	vastly	exceeding	fuel	and	operation	and	maintenance	(O&M)	costs.	From	
the	point	of	view	of	 the	research	project,	 the	exceptionality	of	nuclear	power	
draws	 just	 as	much	 on	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 nuclear	 ‘construction’	 as	 about	
radiation	risks.	
The	 megainvestment	 is	 addressed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 energy	 transitions.	 As	 I	
outlined	 in	the	 introductory	chapter,	Wylfa	Newydd	is	situated	 in	the	 junction	
of	 various	 spaces	 of	 experimentation	 transforming	 the	 energy	 system.	 The	
literature	 on	 the	 blossoming	 energy	 transitions	 research	 field	 is,	 therefore,	 a	
convenient	starting	point	 (Geels	and	Schot	2010;	Markard,	Raven,	and	Truffer	
2012;	 Verbong	 and	 Loorbach	 2012).	 In	 particular,	 the	multi-level	 perspective	
(MLP)	 provides	 an	 exceptionally	 popular	 conceptual	 framework	 to	 address	
sociotechnical	 change	as	 a	dynamic	between	micro-,	meso-,	 and	macro-levels	
(Geels	 2002,	 2004,	 2011;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010;	 Rip	 and	 Kemp	 1998).	 These	
transitions	 concepts	 have	 been	 productive	 in	 orienting	 scholarly	 attention	
beyond	 particular	 technologies	 and	 towards	 multifaceted	 energy	
transformations	 in	 the	 intersection	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 structuration.	 The	
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allure	 of	 MLP,	 however,	 has	 also	 led	 to	 criticisms	 that	 this	 neat	 framework	
obscured	 important	 aspects	 of	 sociotechnical	 change	 (Geels	 2011;	 Shove	 and	
Walker	 2007;	 Smith,	 Voß,	 and	 Grin	 2010).	 The	 negligence	 and	
underconceptualisation	 of	 geographies	 and	 politics	 of	 transitions	 are	 among	
these	crucial	blind	spots	(Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Coenen	and	Truffer	2012;	Hansen	
and	 Coenen	 2015;	 Lawhon	 and	Murphy	 2012;	Meadowcroft	 2011;	 Späth	 and	
Rohracher	2010).	There	was	some	uptake	of	these	critical	issues	in	the	field	but	
often	without	challenging	the	foundations	of	transitions	research	(Bergek	et	al.	
2015;	 Geels	 2014;	 Raven,	 Schot,	 and	 Berkhout	 2012b;	 Truffer,	 Murphy,	 and	
Raven	 2015).	 The	 ambivalent	 relationship	 towards	 transitions	 concepts,	
especially	the	multi-level	perspective,	is	central	to	this	research.	
In	understanding	 the	critical	points	of	 the	 transitions	approach,	especially	 the	
MLP	 framework,	 insights	 from	human	 geography	 and	 science	 and	 technology	
studies	 (STS)	 are	 particularly	 productive.	 While	 in	 MLP	 ontological	 and	
methodological	 questions	 are	 often	 treated	 as	 an	 afterthought	 (Geels	 2010,	
2011),	 the	 debates	 in	 the	 above	 disciplines	 have	 been	 centred	 around	
challenging	 the	 very	 cores	 of	 what	 space,	 society,	 politics,	 and	 knowledge	
mean,	 especially	 around	 relationality	 and	 sociomateriality	 (Braun,	Whatmore,	
and	 Stengers	 2010;	 Jasanoff	 2004;	 Latour	2005b;	 Law	2004;	 Law	and	Hassard	
1999;	 Massey	 2005;	 Mol	 2002;	 Mol	 and	 Law	 1994).	 As	 a	 result,	 these	 fields	
provide	 novel	 insights	 that	 can	 enrich	 transition	 thinking.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
conceptual	language	of	this	thesis	aims	to	go	beyond	the	sometimes	restrictive	
phraseology	 of	 transition	 studies	 and	 reach	 towards	 diverse	 insights	 from	
human	geography	and	STS	in	particular.	
Therefore	 interdisciplinarity	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 thesis.	While	 the	 research	
project	 does	 not	 confine	 itself	 to	 advancing	 a	 transitions	 framework,	 such	 as	
MLP,	by	 importing	concepts	 from	other	 fields,	neither	does	 it	 leave	 transition	
approaches	 entirely	 behind.	 This	 interdisciplinarity	 is	 rather	 driven	 by	 the	
challenge	 of	 understanding	 the	 megainvestment	 project.	 The	 thesis	 is	 not	
rooted	in	one	discipline	but	rather	aims	to	use	insights	from	different	disciplines	
to	understand	 the	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment.	Therefore	 the	emphasis	 is	
not	 on	 developing	 a	 coherent	 theoretical	 approach,	 but	 rather	 on	 taking	
advantage	of	the	diversity	of	perspectives	regarding	the	megainvestment.		
In	 the	 coming	 sections	 I	 review	 various	 literatures	 with	 regards	 to	 their	
relevance	 in	 understanding	 the	megaproject	 and	 providing	 insights	 about	 the	
research	 questions	 of	 the	 thesis.	 In	 section	 2,	 I	 review	 the	 social	 science	
literature	on	nuclear	power	with	a	focus	on	the	discrepancy	between	studying	
nuclear	sites	and	nuclear	policies.	In	section	3,	I	address	the	blossoming	field	of	
energy	 transitions	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 three	 blind	 spots,	 namely	 the	 empirical	
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operationalisation	 of	 the	 concept	 regime,	 the	 geography	 of	 transitions,	 and	
their	 inherent	 political	 and	 participatory	 aspects.	 In	 section	 4,	 I	 use	 core	
geography	concepts	to	address	the	spatial	aspects	of	energy	transitions	and	the	
construction	project,	and	to	highlight	the	lack	of	literature	on	megainvestment	
in	 researching	 infrastructures.	 In	 section	 5,	 I	 use	 STS	 concepts	 to	 unpack	 the	
knowledge	 and	 expertise	 in	 governance	 as	 well	 as	 in	 publics	 and	 public	
engagement.	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 I	 conclude	 the	 chapter	 by	 highlighting	 the	
issues	 this	 literature	 review	raises	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 three	 research	questions	
respectively.	
3.2	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	LITERATURE	ON	NUCLEAR	POWER	
Social	 science	 interest	 in	 nuclear	 power	 resonates	 with	 concurrent	 public	
discussions.	Until	 the	1970s,	 the	scarce	publicly	available	 literature	on	nuclear	
power	was	focused	on	technology	issues.	Social	or	political	aspects	were	hardly	
articulated	 about	 this	 industry	 shrouded	 in	 a	 culture	 of	 secrecy.	 In	 the	 late	
1970s	and	1980s,	a	distinctive	social	science	 literature	emerged	together	with	
the	rise	of	anti-nuclear	activism	focusing	on	technological	risk	(Beck	1995,	1992,	
1987;	 Douglas	 1994;	 Douglas	 and	 Wildavsky	 1982;	 Slovic	 2000),	 cultures	 of	
democracy	 and	 secrecy	 (Massey	 1988;	 O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	 1988;	
Wynne	 2011),	 social	 movements	 (Rudig	 1994,	 1990;	 Welsh	 2001),	 and	 the	
history	 of	 nuclear	 power	 decisions	 (Gowing	 1974a,	 1974b;	 Hannah	 1982;	
Williams	1980).	Social	science	literature	reflected	the	anti-nuclear	public	mood	
of	 the	white	elephant	era	 in	 the	UK	and	elsewhere.	As	 the	 interest	 in	nuclear	
power	 tailed	 off,	 the	 literature	 become	 more	 focused	 on	 discussing	 nuclear	
power	 in	 the	 context	 of	 liberalised	markets	 (MacKerron	 1996,	 2004;	 Thomas	
1988,	2005),	climate	change	and	public	attitudes	(Bickerstaff	et	al.	2008;	Corner	
et	al.	2011;	Grove-White	et	al.	2006;	Pidgeon,	Lorenzoni,	and	Poortinga	2008;	
Poortinga,	 Pidgeon,	 and	 Lorenzoni	 2006),	 and	 nuclear	 waste	 (Blowers	 2010,	
1999;	Chilvers	2007;	Chilvers	and	Burgess	2008)	Currently,	there	is	a	rising	social	
science	 interest	 in	 the	 topic,	 in	 the	UK	 especially,	with	 a	 focus	 on	 issues	 like	
‘nuclear	 renaissance’	 (Goodfellow,	 Williams,	 and	 Azapagic	 2011;	 Johnstone	
2010;	 Nuttall	 2004),	 the	 effect	 of	 Fukushima	 on	 nuclear	 policies	 and	 public	
opinion	 (Blowers	 2011;	 Elliott	 2012;	 Poortinga,	 Aoyagi,	 and	 Pidgeon	 2013;	
WNISR	 2015),	 and	 the	 role	 of	 nuclear	 power	 in	 an	 electricity	 system	 in	
transition	 (Elliott	 2007;	 Johnstone	 and	 Stirling	 2015;	 Scrase	 and	 MacKerron	
2009;	Sovacool	2011).	
This	 review	 on	 the	 social	 science	 literature	 on	 nuclear	 power	 is	 selective.	 It	
primarily	 focuses	on	 the	UK	academic	 literature	with	 references	 to	 influential	
works	 in	English	written	 in,	and	often	on,	other	 countries.	The	 relevant	 social	
science	 literatures	 in	 different	 countries	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 national	 nuclear	
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programmes	and	particular	nuclear	facilities	(Hecht	2009;	Schmid	2015;	Welsh	
2003;	 Williams	 1980;	 Wynne	 2011).	 Academic	 works	 on	 nuclear	 power	 are	
sometimes	 connected	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 (Gowing	 1974a,	 1974b;	 Roberts	
1999),	 which	 is	 outside	 of	 my	 scope.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 review	 is	 on	 the	
qualitative	 studies,	 and	 I	mostly	 ignore	more	 quantitative	 studies	 typically	 on	
economic	 issues,	such	as	cost	comparisons	or	emissions	calculations	(Kennedy	
2007;	MacKerron	1992;	Roques	et	al.	2006).	
In	the	next	two	sections,	I	highlight	two	broad	academic	fields.	In	section	one,	I	
address	 risk	 as	 a	 dominant	 framework	 in	 approaching	 nuclear	 power,	 with	
particular	focus	on	public	attitudes	and	nuclear	sites.	In	section	two,	I	focus	on	
the	 critical	 social	 science	 literature	 on	 ‘national’	 nuclear	 decisions	
encompassing	a	broad	range	of	issues,	such	as	technocratic	politics,	democratic	
publics	and	technical	expertise.	These	are	not	conflicting	approaches	but	rather	
complementing	fields	with	a	number	of	overlaps	(e.g.,	risk	society	and	reflexive	
governance,	siting	controversies).	
3.2.1	RISK	AND	NUCLEAR	SITES	
Nuclear	 power	 caught	 the	 attention	 of	 social	 sciences	 primarily	 through	
technological	risk,	and	this	framework	remained	important	albeit	to	a	lessening	
degree.	 In	 the	 risk	 research,	 nuclear	 power	 has	 been	 a	 central	 topic	 from	
behavioural	 psychologies	 to	 far-reaching	 social	 theories	 (Beck	 1992;	 Douglas	
and	Wildavsky	1982;	Fischhoff	1983;	Irwin,	Allan,	and	Welsh	2000;	Slovic,	Flynn,	
and	 Layman	1991).	 A	 social	 notion	of	 risk	was	 first	 introduced	 as	 opposed	 to	
calculations	of	 technological	 risk	 by	 the	nuclear	 expert	 Chauncey	 Starr	 (1969)	
through	the	example	of	atomic	power	plant	safety.	In	the	engineering	approach	
of	Probabilistic	Risk	Assessment	(PRA),	technological	risk	is	characterised	by	the	
probability	or	likelihood	of	occurrence	of	an	adverse	event	and	by	the	severity	
or	 magnitude	 of	 the	 possible	 adverse	 consequences	 of	 that	 event.	 This	 is	
formulised	as	! = !! ∗ !!,	where	!! 	denotes	the	likelihood	of	an	event	and	!! 	
its	severity	(Goodfellow,	Williams,	and	Azapagic	2011).	In	contrast,	Starr	(1969)	
addressed	 social	 perceptions	 of	 risk	 by	 considering	 various	 factors	 that	make	
risks	more	acceptable,	like	voluntary	vs	involuntary	risks	(e.g.,	driving	accidents	
vs	nuclear	accidents).	The	article	gave	rise	to	a	vast	literature	on	subjective	risk	
perception	by	the	Psychometric	School	(Fischhoff	et	al.	1978;	Slovic	1987,	2000.	
Drawing	 on	 the	 identification	 of	 various	 heuristics	 and	 biases	 in	 subjective	
assessments	 of	 risks	 (Kahneman	 and	 Tversky	 1979;	 Tversky	 and	 Kahneman	
1974),	the	psychometric	school	addressed	risk	perceptions	as	quantifiable	and	
predictable	 (Fischhoff	 et	 al.	 1978;	 Slovic	 1987,	 2000).	 Psychometric	 research	
assessed	 the	 various	 factors	 and	 heuristics	 that	 guide	 individual	 risk	
perceptions.	 For	 psychometricians,	 risk	 follows	 general	 rules	 driven	 by	 the	
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characteristics	 of	 respective	 risk	 and	 socio-structural	 factors,	 such	 as	 affect,	
emotions,	 and	 stigma	 (Slovic	 2000).	 The	perceived	 risks	of	nuclear	power,	 for	
example,	are	seen	particularly	higher	than	the	calculated	risks	due	to	the	lack	of	
technical	knowledge,	dreadfulness	of	the	effects	and	the	high	number	of	people	
potentially	 affected	 (Goodfellow,	 Williams,	 and	 Azapagic	 2011).	 While	
psychometric	 research	particularly	 focused	on	how	subjective	risk	perceptions	
differ	 from	 objective	 calculations	 of	 risk,	 Charles	 Perrow	 and	 his	 colleagues	
were	particularly	 influential	 in	criticising	 the	calculability	of	 ‘objective’	nuclear	
risks	 through	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘normal	 accidents’	 in	 complex	 tightly	 coupled	
systems	(Perrow	1984;	Rijpma	1997).	
The	 subsequent	 debate	 produced	 a	 shift	 from	 individual	 explanations	 of	 risk	
perception	 toward	 social	 patterns	 of	 technological	 risk	 apprehension.	 Most	
notably,	the	Cultural	Theory	of	risk,	developed	by	anthropologists	Mary	Douglas	
and	political	scientists	Aaron	Wildavsky,	asserts	that	risk	perceptions	are	driven	
by	 social	 norms,	 like	 power,	 justice	 and	 legitimacy	 (Douglas	 and	 Wildavsky	
1982;	Douglas	1994).	Moreover,	 risk	perceptions	are	 filtered	 through	 types	of	
social	 organisations	 in	 building	 up	 their	 group/grid	 matrix	 of	 egalitarian,	
collectivist,	individualistic	or	hierarchical	societies,	for	which	nuclear	power	and	
anti-nuclear	 organisations	 are	 the	 primary	 examples	 (Douglas	 and	 Wildavsky	
1982).	More	recently,	even	psychologists	broadened	their	perspective	on	how	
wider	social	influences,	such	as	trust,	affect	risk	perceptions	(Slovic	1993;	Slovic,	
Flynn,	 and	 Layman	 1991).	 From	 these	 efforts,	 the	 social	 amplification	 of	 risk	
framework	(SARF)	aims	to	integrate	cognitive,	social	and	cultural	perspectives	in	
discussing	 how	 risks	 are	 amplified	 or	 attenuated	 through	 public	 attention	
(Kasperson	et	al.	1988;	Pidgeon,	Kasperson,	and	Slovic	2003).	
Theorists	of	the	risk	society	looked	at	risk	not	just	as	a	social	phenomena,	but	as	
becoming	 the	 central	 organising	 concept	 of	 modern	 societies	 in	 a	 transition	
from	classic	industrial	societies	(Adam,	Beck,	and	Loon	2000;	Beck	1995,	1992;	
Anthony	 Giddens	 2015;	 Luhmann	 2005).	 The	 term	 ‘risk	 society’	 refers	 to	 an	
unfolding	socio-economic	era,	where	the	issues	concerning	the	production	and	
distribution	 of	 risks	 overshadow	 the	 conflicts	 around	 the	 production	 and	
distribution	 of	 material	 wealth.	 The	 original	 edition	 of	 Risk	 Society	 by	 the	
German	sociologist	Ulrich	Beck	came	out	together	with	the	shock	of	Chernobyl	
(Beck	1987).	In	parallel	with	the	transformation	from	industrial	(class)	societies	
to	risk	societies	we	also	entered	the	era	of	reflexive	modernisation.	This	means	
both	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	 preparation	 for	 the	 future	 are	
becoming	 primary	 activities	 of	 late	 modern	 societies,	 exemplified	 by	 the	
precautionary	 principle	 or	 the	 notion	 of	 sustainability.	 The	 increasing	 role	 of	
risks	 and	 reflexive	process	on	 risks	 go	hand	 in	hand.	Risk	 society	 is	 "a	 society	
increasingly	preoccupied	with	the	future	(and	also	with	safety),	which	generates	
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the	notion	of	 risk”	 (Giddens	1999:	3).	Nuclear	power	has	become	the	primary	
symbol	of	technological	dangers	out	of	control	in	modern	societies	(Beck	1987).	
Nuclear	sites	have	particularly	been	addressed	by	risk	research	as	case	studies	
of	 the	 perception	 and	 distribution	 of	 risks	 (Slovic,	 Layman,	 and	 Flynn	 1991;	
Slovic	et	al.	1991;	Slovic,	Flynn,	and	Layman	1991).	Living	around	a	nuclear	site	
equates	 to	 living	 with	 risk.	 Even	 studies	 outside	 of	 risk	 research	 tend	 to	
characterise	 nuclear	 sites	 through	 derived	 facets	 of	 living	 in	 a	 high-risk	
environment,	 such	 as	 economic	 dependence	 (Wynne,	 Waterton,	 and	 Grove-
White	 1993),	 social	 peripheriality	 (Blowers	 2010,	 1999;	 Blowers	 and	 Leroy	
1994),	and	normalisation	of	risk	(Zonabend	1993).	Most	studies	imply	a	sense	of	
anxiety	 or	 even	 blind-foldedness	 rooted	 in	 the	 vulnerability	 in	 living	with	 risk	
(Blowers	 2010;	 Blowers	 and	 Leroy	 1994;	Wynne,	Waterton,	 and	Grove-White	
1993;	Zonabend	1993).	Siting	nuclear	facilities	has	been	a	particular	interest	in	
social	 sciences	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	 social	 acceptance	 of	 high-risk	
facilities	 (Bickerstaff	 2012;	 Blowers	 2010;	 Eiser	 and	 Pligt	 1995;	 Grimston,	
Nuttall,	and	Vaughan	2014;	Openshaw	1982).	
I	 am	 aware	 of	 only	 one	 ethnographic	 research	 of	 nuclear	 sites	 in	 the	 UK	 by	
Karen	 Bickerstaff	 near	 Sellafield	 (Bickerstaff	 2012).	 Existing	 studies	 have	 used	
either	 qualitative	 interviewing	 (Davies	 2012;	 Wynne,	 Waterton,	 and	 Grove-
White	 1993)	 or	 quantitative	 surveys	 (Chadwick	 and	 Glasson	 1999;	 Glasson	
2013;	Glasson,	van	der	Wee,	and	Barrett	1988,	1988).	Beyond	the	UK,	there	is	
Zonabend’s	 well-known	 study	 of	 the	 Le	 Havre	 nuclear	 facility	 in	 France	
(Zonabend	 1993),	 plus	 a	 few	 ethnographies	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 sites	
(Gusterson	1998;	Masco	2006).	
In	the	UK,	the	Understanding	Risk	Research	Group	conducted	research	on	both	
the	 national	 public	 acceptance	 of	 nuclear	 power	 in	 the	 context	 of	 climate	
change	(Bickerstaff	et	al.	2008;	Butler,	Parkhill,	and	Pidgeon	2011;	Corner	et	al.	
2011;	Pidgeon,	Lorenzoni,	and	Poortinga	2008;	Poortinga,	Aoyagi,	and	Pidgeon	
2013;	Poortinga,	Pidgeon,	and	Lorenzoni	2006;	Spence	et	al.	2010)	and	on	the	
local	 attitudes	 towards	 nuclear	 power	 at	 the	Oldbury,	Hinkley,	 Bradbury,	 and	
Sizewell	sites	(Butler	et	al.	2015;	Parkhill	et	al.	2011,	2010;	Pidgeon	et	al.	2008;	
Venables	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Venables	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Their	 studies	 often	 go	 beyond	 a	
perspective	of	risk,	and	address	the	sense	of	place,	humour,	and	affect	in	living	
with	 nuclear	 power.	 In	 addition,	 Sellafield	 has	 also	 been	 studied	 using	
qualitative	interviews	(Blowers	1999;	Bolter	1996;	Davies	2012;	Haraldsen	2016;	
Macgill	1987;	Wynne,	Waterton,	and	Grove-White	1993).	
In	this	research,	I	address	three	limitations	on	the	literature	of	risks	and	nuclear	
power,	especially	with	regards	to	nuclear	sites.	First,	many	studies	tend	to	limit	
living	 with	 nuclear	 power,	 both	 near	 nuclear	 facilities	 and	 elsewhere,	 to	 the	
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exposure	of	 risk.	The	 fieldwork	around	the	existing	Wylfa	site,	however,	drew	
my	attention	to	the	multifaceted	experience	of	living	with	nuclear	power.	In	the	
Cemaes	area,	both	the	existing	and	planned	nuclear	power	plants	were	rather	
seen	 as	 questions	 of	 employment	 and	 livelihood,	 or	 language	 and	 cultural	
identity,	than	of	risk	and	accidents.	
Second,	studies	of	nuclear	sites	tend	to	limit	their	interest	to	operational	power	
plants	 (and,	 to	 some	 extent,	waste	 facilities)	 as	 sources	 of	 radiation	 hazards.	
Nuclear	constructions,	however,	are	almost	entirely	neglected	in	the	literature,	
despite	 these	 dwarf	 the	 actual	 plant	 operation	 in	 terms	 of	 financial	 cost	 or	
employed	 workforce	 (Chadwick	 and	 Glasson	 1999;	 Glasson	 2013,	 2005;	
Glasson,	 van	 Der	 Wee,	 and	 Barrett	 1988).	 In	 this	 case	 study,	 I	 highlight	 the	
sheer	scale	of	a	nuclear	megainvestment	and	the	wide-ranging	socioeconomic,	
cultural	and	political	transformations	it	means.	
Third,	nuclear	sites	tend	to	be	approached	as	isolated	and	homogenous	places.	
However,	 the	 boundaries	 of	 nuclear	 sites	 are	 not	 easily	 drawn.	My	 fieldwork	
revealed	 the	 negotiation	 of	 geographies	 of	 nuclear	 sites,	 in	 particular	 how	
boundaries	of	‘local	impacts’	and	‘local	employment’	are	drawn.	
In	summary,	nuclear	power	has	been	a	pivotal	topic	in	risk	research	in	various	
disciplines,	 from	psychology	 to	cultural	anthropology.	 In	addition	 to	 individual	
and	social	perceptions	of	risk,	nuclear	hazards	are	often	portrayed	against	the	
background	 of	 risk	 society,	 a	 new	 epoch	 of	 late	modernity.	 Nuclear	 sites	 are	
particularly	 important	 in	 understanding	 exposures	 to	 risk	 through	
understanding	 attitudes	 and	 siting	 conflicts.	 In	my	 thesis,	 however,	 I	 address	
three	limitations	of	the	research	on	risk	and	nuclear	sites,	namely	the	neglect	of	
multifaceted	 aspects	 of	 living	with	 nuclear	 power	 beyond	 risk,	 the	 neglect	 of	
nuclear	 constructions	 in	 contrast	 with	 operational	 facilities,	 and	 the	 isolated	
and	homogenous	notion	of	nuclear	sites.	
3.2.2	NUCLEAR	DECISIONS:	STATE,	DEMOCRACY,	AND	TECHNICAL	EXPERTISE	
Nuclear	 power	 decisions	 offer	 a	 way	 to	 understand	 how	 state	 and	 political	
institutions	 work.	 In	 this	 realm,	 nuclear	 power	 is	 often	 associated	 with	
authoritarian	politics	and	some	level	of	technological	determinism	(Collingridge	
1983;	 Winner	 1988).	 The	 decision-making	 jungle	 of	 politicians,	 industry	
managers	and	technical	experts	has	become	an	important	area	of	social	science	
nuclear	 scholarship,	 sometimes	 contrasted	 with	 laypeople	 and	 social	
movements.	 In	 the	UK,	 the	 first	 social	 scientists	 studying	nuclear	power	were	
the	 official	 archivists	 of	 the	 nationalised	 nuclear	 and	 electricity	 industries	
(Arnold	2007;	Gowing	1974a,	1974b,	1964;	Hannah	1982,	1979).	As	the	nuclear	
controversy	 emerged,	 however,	 there	 was	 an	 upsurge	 of	 critical	 scholarship	
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producing	 several	 monographs	 highlighting	 technocratic	 decision-making,	
undemocratic	 practices,	 and	 political	 secrecy	 in	 nuclear	 decisions	 (Elliott,	
Coyne,	 and	 George	 1978;	Massey	 1988;	 O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	 1988;	
Patterson	 1985;	 Walker	 2000,	 1999;	 Williams	 1980;	 Wynne	 2011).	 This	
literature	 review	 is	 not	 contrasting	 this	 research	 area	with	 the	 risk	 literature,	
rather	 complementing	 the	 two.	 For	 example,	 the	 political	 and	 bureaucratic	
governance	of	risks	through	scientific	and	regulatory	expertise	is	a	key	topic	of	
interest	 (O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	 1985;	Wynne	 1996).	Moreover,	much	
work	has	been	focused	on	critically	engaging	with	the	risk	society	and	reflexive	
governance	 issues	 (Irwin,	 Allan,	 and	 Welsh	 2000).	 The	 focal	 point	 of	 this	
literature	were	the	public	inquiries	about	nuclear	power,	namely	the	Windscale	
Inquiry	in	1977-1978	(Kemp	1983;	Walker	1999;	Wynne	2011)	and	the	Sizewell	
Inquiry	 in	 1982-1985	 (Davies	 1984;	 Ince	 1984;	 O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	
1988,	1985;	Purdue,	Kemp,	and	O’Riordan	1984;	J.	Walker	1987).	In	chapter	7,	I	
outline	the	politics	and	publics	imagined	of	these	inquiries	in	more	detail.	
The	 above	 studies	 are	 primarily	 focused	 on	 the	 British	 state	machinery.	 Even	
studies	of	public	inquiries	about	nuclear	facilities,	such	as	THORP	at	Windscale	
or	 the	 Sizewell	 B	 station,	 focused	 on	 addressing	 the	 political	 institutions	 of	
‘national’	nuclear	decisions.	 The	exception	 is	 the	work	of	Brian	Wynne	 (1996,	
1992a)	 on	 the	 controversy	 of	 sheep-farming	 bans	 in	 Cumbria	 after	 the	
radioactive	 Chernobyl	 fallout.	 The	 case	 study	 contrasted	 the	 local	 practical	
knowledge	of	the	farmers	with	the	academic	and	regulatory	knowledge	of	the	
state	 experts	 that	 revealed	 complex	 issues	 of	 social	 identities,	 trust,	 and	
accepted	knowledge	(Wynne	1996,	1992a),	as	I	will	describe	in	subsection	3.5.3.	
Looking	 at	 countries	 beyond	 the	UK,	 there	 are	 clear	 similarities	 to	 the	British	
nuclear	 programme,	 such	 as	 the	 historical	 rivalries	 between	 the	military	 and	
power	 sectors	 over	 ‘national’	 nuclear	 designs	 (Hecht	 2009;	 Schmid	 2015),	
reshaping	 of	 national	 identities	 through	 technological	 prowess	 (Hecht	 2009;	
Jasanoff	 and	 Kim	 2009),	 linking	 nuclear	 technology	 to	 autocratic	 politics		
Sovacool	 2012;	Winner	 1988),	 or	 the	 secretive	 and	 technologically	 optimistic	
industry	culture	 (Hilgartner,	Bell,	and	O’Connor	1982;	Perin	2005).	Particularly	
relevant	is	the	acclaimed	historical	monograph	of	Gabrielle	Hecht	(2009)	on	the	
French	 nuclear	 programme,	 which	 she	 centres	 on	 two	 competing	
technopolitical	regimes.	
The	emerging	anti-nuclear	movements	offered	other	ways	 to	address	political	
institutions.	 Particular	 attention	 has	 been	 put	 on	 how	 social	 movements	 are	
influential	through	political	opportunity	structures.	This	meant	that	there	were	
several	 political	 comparisons	 between	 mainly	 Western	 European	 countries	
using	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	factors	(Chafer	1985;	Rucht	1995;	Rudig	
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1990).	These	 indicated	a	 relatively	weak	anti-nuclear	power	movement	 in	 the	
UK,	especially	compared	to	the	pacifist	one	(Rudig	1994).	
After	the	emergence	of	the	above	set	of	critical	social	science	literature	in	the	
late	1970s	and	1980s,	however,	liberalisation	created	a	very	different	context	in	
which	economics	perspectives	became	more	prominent	 in	academic	 literature	
(Helm	 2009,	 MacKerron	 	 1996,	 1992,	 2004;	 MacKerron;	 Newbery	 and	 Pollitt	
1997;	 Taylor	 2007).	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 climate	 change,	 however,	 a	 new	 nuclear	
research	 agenda	 reflected	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 potential	 ‘nuclear	 renaissance’	
(Ekins	 2004;	 Elliott	 2007)	 with	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 costs	 of	 nuclear	 (Kennedy	
2007),	 learning	 effect	 and	 commercialisation	 (Zimmerman	 1982),	
decarbonisation	potentials	 (Kannan	2009;	Roques	et	al.	2006),	energy	security	
(Watson	 and	 Scott	 2009),	 energy	 governance	 framework	 (Baker,	 Stoker,	 and	
Simpson	 2012;	 Baker	 and	 Stoker	 2015,	 2012a,	 2012b;	 Heffron	 2013),	
contractual	 structure	 (Wearne	 2015;	Wearne	 and	 Bird	 2010),	 public	 attitudes	
towards	nuclear	power	(Bickerstaff	et	al.	2008;	Corner	et	al.	2011;	Costa-Font,	
Rudisill,	and	Mossialos	2008;	Grove-White	et	al.	2006;	Pidgeon,	Lorenzoni,	and	
Poortinga	2008;	Poortinga,	Aoyagi,	and	Pidgeon	2013;	Poortinga,	Pidgeon,	and	
Lorenzoni	 2006),	 or	 the	 planning	 reform	 (Johnstone	 2014,	 2010).	 In	 general,	
academic	literature	reflected	a	move	towards	more	topical	aspects	with	regards	
to	 the	 nuclear	 programme,	 sometimes	 with	 a	 more	 pragmatic	 and	 policy-
oriented	approach	(Elliott	2007;	Nuttall	2004;	Sovacool	2012,	2011).	
In	 some	sense,	 this	PhD	 thesis	 is	 in	 the	 footsteps	of	 the	 critical	 social	 science	
approaches	addressing	nuclear	decisions,	including	historical	big	public	inquiries	
and	the	histories	of	national	nuclear	programmes	(Hecht	2009;	Williams	1980;	
Wynne	1996,	1992a,	2011).	While	the	insights	from	this	literature	enriched	my	
thinking,	this	research	also	aims	to	move	beyond	it	in	two	key	areas.	First,	while	
critical	 social	 science	 literature	 on	 nuclear	 power	 is	 strongly	 rooted	 in	 the	
1980s,	currently	we	are	in	a	very	different	era	with	liberalisation,	globalisation,	
and	 a	 supposedly	 more	 open	 governance.	 In	 particular,	 the	 big	 monolithic	
public	 inquires	 were	 replaced	 by	 fragmented	 public	 consultations	 in	 the	
planning	reform	(Johnstone	2014,	2013).	 In	chapter	7,	 for	example,	 I	highlight	
that	our	era	 is	more	characterised	by	 swamping	publics	with	 information	and	
consultations	about	nuclear	megainvestments	rather	than	a	lack	of	information	
and	 engagement.	 Second,	 nuclear	 sites	 often	 seem	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 passive	
background	of	‘national’	nuclear	decisions	in	the	UK.	A	few	historical	studies	in	
other	 countries,	 however,	 highlight	 nuclear	 sites	 offer	 exceptional	 ways	 to	
understand	‘national’	nuclear	industries	(Hecht	2009;	Schmid	2015).	Moreover,	
multi-level	governance,	from	devolution	to	global	companies,	challenge	locating	
nuclear	 decisions	 solely	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	nation	 state	 even	with	 the	
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prospect	 of	 Brexit.	 This	 research,	 in	 contrast,	 regards	 geographic	 connections	
and	scales	crucial	to	understand	how	nuclear	power	is	governed.	
3.3	ENERGY	TRANSITIONS	
The	 Wylfa	 megainvestment	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 transforming	
electricity	system.	The	dominant	cornerstones	of	electricity	provision	are	under	
challenge,	from	national	transmission	systems	to	home	electricity	use.	In	other	
words,	regimes	of	electricity	supply	are	pressed	by	emerging	technologies	and	
new	practices.	The	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment	is	situated	in	the	juncture	of	
various	 spaces	 of	 experimentation,	 which	 mark	 ways	 of	 how	 the	 regime	 of	
nuclear	electricity	generation	changes.	
The	study	of	transitions	of	sociotechnical	systems,	energy	 in	particular	(Araújo	
2014;	Foxon	et	al.	2013;	Garud	and	Karnøe	2003;	Geels	et	al.	2016;	Jacobsson	
and	Bergek	2004;	Jacobsson	and	Lauber	2006;	Kemp	2010;	Verbong	and	Geels	
2007;	 Verbong	 and	 Geels	 2012,	 2010;	 Verbong	 and	 Loorbach	 2012),	 is	 a	
burgeoning	interdisciplinary	research	field	(Geels	2011.Geels	2004,	Geels	2002;	
Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010;	Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2010c;	Markard,	 Raven,	 and	
Truffer	2012;	Smith,	Voß,	and	Grin	2010;	STRN	2010).	Transitions	are	systematic	
changes	 well	 beyond	 just	 a	 single	 technology	 (Smith,	 Voß,	 and	 Grin	 2010).	
Transitions	are	 long-term,	radical	changes	from	one	state	of	affairs	to	another	
involving	multiple	actors,	multiple	 levels	and	multiple	phases	 (G.	Verbong	and	
Loorbach	2012).	
The	 perspective	 of	 energy	 transitions	 is	 an	 obvious	 starting	 point	 in	
conceptually	understanding	the	case	study.	First,	transitions	highlight	shifts	on	a	
long	time-scale,	in	sync	with	the	research	aim	of	characterising	the	current	era	
of	 nuclear	 programme	 through	 the	 case	 study	of	Wylfa	Newydd.	 Second,	 the	
unit	of	analysis	is	not	simply	the	technology,	but	it	highlights	the	organisational	
and	sectoral	regime	aspects	as	well	as	the	broader	sociotechnical	landscape	in	
understanding	 technological	 change.	 Third,	 the	 transitions	 literature	 does	 not	
privilege	 one	 perspective,	 such	 as	 economic	 or	 cultural	 change,	 but	 aims	 to	
understand	the	multi-dimensionality	of	change.	The	literature,	however,	 is	not	
without	 blind	 spots	 (for	 example,	 the	 geographies	 and	 politics	 of	 transitions	
among	others).	This	research	has	a	somewhat	ambivalent	relationship	with	the	
academic	field.	
In	 the	 next	 subsection	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 outline	 the	 sociotechnical	 transitions	
literature,	 especially	 focusing	 on	 the	 dominant	 multi-level	 transitions	 (MLP)	
approach	 addressing	 the	 interaction	 between	 micro-level	 niche	 processes,	
meso-level	regime	transformations,	and	macro-level	landscape	pressures.	Then	
I	focus	on	three	blind	spots	of	transition	research.	In	subsection	3.3.2,	I	address	
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the	 empirical	 problems	 related	 to	 the	 application	 of	 the	 analytical	 MLP	
framework	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 regime.	 In	 subsection	
3.3.3,	I	address	the	blossoming	literature	on	the	geography	of	transitions	with	a	
particular	focus	on	how	spatiality	challenges	established	transition	concepts.	In	
subsection	3.3.4,	I	outline	the	politics	of	transitions,	which	is	often	either	simply	
ignored,	 or	 identified	with	 actor	 strategies	 and	 power.	 Similarly,	 participation	
and	democracy	in	transitions	is	tended	to	be	limited	to	legitimation.	
3.3.1	THE	CORE	CONCEPTS:	NICHE,	REGIME,	LANDSCAPE	
The	 heart	 of	 transition	 research	 is	 the	 understanding	 that	 a	 technological	
change	is	inevitably	a	social	change.	The	fundamental	claim	is	that	“transitions	
result	 from	 the	 interaction	 between	 innovative	 practices	 at	 the	 micro-level,	
incremental	change	induced	by	actors	who	operate	what	we	call	the	meso-	or	
regime-level,	 and	 quasi	 autonomous	 macro-dynamics”	 (Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	
Schot	2010a:	324).	Sociotechnical	transitions	are	(a)	co-evolutionary,	(b)	multi-
actor,	 (c)	 long-term	 processes	 resulting	 in	 (d)	 radical	 shifts	 from	 one	
configuration	 to	 another	 (e)	 on	 the	 large-scale	 (Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	
2010b;	G.	Verbong	and	Loorbach	2012:	7).	Transitions	can	be	explained	through	
the	 dynamics	 of	 micro-,	 meso-	 and	 macro-level	 processes,	 which	 is	 also	 the	
basis	 of	 the	 formal	multi-level	 perspective.	On	 the	micro-level,	 sociotechnical	
niches	 are	 “the	 locus	 for	 radical	 innovations”	 (Geels	 2011:	 26)	 through	
providing	 protective	 spaces	 for	 emerging	 technologies.	 On	 the	 meso-level,	
sociotechnical	 regimes	 are	 “the	 locus	 of	 established	 practices	 and	 associated	
rules	 that	 stabilise	 existing	 systems”	 (Geels	 2011:	 26).	 The	 socio-technical	
landscape	encompasses	all	exogenous	processes	outside	the	direct	influence	of	
regime	and	niche	actors,	such	as	“(1)	factors	that	do	not	change	or	that	change	
only	 slowly,	 such	 as	 climate;	 (2)	 long-term	 changes,	 such	 as	 German	
industrialisation	in	the	late	19th	century;	(3)	rapid	external	shocks,	such	as	wars	
or	fluctuations	in	the	price	of	oil.	This	varied	set	of	factors	can	be	combined	in	a	
single	 ‘landscape’	category,	because	they	form	an	external	context	that	actors	
cannot	influence	in	the	short	run.”	(Geels	and	Schot	2010:	403,	drawing	on	the	
typology	developed	by	Van	Driel	and	Schot,	2005).	
The	transition	field	 is	rooted	 in	an	understanding	of	technological	change	that	
fruitfully	combines	conceptions	from	various	disciplines	(Geels	2010;	Geels	and	
Schot	2010;	Rip	and	Kemp	1998;	 Schot	1998).	Drawing	on	 innovation	 studies,	
transition	 research	 addresses	 changes	 in	 a	 technology	 not	 in	 isolation	 but	 as	
integral	 to	 the	 co-evolutionary	 dynamics	 of	 wider	 technological	 and	
organisational	context,	epitomised	by	concepts	of	technological	regime	(Nelson	
and	Winter	 1982,	 1977)	 and	 technological	 paradigm	 (Dosi	 1988,	 1984,	 1982).	
Transition	 research	 is	 also	 infused	by	 the	 social	 constructivism	of	 science	and	
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technology	 studies,	 which	 addresses	 how	 technologies	 are	 inherently	 social	
illustrated	 by	 conceptual	 frameworks	 such	 as	 the	 Social	 Construction	 of	
Technology	 or	 SCOT	 (Bijker	 1997;	 Bijker,	 Hughes,	 and	 Pinch	 1987;	 Bijker	 and	
Law	1992;	Pinch	and	Bijker	1984),	Large	Technological	Systems	or	LTS	Hughes	
1993,	 1987,	 1986;	 Joerges	 1988),	 and	 Actor-Network	 Theory	 or	 ANT	 (Callon	
1987,	1986;	Latour	1992,	1991).	 In	addition,	other	approaches	have	also	been	
influential	 on	 specific	 transition	 approaches,	 such	 as	 neoinstitutionalism	 and	
structuration	 theory	 on	 the	 multi-level	 perspective	 (Geels	 2011,	 2010,	 2004;	
Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010,	 2007)	 or	 complex	 adaptive	 systems	 on	 transition	
management	 (Rotmans,	 Kemp,	 and	 van	 Asselt	 2001;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	
2010).	
Transitions	 are	 based	 on	 the	 duality	 of	 path-creation	 (innovation)	 and	 path-
dependence	 (lock-in).	On	 the	one	 side,	 innovation	 is	neither	an	unpredictable	
“manna	 from	 heaven”	 (Fagerberg	 2003:	 6),	 nor	 a	 predictable	 deterministic	
process.	 Innovation	 as	 a	 social	 process	 is	 shaped	 through	 actors	 and	 their	
interests	 and	 sense-making,	 as	 well	 as	 broader	 social	 and	 organisational	
contexts	 (Rip	 and	 Kemp	 1998).	 Innovation	 is	 characterised	 by	 non-linearity,	
tipping	points,	and	co-evolutionary	processes,	particularly	 in	 the	 technological	
niches.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 path-dependence	 and	 lock-ins	 highlight	 how	
incumbent	technologies	and	systems	get	entrenched,	particularly	in	the	regime	
(Unruh	 2000).	 These	 complex	 mechanisms	 of	 entrenchment	 include	
dependencies	 through	 historical	 institutions	 (Mahoney	 2000;	 North	 1990)	 as	
well	as	technological	lock-in	processes	characterised	by	learning	economies	and	
increasing	returns	of	scale	(Arthur	1989;	Cowan	1990;	David	1985).	Particularly	
relevant	for	this	thesis	is	Walker’s	(2000,	1999)	study	of	the	investment	decision	
in	 the	 THORP	 nuclear	 reprocessing	 facility	 at	 Sellafield.	 He	 highlights	 that	
political,	 institutional	 and	 organisational	 commitments	 rather	 than	 increasing	
financial	returns	or	technological	path-dependence	led	to	the	establishment	of	
the	 plant	 (Walker	 2000,	 1999).	 The	 above	 mechanisms	 of	 innovation	 and	
entrenchment	 of	 technologies	 provide	 the	 background	 to	 research	
sociotechnical	 transitions	 through	 the	 interaction	 of	 niches,	 regimes,	 and	
landscapes.	
Along	these	common	lines,	most	reviews	of	the	literature	identify	three	more	or	
less	 coherent	 approaches	 to	 sociotechnical	 transitions	 (Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	
Schot	 2010c;	 Kern	 2015;	Markard,	 Raven,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	 Smith,	 Voß,	 and	
Grin	2010;	Van	den	Bergh,	Truffer,	and	Kallis	2011),	the	multi-level	perspective	
or	 MLP	 (Geels	 2011,	 2010,	 2004,	 2002;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010,	 2007),	
technological	innovation	systems	or	TIS	(Bergek	et	al.	2015,	2008;	Carlsson	et	al.	
2002;	 Carlsson	 and	 Stankiewicz	 1991;	 Edquist	 1997;	 Staffan	 Jacobsson	 and	
Bergek	2011),	and	 transition	management	or	TM	(Grin	2010;	Rotmans,	Kemp,	
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and	van	Asselt	2001;	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	2010).	First,	multi-level	perspective	
is	the	most	dominant	formal	analytical	approach	in	transition	studies	based	on	
a	 heuristic	 framework	 to	 study	 the	 transitional	 dynamics	 between	 niche,	
regime,	 and	 landscape	 levels.	 It	 provides	 a	 rigorous	 conceptual	 scheme	 to	
analyse	 the	 patterns	 of	 stability	 and	 change	 in	 sociotechnical	 systems.	 The	
perspective	has	been	refined	through	historical	case	studies	(Geels	2004;	Geels	
and	Verhees	2011;	Turnheim	and	Geels	2012)	and	integration	of	concepts	from	
various	fields,	from	STS	to	structuration	theory	(Geels	2011,	2010,	2004).	MLP	is	
intrinsically	 linked	 to	 strategic	 niche	 management	 (SNM),	 a	 more	 policy-
oriented	 approach	 to	 promote	 innovations	 not	 by	 ineffective	 and	 politically	
problematic	 conventional	 means	 (e.g.,	 economic	 incentives)	 but	 through	 a	
learning-by-doing	 process	 of	 facilitating	 and	 sheltering	 emerging	 technologies	
via	 coupling	 of	 expectations,	 various	 articulation	 processes,	 and	 network	
formation	 (Kemp,	 Schot,	 and	 Hoogma	 1998;	 Lovell	 2007;	 Smith	 and	 Raven	
2012).	
Second,	 the	 technological	 innovations	 system	 (TIS)	 approach	 is	 oriented	
towards	 how	 different	 institutional	 settings,	 together	 with	 associated	 actors	
constellations	and	 technologies,	produce	distinctive	patterns	of	 innovation	on	
the	sectoral	and	national	levels	(Bergek	et	al.	2015,	2008;	Carlsson	et	al.	2002;	
Carlsson	 and	 Stankiewicz	 1991;	 Edquist	 1997;	 Hekkert	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Staffan	
Jacobsson	and	Bergek	2011).	While	MLP	focuses	on	the	temporal	dynamics	of	
technological	 change	 often	 through	 historical	 case	 studies,	 TIS	 addresses	
territorial	and	sectoral	institutional	settings	facilitating	or	blocking	technological	
innovations	 (Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012).	 The	 TIS	 approach	 is	
rooted	 in	 the	 national	 innovation	 systems	 or	 NIS	 literature	 (Lundvall	 2010,	
1985;	Nelson	1993),	which	addresses	how	the	distinctive	national	settings	have	
facilitated	 innovations	 in	 countries,	 like	 Sweden	 (Dahmén	 1988)	 and	 Japan	
(Freeman	1988).	In	the	innovation	field	later	similar	concepts	also	appeared	on	
regional	innovation	systems	or	RIS	(Cooke,	Gomez	Uranga,	and	Etxebarria	1997)	
and	 cross-national	 sectoral	 innovation	 systems	 or	 SIS	 (Breschi	 and	 Malerba	
1997;	 Malerba	 2004,	 2002).	 The	 TIS	 perspective	 turned	 its	 attention	 to	 the	
development	 of	 specific	 technologies	 in	 the	 intersection	 of	 sectoral	 and	
national	innovation	systems	(see	Figure	3.1)	(Bergek	et	al.	2008;	Carlsson	et	al.	
2002;	 Hekkert	 et	 al.	 2007),	 such	 as	 wind	 sector	 development	 in	 Denmark,	
Sweden,	 and	Germany	 (Bergek	 and	 Jacobsson	2003;	Garud	 and	Karnøe	2003;	
Jacobsson	 and	 Bergek	 2004;	 Jacobsson	 and	 Johnson	 2000;	 Jacobsson	 and	
Lauber	2006).	In	response	to	criticism	from	MLP	scholars	(Geels	2011:	25,		2004:	
898),	 the	 TIS	 approach	 has	 been	 remodelled	 based	 on	 different	 interrelated	
‘functional	 systems’,	 such	 as	 market	 formation,	 to	 emphasise	 more	 the	
changeableness	of	such	 innovation	systems	 (Bergek	et	al.	2008;	Hekkert	et	al.	
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2007).	 Recently,	 there	 were	 efforts	 in	 the	 TIS	 literature	 to	 embrace	 niche	
dynamics	 and	 to	 incorporate	 some	 of	 the	 conceptual	 terminologies	 of	 MLP	
(Bergek	et	al.	2015;	Markard	and	Truffer	2008).	
	
Figure	 3.1.	 Boundary	 relations	 between	National,	 Sectoral,	 and	 Technology	 Specific	 Innovation	 Systems	
(NSI,	SSI,	TSIS).	Source:	Figure	1	in	Hekkert	et	al.	(2007:	417)	
Third,	transition	management	(TM)	was	developed	from	the	practical	aims	and	
experiences	 of	 steering	 sustainability	 transitions	 (Grin	 2010;	 Kemp,	 Loorbach,	
and	 Rotmans	 2007;	 Loorbach	 and	 Rotmans	 2010;	 Rotmans,	 Kemp,	 and	 van	
Asselt	2001;	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	2010)	 (Grin	et	al.	2010).	While	TM	shares	
some	 of	 the	 conceptual	 language	 of	 MLP,	 such	 as	 regime	 and	 niche,	 it	 also	
proposes	 the	 multi-phase	 model	 of	 (1)	 pre-development,	 (2)	 take-off,	 (3)	
acceleration	and	(4)	stabilisation	phases	comprising	a	general	S-shaped	curve	of	
development	(see	Figure	3.2).	As	a	response	to	the	criticism	of	ignoring	politics,	
transition	 governance	 perspective	 was	 developed	 from	 the	 TM	 approach	 by	
situating	transitions	 in	the	nexus	of	state,	market,	science	and	technology	and	
civil	 society	 (Grin	 2010;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	 2010).	 Nevertheless,	 the	
approach	 is	 still	 oriented	 towards	 the	 practical	 challenges	 to	 steer	 transtions	
rather	than	conceptual	analysis.	
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Figure	3.2.	Alternatives	for	S-shaped	curve.	Source:	Figure	II.3.2	in	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	(2010:	131)	
For	brevity	this	literature	review	does	not	cover	less	prominent,	less	developed,	
or	simply	less	relevant	approaches	to	transitions,	such	as	the	long-wave	theory	
on	techno-economic	paradigm	or	TEP	(Freeman	1989;	Perez	2010),	agent-based	
modelling	approach	(Safarzyńska,	Frenken,	and	van	den	Bergh	2012),	disruptive	
innovation	 (Christensen	 1997)	 and	 technological	 discontinuity	 (Anderson	 and	
Tushman	 1990),	 and	 practice	 theory	 (Shove	 2012,	 2010;	 Shove,	 Pantzar,	 and	
Watson	2012;	Shove	and	Walker	2007).	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 focus	 primarily	 on	 the	multi-level	 perspective	 (MLP)	 for	
three	key	reasons.	First,	MLP	is	dominating	the	field	of	transition	studies	(Grin,	
Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2010c;	 Smith,	 Voß,	 and	 Grin	 2010;	 STRN	 2010).	 It	 is	 a	
substantially	more	influential	approach	than	TIS,	for	example.	Second,	some	of	
the	cornerstones	of	MLP	are	more	widely	shared	in	transitions	studies	than	the	
formal	 MLP	 framework,	 such	 as	 the	 very	 multi-level	 framework	 of	 niche-
regime-landscape	 that	 is	 also	 used	 in	 transition	 management.	 Third,	 MLP	 is	
probably	the	most	applicable	framework	for	the	research	aim,	ie.	characterising	
an	 era	 of	 megainvestments	 through	 the	 in-depth	 case	 study	 of	 the	 Wylfa	
Newydd	 project,	 compared	 to	 other	 transition	 approaches.	 Transition	
management	is	more	suitable	for	policy	uses	than	for	scholarly	ones	(Grin	2010;	
Kemp,	 Loorbach,	 and	 Rotmans	 2007;	 Loorbach	 2009;	 Loorbach	 2007).	 The	
technological	 innovation	 systems	 approach	 offers	 very	 limited	 guidance	 to	
connect	 micro-level	 practices	 to	 macro-level	 processes.	 Innovation	 systems	
tend	 to	 provide	 very	 simplistic	 and	 rigid	 frameworks	 as	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 it	
when	 talking	 about	 the	 geographies	 of	 transitions	 (Bergek	 et	 al.	 2015,	 2008;	
Jacobsson	 and	Bergek	 2011).	 From	other	 popular	 concepts,	 practice	 theory	 is	
more	suitable	to	study	consumption	and	use	practices	than	a	megainvestment	
project	 (Shove	 2012;	 Shove,	 Pantzar,	 and	 Watson	 2012;	 Shove	 and	 Walker	
2007).	While	the	focus	of	this	section	 is	on	MLP,	my	points	are	often	as	much	
relevant	to	the	overall	transitions	field.	
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The	 multi-level	 perspective	 has	 been	 developed	 as	 a	 formalised	 analytical	
approach	 in	 particular	 by	 Frank	 Geels	 (Geels	 2014,	 2011,	 2010,	 2005,	 2004,	
2002;	 Geels	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010,	 2007)	 from	 the	 less	 coherent	
concepts	 of	 the	 early	 transitions	work	 (Rip	 and	Kemp	1998;	 Schot	 1998).	 The	
initial	 formation	 of	 the	 MLP	 approach	 formalised	 the	 three	 levels	 (niche,	
regime,	landscape)	as	nested	hierarchies	(see	Figure	3.3),	where	regime	change	
happens	 through	 various	 niche	 accumulations	 and	 add-ons,	 such	 as	
hybridisation	of	the	niche	with	the	existing	regime	(Geels	2002).	This	framework	
has	 been	 refined	 over	 the	 years	 through	 historical	 case	 studies	 Geels	 and	
Verhees	 2011;	 Turnheim	 and	 Geels	 2012;	 Verbong,	 Geels,	 and	 Raven	 2008;	
Verbong	 and	 Geels	 2007),	 resulting	 in	 a	 broader	 typology	 of	 niche-regime	
interactions	(Geels	et	al.	2016;	Geels	and	Schot	2007;	Verbong	and	Geels	2012,	
2010),	 and	 through	 engagement	 with	 diverse	 theoretical	 approaches	 (Geels	
2010;	Geels	and	Schot	2010),	exemplified	by	 the	 redefinition	of	 the	 regime	 in	
neoinstitutionalist	terms	(Geels	2011,	2004).	
	
Figure	3.3.	Multiple	levels	as	a	nested	hierarchy.	Source:	Figure	3	in	Geels	(2002:	1261).	
Technological	 change	 takes	 place	 through	 the	 dynamics	 between	 the	 three	
analytical	levels,	where	regimes	and	the	landscape	account	for	stability,	with	a	
particular	 focus	 on	 niche-regime	 interactions.	 Transitions,	 or	 regime	 changes,	
take	 place	 as	 an	 interaction	of	 the	 three	 analytic	 levels	 (see	 Figure	 3.4).	 As	 a	
general	 pattern,	 niches	 challenge	 the	 regime	 through	 niche-accummulations,	
hybridisation	 and	 growth,	 while	 landscape	 pressures	 can	 create	 “windows	 of	
opportunity”	 (Geels,	2002:	1262)	 for	 regime	changes	via	 the	destabilisation	of	
the	 current	 one.	 Regime	 changes	 are	 seen	 as	 gradual	 reconfigurations	 rather	
than	revolutionary	changes	through	sudden	regime-wide	replacements	(Geels,	
2002:	 1272).	 This	 singular	 bottom-up	 mode	 of	 regime	 change	 has	 been	
criticised	(e.g.,	Smith	et	al.	2005).	As	a	response	to	this	criticism,	a	typology	of	
different	pathways	or	regime	changes	has	been	created	 in	more	recent	works	
(Geels	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010,	 2007).	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 (2007)	
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distinguish	 six	 different	 transition	 pathways	 based	 on	 differences	 (a)	 in	 the	
timing	of	landscape	changes	and	niche-innovations	(simultaneous	or	not),	(b)	in	
the	 symbiotic	 or	 reinforcing	 nature	 of	 niche-innovations	 (niche-regime	
interactions),	 and	 (c)	 in	 the	 reinforcing	 or	 disruptive	 nature	 of	 landscape	
changes	 (landscape-regime	 interactions).	 The	 six	 pathways	 are	 reproduction	
process	 (incremental	 innovations),	 transformation	 path,	 de-alignment	 and	 re-
alignment	path,	technological	substitution,	reconfiguration	pathway	and	finally	
a	 sequence	 of	 transition	 pathways	 (see	 Table	 3.1	 for	 the	 characteristics	 and	
main	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 four	 main	 transition	 pathways).	 The	 typology	
indicates	that	the	previous	concept	of	regime	transformation	(see	3.4)	is	rather	
just	 one	 pathway	 (technology	 substitution)	 than	 a	 one-size-fits-all	 general	
pattern	(Geels	and	Schot,	2010).	Recently	even	this	typology	was	reformulated	
by	Geels	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 by	 articulating	 the	main	 causal	mechanisms	 for	 actors,	
formal	 institutions,	 and	 technologies	 through	 the	 example	 of	 the	 recent	
histories	of	the	UK	and	German	electricity	systems.		
		
	
Figure	3.4.	A	dynamic	multi-level	perspective	on	system	innovation.	Source:	Figure	9	in	Geels	(2004:	915).	
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Transition	
pathways	
Main	actors	 Type	of	(inter)actions	 Key	words	
1.	
Transformation	
Regime	 actors	
and	 outside	
groups	 (social	
movements)	
Outsiders	 voice	 criticism.	
Incumbent	 actors	 adjust	
regime	 rules	 (goals,	
guiding	principles,	search	
heuristics)	
Outside	 pressure,	
institutional	 power	
struggles,	
negotiations,	
adjustment	of	regime	
rules	
2.	Technological	
substitution	
Incumbent	
firms	 versus	
new	firms	
Newcomers	 develop	
novelties,	 which	
compete	 with	 regime	
technologies	
Market	 competition	
and	 power	 struggles	
between	 old	 and	
new	firms	
3.	
Reconfiguration	
Regime	 actors	
and	suppliers	
Regime	 actors	 adopt	
component-innovations,	
developed	 by	 new	
suppliers.	 Competition	
between	 old	 and	 new	
suppliers	
Cumulative	
component	 changes,	
because	 of	 economic	
and	 functional	
reasons.	 Followed	 by	
new	 combinations,	
changing	
interpretations	 and	
new	practices	
4.	De-alignment	
and		
re-alignment	
New	 niche	
actors	
Changes	 in	 deep	
structures	 create	 strong	
pressure	 on	 regime.	
Incumbents	 lose	 faith	
and	legitimacy.	Followed	
by	 emergence	 of	
multiple	 novelties.	 New	
entrants	 compete	 for	
resources,	 attention	 and	
legitimacy.	 Eventually	
one	 novelty	 wins,	
leading	 to	 restabilisation	
of	regime	
Erosion	and	collapse,	
multiple	 novelties,	
prolonged	
uncertainty	 and	
changing	
interpretations,	 new	
winner	 and	
restabilisation	
Table	3.1.	Main	actors	and	(inter)actions	in	transition	pathways.	Source:	Table	3	in	Geels	and	Schot	(2007:	
414)		
MLP	 provides	 some	 productive	 insights	 into	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 Wylfa	
Newydd	megaproject	 from	the	transition	perspective.	First	of	all,	new	nuclear	
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power	in	the	UK	is	not	a	standalone	case	study	but	it	is	situated	in	the	dynamics	
of	changing	electricity	systems	and	various	landscape	pressures	(e.g.,	neoliberal	
governance).	Second,	Wylfa	Newydd	can	only	be	understood	in	the	junction	of	
interrelated	micro,	meso,	and	macro-level	processes.	Third,	the	deployment	of	
a	 technology	 is	not	determined	by	a	purely	 technical	 rationale,	but	shaped	by	
cultural	meanings,	organisational	practices,	political	 institutions,	 and	 so	on.	 In	
this	sense,	I	found	the	framework	useful	in	understanding	the	case	study.	
There	are	various	critical	issues	associated	with	the	appealing	simplicity	of	this	
popular	 heuristic	 framework	 (Berkhout,	 Smith,	 and	 Stirling	 2004;	 Genus	 and	
Coles	 2008;	Markard	 and	 Truffer	 2008;	 Shove	 2010;	 Shove	 and	Walker	 2007;	
Smith,	 Voß,	 and	Grin	 2010;	 Smith,	 Stirling,	 and	 Berkhout	 2005).	 According	 to	
Smith	 et	 al.	 (2010:	 441-442),	 “[the]	 allure	 of	 the	 MLP	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 a	
relatively	 straightforward	 way	 of	 ordering	 and	 simplifying	 the	 analysis	 of	
complex,	large-scale	structural	transformations	[…]	There	is	a	tension	between	
appreciating	 the	 bigger	 picture	 whilst	 maintaining	 a	 tractable	 parsimony	 in	
analysis.	The	MLP	may	help	people	simplify	and	intervene	reflexively,	but	must	
not	 become	 counter-productively	 simplistic	 in	 its	 abstraction”.	 Critics	 of	MLP	
highlight	 that	 the	 framework	 makes	 important	 omissions,	 and	 intriguing	
empirical	 cases	 often	 do	 not	 fit	 to	 the	 neat	 three-level	 transitions	 dynamics	
framework	(Berkhout,	Smith,	and	Stirling	2004;	Genus	and	Coles	2008;	Markard	
and	 Truffer	 2008;	 Shove	2010;	 Shove	 and	Walker	 2007;	 Smith,	 Voß,	 and	Grin	
2010;	Smith,	Stirling,	and	Berkhout	2005).	
There	are	various	‘blind	spots’	of	transition	research,	the	multi-level	perspective	
in	particular,	that	are	identified	in	the	literature	(for	overviews	see	Geels	2011;	
Grin,	Rotmans,	and	Schot	2010c;	Markard,	Raven,	and	Truffer	2012;	Smith,	Voß,	
and	Grin	2010;	STRN	2010;	Van	den	Bergh,	Truffer,	and	Kallis	2011).	Transition	
studies	 is	 still	 a	 young	and	dynamic	 research	area	where	many	core	 concepts	
are	changing.	Key	conceptual	shifts	in	MLP,	for	example,	include	redefinitions	of	
regime	(Geels	2010,	Geels	2004;	Verbong	and	Geels	2007)	or	diversification	of	
transition	 pathways	 with	 regards	 to	 niche-regime	 interactions	 (Geels	 et	 al.	
2016;	Geels	and	Schot	2010,	2007).	 In	 the	coming	subsections	 I	address	 three	
critical	 issues	of	MLP,	namely	the	empirical	operability	of	 the	regime	concept,	
the	geography	of	transitions,	and	politics	and	transitions.	
The	core	of	the	above	problems	is	that	MLP	is	an	overly	rigid	approach.	These	
three	 challenges	 are	 all	 rooted	 in	 ontological	 questions	 about	 scale,	
relationality,	 and	 positionality.	 How	 to	 overcome	 the	monolithic	 definition	 of	
regime	and	address	entrenchment	in	a	more	heterogeneous,	multi-layered,	and	
contested	way?	How	to	overcome	the	nested	hierarchies	 implied	by	the	local-
national-global	 levels	 or	 micro-meso-macro	 scales?	 How	 to	 overcome	 the	
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dichotomy	of	actors	and	institutions,	or	in	other	words,	how	to	address	agency	
beyond	actor	 strategies	 and	 resources?	 In	 finding	 the	 conceptual	 language	 to	
write	 about	 the	Wylfa	 Newydd	megainvestment,	 the	 above	 questions	 turned	
my	 attention	 away	 from	 MLP	 to	 the	 fields	 of	 relational	 geography	 and	 STS	
which	I	will	cover	in	later	sections.	Here,	I	address	the	critical	issues	of	empirical	
applicability,	geographies,	and	politics	of	transitions	in	detail.	
3.3.2	REGIME:	FROM	ANALYTICAL	FRAMEWORK	TO	EMPIRICAL	CONCEPT	
The	nested	niche-regime-landscape	levels	highlight	that	technological	change	is	
embedded	in	wider	sociotechnical	contexts,	but	critics	argue	that	the	empirical	
application	 of	 this	 neat	 analytical	 framework	 opens	 a	 whole	 can	 of	 worms	
(Berkhout,	 Smith,	 and	 Stirling	 2004;	 Geels	 2011;	 Holtz,	 Brugnach,	 and	 Pahl-
Wostl	2008;	Konrad,	Truffer,	and	Voß	2008;	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	2010;	Shove	
2012;	Smith,	Stirling,	and	Berkhout	2005;	van	der	Vleuten	and	Högselius	2012).	
The	 concept	 of	 regime	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 transitions	 literature	 as	
sociotechnical	 transitions	 are	 principally	 regime	 shifts.	 According	 to	 Geels	
(2011:	 26),	 the	 other	 two	 levels	 “can	 be	 seen	 as	 ‘derived	 concepts’,	 because	
they	 are	 defined	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 regime”.	 While	 MLP	 provides	 a	 robust	
analytical	 framework,	 the	 concepts	 of	 niche,	 regime	 and	 landscape	 are	 also	
central	 to	 other	 transition	 approaches,	 such	 as	 strategic	 niche	 management	
(SNM)	or	transition	management	(TM).	
The	empirical	meaning	of	 regime	 is	 far	 from	clear-cut	 in	 the	context	of	Wylfa	
Newydd	 project.	 Is	 it	 the	 nuclear	 power	 industry?	 Or	 the	 electricity	 supply	
industry?	 Or	 the	 overall	 system,	 including	 the	 realms	 of	 electricity	 use	 and	
consumption?	Or	even	the	nuclear	construction	industry	as	distinct	from	plant	
operation?	Or	is	the	regime	limited	to	the	dominant	light	water	reactors?	And	
even	if	we	decide	on	one	of	these	definitions,	what	does	the	regime	encompass	
in	 detail?	 Actors	 and	 institutions?	 Physical	 infrastructures?	 Discourses?	 Rules	
and	norms?	These	questions	are	linked	to	several	issues	raised	in	the	literature,	
namely	 the	 exact	 level	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 regime,	 the	 exact	 content	 of	 the	
definition,	and	the	boundaries	between	different	levels.	
First,	 the	 abstruseness	 in	 defining	 the	 exact	 level	 of	 regime	 is	 also	 raised	 by	
Konrad	et	al.	(2008:	1193):	
“When	applying	 the	 regime	 concept	 to	utility	 sectors,	 it	 is	 not	 a	priori	
obvious	at	which	level	the	concept	should	be	identified.	Does	it	refer	to	
dominant	 sector	 structures	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 prevailing	 gas	 or	 water	
distribution	configurations?	Or	may	we	even	talk	about	an	overarching	
utility	regime	that	encompasses	state	provided	basic	services	which	are	
provided	 to	 all	 citizens	 and	 firms	 in	 a	 country	 at	 low	 cost?	 Or	 even,	
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should	it	be	applied	to	specific	socio-technical	configurations,	e.g.	those	
which	have	evolved	around	certain	electricity	generation	 technologies,	
like	nuclear	or	wind	power?”	
This	is	echoed	by	the	ambiguity	of	empirical	studies	defining	the	regime	either	
broadly	 on	 the	 level	 of	 the	 electricity	 supply	 system	 (van	 der	 Vleuten	 and	
Högselius	 2012)	 or	 of	 the	 nuclear	 industry	 complex	 (Berkhout,	 Smith,	 and	
Stirling	2004:	6).	One	potential	way	out	of	the	conundrum	is	to	introduce	more	
than	 three	 levels,	 such	 as	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	 (2010:	 134)	 propose	 by	
suggesting	the	“niche-regime”	or	“empowered	niche”	as	an	intermediary	level.	
The	problem,	however,	 is	 exacerbated	by	 the	ambiguity	 in	 the	MLP	 literature	
whether	the	former	is	envisaged	as	situated	under	(within)	the	latter	or	rather	
outside	of	it.	On	the	one	hand,	the	nested	hierarchical	scheme	(see	Figures	3.3	
and	 3.4)	would	 imply	 that	 niches	 (micro-level)	 are	 situated	 under	 the	 regime	
(meso-level).	Therefore	the	electricity	sector,	for	example,	in	its	entirety	can	be	
seen	as	an	example	of	a	regime.	While	it	could	be	characterised	as	dominated	
by	 the	 Big	 Six	 and	 the	 Grid,	 it	 encompasses	 emerging	 niches,	 too	 (e.g.,	
community	power	schemes,	etc.).	On	the	other	hand,	the	separation	between	
radical	 innovations	 in	 the	 niche	 and	 incremental	 innovations	 in	 the	 regime	
implies	that	niches	challenge	the	regime	from	the	outside	(Geels	2011).	In	this	
case,	the	electricity	sector	could	be	separated	into	two:	a	regime	consisting	of	
dominant	 corporate	 actors,	 large-scale	 conventional	 plants,	 et	 cetera,	 as	
opposed	to	the	multitude	of	emerging	niches.	
This	 picture	 is	 further	 complicated	 by	 multi-regime	 transitions	 in	 the	
intersection	 of	 different	 regimes	 (Raven	 and	 Verbong	 2009,	 2007),	 such	 as	
military	 and	 waste	 regimes	 in	 case	 of	 nuclear	 power.	 These	 multi-domain	
transitions	(Geels	and	Schot	2010:	78;	Konrad,	Truffer,	and	Voß	2008),	including	
multi-niche	 dynamics	 (Verbong,	 Geels,	 and	 Raven	 2008),	 highlight	 that	 the	
problems	goes	beyond	adding	 intermediary	 levels.	The	analytical	focus	on	one	
clearly-defined	regime,	even	by	situating	it	in	a	nested	hierarchy	of	supra-	and	
sub-regimes,	 is	 problematic	 where	 there	 are	 complex	 dynamics	 between	
interlocked	and	entangled	configurations	on	different	scales	of	structuration.		
Second,	the	exact	meaning	of	the	regime	varies	in	the	literature,	especially	with	
regards	to	the	elements	it	encompasses.	The	initial	conceptualisation	of	Nelson	
and	 Winter	 (1977,	 1982)	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 cognitive	 'search	 heuristics'	
providing	 a	 dominant	 design	 pattern.	 Rip	 and	 Kemp	 (1998)	 rephrased	 the	
definition	 of	 the	 regime	 in	 broader	 sociological	 terms	 as	 a	 “rule	 set	 or	
grammar”	(ibid.:	338).	According	to	them,	a	regime	is	a	“[...]	coherent	complex	
of	 scientific	 knowledges,	 engineering	 practices,	 production	 process	
technologies,	product	characteristics,	skills	and	procedures,	and	institutions	and	
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infrastructure	that	are	labelled	in	terms	of	a	certain	technology	[...]	or	mode	of	
work	organisation	[...].	”	 (Rip	and	Kemp	1998:	388).	To	highlight	these	diverse	
aspects,	 Geels	 (2002)	 introduced	 the	 term	 sociotechnical	 regime	 rather	 than	
technological	regime.	In	his	words,	the	regime	is	a	“semi-coherent	set	of	rules	
carried	 by	 different	 social	 groups”,	 or	 the	 “deep	 structure”	 providing	 the	
selection	 and	 retention	 mechanisms	 in	 an	 evolutionary	 sense	 (Geels	 2002:	
1260).	 Based	 on	 this	 definition,	 there	 are	 “seven	 dimensions	 in	 the	
sociotechnical	 regime:	 technology,	 user	 practices	 application	 domains	
(markets),	 symbolic	meaning	 of	 technology,	 infrastructure,	 industry	 structure,	
politics,	 and	 techno-scientific	 knowledge”	 (Geels	 2002:	 1262).	 Subsequently,	
Geels	 developed	 another	 definition	 of	 regime	 (and	 niche)	 influenced	 by	
neoinstitutionalism	 as	 being	 composed	 of	 “systems	 (resources,	 material	
aspects),	actors	involved	in	maintaining	and	changing	the	system,	and	the	rules	
and	 institutions	 which	 guide	 actor's	 perceptions	 and	 activities”	 (Geels	 2004:	
898).	 These	 three	 analytical	 dimensions	 –	 systems,	 actors,	 and	 rules	 or	
institutions	–	co-constitute	each	other	as	 schematically	 represented	on	Figure	
3.5.	Rules	can	be	 further	differentiated	 to	cognitive,	normative	and	regulative	
rules	 (Geels	 2004:	 904).14	According	 to	 him,	 niches	 consist	 of	 the	 same	 three	
analytical	 dimensions,	 but	 with	 a	 lesser	 degree	 of	 stability	 and	 structuration	
(Geels	 2004:	 912).	 Landscapes	 are,	 however,	 essentially	 different	 and	beyond	
the	direct	influence	of	actors	(Geels	2004:	913),	which	distinction	is	somewhat	
diffuse	in	practice.	This	conceptualisation	of	the	regime	–	and	correspondingly	
of	the	niche	and	the	landscape	–	relates	to	incorporating	agency	and	structure	
influenced	 by	 structuration	 theory	 (Giddens	 1984,	 1979)	 with	 the	 notable	
addition	of	 technological	system	as	the	hardware	of	 the	 institutional	software	
(Geels	 2010,	 2004).	 While	 regime	 is	 a	 foundational	 concept	 in	 transitions	
research,	there	is	difficulty	in	the	literature	to	provide	a	definition	that	is	both	
broad	 enough	 to	 incorporate	 the	 vast	 many	 aspects	 and	 specific	 enough	 to	
operationalise	 it	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Some	 critics	 highlight	 the	 difficulties	 of	
empirical	 application	 (Holtz,	 Brugnach,	 and	 Pahl-Wostl	 2008;	 Konrad,	 Truffer,	
and	 Voß	 2008;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	 2010),	 while	 others	 address	 the	
restricting	definition,	especially	with	regards	to	social	practices	of	consumption	
and	use	of	electricity	(Shove	2012:	54).	
																																																						
14	 	Institutions	mean	rather	abstract	social	institutions,	not	to	be	confused	with	the	everyday	use	of	
the	word	 institution	 as	 public	 organisation.	 Similarly,	 social	 rules	 embrace	 broader	meanings	 than	 legal	
regulations.	In	this	sense	institutions	and	rules	are	used	rather	synonymously.	
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Figure	3.5.	Three	interrelated	analytical	dimensions.	Source:	Figure	4	in	Geels	(2004:	903).	
Third,	the	dynamics	between	the	different	levels	highlights	that	niches,	regimes,	
and	the	 landscape	cannot	be	understood	on	their	own	but	 in	relation	to	each	
other.	 The	 boundary	 is	 somewhat	 unclear	 between	 the	 different	 levels.	 The	
problem	 is	 further	 exacerbated	 as	 in	more	 recent	 definitions	 the	 diversity	 of	
pathways	 challenged	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 regime	 as	 a	 locus	 of	
incremental	 innovation	 and	 the	 niche	 as	 a	 locus	 of	 radical	 innovation	 (Geels	
2011;	 Geels	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2007).	 For	
example,	regimes	can	undergo	radical	changes.	
The	 boundary	 between	 regime	 and	 landscape	 is	 another	 critical	 issue.	
Landscape	 is	defined	as	the	external	environment,	behind	the	direct	 influence	
of	 both	 regime	 and	 niche	 actors	 (Geels	 2011;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2010).	 The	
boundary	between	endogenous	and	external	environment	is	highly	contingent	
upon	 the	definition	of	 the	aggregation	 levels	 ascribed	 to	actors	 (e.g.,	 state	as	
actor	 or	 structure),	 of	 direct	 action,	 and	 of	 the	 timescale.	 Therefore	 the	
differentiation	and	the	boundaries	between	different	levels	are	far	from	clear.	
Recently,	the	regime	became	less	seen	as	an	incrementally	changing	monolithic	
bloc	challenged	by	different	niches	(Berkhout,	Smith,	and	Stirling	2004;	Smith,	
Stirling,	 and	 Berkhout	 2005).	 A	 sociotechnical	 transition	 is	 less	 like	 a	 struggle	
between	many	Davids	and	a	Goliath	 for	becoming	 the	next	Goliath,	using	 the	
analogy	of	Geels	and	Schot	(2010:	79).	In	the	literature,	there	are	recent	efforts	
to	overcome	this	sense	of	stability	and	to	address	the	capability	of	regimes	to	
change	and	the	potential	to	accommodate	radical	innovations	(van	der	Vleuten	
and	 Högselius	 2012).	 Similarly,	 regime	 became	 seen	 less	 as	 a	 homogenous	
entity	 but	 rather	 something	 that	 is	 constituted	 from	 heterogenous	 elements	
and	 regime	 actors	 exhibiting	 different	 goals	 which	 can	 even	 create	 internal	
tension	within	the	regime	(Verbong	and	Geels	2012).	
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In	summary,	 I	have	 found	 it	difficult	 to	apply	 the	concept	of	 regime,	and	thus	
the	 whole	 multi-level	 framework,	 to	 the	 case	 study	 of	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
investment.	 Neither	 the	 exact	 level	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 regimes,	 nor	 the	 exact	
content,	and	not	even	the	distinction	with	niche	on	the	one	side	and	landscape	
on	the	other	were	clear.	In	this	subsection	I	focused	on	the	level	of	regime	but	
the	 other	 two	 concepts	 can	 be	 as	 much	 problematic	 to	 define.	 The	 micro-,	
meso-,	 and	 macro-levels	 are	 further	 complicated	 from	 looking	 from	 the	
perspective	of	a	megainvestment,	and	not	a	national	case	study.	While	I	found	
the	concept	of	regime	clearly	useful	in	orienteering	attention	towards	patterns	
of	incumbency,	path-dependency,	lock-in,	the	substance	of	regime	seems	to	slip	
out	of	 grasp	 in	 the	hands	of	 tangible	definitions.	 Probably	 regimes	are	better	
approached	as	processes	and	mechanisms	than	as	entities.	In	many	extent	the	
core	of	the	problem	thus	is	the	very	nested	hierarchical	framework	with	three	
distinctive	levels	of	structuration.	These	scales	of	structuration	intermingle	each	
other,	 and	 the	 analytical	 separation	 of	 three	 levels	 always	 leaves	 us	 with	
reservations	about	omissions.	This	leads	to	the	discussion	in	the	next	subsection	
on	the	geographies	of	transition,	where	spatiality	highlights	the	 inadequacy	of	
(geographic)	scales	as	nested	hierarchies	and	paves	the	way	to	more	relational	
understandings	of	multi-scalarity.	
3.3.3	ENTANGLED	GEOGRAPHIES	OF	TRANSITION	
The	 transition	 of	 the	 electricity	 system	 is	 an	 inherently	 geographical	 process.	
There	is	an	unfolding	‘spatial	turn’	(Becker,	Moss,	and	Naumann	2016;	Murphy	
2015)	 in	 transition	 research	 after	 an	 long-time	 neglect	 of	 the	 geographies	 of	
energy	transitions	(Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Coenen,	Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012;	
Coenen	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	 Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 2015;	 Murphy	 2015;	 Truffer,	
Murphy,	 and	 Raven	 2015).	 Scholars	 inside	 and	 outside	 transition	 studies	
highlighted	that	the	field,	especially	MLP	and	TIS,	were	either	 ignoring	or	very	
naively	 conceptualising	 spatiality	 (Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 2010;	
Coenen,	Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012;	Coenen	and	Truffer	2012;	Hodson	and	
Marvin	 2010;	 Shove	 and	 Walker	 2007;	 Smith,	 Voß,	 and	 Grin	 2010).	 The	
neglected	 issues	 include	 the	 spatial	 embeddedness	 and	 place-specificity	 of	
sociotechnical	niches,	regimes,	and	systems	(Bouzarovski–Buzar	2009;	Bridge	et	
al.	 2013;	 Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	 Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 2015);	
the	 geographic	 scaling	 and	 networking	 of	 processes	 (Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	
Goldthau	 2014;	 Raven,	 Schot,	 and	 Berkhout	 2012b);	 and	 the	 uptake	 of	 cities	
and	 regions	 as	 the	 hotbeds	 for	 transitions,	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 nation	 states	
(Bulkeley	et	al.	2010;	Bulkeley,	Castán	Broto,	and	Maassen	2010;	Hodson	and	
Marvin	2010;	Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012a,	2012b;	Rohracher	and	Späth	
2014,	 2014;	 Rutherford	 and	 Coutard	 2014;	 Truffer	 and	 Coenen	 2012).	 In	
particular,	 concepts	 from	 human	 geography	 and	 related	 disciplines	 have	
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provided	 fertile	 grounds	 for	 transition	 thinking	 (Becker,	Moss,	 and	 Naumann	
2016;	 Bouzarovski–Buzar	 2009;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 2015;	
Murphy	2015;	Truffer	and	Coenen	2012).	This	turn	has	led	to	some	initial	efforts	
to	rethink	key	transition	concepts,	such	as	regime	and	sociotechnical	system,	in	
geographical	terms	(Binz,	Truffer,	and	Coenen	2014;	Murphy	2015;	Rob	Raven,	
Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012b).	In	this	section,	after	summarising	the	‘unspatiality’	
of	 transitions	 frameworks,	 I	 address	 three	 interconnected	 topics	 in	 the	
geography	 of	 transitions,	 namely	 spatial	 embeddedness,	 multi-scalarity,	 and	
materiality	and	landscapes.		
Despite	 the	 proliferation	 of	 spatial	 analogies	 –	 such	 as	 niche	 as	 a	 protective	
space,	 sociotechnical	 landscape	 and	 technological	 trajectory	 –	 in	 transition	
literature,	 the	 field	 was	 remarkably	 silent	 on	 the	 actual	 geographies	 of	
transitions	 until	 very	 recently	 (Bouzarovski–Buzar	 2009;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	
Coenen,	Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012;	Smith,	Voß,	and	Grin	2010;	Truffer	and	
Coenen	2012).	Regarding	MLP,	for	example,	it	was	explicitly	stated	that	the	“the	
scale	levels	are	intended	as	functional	scale	levels	–	degrees	of	structuration	–	
[between	niche,	regime,	and	landscape]	and	not	as	spatial	or	geographical	scale	
levels.”	 (Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2010c:	 4).	 For	 long,	 there	 was	 an	 implicit	
assumption	 that	 regimes	 operate	 on	 the	 national	 level	 (Raven,	 Schot,	 and	
Berkhout	2012b:	64,	2012a;	Smith,	Voß,	and	Grin	2010:	443).	
Looking	 at	 other	 transition	 approaches,	 only	 TIS	 engaged	 explicitly	 with	 the	
geographies	of	technological	change,	with	the	concept	of	national,	regional,	and	
sectoral	 innovation	 systems	 (see	 Figure	 3.1).	 Coenen	 et	 al.	 (2012:	 970)	 note,	
however,	 that	 there	 is	 “nothing	 particularly	 spatial	 in	 the	 national	 innovation	
system	 (NIS)	 approach,	 that	 level	 serving	 primarily	 as	 a	 convenient	 way	 of	
distinguishing	relevant	institutional	and	actor–related	structures.”	This	aspatial	
character	 of	 innovation	 systems	 is	 exemplified	 by	 the	 homogenous	 notion	 of	
‘global	 opportunity	 sets’	 and	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 place-specificity	 and	 spatial	
embeddedness	 (Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012).	 The	 nested	
hierarchies	of	national,	sectoral	and	technology	specific	innovation	systems,	or	
other	 ‘geographical	 contexts’,	 is	 a	 fairly	naïve	and	 rudimentary	understanding	
of	 the	 spatial	 intersections	 of	 sociotechnical	 transitions	 (Binz,	 Truffer,	 and	
Coenen	2014;	Coenen	and	Truffer	2012).	The	TIS	 literature	does	not	provide	a	
geographically	more	sophisticated	alternative	to	the	MLP	framework.	
In	the	next	paragraphs,	I	elaborate	on	three	critical	aspects	of	the	geographies	
of	 energy	 transitions,	 namely	 spatial	 embeddedness,	 multi-scalarity,	 and	
materiality	 and	 landscapes	 (Becker,	 Moss,	 and	 Naumann	 2016;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	
2013;	 Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012).	 First,	 transitions	 are	 spatially	
embedded	 processes,	 where	 place	 and	 scale	 are	 not	 a	 priori	 given	 but	
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constructed.	 In	 other	words,	 niches	 and	 regimes	 are	 rooted	 in	 places.	 Spatial	
differences	and	differentiations	are	crucial	to	transitions	(Bridge	et	al.	2013).	As	
energy	 transitions	 are	 connected	 to	 changing	 patterns	 of	 energy	 provision,	
technological	niches	are	rooted	in	places	(Hansen	and	Coenen	2015),	from	the	
transition	 town	 Totnes	 (Longhurst	 2015)	 to	 the	 Anglesey	 Energy	 Island	
initiative.	 Spatial	 embeddedness	 is	 connected	 to	 incumbency	 and	 lock-in	
(Murphy	2015;	Truffer	and	Coenen	2012),	such	as	the	deep-rootedness	of	Wylfa	
in	Anglesey	economy	and	culture.	
In	 transition	 research,	 there	was	 a	 recent	 recognition	of	 cities	 and	 regions	 as	
hotbeds	of	sustainability	transitions.	Cities	are	seen	as	regime	junctions	through	
cross-cutting	various	sectors,	such	as	energy,	 transport,	and	housing	 (Bulkeley	
et	 al.	 2010;	 Bulkeley,	 Castán	 Broto,	 and	Maassen	 2010;	 Hodson,	Marvin,	 and	
Bulkeley	 2013;	 Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 2010;	 Monstadt	 2009;	 Rutherford	 and	
Coutard	2014).	The	role	of	regions	have	been	addressed	only	to	a	lesser	extent	
with	 emphasis	 on	 multi-level	 governance	 and	 regional	 guiding	 visions	 (Smith	
2007;	Späth	and	Rohracher	2010;	Truffer	and	Coenen	2012).	The	issue	of	spatial	
embeddedness	clearly	resonates	with	the	Wylfa	Newydd	investment,	where	the	
territorial	institutions	play	a	key	part,	such	as	the	Energy	Island	vision.	
Second,	the	multiple-scalarity	of	transitions	and	the	associated	scalar	politics	is	
also	a	key	issue	(Coenen,	Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012).	The	places	and	spaces	
of	transitions	are	not	 isolated	but	deeply	 interconnected	with	each	other.	The	
field	conceptualises	transitions	spatially	as	scaling	up	from	a	place	as	protected	
space	 to	 a	 global	 network	 (STRN	 2010:	 18).	 A	 key	 discussion	 point,	 however,	
about	 the	geographies	of	 transitions	 is	 that	 the	distinction	between	 local	 and	
global	 is	 not	 obvious.	 In	 other	 words,	 innovations	 take	 place	 on	 multiple	
geographic	scales,	exemplified	by	global	niches	(Raven,	Verbong,	and	Rotmans	
2012;	Späth	and	Rohracher	2012).	As	there	is	no	single,	a	priory	scale,	there	is	a	
politics	 in	 scaling	 innovations	 and	 technologies.	 These	 multi-scalar	 and	
networked	strategies	are	especially	highlighted	in	urban	decarbonisation	efforts	
(Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 2013,	 2010).	 The	 negotiation	 of	
different	 scales	 is	 an	 inherently	 political	 process	 (Lawhon	 and	Murphy	 2012;	
Murphy	 2015).	 This	 politics	 of	 multiple	 scales	 fundamentally	 challenges	 the	
simplistic	 hierarchy	 between	 scales,	 such	 as	 local	 and	 global	 (Späth	 and	
Rohracher	2012).	Transitions	take	place	on	different	scales,	and	these	scales	co-
constitute	each	other.	Wylfa	Newydd,	for	example,	as	I	highlight	in	chapter	5,	is	
negotiated	between	different	scales.	Wylfa	 is	 simultaneously	a	cornerstone	of	
the	 Anglesey	 Energy	 Island,	 a	 capacity	 challenge	 for	 the	 devolved	 Welsh	
government	 for	 spatial	 integration,	 a	 Nationally	 Significant	 Infrastructure	
Project	to	achieve	UK	objectives,	and	a	global	nuclear	technology	showcase.		
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Third,	 the	 changing	 landscapes	 and	 spatial	 materialities	 are	 often	 neglected	
elements	 of	 energy	 transitions,	 highlighting	 the	 infrastructural	 aspects	 of	
technologies	 (Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013).	 While	 spatial	 embeddedness	 and	 multi-
scalarity	are	prominent	issues	in	the	ongoing	‘spatial	turn’	in	transition	studies,	
material	 infrastructures	 and	 energy	 landscapes	 are	 barely	 addressed	 (Becker,	
Moss,	 and	 Naumann	 2016;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013).	 In	 urban	 studies,	 there	 is	 an	
increasing	 view	 that	 looks	 at	 the	 city	 as	 “both	 the	 product	 and	 medium	 of	
sociomaterial	processes”	(Becker,	Moss,	and	Naumann	2016:	96).	In	addressing	
cities	and	 transitions,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	emphasis	on	materiality,	multiplicity,	
and	 networked	 connections,	 which	 offers	 a	 new	 perspective	 to	 urbanism	
through	infrastructures	(Monstadt	2009;	Rutherford	and	Coutard	2014).	In	rural	
contexts,	 however,	 the	 materialities	 of	 energy	 infrastructures	 are	 often	 just	
seen	 as	 ‘local	 resources	 and	 endowments’	 (Späth	 and	Rohracher	 2014;	 Späth	
and	Rohracher	2010).	 It	 is	 important	 to	highlight	 the	 importance	of	 landscape	
as	 “the	assemblage	of	natural	 and	 cultural	 features	across	a	broad	 space	and	
the	 history	 of	 their	 production	 and	 interaction”	 (Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013:	 335).	 For	
instance,	 for	 many	 people	 “’low	 carbon	 transition’	 is	 experienced	 as	 the	
transformation	of	landscape”	(Bridge	et	al.	2013:	335,	emphasis	in	original),	as	
exemplified	 by	 the	 UK	 debates	 on	 the	 siting	 of	 windfarms	 and	 transmission	
infrastructures	(Batel	and	Devine-Wright	2017;	Cotton	and	Devine-Wright	2013;	
Devine-Wright	 2015).	 As	 Chapter	 5	 shows,	 the	 changing	 ‘energy	 landscapes’	
(Nadaï	and	Van	Der	Horst	2010)	is	also	a	key	topic	in	the	Anglesey	controversies	
about	the	Energy	Island	vision,	including	the	new	transmission	lines	to	nuclear	
new	 build	 and	 wind	 turbine	 developments.	 Landscapes	 are	 more	 than	 just	
visual	 effects,	 but	 they	 are	 materialisations	 of	 places.	 Energy	 transitions	
transform	both	physical	and	social	landscapes.		
There	have	been	 some	 initial	 efforts	 in	 the	 recent	years	 to	enrich	established	
transition	 concepts,	 especially	 MLP	 and	 TIS,	 with	 spatiality	 as	 a	 response	 to	
these	 growing	 insights	 on	 the	 geographies	 of	 transitions	 (Bergek	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Binz,	 Truffer,	 and	 Coenen	 2014;	 Lawhon	 and	 Murphy	 2012;	 Murphy	 2015;	
Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012a,	2012b).	It	is	not	easy,	however,	to	flawlessly	
incorporate	 these	 geographies	 to	 the	 established	 concepts	 of	 niche,	 regime,	
and	innovation	system.	In	an	effort	to	create	a	“second	generation,	multi-scalar	
MLP”,	Raven	et	al.	(2012b),	for	example,	suggest	that	‘space’	can	be	an	added	
dimension	 to	 ‘structure’	and	 ‘time’	 to	 characterise	 the	 three	 levels	 (see	Table	
3.2).	 This	 framework,	 however,	 reiterates	 the	 nested	 hierarchies	 of	 micro-,	
meso-,	 and	 macro-scales	 without	 specifying	 how	 these	 interrelate	 with	 each	
other,	 and	 that	 the	 three	 dimensions	 (structure,	 time,	 and	 space)	 do	 not	
necessarily	 correspond	with	 each	 other.	 Coenen	 et	 al.	 (2012:	 973)	 also	 argue	
that	 the	 “conflation	 of	 levels	 niche-regime-landscape	 and	 scales	 (territorial	
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levels)“	 are	 inherent	 problems	 of	 MLP.	 There	 is	 no	 convincing	 renewed	
conceptual	frame	yet	to	demonstrate	the	territorial	institutional	embeddedness	
of	 niches	 and	 regimes	 (Späth	 and	 Rohracher	 2014:	 118-119).	 Similarly,	 TIS	
scholars	 also	 tried	 to	 combine	 technological	 innovation	 systems	with	 (spatial)	
contexts	 (Bergek	 et	 al.	 2015;	Murphy	 2015)	 and	with	 social	 network	 analysis	
(Binz,	 Truffer,	 and	 Coenen	 2014),	 but	 this	 raised	 similar	 problems.	 There	 is	 a	
tension,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 Binz	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 of	 simply	 cascading	
down	 the	problem	of	 a	priory	defined	 structures	by	addressing	how	scales	of	
innovation	 systems	 are	 indeed	 constituted,	 but	 by	 a	 seemingly	 taken	 for	
granted	 constellation	 of	 organisational	 actors.	 These	 efforts	 in	 MLP	 and	 TIS	
show	that	geographies	are	rather	odd	ornaments	on	established	concepts	than	
reformulations	 of	 the	 very	 roots.	 Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 (2015:	 105)	 conclude	
their	review	of	the	geographies	of	transitions:	
	“In	 sum,	most	 studies	 on	 the	 geography	 of	 transitions	 have	 primarily	
layered	 on	 top	 of	 existing	 theory	 in	 the	 transitions	 literature,	 relying	
largely	 on	 concepts	 and	 frameworks	 such	 as	 MLP,	 TIS	 and	 SNM	 yet	
adding	 spatial	 sensitivity.	 Few	 studies	 in	 the	 geography	 of	 transitions	
field	 suggest	 alternative	 frameworks	 to	 study	 sustainability	 transitions	
MLP	level	 Time	 Structure	 Space	
Landscape	 Long	 durée,	
sometimes	 rapid	
change	caused	by	
disruptive	events	
Exogenous	environment	 Typical	 landscape	
networks	 exhibit	 high	
degrees	 of	 proximity	
and	 power	 across	
incumbent	 socio-
technical	system	
Regime	 Decades	 Endogenous	 structures	
enacted	 by	 extensive	
organisational	 networks	
and	 embedded	 in	
institutions	 and	
infrastructures	
Typical	 regime	
networks	 exhibit	 high	
degrees	 of	 proximity	
and	 power	 within	 an	
incumbent	 socio-
technical	system	
Niche	 0–10	years	 Protective	 space	 that	
enables	 development	 of	
alternative	structures	
Typical	niche	networks	
exhibit	 low	 degrees	 of	
proximity	 and	 power	
within	 an	 emerging	
socio-technical	system	
Table	3.2.	Scales	in	multi-scalar	MLP.	Source	Source:	Table	2	in	Raven	et	al.	(2012b:	72).	
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and	 thus	 challenge	 current	 theorisations	 of	 transitions	 and	 its	
geographies.”		
These	 difficulties	 to	 absorb	 spatialities	 might	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 ontological	
tensions	 of	 relational	 geography	 concepts	 and	 established	 non-relational	
frameworks	 in	 transition	 studies.	 While	 the	 salience	 of	 relationality	 of	 the	
geographic	 concepts	 is	 repeatedly	 acknowledged	 in	 this	 emerging	 field	 (Binz,	
Truffer,	 and	 Coenen	 2014;	 Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	 Murphy	
2015;	 Raven,	 Schot,	 and	 Berkhout	 2012b),	 there	 are	 less	 reflections	 on	 the	
ontological	 foundations	 of	 transitions	 concepts.	 While	 efforts	 to	 ‘spatialise’	
conceptual	frameworks	of	transition	studies	nominally	take	up	relationality,	the	
very	 core	 ontological	 assumptions	 of	 established	 frameworks	 are	 not	
challenged.	 Unlike	 the	 relational	 geography	 literature	 revolving	 around	 ‘flat	
ontologies’,	 MLP	 maintains	 that	 there	 are	 distinctive	 (a	 priori)	 levels	 of	
structuration	(Geels	2010).	While	there	 is	a	seeming	discomfort	 in	seeing	MLP	
as	 ‘nested	 hierarchies’	 (Geels	 2011:	 37-38),	 it	 only	 goes	 as	 far	 as	 the	 tepid	
realisation	that	“perhaps	we	should	consider	dropping	the	‘hierarchy’	notion	in	
the	MLP”	(Geels	2011:	38),	and	not	as	a	solid	ontological	foundation	compatible	
with	relationality.	The	root	of	the	problem	is	that	while	these	efforts	nominally	
emphasise	 the	 relationality	 of	 geography	 concepts	 (Binz,	 Truffer,	 and	 Coenen	
2014;	 Raven,	 Schot,	 and	 Berkhout	 2012b),	 these	 are	 embedded	 in	 ‘non-
relational’	frameworks	(Geels	2011:	37-38,	2010).		
In	 summary,	 the	 geographies	 of	 transition	 have	 been	 an	 emerging	 research	
interest	 with	 a	 number	 of	 valuable	 insights	 (Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Coenen,	
Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012;	Coenen	and	Truffer	2012;	Hansen	and	Coenen	
2015;	 Murphy	 2015;	 Truffer,	 Murphy,	 and	 Raven	 2015).	 More	 specifically	 I	
addressed	 the	 questions	 of	 neglecting	 spatial	 embeddedness,	 multi-scalarity,	
and	materiality	and	landscapes	in	established	transitions	frameworks,	MLP	and	
TIS	(Becker,	Moss,	and	Naumann	2016;	Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Coenen,	Benneworth,	
and	Truffer	2012;	Lawhon	and	Murphy	2012).	I	highlighted	that	the	core	of	the	
problem	 of	 accommodating	 these	 insights	 into	 established	 transitions	
frameworks	is	the	different	ontological	foundations,	namely	the	non-relational	
roots	 of	 transitions	 concepts.	 In	 the	 coming	 section	 on	 infrastructures	 and	
geographies	I	develop	more	on	the	conceptual	language	of	relational	geography	
with	a	focus	on	the	questions	raised	about	the	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment.	
3.3.4	POLITICS	OF	TRANSITIONS:	BEYOND	ACTOR	STRATEGIES,	AGENCY,	AND	POWER	
The	 transition	 literature	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 criticised	 for	 neglecting	 the	
politics	 and	 power	 inherent	 in	 transitions	 (Avelino	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Avelino	 and	
Rotmans	2009;	Berkhout,	Smith,	and	Stirling	2004;	Lawhon	and	Murphy	2012;	
Meadowcroft	2011,	2009;	Meadowcroft	2005;	Shove	and	Walker	2007;	Smith,	
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Stirling,	 and	 Berkhout	 2005;	 Smith	 and	 Kern	 2009).	 There	 has	 been	 some	
reflection	 on	 this	 criticism	 by	 incorporating	 politics	 in	 the	 transitions	
framework,	 particularly	 in	 MLP	 (Geels	 2014;	 Geels	 2011)	 and	 transition	
management	approaches	(Grin	2010;	Grin,	Rotmans,	and	Schot	2011;	Rotmans	
and	 Loorbach	 2010).	 In	 transition	 research,	 however,	 this	 response	 has	 been	
predominantly	focused	on	a	certain	implicit	conceptualisation	of	politics	based	
on	 multi-actor	 strategies,	 agency	 and	 power	 (Avelino	 and	 Wittmayer	 2016;	
Farla	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Geels	 2004;	 Grin,	 Rotmans,	 and	 Schot	 2011).	 In	 this	
subsection,	I	highlight	that	this	notion	of	politics	is	overtly	restrictive	and	does	
not	embrace	the	multifaceted	character	of	politics.	
The	 first	 calls	 for	 politics	 in	 transition	 studies	 were	 mainly	 connected	 to	 the	
transition	 management	 literature	 by	 highlighting	 that	 achieving	 sustainability	
transitions	 is	 not	 just	 a	 managerial	 task	 but	 also	 a	 political	 endeavour	
(Meadowcroft	 2009;	 Shove	 and	 Walker	 2007;	 Smith,	 Stirling,	 and	 Berkhout	
2005;	 Voss,	 Smith,	 and	 Grin	 2009;	 Voss,	 Bauknecht,	 and	 Kemp	 2006).	 The	
politics	 in	 transitions	 does	 not	 mean	 just	 an	 analytical	 omission	 but	 also	 a	
challenge	 to	 the	 positionality	 of	 practitioners	 in	 governing	 transitions	 as	
apolitical	managers	(Meadowcroft	2011,	2009;	Smith	and	Stirling	2007).	Thus	a	
number	of	 appeals	 have	 focused	on	 the	question	of	 political	 legitimisation	of	
transition	 initiatives	 (Berkhout,	Smith,	and	Stirling	2004;	Hendriks	2009,	2008;		
Meadowcroft	 2009;	 Shove	 and	Walker	 2007;	 Smith	 and	 Stirling	 2010,	 2007).	
While	 the	 above	 initial	 calls	 focused	mostly	 on	 transition	management,	 later	
there	has	also	been	a	growing	interest	in	incorporating	politics	in	the	analysis	of	
transitions,	especially	in	the	multi-level	perspective	(Smith,	Voß,	and	Grin	2010).	
The	 mainstream	 understanding	 of	 politics	 in	 transition	 research	 can	 be	
exemplified	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 politics	 by	 Frank	 Geels	 (2014)	 into	 MLP	
framework	 through	 highlighting	 the	 instrumental,	 discursive,	 material,	 and	
institutional	 forms	 of	 power	 used	 by	 incumbent	 regime	 actors	 in	 resisting	
change	in	the	decarbonisation	of	the	UK	electricity	system.	The	proposed	“way	
to	 introduce	 power	 and	 politics	 into	 the	 MLP	 is	 to	 conceptualize	 relations	
between	 policymakers	 and	 incumbent	 firms	 as	 a	 core	 regime	 level	 alliance,	
which	often	resists	fundamental	change”	(Geels	2014:	27).	The	article	identifies	
politics	 with	 the	 power	 of	 incumbent	 regime	 actors	 to	 resist	 change	 and	
demonstrates	this	with	various	recent	examples	from	the	UK	electricity	sector,	
including	the	push	for	a	‘nuclear	renaissance’	by	politicians	even	when	previous	
commitments	 to	 ‘the	 fullest	 consultation’	 and	 ‘no	 public	 subsidies’	 were	
undermined	(Geels	2014:	29).	The	author	is	not	alone	in	addressing	the	politics	
of	 energy	 transitions	 by	 highlighting	 actor	 strategies	 using	 various	 forms	 of	
power.	While	agency	is	indeed	distributed,	it	is	also	asymmetric.	
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Therefore	the	dominant	uptake	of	politics	follows	more	or	less	a	similar	picture	
based	on	actor	 strategies,	 agency	and	power.	 The	understanding	of	politics	 is	
rooted	in	the	notion	of	agency	as	the	rational	action	of	collective	actors	(Geels	
and	Schot	2007:	403;	Smith,	Stirling,	and	Berkhout	2005).	The	conceptualisation	
of	 agency	 as	 “the	 capacity	 to	 make	 a	 difference”	 vis-à-vis	 the	 structure	 is	
influenced	by	Anthony	Giddens’	(1984,	1979)	structuration	theory	(Geels	2014,	
2004;	 Geels	 and	 Schot	 2007;	 Grin	 2010).	 Similarly,	 power	 is	 defined	 “as	 the	
ability	to	mobilize	resources”	(Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009:	563)	in	the	broadest	
possible	 sense.	 Thus	 power	 is	 strongly	 linked	 to	 agency,	 that	 is,	 to	 the	
instrumental	capacity	to	act	on	the	basis	of	these	resources.	
Transition	 is	 thus	 a	 multi-actor	 process	 and	 agency	 is	 distributed	 between	
various	 actors	 (Avelino	 and	 Wittmayer	 2016;	 Farla	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Garud	 and	
Karnøe	2003;	Geels	2011;	Geels	2010).	The	uptake	of	politics	has	mostly	meant	
the	 broadening	 the	 realm	 of	 actors	 considered	 in	 studies	 about	 transitions	
(Geels	and	Verhees	2011;	Genus	and	Coles	2008;	Seyfang	and	Smith	2007).	 In	
addition	to	the	state	and	corporate	actors,	this	capacity	to	change	has	become	
seen	 as	 also	 being	 distributed	 across	 social	 movements	 and	 users	 (Foxon,	
Hammond,	 and	 Pearson	 2010;	 Geels	 and	 Verhees	 2011;	 Seyfang	 and	 Smith	
2007;	 STRN	 2010:	 12-13;	 Verbong	 and	 Geels	 2007).	 Recently,	 Avelino	 and	
Wittmayer	 (2016)	 go	 as	 far	 as	 proposing	 a	 Multi-actor	 Perspective	 (MaP)	
distinguishing	 between	 four	 sectors	 (state,	 market,	 community,	 third	 sector)	
and	 between	 three	 levels	 of	 aggregation	 of	 actors	 (sectors,	 organisational	
actors,	 and	 individual	 actors).	 The	 emphasis	 is	 on	 the	 understanding	 of	 actor	
strategies,	 capacities,	and	 resources	 (Farla	et	al.	2012;	Hess	2014).	Actors	 can	
be	 both	 incumbent	 regime	 actors	 and	 emergent	 niche	 challengers.	 Similarly,	
strategies	encompass	economic,	political,	and	innovation	strategies	(Farla	et	al.	
2012).	As	Geels	and	Schot	(2007:	403)	highlight:	
“Underlying	 this	 [neoinstitutionalist]	 conceptualisation	 is	 a	 multi-
dimensional	 model	 of	 agency.	 We	 assume	 that	 actors	 are	 self-
interested,	act	strategically,	and	try	to	calculate	which	actions	will	best	
achieve	 their	 goals.	 But	 cognitive	 capabilities	 and	 time	 are	 limited	
(bounded	 rationality).	 Hence,	 actors	 use	 cognitive	 rules	 and	 schemas,	
some	of	which	are	shared	with	others.”		
In	 the	 recent	 years	 there	 was	 indeed	 a	 shift	 from	 the	 instrumental	 forms	 of	
power,	 ie.	 rational	action	based	on	self-interest,	 to	a	 recognition	of	discursive	
and	 institutional	 forms	 of	 power,	 such	 as	 influencing	 how	 problems	 and	
solutions	are	framed	(Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009;	Avelino	and	Wittmayer	2016;	
Geels	2014;	Grin,	Rotmans,	and	Schot	2010a).	In	other	words,	power	is	not	just	
an	 attribute	 to	 the	 players	 in	 an	 uneven	 playing	 field,	 the	 asymmetries	 of	
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agency,	but	to	the	playing	field	itself,	the	structure	(Kern	2011).	This	broadening	
notion	 of	 power,	 however,	 rather	 reinforces	 than	 challenges	 the	 basic	
assumption	 that	 politics	 is	 conceptualised	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 agency	 and	
actor	strategies	in	a	structured	context.	
Politics,	 however,	 is	 not	 just	 the	 strategic	 actions	of	 niche	and	 regime	actors.	
While	 this	 kind	 of	 politics	 is	 undoubtedly	 part	 of	 energy	 transitions,	 it	 also	
restricts	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	multifaceted	 and	 complex	 ways	 of	 politics	
manifesting	 in	 energy	 transitions	 (Chilvers	 and	 Longhurst	 2016;	 see	 also	
Scoones,	 Leach,	 and	 Newell	 2015).	 Here	 I	 address	 three	 particular	 aspects	
where	 this	 mainstream	 conceptualisation	 of	 politics	 as	 a	 multi-actor	 power	
strategy	becomes	problematic,	namely	instrumental	actor	strategies,	actors	and	
interests	as	fixed	categories,	and	individual	or	collective	human	actors.		
First,	there	are	important	dimensions	overshadowed	by	the	emphasis	on	actor	
strategies,	 instrumentality,	 and	 rationality.	 The	 diverse	 forms	 of	 knowledge	
constructed,	the	cultural	meanings	embedded,	and	the	social	practices	often	go	
well	beyond	 rational	 actor	 strategies	 (Wynne	and	Felt	2007).	While	 there	 is	 a	
recognition	 of	 these	 aspects	 (Geels	 and	 Verhees	 2011;	 Hoffman	 2013;	 Smith	
and	Kern	2009),	these	often	seem	secondary	to	or	confined	into	a	broad	sense	
of	 instrumental	strategies	(Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009;	Farla	et	al.	2012;	Geels	
2014).	
Second,	 actors	 and	 their	 interests	 are	 not	 necessarily	 pre-defined,	 as	 actor	
strategies	 suggest,	 but	 often	 co-constituted	 and	 shaped	 through	 politics.	
Current	 debates	 in	 social	 theory	 are	 centred	 on	 more	 relational	 concepts	 of	
agency	without	these	kind	of	a	priori	assumptions	(Emirbayer	1997;	Emirbayer	
and	Mische	 1998;	 Law	 2004;	 Law	 and	 Hassard	 1999).	 Actor-Network	 Theory	
(Bijker	 and	 Law	 1992;	 Callon	 1987,	 1984;	 Latour	 1999)	 and	 practice	 theory	
(Reckwitz	 2002;	 Shove	 2012,	 2004;	 Shove	 et	 al.	 2007),	 for	 example,	 provide	
alternative	ways	to	think	about	sociotechnical	change.	
Third,	 actors	 cannot	 be	 limited	 to	 humans	 and	 ‘superhumans’	 (organisational	
collectives)	 only	 because	 non-humans	 and	 materialities	 play	 also	 parts	 in	
political	life.	Geographers	and	STS	thinkers	criticise	the	notion	of	agency	solely	
attributed	 to	 human	 actors	 and	 highlight	 instead	 the	 entanglements	 with	
materiality	and	society	(Barry	2013;	Bennett	et	al.	2010;	Braun,	Whatmore,	and	
Stengers	2010;	Latour	2005a;	Marres	2012),	being	inspired	among	others	with	
Actor-Network	Theory	(ANT)	thinking	(Callon	1986,	1984;	Latour	2005b,	1987).	
This	highlights	that	we	need	other	conceptualisations	of	politics.	Among	others,	
STS	 literature	 provide	 promising	 alternatives	 about	 the	 making	 of	 publics,	
expertise,	 and	democracy	 (Irwin	2006;	 Irwin	 and	Wynne	2004;	 Jasanoff	 2004,	
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1994;	Michael	2009;	Stirling	2008;	Wynne	1996;	Wynne	and	Felt	2007)	or	 the	
spatial,	 material,	 and	 mundane	 ways	 of	 politics	 (Braun,	 Whatmore,	 and	
Stengers	2010;	Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015b;	Felt	and	Fochler	2010;	Lezaun	and	
Soneryd	2007;	Marres	2012;	Marres	and	Lezaun	2011).	The	previous	subsection	
on	the	geographies	of	 transitions,	 for	 instance,	highlighted	how	the	politics	of	
transitions	is	connected	to	space,	such	as	scaling,	territorial	visions,	and	place-
based	or	networked	politics	(Avelino	et	al.	2016;	Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Chilvers	and	
Longhurst	 2016;	 Lawhon	 and	 Murphy	 2012;	 Späth	 and	 Rohracher	 2010).	 In	
section	 3.5,	 I	 will	 elaborate	 more	 on	 these	 alternative	 conceptualisations	 to	
address	 the	 politics	 of	 technological	 change.	 This	 interest	 in	 providing	
alternative	concepts	of	the	politics	of	transitions	resonates	with	recent	special	
issues	about	the	same	theme	(Avelino	et	al.	2016).	
Democratic	participation	is	often	neglected	in	transition	research,	especially	as	
being	 more	 than	 a	 tool	 providing	 political	 legitimacy	 for	 sustainability	
transitions	 (Hendriks	 2009,	 2008;	 Lawhon	 and	 Murphy	 2012;	 STEPS	 Centre	
2010;	 Stirling	 2009).	 The	 politics	 in	 transition	 literature	 is	 often	 either	 an	
analytical	aspect	or	a	 tool	 to	promote	transitions	 (Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009;	
Geels	2014;	Grin,	Rotmans,	and	Schot	2010c;	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	2010).	The	
most	frequent	question	is	how	sustainable	transitions	are	politically	shaped?	In	
contrast,	however,	the	less	asked	question	is	how	transitions	shape	politics?	In	
other	 words,	 democracy	 is	 as	 much	 important	 to	 energy	 transitions	 as	
decarbonisation.	 In	 section	 3.5,	 I	 follow	 the	 recent	 first	 step	 of	 Chilvers	 and	
Longhurst	 (2016)	to	use	STS	perspectives	on	participation	to	shed	 light	on	the	
co-produced,	relational,	and	emergent	politics	of	transitions.	
In	summary,	there	is	a	recent	uptake	of	the	irreconcilable	politics	 in	transition	
studies	after	initial	ignorance.	Politics	is	mainly	conceptualised	in	terms	of	actor	
strategies,	 agency,	 and	 power.	While	 these	 aspects	 are	 important,	 politics	 is	
more	multifaceted	than	this.	In	section	3.5	I	will	explore	more	how	STS	takes	on	
politics,	especially	about	the	themes	of	participation	and	democracy,	which	are	
often	seen	only	as	means	of	legitimation	in	transition	studies.	
3.4	INFRASTRUCTURES	AND	GEOGRAPHIES	
The	geographies	of	a	megainvestment	go	beyond	Wylfa	as	a	 locational	dot	on	
the	map.	In	this	section,	I	outline	some	of	the	geography	concepts	that	help	to	
reveal	 the	 intertwined	geographies	of	Wylfa	Newydd	 to	 respond	 to	RQ1.	This	
section	is	a	reflection	of	some	of	the	points	made	in	the	previous	two	sections.	
In	the	section	on	social	science	scholarship	on	nuclear	power	I	highlighted	the	
discrepancy	between	nuclear	sites	and	national	nuclear	policies	with	only	a	few	
notable	exceptions	(Hecht	2012,	2009;	Schmid	2015).	Also,	nuclear	sites	tend	to	
be	 described	 as	 singular,	 bounded,	 and	 homogenous	 places	 with	 an	
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overwhelming	 focus	on	 living	with	 radiation	 risks	 (Blowers	2010;	Blowers	 and	
Leroy	 1994;	 Slovic,	 Layman,	 and	 Flynn	 1991;	 Slovic	 et	 al.	 1991;	 Wynne,	
Waterton,	 and	 Grove-White	 1993).	 Only	 a	 few	 studies	 highlight	 the	
multifaceted	 character	 of	 living	 with	 nuclear	 power,	 and	 the	 heterogenous	
social	 landscapes	of	nuclear	 sites	 (Bickerstaff	 2012;	Parkhill	 et	 al.	 2011,	 2010;	
Venables	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Zonabend	 1993).	 In	 this	 section	 I	 outline	 a	 conceptual	
language	to	understand	the	entangled	geographies	of	nuclear	places,	and	how	
relational	geographies	can	help	us	 to	understand	the	 ‘national’	governance	of	
nuclear	 power	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 megainvestment	 on	 the	 Wylfa	
nuclear	site.	
This	section	very	much	builds	on	the	issues	raised	in	the	previous	section	with	
regards	to	the	emerging	geographies	of	transitions	research	(Becker,	Moss,	and	
Naumann	 2016;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	
Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 2015;	Murphy	 2015;	 Raven,	 Schot,	 and	 Berkhout	 2012b;	
Truffer,	 Murphy,	 and	 Raven	 2015).	 There,	 I	 highlighted	 especially	 three	
geographical	 aspects	 of	 energy	 transitions,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 Wylfa	
Newydd,	 spatial	 embeddedness,	 multi-scalarity,	 and	 landscapes	 and	 spatial	
materialities.	 This	 section	 builds	 on	 those	 discussions,	 and	 aims	 to	 develop	
those	geography	concepts	 further	which	have	 fertilised	transitions	research	 in	
the	 recent	 years,	 such	 as	 place	 and	 scale.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 do	 not	 have	 the	
ambition	to	redefine	established	transition	concepts,	such	as	the	sociotechnical	
regime	 in	 geographical	 terms.	 The	more	modest	 aim	 of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 use	
these	 concepts	 from	 relational	 geography	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 nuanced	
understanding	of	megainvestments.	
3.4.1	OPENING	THE	BLACK	BOX	OF	GEOGRAPHY	
This	is	a	geography	thesis.	Yet	I	have	entered	to	a	rather	unchartered	territory	
with	 the	geographies	of	a	nuclear	power	construction.	As	one	of	 the	previous	
subsections	 indicates,	nuclear	power	plants	 in	 the	 literature	mostly	appear	as	
high-risk	technological	objects.	There	has	been	much	work	in	opening	the	black	
box	 of	 this	 extraordinary	 technology	 from	 radiation	 risk	 to	 workplace	 issues	
(Beck	 1987;	 Douglas	 and	 Wildavsky	 1982;	 Douglas	 1994;	 MacKerron	 2004;	
O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	 1985;	 Perin	 2005;	 Perrow	 1984;	 Slovic,	
Lichtenstein,	 and	 Bischhoff	 1979;	 Winner	 1988;	 Wynne	 2011;	 Wynne,	
Waterton,	and	Grove-White	1993).	
The	 geographies	 of	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 have	 remained	 so	 far	 rather	
underexplored	 which	 I	 highlighted	 with	 the	 dichotomy	 of	 nuclear	 sites	 and	
national	 policies.	 Ethnographies	 of	 nuclear	 sites	 highlighted	 the	 physical	 and	
social	 landscapes	 or	 the	 area,	 but	 too	 often	 emphasised	 its	 isolation	 from,	
rather	its	connection	to,	a	national	and	global	industry	(Masco	2006;	Zonabend	
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1993).	 In	 the	 UK,	 the	 ‘Understanding	 risk’	 research	 group	 made	 pioneering	
research	 in	 addressing	 the	 ‘sense	 of	 place’	 around	 nuclear	 power	 plants	
(Bickerstaff	2012;	Parkhill	et	al.	2011;	Parkhill	et	al.	2010;	Venables	et	al.	2012),	
and	another	striking	exception	is	the	recent	book	on	the	entangled	geographies	
of	uranium	mining	and	Africans	by	Gabrielle	Hecht	(2012).	These	exceptions	are	
rare,	 and	 coming	 mostly	 from	 the	 disciplines	 of	 anthropology	 (Masco	 2006;	
Zonabend	 1993),	 history	 (Hecht	 2012,	 2011;	 Hecht	 2009;	 Schmid	 2011),	 or	
psychology	(Pidgeon	et	al.	2008;	Venables	et	al.	2012)	than	from	geography.	
3.4.2	RELATIONAL	GEOGRAPHIES:	TOWARDS	A	NATIONAL	SENSE	OF	PLACE		
In	human	geography,	 taken-for-granted	concepts	of	place,	 scale,	and	 territory	
have	 been	 challenged	 and	 rethought	 in	 the	 recent	 decades	 (Jessop,	 Brenner,	
and	Jones	2008;	Marston	2000;	Marston,	Jones,	and	Woodward	2005;	Massey	
2010,	 2005).	 The	 ground-breaking	 book	 of	 Lefebvre	 (1991)	 was	 particularly	
important	 in	opening	up	geographic	 thinking	about	how	 spaces	 are	produced	
through	 social	 relations.	 It	 has	 become	 a	 starting	 point	 of	 human	 geography	
that	 space	 not	 only	 takes	 part	 in	 and	 actively	 constitutes	 social	 relations	 and	
processes	 but	 spatiality	 itself	 is	 also	 produced	 or	 shaped	 by	 social	 relations	
(Hubbard	 2009).	 Moreover,	 relationality	 also	 became	 central	 to	 geography	
meaning	 that	 scales,	 places,	 etc.,	 are	 not	 constituted	 on	 their	 own	 but	 in	
relation	to	each	other.	
First,	Doreen	Massey	(2010)	breaks	with	the	fixed	and	self-contained	notion	of	
place	 in	 her	 seminar	 work	 on	 the	 ‘global	 sense	 of	 place’	 by	 highlighting	 the	
global	 connections	embedded	 in	 it	 through	 the	example	of	her	North	 London	
neighbourhood	 around	 Kilburn	 High	 Road.	 She	 emphasises	 that	 places	 are	
relationally	 constituted	 through	 a	 mixture	 of	 broader	 processes	 and	
conditionalities.	 She	 highlights	 four	 ways	 to	 contribute	 to	 “a	 progressive	
concept	of	place”	(Massey	2010:	8).	First,	places	are	“absolutely	not	static”	and	
frozen	in	time	but	processes	tied	together	through	social	interactions.	Second,	
“places	 do	 not	 have	 boundaries	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 divisions	which	 frame	 simple	
enclosures”.	 “Third,	 clearly	places	do	not	have	 single,	unique	 'identities';	 they	
are	 full	 of	 internal	 conflicts.”	 And	 fourth,	 “none	 of	 this	 denies	 place	 nor	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 place“	 (Massey	 2010:	 8).	 As	 a	 consequence	
places	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 places	 rather	 than	 in	 isolation	
(Hetherington	1997).	
Second,	 territories	 are	 also	 less	 ‘natural’	 categories,	 and	 nation	 states	 are	
particular	 examples	of	 the	 co-formation	of	 territory,	 identity,	 and	 sovereignty	
(Allen	 and	 Cochrane	 2010,	 2007;	 Anderson	 2006;	 Brenner	 1999a,	 1999b;	
Brenner	et	al.	2008;	Paasi	2013,	2003).	Especially	relevant	are,	 in	this	respect,	
studies	 decoupling	 state	 power	 and	 territory,	 claiming	 that	 (modern)	 state	
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power	is	better	approached	in	terms	of	reach	both	within	and	beyond	the	state	
boundaries	 than	 of	 sovereignty	 within	 a	 territory	 (Allen	 and	 Cochrane	 2010,	
2007;	Brenner	et	al.	2008;	Jessop,	Brenner,	and	Jones	2008).	The	questions	of	
regional	 identity,	 a	 particularly	 salient	 issue	 when	 talking	 to	 people	 on	
Anglesey,	has	been	also	a	topic	of	much	discussions.	While	Paasi	(Paasi	2003),	
for	example,	highlights	how	regions	are	constructed,	Allen	and	Cochrane	(2007)	
offer	a	relational	understanding	through	the	political	relations	constituting	the	
region.	
Third,	geographic	scale	has	been	a	particular	centre	of	debates	(Brenner	2001;	
Marston	2000;	Marston,	Jones,	and	Woodward	2005;	Marston	and	Smith	2001;	
Smith	1992;	Swyngedouw	1997).	The	starting	point	is	that	scale	is	not	a	natural	
category	 but	 geographies	 of	 difference	 are	 created	 through	 scaling	 (Smith	
1992).	 The	 question	 is	 whether	 scale	 is	 an	 analytical	 category	 to	 understand	
otherwise	‘flat	onthologies’	or	that	scaling	a	real-world	process	(Marston,	Jones,	
and	Woodward	2005).	For	some,	the	construction	of	scale	means	restructurings	
in	 the	 very	material	 sense,	 thus	 there	 is	 a	 politics	 in	 the	 designation	 of	 scale	
(Swyngedouw	1997).	As	Swyngedouw	summarises	(1997:	140):	
“Scale,	 it	seems	to	me,	 is	both	materially	and	metaphorically	central	 in	
structuring	 processes	 […].	 This	 multiplicity	 of	 scalar	 levels	 and	
perspectives	 also	 suggests	 that	 scale	 is	 neither	 an	 ontologically	 given	
and	 a	 priori	 definable	 geographical	 territory	 not	 a	 political	 neutral	
discursive	 strategy	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 narratives.	 […]	 Scale	 is,	
consequently,	 not	 socially	 or	 politically	 neutral,	 but	 embodies	 and	
expresses	power	relationships.”		
For	 example,	 it	 has	 very	 different	 consequences	 for	 the	 nuclear	 industry	
whether	the	Fukushima	accident	is	a	‘natural’	catastrophe	in	the	Tōhoku	region,	
a	 failure	of	 the	 Japanese	 institutional	setting,	or	a	 fiasco	of	 the	global	nuclear	
industry,	 thus	 there	 are	 political	 contentions	 about	 the	 designations	 of	 these	
debates.	Swyngedouw	(1997)	proposes	the	term	‘glocalisation’	to	indicate	that	
the	 ‘local’	 and	 ‘global’	 are	 deeply	 intertwined	 and	 co-constituted	 through	
processes	 that	 often	 simultaneously	 move	 both	 toward	 smaller	 and	 larger	
scales.	Wylfa	Newydd	is	localised	and	at	the	same	time	just	as	much	globalised;	
the	nuclear	investment	is	made	both	as	a	Welsh	and	a	Japanese	construction.		
These	debates	often	gave	primacy	to	one	geographic	concept,	such	as	scale,	as	
the	 superior	explanatory	 factor	over	other	dimensions.	 In	 response,	 Jessop	et	
al.	 (2008)	 made	 an	 influential	 argument	 about	 the	 complementary	 use	 of	
different	 aspects	 –	 what	 they	 called	 the	 TPSN	 framework	 denoting	 territory,	
place,	scale,	and	networks	–	in	the	analysis.	In	this	dissertation,	I	am	making	use	
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of	 geography	 concepts	 and	 of	 relationality	 in	 revealing	 the	 heterogeneous	
spatialities	of	Wylfa	Newydd.		
In	 geography,	 there	 is	 a	 key	 interest	 in	 how	 the	 ‘global’	 and	 the	 ‘local’	 are	
constituted.	 Here	my	 research	 project	 (especially	 RQ1)	 drives	me	 toward	 the	
issue	of	how	the	local	and	the	national	are	co-constituted.	In	other	worlds,	how	
a	 megainvestment	 on	 a	 remote	 island	 in	 the	 fringe	 of	 Wales	 is	 connected,	
among	others,	to	the	reconfiguration	of	the	nation	state	in	the	UK.	The	ways	of	
how	these	visions	and	practices	are	constituted	on	multiple	scales	 in	 interplay	
with	each	other	helps	 to	understand	why	 the	Wylfa	Newydd	project	 is	 taking	
place.	 Multi-scarcity	 and	 relational	 geographies	 provide	 a	 language	 that	
addresses	the	insight	that	the	Wylfa	Newydd	construction	is	both	taking	place	
on	the	Anglesey	nuclear	site	and	is	constitutive	of	UK	nuclear	policies.	
3.4.3	INFRASTRUCTURES	AND	MEGAPROJECTS	
Modern	 Britain	 has	 been	 created	 through	 immense	 infrastructures.	 The	
construction	 of	 canals	 and	 railways	 made	 Britain	 during	 the	 industrial	
revolution	 by	 connecting	 mining	 communities	 and	 industrial	 cities.	 Similarly,	
current	 Britain	 is	 shaped	 by	 its	 motorways,	 optical	 cables,	 and	 airports.	 The	
National	 Grid	 played	 an	 important	 part	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 post-war	 Britain	
during	which	period	the	electricity	sector	was	the	biggest	capital	investor	in	the	
UK	 (Hannah	 1982).	 The	 infrastructure	 is	 made	 up	 of	 a	 national	 industry	 of	
networked	nuclear	 sites	 in	often	 remote	places,	but	also	of	a	global	 flow	and	
circulation	of	 people,	materials,	 and	 knowledge	 connecting	uranium	mines	 as	
well	 as	 high-tech	 research	 labs	 (Hecht	 2009;	 Schmid	 2015).	 Infrastructure	
investments	are	 important	means	for	both	the	territorial	 integration	of	spatial	
heterogeneity	and	 the	establishment	of	 state	 capacity	 (Guldi	2012;	Högselius,	
Kaijser,	and	van	der	Vleuten	2015;	Mann	2008,	1984;	Weber	1976).	
In	contrast	to	the	salience	of	these	vast	infrastructures,	 little	has	been	written	
on	the	ways	they	were	made,	especially	in	relation	to	megainvestments,	such	as	
the	 Channel	 Tunnel	 (Genus	 1997).	 There	 is	 an	 emerging	 interest	 in	
infrastructures	in	social	sciences,	with	sensitivities	on	the	materialities,	politics,	
use	and	even	design	of	these	 interconnected	sociomaterial	networks	(Graham	
and	Marvin	2001;	Larkin	2013;	Star	1999),	but	hardly	on	the	very	 investments	
making	 these	 infrastructures.	 Infrastructural	 investments	 are	 addressed	more	
by	economics	(Gramlich	1994)	with	a	refreshing	exception	of	the	 literature	on	
megaprojects	 (Flyvbjerg	 2014;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	 2003;	
Sovacool	 and	 Cooper	 2013).	 Megaproject	 studies	 highlight	 the	 top-level	
decisions	that	lead	to	cost	escalations	often	coupled	with	a	lack	of	transparency	
and	omission	of	risks.	I	address	four	approaches	to	infrastructures	with	a	focus	
on	 megainvestments,	 namely	 infrastructure	 studies	 in	 anthropology	 and	 STS	
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(Edwards	 2003;	 Larkin	 2013;	 Le	 Dantec	 and	 DiSalvo	 2013;	 Star	 1999),	 large	
technological	 systems	 (LTS)	 studies	 (Hughes	 1987,	 1986;	 Joerges	 1988),	
infrastructures	 in	 urban	 studies	 (Heynen,	 Kaika,	 and	 Swyngedouw	 2006;	
Monstadt	 2009;	 Swyngedouw	 1999),	 and	 megaprojects	 literature	 (Flyvbjerg	
2014;	Flyvbjerg,	Bruzelius,	and	Rothengatter	2003;	Sovacool	and	Cooper	2013).	
First,	 infrastructure	studies	started	off	to	study	what	is	“by	definition	invisible,	
part	of	the	background	for	other	kinds	of	work”	(Star	1999:	379),	especially	 in	
relation	 to	 information	 infrastructures	 (Bowker	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Star	 and	 Bowker	
2006).	 The	 small	 study	 area	 is	 driven	 by	 opening	 the	 ‘black	 box’	 of	
infrastructures	 (Furlong	2011).	 Infrastructures	provided	more	fertile	ground	of	
theoretisations	 addressing	 the	 interconnections	 of	 social	 and	 technical,	
mundane	 and	 grandiose,	 visible	 and	 invisible,	 fix	 and	mobile	 (Edwards	 2003;	
Larkin	 2013;	 Le	 Dantec	 and	DiSalvo	 2013).	 This	 drove	 orientation	 toward	 the	
“poetics	 of	 infrastructure”	 (Larkin	 2013)	 trying	 to	 replace	 the	 rather	
unimaginative	reporting	of	infrastructures.	Others	emphasised	the	difficulties	to	
define	infrastructures	empirically	(Barry	2013).	
Second,	the	literature	on	large	technological	systems	(LTS)	put	spatiality	in	the	
centre	 of	 how	 infrastructures	 are	 defined	 (Hughes	 1987,	 1986;	 Joerges	 1988;	
Mayntz	 and	 Hughes	 1988).	 The	 LTS	 framework	 is	 rooted	 in	 developing	 a	
conceptual	framework	of	the	pioneering	study	of	Thomas	Hughes	(1993)	on	the	
growth	 of	 electricity	 networks	 of	 small	 municipal	 lighting	 systems	 to	 vast	
national	and	regional	infrastructures.	Large	technological	systems	are	“seamless	
webs”	 (Hughes	 1986)	 with	 a	 technological	 momentum	 (Hughes	 1994)	 to	
expand,	 though	not	without	 impediments	or	 ‘reverse	 salients’	 (Hughes	1987).	
While	 LTS	 literature	 puts	 indefinite	 extension	 as	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 large	
technological	systems,	this	research	is	more	oriented	towards	the	very	seams	of	
infrastructures.	 Unfortunately,	 infrastructural	 investments	 seem	 to	 be	 lost	 in	
the	seamless	web	of	large	technological	systems.	
Third,	 the	 growing	 interest	 in	 infrastructures	 in	 geography,	 especially	 urban	
studies	 highlights	 the	 territorial	 dimensions	 of	 infrastructures	 (Graham	 and	
Marvin	 2001;	 Heynen,	 Kaika,	 and	 Swyngedouw	 2006;	 Monstadt	 2009;	
Swyngedouw	 1999).	 Geographers	 criticise	 the	 LTS	 literature	 for	 simplifying	
infrastructures	to	spatial	expansion	(Graham	and	Marvin	2001:	184).	The	focus	
of	the	literature	is	on	cities	as	hubs	of	infrastructures	that	condition	urban	living	
and	 mix	 the	 social	 and	 the	 material	 (Amin	 2014).	 This	 emerging	 literature	
combines	 insights	 from	 different	 fields,	 such	 as	 materiality	 and	 agency	 from	
Actor-Network	 Theory	 (Latour	 2005b,	 1992)	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 spatial	 fix	 in	
capitalist	 accumulation	 and	 uneven	 development	 in	 post-Marxist	 geography	
(Brenner	1998;	Harvey	2001,	1996;	Jessop	2006).	The	emphasis	on	the	cities	as	
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infrastructural	hubs,	however,	overlooks	 ‘national’	 infrastructures,	such	as	the	
electricity	systems	around	the	national	grid.	More	relevantly,	the	literature	pays	
no	attention	to	infrastructural	hubs	beyond	the	city,	such	as	nuclear	sites.	Wylfa	
Newydd,	for	example,	is	not	only	a	hub	of	electricity	but	also	transport	and	ICT	
infrastructure.	 The	 literature	 focuses	 on	 the	 design,	 use,	 repair	 and	
maintenance	 of	 infrastructures.	 In	 the	 urban	 infrastructures	 literature,	
investments	 are	 often	 neglected	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 topic	 of	
neoliberalisation,	 such	 as	 the	 competitive	 scramble	 for	 investments	 (Graham	
and	Marvin	 2001)	 and	 the	 private	 involvement	 in	 public	 projects,	 such	 as	 in	
public-private	 partnership	 (PPP)	 agreements	 (Swyngedouw,	 Moulaert,	 and	
Rodriguez	2002).	
Fourth,	 megaprojects	 literature	 focuses	 exactly	 on	 the	 gap	 of	 large-scale	
investment	 projects	 (Flyvbjerg	 2014;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	
2003;	 Scott	 1998).	 The	 literature	 addresses	 the	 rise	 of	 “a	 new	 political	 and	
physical	animal,	 the	multibillion-dollar	mega	 infrastructure	project”	 (Flyvbjerg,	
Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	 2003:	 1),	 from	 high-speed	 rail	 networks	 to	 the	
Three	Gorges	Dam.	Globally,	these	megainvestments	amount	to	6-9	trillion	USD	
annually	 (Flyvbjerg	 2014:	 6).	 In	 the	 literature	megaprojects	 are	 addressed	 as	
political	 issues	 (Flyvbjerg	 2014,	 1998;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	
2003;	Scott	1998),	 in	contrast	to	economics	(Gramlich	1994)	and	management	
perspectives	 (Li	 and	 Guo	 2011;	 Mok,	 Shen,	 and	 Yang	 2015).	 The	 focus	 of	
megainvestment	 studies	 is	 on	 the	 paradox	 of	 systematic	 and	 substantial	 cost	
overruns	 and	 delays	 (Flyvbjerg	 2014;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	
2003).	 The	 recurring	 problems	 include	 exaggerated	 demand	 forecasts,	
fabricated	costs	and	 time	schedules,	and	brushing	aside	negative	 side	effects.	
The	 controversies	 about	 cost	 of	 new	 nuclear	 exemplify	 these	 issues	 (Boccard	
2014;	 Kennedy	 2007;	 MacKerron	 1992;	 Sovacool	 2011),	 including	 the	 very	
recent	 debates	 (Gilbert	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Koomey,	 Hultman,	 and	 Grubler	 2016;	
Lovering,	 Yip,	 and	 Nordhaus	 2016).	 As	 these	 problems	 are	 rooted	 in	
institutional	 political	 hubris	 (Scott	 1998),	megaprojects	 scholars	 emphasis	 the	
role	 of	 accountability,	 third-party	 studies	 and	 auditing	 (Flyvbjerg	 2014;	
Flyvbjerg,	Bruzelius,	and	Rothengatter	2003;	Flyvbjerg,	Holm,	and	Buhl	2002).	In	
their	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 four	 energy	 megaprojects	 in	 Asia,	 Sovacool	 and	
Cooper	 (2013)	 confirmed	 fragmentation	 of	 megaproject	 design	 and	
implementation;	susceptibility	to	technical	problems,	delays	and	cost	overruns;	
production	of	massive	externalities	that	usually	overwhelm	purported	benefits;	
negative	 impacts	 upon	 public	 representation	 and	 participation;	 and	 overly	
optimistic	 projected	benefits	 that	were	not	 actually	 achieved	by	 the	projects.	
While	 the	megaprojects	 literature	 is	 instructive	 about	 the	 top-level	 decision-
making	and	about	 its	 financial,	economic	and	environmental	 consequences,	 it	
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does	not	say	much	about	the	construction	itself	on	the	ground.	In	other	words,	
megaprojects	do	not	provide	much	guideline	for	my	ethnographic	study	of	the	
Wylfa	 Newydd	 project.	 Thus	 I	 use	 the	 term	 megainvestment	 instead	 of	
megaproject.	
In	developing	 the	concept	of	a	megainvestment,	 I	would	 like	 to	emphase	 two	
key	aspects,	 the	assemblage	of	 issues	and	 the	multi-scalar	 spatialities.	 First,	 a	
megainvestment	 is	an	assemblage	of	 issues	 that	go	well	beyond	a	 ‘project’	 in	
the	 strict	 sense,	 including	 associated	 developments	 (e.g.,	 roads,	 workers’	
accommodation,	 logistics	 centres),	 education	 and	 training,	 or	 preparation	 of	
operation	protocols.	As	chapter	7	shows,	in	case	of	Wylfa	Newydd,	these	issues	
are	subjects	to	separate	workstreams	of	the	Energy	Island	Programme	or	even	
mini	 consultations,	 such	 as	 the	 2015	 summer	 engagement	 events	 of	 Horizon	
over	the	road	improvements.		
Second,	 megainvestment	 as	 a	 multi-scalar	 spatiality	 highlights	 that	 an	
investment	 is	 neither	 a	 singular	 point	 on	 the	map	 –	 a	 technological	 object,	 a	
sum	 of	money,	 or	 an	 investment	 decision	 on	 a	 site	 –	 nor	 it	 is	 situated	 in	 an	
indefinite	 ‘seamless	 web’.	 The	 geographies	 of	 spatial	 embeddedness	 and	 the	
multiple	scales	and	places	 implicated	 in	the	 investment	are	key	to	understand	
megainvestments.	Geographic	scales	are	proxies	 to	the	magnitudes	of	 ‘mega’.	
In	chapter	5,	I	address	the	manifold	geographies	of	the	project	showing	that	the	
investment	 is	 transformative	 for	 the	 wider	 region,	 and	 the	 negotiation	 of	
geographic	 aspects	 is	 central	 to	 understand	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 as	 a	
megainvestment.	
3.5	TECHNOLOGICAL	POLITICS,	EXPERTISE,	AND	PUBLICS	
3.5.1	SCIENCE,	TECHNOLOGY	AND	SOCIETY	
This	 section	 builds	 on	 the	 criticism	 of	 the	 transitions	 literature	 regarding	 its	
poor	 accommodation	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 technological	 change,	 addressed	 in	
subsection	 3.3.4.	 The	 recent	 uptake	 of	 politics	 in	 transitions	 literature	 was	
mainly	 identified	 with	 actor	 strategies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 agency	 and	 power	
(Avelino	 and	 Rotmans	 2009;	 Farla	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Geels	 2014).	 I	 found	 that	 this	
definition	 is	 overly	 restrictive	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 instrumentalism	 of	 actor	
strategies,	the	taken-for-granted	concept	of	actors	and	their	interests,	and	the	
limitation	 of	 agency	 to	 individual	 and	 collective	 human	 actors.	 Alternative	
approaches	to	the	politics	of	transitions	are	needed.	Here	I	show	some	relevant	
concepts	 from	 the	 broad	 field	 of	 STS	 literature	 to	 provide	 additional	 insights	
(Chilvers	and	Longhurst	2016).	The	field	has	been	generative	in	the	recent	years	
in	 offering	 novel	 ways	 of	 conceptualising	 the	 democratic	 politics,	 technology	
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and	knowledge	 (Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015b;	 Irwin	and	Wynne	2004;	 Jasanoff	
2004;	Latour	and	Weibel	2005;	Marres	2012;	Marres	and	Lezaun	2011;	Michael	
2009;	 Stirling	2008;	Wynne	and	Felt	2007).	 First,	 transition	 studies	are	 largely	
ignoring	 the	 role	 of	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 in	 governing	 sustainability,	 the	
multifaceted	 aspects	 of	 knowledge	 forms,	 and	 the	 entanglements	 of	 expert	
knowledge	and	politics.	 Second,	 transition	 studies	 address	democratic	 politics	
as	limited	to	legitimation	with	an	implied	sense	of	faceless	generic	public.	In	this	
section	 I	 unpack	 some	 insight	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 and	 participation	 in	
technological	issues	with	a	focus	on	the	knowledge	issues.	
STS	 thinking	 is	 rooted	 in	 social	 constructivism.	 The	 social	 construction	 of	
technology	 (SCOT)	 approach	 claims	 that	 social	 norms	 and	 interests,	 and	 thus	
politics,	 are	 inherent	 in	 technologies	 (Bijker	 1997;	 Bijker,	 Hughes,	 and	 Pinch	
1987;	 Bijker	 and	 Law	 1992;	 Pinch	 and	 Bijker	 1984;	 see	 also	 Winner	 1993).	
Subsequently,	 various	 approaches	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 conceptualise	 the	
social	 or	 political	 character	 of	 technologies,	 often	 advancing	 or	 criticising	 the	
SCOT	approach,	from	social	construction	of	large	technological	systems	(Hughes	
1987,	 1986;	 Joerges	 1988)	 and	 constructive	 technology	 assessment	 (J.	 Schot	
and	Rip	1997;	Schot	1992)	to	autonomous	technology	(Winner	1988,	1980)	and	
neo-Foucaultian	governmentality	(Rose	2001,	1999).	
While	 constructivist	 approaches	 tend	 to	 focus	on	how	particular	 technologies	
are	 shaped	 politically	 (Bijker	 and	 Law	 1992),	 other	 scholars	 look	 at	 the	
somewhat	bigger	 scheme	of	 things,	namely	 the	 relationship	between	modern	
liberal	 democracies	 and	 modern	 technoscience	 (Ezrahi	 1990;	 Jasanoff	 2007,	
1994;	 Mitchell	 2002).	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 co-production	 of	 (techno)science	 and	
social	order	has	been	particularly	influential	(Jasanoff	2004).	There	are	various	
concepts	highlighting	the	entanglements	of	technologies	and	the	political,	such	
as	 technopolitical	 regimes	 (Gille	 2007;	 Hecht	 2009),	 political	 machines	 and	
technological	zones	(Barry	2001),	or	techno-politics	(Mitchell	2002).	
The	 inseparability	 of	 technologies	 and	 politics	 means	 rethinking	 what	
technology	 and	 politics	 mean.	 As	 discussed	 earlier	 (subsection	 3.3.3),	 the	
mainstream	 concept	 of	 politics	 in	 transition	 studies	 is	 linked	 to	 power	 as	 a	
capability	of	human	agency.	 In	STS,	however,	 the	decentering	of	agency	 from	
human	 individuals	 sheds	 new	 light	 on	 politics.	 Actor-Network	 Theory	 (ANT)	
scholars	provocatively	highlighted	non-humans	as	agents	of	social	change,	from	
the	 scallops	 of	 St	 Brieuc	 Bay	 (Callon	 1984)	 to	 the	 mechanic	 door-closers	
interchangeable	with	humans	(Johnson	1988).	Other	writings,	even	challenged	
the	distinction	between	humans	and	non-humans,	particularly	Donna	Haraway	
through	the	concept	of	cyborgs	(Haraway	1995,	1992,	1985;	Penley,	Ross,	and	
Haraway	1990).	
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In	the	next	subsection	I	address	the	question	of	how	knowledge	and	expertise	is	
used	 in	 governing	 technoscientific	 issues,	 providing	 some	 theoretical	 context	
for	 Chapter	 7.	 In	 the	 subsequent	 subsection,	 I	 concentrate	 on	 democratic	
politics	in	the	nexus	of	publics	and	engagement,	which	serves	as	a	background	
of	my	approach	to	public	consultations	and	engagement	in	Chapter	8.		
3.5.2	KNOWLEDGE	AND	EXPERTISE	IN	GOVERNANCE	
In	governing	sustainability	transitions,	the	 literature	 is	remarkably	silent	about	
the	role	of	expert	knowledge,	especially	in	relation	to	the	politics	of	transitions.	
Knowledge	appears	only	 in	very	vague	and	generic	 terms,	 such	as	a	means	 in	
reflexive	governance	(Grin	2010;	Rotmans	and	Loorbach	2010),	as	a	resource	in	
the	 actor	 dynamics	 (Avelino	 and	 Rotmans	 2009;	 Farla	 et	 al.	 2012),	 as	 one	
dimension	 of	 the	 seven	 dimensions	 of	 a	 sociotechnical	 regime	 (Geels	 2002:	
1262)	 or	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 innovation	 (Kemp,	 Schot,	 and	 Hoogma	 1998).	
Knowledge,	however,	 is	much	more	complex,	diverse,	and	multifaceted.	Most	
importantly	 expert	 knowledge	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 politics	 and	 governance	
(Wynne	and	Felt	2007).	
STS	perspectives	challenge	the	very	core	of	the	question	raised	by	Plato	 in	his	
Republic	whether	experts	(philosophers	in	his	words)	or	politicians	should	make	
public	 decisions.	 Science	 and	 politics	 are	 often	 contrasted	with	 each	 other	 in	
public	 discussions	 about	 evidence-based	 policies,	 technocracy,	 or	 climate	
change	 science.	 The	 deeply	 rooted	 claim	 in	 STS	 that	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	
socially	 constructed,	 however,	 puts	 the	 question	 into	 a	 very	 different	
perspective.	 Knowledge	 production	 and	 politics	 are	 deeply	 interlinked,	
especially	in	governing	modern	societies.	
The	social	construction	of	scientific	knowledge	draws	us	to	the	roots	of	STS.	A	
common	thread	of	early	STS	writings	 is	 that	scientific	knowledge	 is	shaped	by	
social	 interests	 and	 values	 (Barnes	 and	 Edge	 1982;	 Bloor	 1991;	 Collins	 1975,	
1974;	Latour	1987;	Latour	and	Woolgar	1979).	Moreover,	several	case	studies	
have	 highlighted	 the	 historical	 and	 current	 importance	 of	 public	
demonstrations	of	scientific	knowledge,	such	as	publicly	displayed	experiments	
(Collins	1988;	Hilgartner	2000;	 Shapin	1994;	 Shapin	and	Schaffer	1985).	Harry	
Collins	 (1988)	 draws	 an	 important	 distinction	 between	 scientific	 experiments	
where	 the	 result	 is	 left	 to	 uncertainty	 and	 public	 demonstrations	 where	 the	
results	are	ascertained	through	the	virtuosity	of	the	expert.	As	an	example	for	
public	demonstrations,	he	cites	the	choreographed	crash	of	two	trains	carrying	
empty	nuclear	fuel	flasks	that	displayed	the	safety	of	nuclear	waste	transport	of	
CEGB	 through	 the	 unscathed	 flasks	 (Collins	 1988:	 731-742).	 The	 train	 crash	
demonstrated	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 technical	 experts	 of	 CEGB	 over	 nuclear	
safety	matters.	
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The	social	construction	of	scientific	 facts	 is	 thus	not	simply	an	epistemological	
question	of	truth	and	objectivity	(Merton	1973;	Popper	2005,	1972).	There	are	
technosocial	agendas	inscribed	in	expert	knowledge	with	a	political	substance.	
Scientific	 advice	 has	 become	 increasingly	 influential	 in	 the	 democratic	
governance	of	modern	industrial	societies	(Ezrahi	1990;	Jasanoff	1994;	Mitchell	
2002;	Porter	1996;	Price	1965).	Modern	state	apparatuses	both	face	more	and	
more	complex	problems,	such	as	climate	change,	and	reach	to	previously	intact	
spheres,	such	as	human	reproduction	(Foucault	2003)	or	geoengineering,	often	
through	the	emergence	of	new	technologies.	The	governance	of	technological	
risks	 has	 become	 a	 central	 issue,	 especially	 with	 the	 boom	 of	 environmental	
regulation	(Jasanoff	1999;	Renn	2008)	resonating	with	the	claims	of	risk	society	
and	 reflective	 governance	 (Beck	 1992;	 Giddens	 2003).	 In	 political	 decision-
making	there	is	a	strain	to	be	‘evidence-based’.	As	Jasanoff	(2007:	6)	says:		
“That	contemporary	societies	are	constituted	as	knowledge	societies	is,	
of	course,	an	important	part	of	the	reason	[why	democratic	theory	can	
only	be	articulated	today	with	the	politics	of	science	and	technology].	It	
follows	 that	 important	 aspects	 of	 political	 behaviour	 and	 action	
clustered	around	 the	ways	 in	which	knowledge	 is	generated,	disputed,	
and	used	to	underwrite	collective	decisions.”	
Politics-oriented	STS	literature	has	criticised	the	notion	that	scientists	‘produce‘	
knowledge	for	politicians	and	bureaucrats	to	‘use’	it	(Jasanoff	et	al.	1998;	Pielke	
2007,	 2004).	 This	 claim	 goes	 beyond	 simply	 stating	 that	 scientific	 facts	 are	
socially	constructed,	but	asserts	that	knowledge	production	is	taking	place	in	a	
political	 context.	 The	 concept	 of	 civic	 epistemologies,	 that	 is,	 “the	
institutionalised	practices	by	which	members	of	a	given	society	test	and	deploy	
knowledge	claims	used	to	act	as	a	basis	for	making	collective	choices”	(Jasanoff	
2007:	 254),	 highlights	 that	 practices	 of	 governing	 technology	 and	 society	 are	
culturally	embedded.	
Public	 knowledge	 controversies	 are	 especially	 important	 in	 addressing	
knowledge	 and	 expertise	 in	 political	 decision-making	 (Martin	 and	 Richards	
1995;	Nelkin	1979,	1971;	Sarewitz	2004),	 such	as	 the	UK	controversies	of	GM	
food	 (Horlick-Jones	 2007;	 Levidow	 and	 Marris	 2001;	 Wynne	 2001).	
Controversies	are	often	rooted	in	the	disputes	of	what	is	legitimate	knowledge	
and	what	is	not,	either	by	drawing	a	boundary	between	lays	and	experts,	or	by	
negotiating	 different	 kinds	 of	 expertise	 and	 knowledge	 (Epstein	 1998,	 1995;	
Wynne	1996,	1992b).	The	salience	of	different	productions	and	contestations	of	
knowledge	is	exacerbated	as	standardised	technical	knowledge	and	information	
has	been	increasingly	underlying	the	production	of	materials	and	technological	
infrastructures	 (Barry	 2013,	 2010,	 2005).	 As	 Chapter	 6	 highlights,	 the	
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governance	 of	 a	 megainvestment,	 such	 as	 Wylfa	 Newydd,	 is	 based	 on	
documentations	 and	 expert	 knowledges	 that	 are	 produced	 through	
collaborations	and	contestations.		
Barry	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘political	 situation’	 to	 highlight	 “the	 way	 in	
which	 the	 spatiality,	 temporality	 and	 limits	 of	 any	 given	 controversy	 are	
themselves	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 question”	 (Barry	 2013:	 6).	 Political	 situations	 draw	
together	 the	 various	 facets	 of	 issues.	An	example	 is	 how	 the	outbreak	of	 the	
BSE	epidemic	 in	 the	UK	 is	connected	to	both	to	 the	arrangement	of	materials	
and	 agricultural	 practices	 on	 a	 farm	 in	 the	north	 of	 England	 as	well	 as	 global	
trade	regulations	(Law	and	Mol	2008).	Political	situations	highlight	that	the	co-
production	and	contestation	of	knowledge	in	governance	does	not	happen	on	a	
single	 site	 but	 on	 various	 interconnected	 sites	 and	 through	 various	 practices	
that	 are	 scattered	 but	 interconnected	 both	 temporally	 and	 spatially	 (Barry	
2013).	
This	 thesis	 draws	 on	 the	 above	 literature	 in	 addressing	 evidence	 and	 expert	
knowledge	 as	 both	 tools	 of	 governing	 complex	 technosocial	 matters	 and	
justification	of	political	decisions,	especially	on	controversial	 issues.	The	above	
insights	from	STS	approaches	on	governance	serve	as	an	orientation	to	address	
the	ways	of	governing	Wylfa	Newydd.	These	provide	key	conceptual	insights	to	
answer	RQ2	on	governance.		
3.5.3	PUBLICS	AND	PUBLIC	ENGAGEMENT	
Public	participation	is	largely	neglected	in	energy	transitions	research	(Chilvers	
and	 Longhurst	 2016;	 Hendriks	 2009,	 2008;	 STEPS	 Centre	 2010),	 and	 STS	
provides	productive	ways	to	address	how	public	participations	are	orchestrated	
around	public	 technical	 issues	 (Chilvers	 and	 Longhurst	 2016;	 Stirling	2008).	 In	
subsection	 3.3.4,	 I	 highlighted	 that	 even	 when	 the	 politics	 of	 transitions	 is	
discussed,	 it	 is	 often	 framed	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 provide	 legitimation	 for	
sustainability	transitions	(Grin,	Rotmans,	and	Schot	2010c;	Meadowcroft	2011,	
2009;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	2010).	 In	 this	 section	 I	 outline	 the	 literature	on	
the	 making	 of	 publics	 and	 knowledge	 controversies	 (Irwin	 2006;	 Irwin	 and	
Wynne	 2004;	 Jasanoff	 2004,	 1994;	Michael	 2009;	 Stirling	 2008;	Wynne	 1996;	
Wynne	and	Felt	2007)	and	highlight	the	spatial,	material,	and	mundane	aspect	
of	 participation	 as	 emergent,	 co-produced	 and	 relational	 (Braun,	 Whatmore,	
and	Stengers	2010;	Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015b;	Felt	and	Fochler	2010;	Laurent	
2011;	Lezaun	and	Soneryd	2007;	Marres	2012;	Marres	and	Lezaun	2011).		
While	there	has	been	a	‘participative	turn’	in	modern	governance,	especially	in	
relation	 to	 sustainability,	 it	 has	 evoked	 a	 growing	 academic	 criticism.	
Participation	 does	 not	 happen	 in	 a	 political	 vacuum,	 but	 shaped	 by	 uneven	
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power	 relations	 as	 highlighted	 both	 by	 practitioners	 and	 political	 theorists	
(Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015b;	Cooke	and	Kothari	2001;	Cruikshank	1999;	Mouffe	
2005;	 Swyngedouw	 2005).	 In	 relation	 to	 science	 and	 technology,	 this	 line	 of	
criticism	 has	 challenged	 traditional	 approaches	 to	 ‘public	 understanding	 of	
science’	 (PUS)	highlighted	by	 the	deficit	model	 (Irwin	and	Wynne	2004;	Miller	
2001;	Stirling	2008;	Wynne	1995).	The	deficit	model	assumes	that	 ‘the	public’	
has	a	deficit	in	understanding	science	therefore	it	needs	to	be	educated.	Critics	
of	 the	 above	model	 highlight	 that	 citizens	 actively	make	 sense	 of	 science	 by	
considering	contextual	issues.	In	his	classic	study	of	sheepfarmers	following	the	
Chernobyl	 fallout	 in	 Cumbria,	 Wynne	 (1996,	 1992a)	 that	 the	 reluctance	 of	
farmers	 to	accept	bureaucratic/scientific	expertise	on	 radiation	matters	 is	not	
simply	based	on	the	improper	understanding	of	nuclear	risks,	but	more	on	the	
comprehension	of	the	corporate	and	military	interest	behind	or	the	democratic	
deficiencies	 of	 nuclear	 decision-making.	 The	 case	 study	 also	 blurs	 the	 sharp	
distinctions	 between	 experts	 and	 laypeople	 by	 highlighting	 different	 kinds	 of	
expertise,	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘local’	 contextual	 knowledge,	 and	 the	 social	
construction	of	the	boundaries	of	expertise	(Wynne	1996,	1992a).	
Lay	and	expert	knowledge	are	central	 issues.	The	differentiation	Mike	Michael	
makes	 between	 public-in-general	 (PiG)	 and	 publics-in-particular	 (PiP)	 is	
particularly	useful	in	this	regard	(Michael	2009).	According	to	him,	the	public-in-
general	(PiG)	is	“an	undifferentiated	whole	that	is	distinguished	from”	(Michael	
2009:	620)	science-in-general,	Science	with	a	capital	S,	“science	understood	 in	
terms	 of	 general	 characteristics	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 hypothesis	 testing,	 or	 the	
production	 of	 particular	 sorts	 of	 arcane	 knowledge,	 or	 a	 commitment	 to	
epistemic	 (or	 even	 ‘civilizational’)	 progress“	 (Michael	 2009:	 620).	 In	 contrast,	
publics-in-particular	(PiP)	“can	be	broadly	defined	as	those	publics	that	have	an	
identifiable	 stake	 in	 particular	 scientific	 and	 technological	 issues	 or	
controversies”	 (Michael	 2009:	 620).	 Addressing	 science	 and	 public	 along	 a	
particular	issue,	thus	challenges	the	singular	notion	of	‘general	public’	or	‘public	
interest’	and	highlights	that	publics	are	also	made	or	performed	through	public	
engagement	(Horst	2007;	Alan	Irwin	and	Michael	2003;	Michael	2009).	As	there	
are	multiple	ways	 to	make	 publics,	multiple	 publics	 can	 be	made	 (Braun	 and	
Schultz	2010;	Michael	2009).	
Publics	are	not	pre-given	and	autonomous	aggregations	of	 individuals,	but	co-
produced,	 relational,	 and	 emergent	 (Chilvers	 and	 Kearnes	 2015c).	 Moreover,	
the	 “objects	 (or	 issues),	 subjects	 (or	 publics/participants),	 instruments	 (or	
methods	and	devices)	and	procedures	(or	political	philosophies)	of	participation	
[…]	are	not	pre-determined”	(Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015c:	13-14).	These	are	co-
produced	in	the	process	of	participation.	The	academic	challenge	is	not	simply	
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to	claim	that	publics	are	‘made’	but	to	show	the	ways	of	making	publics	(Braun	
and	Schultz	2010;	Felt	and	Fochler	2010).	
Formal	 public	 engagement	 exercises	 are	 of	 particular	 interest	 (Chilvers	 and	
Kearnes	 2015c;	 Chilvers	 and	 Longhurst	 2016;	 Felt	 and	 Fochler	 2010;	 Laurent	
2011;	 Wynne	 2007).	 The	 proliferation	 of	 public	 consultations,	 etc.,	 highlight	
that	that	publics	are	not	 just	made,	but	there	are	political	machineries	behind	
creating	 publics	 (Barry	 2001;	 Braun	 and	 Schultz	 2010;	 Pestre	 2008).	 In	 other	
worlds,	 formal	 public	 engagements	 are	 not	 just	 about	 eliciting	 the	 opinions	
through	broadening	the	ways	to	‘give	voice’	to	the	people	(Lezaun	and	Soneryd	
2007),	but	as	much	about	legitimising	political	decisions	through	designing	the	
ways	by	which	the	public	consent,	and	thus	the	public	itself,	is	made	up.		
The	understanding	of	the	ways	of	making	publics	and	public	participation	leads	
to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 public	 engagement	 is	 made	 of.	 There	 has	 been	 an	
interest	 in	 the	 academic	 literature	 in	 the	 ‘things’	 (Latour	 and	 Weibel	 2005),	
issues	 (Marres	 2007;	 Marres,	 Latour,	 and	 Weibel	 2005),	 materialities	 and	
objects	 (Braun,	Whatmore,	and	Stengers	2010;	Marres	2012),	devices	 (Marres	
and	Lezaun	2011),	and	technologies	of	participation	(Asdal	2008;	Laurent	2011;	
Lezaun	and	Soneryd	2007).	Marres	 (2007;	2005;	2005),	 for	example	highlights	
that	 publics	 emerge	 through	 issue	 formations.	 The	 architecture	 of	 politics,	 in	
which	 issues	 are	 articulated,	 is	 based	 on	 specific	 devices	 and	 technologies	 of	
participation.	 Different	 devices	 facilitate	 different	 publics,	 such	 as	 public	
opinion	surveys	(Felt	and	Fochler	2010;	Lezaun	and	Soneryd	2007;	Marres	and	
Lezaun	2011).	This	growing	 literature	focuses	on	the	“missing	masses”	(Latour	
1992)	 of	 public	 participation	 and	 democratic	 practices	 to	 provide	 a	
comprehensive	 account	 by	 taking	materials,	 devices	 and	 objects	 into	 account	
(Barry	 2013;	 Chilvers	 and	 Kearnes	 2015a;	 Laurent	 2011;	 Lezaun	 and	 Soneryd	
2007;	Marres	2012;	Marres	and	Lezaun	2011).		
There	are	two	key	issues	where	the	case	study	of	public	engagement	of	Wylfa	
Newydd,	 addressed	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 means	 a	 reorientation	 with	 regards	 to	 the	
above	STS	literature	on	participation.	First,	the	emphasis	in	the	literature	is	on	
public	 engagement	 with	 science,	 and	 less	 on	 technology.	 Moreover,	 Wylfa	
Newydd	 is	 more	 of	 a	 megainvestment	 than	 a	 technology,	 where	 the	 public	
engagements	 primarily	 focus	 on	 the	 socioeconomic	 aspects	 than	 on	 the	
technical	or	scientific	issues	(e.g.,	technological	risks	of	nuclear	power),	at	least	
in	 the	 local	 consultations.	 Second,	 the	 literature	mostly	 focuses	on	 the	public	
engagement	 exercises	 by	 state	 bureaucracies	 and	 scientific	 establishments,	
such	as	 the	GM	nation	debate	 in	 the	UK	 (Horlick-Jones	et	 al.	 2006).	 The	 case	
study	 of	 Wylfa,	 however,	 highlights	 that	 corporations	 are	 increasingly	
implicated	well	beyond	PR	and	CSR	campaigns	through	the	neoliberalisation	of	
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the	 public	 sphere.	 In	 the	 UK,	 for	 example,	 the	 burden	 of	 public	 engagement	
with	regards	to	‘nationally	significant	infrastructure	projects’	(NSIPs)	shifted	to	
the	developer	companies	 in	so-called	pre-application	consultations	(PAC)	from	
the	 public	 hearings	 of	 the	 planning	 authority.	 In	 addressing	 the	 public	
engagement	 about	 Wylfa	 Newydd,	 both	 the	 private	 consultations	 and	 the	
emphasis	on	less	technical	issues	become	crucial	to	understand.		
3.6	CONCLUSIONS	
Nuclear	power	 is	more	 than	a	high-risk	 technology.	 Social	 science	 scholarship	
on	nuclear	 power	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 exceptionality	 of	 nuclear	 power	 associated	
with	 radiation	 risks.	 Addressing	Wylfa	Newydd	 as	 a	megainvestment	 helps	 to	
open	up	aspects,	such	as	the	socioeconomic	changes	associated	with	a	nuclear	
construction	or	the	interconnectedness	of	the	nuclear	site	and	national	policies.	
These	 perspectives	 are	 not	 exclusive,	 thus	 I	 am	 hoping	 that	 the	 conceptual	
questions	this	case	study	raises	about	the	geographies	and	politics	of	the	Wylfa	
Newydd	megainvestment	will	enrich	nuclear	scholarship.	In	addition,	transitions	
provide	 an	 avenue	 to	 look	 beyond	 this	 exceptionality	 of	 nuclear	 power	 by	
situating	Wylfa	Newydd	in	a	changing	system	of	electricity	generation.	
In	 the	 root	 of	 this	 literature	 review,	 however,	 there	 is	 the	 ambivalent	
relationship	 with	 transitions	 studies,	 especially	 with	 the	 dominant	multi-level	
perspective	(MLP).	On	the	one	hand,	the	 literature	 is	productive	 in	addressing	
the	 multifaceted	 dimensions	 of	 technological	 change	 with	 embracing	 the	
dynamics	between	different	 scales.	On	 the	other	hand,	 I	 found	 this	 an	overly	
rigid	analytical	framework	of	which	I	highlighted	three	blind	spots,	the	empirical	
application	of	the	central	concept	‘regime’,	the	geographies	of	transitions,	and	
the	 narrow	 conceptualisation	 of	 politics.	 Accordingly,	 I	 decided	 that	 the	
transitions	approach	put	too	much	limit	on	the	unpacking	of	the	rich	empirical	
data	 from	 my	 fieldwork,	 which	 could	 provide	 a	 productive	 framework	
articulating	the	in-depth	complexities	of	the	megainvestment.	Nevertheless,	the	
transitions	 studies	 enriched	 my	 thinking	 when	 I	 was	 writing	 the	 empirical	
chapters	(Ch5-Ch7).	 In	other	words,	 I	was	not	seduced	by	the	“allure	of	multi-
level	 perspective”	 (Smith,	 Voß,	 and	Grin	 2010)	 in	 understanding	 the	 intricate	
aspects	of	the	Wylfa	Newydd	project.	
Here	 I	 summarise	 how	 the	 points	 raised	 in	 this	 chapter	 help	 to	 inform	 the	
response	to	the	research	questions	of	the	thesis.	First,	RQ1,	that	is,	‘How	is	the	
Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment	made	on	different	geographic	 scales?’	 relates	
to	the	emerging	intersection	of	sociotechnical	transitions	and	human	geography	
literatures	 (Becker,	 Moss,	 and	 Naumann	 2016;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Coenen,	
Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012).	There	is	an	ongoing	‘spatial	turn’	in	transitions	
research	 reflecting	 on	 the	 previously	 neglected	 geographies	 of	 energy	
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transitions	 (Becker,	 Moss,	 and	 Naumann	 2016;	 Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 2015;	
Murphy	2015;	Truffer,	Murphy,	and	Raven	2015).	There	are	three	key	issues	in	
this	 literature	 in	relation	to	Wylfa	Newydd.	First,	 the	salience	of	place	focuses	
attention	 to	 the	 spatial	 embeddedness	 of	 the	 investment	 project	 (Coenen,	
Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012;	Hansen	and	Coenen	2015;	Späth	and	Rohracher	
2010).	Second,	the	scaling	raises	the	question	of	how	is	Wylfa	Newydd	situated	
at	different	scales,	including	the	politics	of	negotiating	them	(Binz,	Truffer,	and	
Coenen	2014;	Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012b;	Späth	and	Rohracher	2014).	
Third,	 the	 infrastructural	 aspects	 highlight	 the	 social	 and	material	 landscapes	
involved	(Becker,	Moss,	and	Naumann	2016;	Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Nadaï	and	Van	
Der	 Horst	 2010).	 While	 the	 geographies	 of	 transitions	 provided	 practice	
insights,	 I	have	argued	 that	 it	 is	difficult	 to	eliminate	 the	problems	associated	
with	 established	 transitions	 concepts.	 This	 has	 been	 exacerbated	 with	 the	
problematic	empirical	operationalization	of	the	MLP	framework	with	regards	to	
the	Wylfa	Newydd	project	(Berkhout,	Smith,	and	Stirling	2004;	Holtz,	Brugnach,	
and	 Pahl-Wostl	 2008;	 Konrad,	 Truffer,	 and	 Voß	 2008;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	
2010;	 van	 der	 Vleuten	 and	 Högselius	 2012).	 Looking	 beyond	 transitions	
research,	megainvestments	 are	 a	 very	much	 neglected	 area	 of	 social	 science	
research,	 despite	 a	 burgeoning	 interdisciplinary	 literature	 on	 infrastructures	
(Graham	 and	Marvin	 2001;	 Larkin	 2013;	 Star	 1999).	 Recent	 debates	 on	 core	
geographic	concepts,	such	as	place	and	scale,	provide	a	productive	vocabulary	
to	address	the	geographies	of	Wylfa	Newydd	(Jessop,	Brenner,	and	Jones	2008;	
Marston	 2000;	 Marston,	 Jones,	 and	 Woodward	 2005;	 Massey	 2010,	 2005;	
Swyngedouw	1997).	 In	 particular,	 the	 concepts	 of	multi-level	 governance	 and	
the	politics	of	scale	are	particularly	 relevant	 to	address	 the	different	practices	
and	visions	towards	the	megainvestment	on	various	scales	(Meadowcroft	2002;	
Smith	 2007;	 Swyngedouw	 1997).	 This	 vocabulary	 also	 helps	 to	 address	 the	
identified	gap	in	the	literature	on	nuclear	power	between	the	nuclear	sites	and	
national	 nuclear	 policies	 with	 a	 few	 notable	 exceptions	 (Hecht	 2012,	 2009;	
Schmid	2015).		
Second,	RQ2,	 ‘How	 is	Wylfa	Newydd	governed	as	a	megainvestment	project?’	
drives	 attention	 away	 from	 the	 top-level	 decision-making	 on	 megaprojects	
(Flyvbjerg	 2014;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	 2003)	 to	 the	 messy	
politics	 of	 knowledge	 on	 technological	 issues	 (Barry	 2013,	 2001).	 In	 the	
transitions	 literature,	 governance	 is	 often	 a	 practical	 question	 rather	 than	 an	
analytical	 one	 (Grin	 2010;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	2010).	 In	 the	 areas	 of	 both	
strategic	niche	management	 and	 transition	management,	 governance	 is	 often	
discussed	 in	 fairly	 generic	 terms,	 such	 as	 reflexive	 governance,	 co-evolution,	
and	 facilitation	 (Grin	 2010;	 Kemp,	 Schot,	 and	 Hoogma	 1998;	 Rotmans	 and	
Loorbach	 2010;	 Smith	 and	 Raven	 2012).	 In	 my	 research,	 however,	 I	 was	
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approaching	the	megainvestment	from	the	ground,	therefore	the	literature	on	
expertise,	politics,	and	technical	issues	seems	to	be	more	suitable	in	providing	a	
conceptual	orientation	to	answer	the	question.	The	STS	literature	on	the	politics	
of	 knowledge	 highlight	 the	 intricate	 ways	 in	 which	 technical	 expertise	 is	
produced,	negotiated	and	challenged	in	political	domains	deeply	rooted	in	the	
approach	 that	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 socially	 constructed	 (Epstein	 1995;	
Hilgartner	2000;	Wynne	1996,	1992a).	These	processes	are	taking	place	against	
the	background	of	expert	knowledge	and	governance	 intermingling	 in	modern	
and	 increasingly	 neoliberalised	 societies	 (Ezrahi	 1990;	 Jasanoff	 2007).	 Public	
knowledge	controversies	offer	particular	insights	about	the	interconnectedness	
of	politics	and	expert	knowledge	(Barry	2013;	Sarewitz	2004).	The	centrality	of	
knowledge	and	the	associated	practices	of	governance	are	central	to	respond	to	
the	question	of	how	Wylfa	Newydd	is	governed.	
Third,	 RQ3,	 ‘How	 is	 democratic	 politics	 enacted	 in	 practice	 in	 the	 public	
consultations	and	engagement	of	Wylfa	Newydd?’	diverts	attention	from	actor	
strategies	 in	 transitions	 to	 the	mundane	 and	 often	material	 politics	 of	 public	
participation.	Participation	is	hardly	addressed	in	transition	literature,	and	even	
then	often	only	as	a	means	of	legitimation	of	sustainable	transitions	(Hendriks	
2009,	2008;	 STEPS	Centre	2010).	Democracy,	however,	 is	 as	much	at	 stake	 in	
energy	transitions	as	decarbonisation.	STS	literatures	on	participation	open	up	
avenues	to	address	the	democratic	politics	of	transitions	well	beyond	a	generic	
sense	of	public	and	engagement	(Chilvers	and	Longhurst	2016).	Instead	of	one	
general	 public,	 these	 studies	 rather	 address	 multiple	 publics	 in	 the	 making	
(Barnett	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Irwin	 and	 Michael	 2003;	 Michael	 2009)	 leading	 to	 the	
crucial	question	of	how	publics	and	public	engagement	are	designed	(Felt	and	
Fochler	2010;	Stirling	2008).	Public	consultations	and	other	formal	engagement	
events	 are	 key	 arenas	 of	 making	 publics,	 issues,	 and	 ways	 of	 engagement	
(Chilvers	 and	 Kearnes	 2015c;	 Chilvers	 and	 Longhurst	 2016;	 Felt	 and	 Fochler	
2010;	 Laurent	 2011;	 Wynne	 2007).	 These	 can	 be	 viewed	 not	 as	 neutral	
platforms	 of	 eliciting	 opinion,	 but	 machineries	 to	 design	 democratic	 consent	
(Barry	2001;	Braun	and	Schultz	2010;	Lezaun	and	Soneryd	2007;	Pestre	2008).	In	
understanding	 the	 publics	 and	 public	 engagement,	 there	 is	 an	 increasing	
interest	in	the	‘things’	(Latour	and	Weibel	2005),	issues	(Marres	2007;	Marres,	
Latour,	 and	 Weibel	 2005),	 materialities	 and	 objects	 (Braun,	 Whatmore,	 and	
Stengers	 2010;	 Marres	 2012),	 devices	 (Marres	 and	 Lezaun	 2011),	 and	
technologies	 of	 participation	 (Asdal	 2008;	 Laurent	 2011;	 Lezaun	 and	 Soneryd	
2007).	These	insights	orient	attention	to	the	very	designs	of	public	engagement	
from	 the	 orchestration	 of	 events	 to	 the	 materiality	 of	 documents	 in	 the	
consultations	of	Wylfa	Newydd.	
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In	summary,	this	chapter	 laid	down	the	conceptual	orientations	of	the	coming	
empirical	 chapters	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 research	 questions	 acting	 rather	 as	
insights	 and	 interests	 than	 one	 single	 coherent	 conceptual	 framework.	 This	
research	 is	 interdisciplinary.	 Along	 with	 my	 ambivalent	 relationship	 with	
transitions	 studies	 in	 the	 conceptual	 sense,	 I	 also	 possess	 a	 similar	 unease	 in	
terms	of	methodology.	While	 the	national	 case	 studies	abundant	 in	 transition	
research	are	fertile	grounds	to	understand	the	current	energy	transformations	
(Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012a),	 there	 is	often	a	certain	 lack	of	 reflexivity	
about	methodology	(Geels	2011)	and	of	in-depth	engagements	on	the	ground.	
Therefore	the	next	chapter	will	follow	my	argument	in	this	chapter	in	opening	
up	thinking	about	transitions	beyond	the	conventional	vocabularies.	
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CHAPTER	 4.	 METHODOLOGY:	 A	 MULTI-SCALAR	
ETHNOGRAPHY	
4.1	AN	ETHNOGRAPHIC	APPROACH	TO	ENERGY	TRANSITIONS	
In	transition	research,	there	is	not	much	discussion	on	research	methodologies	
(Geels	 2011:	 36-37).	 This	 study,	 however,	 approaches	 energy	 transitions	 not	
through	a	‘national’	case	study	(Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012a)	but	through	
a	megainvestment	project	from	the	ground.	Therefore	methodological	thinking	
is	 in	the	core	of	this	study.	Ethnography	is	a	very	unusual	choice	for	transition	
research	 (Morton	 and	 Müller	 2016).	 Yet	 in	 the	 coming	 chapters	 I	 aim	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 empirical	 sensitivity	 of	 this	 research	 methodology	 can	
reveal	important	aspects	of	this	megainvestment.	Transition	research	addresses	
nuclear	 power	 as	 an	 electricity	 generating	 technology.	 Similarly,	 the	 social	
science	scholarship	on	nuclear	power,	the	focus	is	on	the	high-risk	technology.	
In	 the	 coming	 parts	 of	 the	 thesis,	 I	 address	 that	 nuclear	 power	 is	 also	 about	
community,	 identity,	 and	 jobs	 (Chapter	 5),	 about	 investment,	 economic	
development,	 and	 governance	 (Chapter	 6),	 or	 about	 democracy	 (Chapter	 7).	
One	of	the	key	fieldwork	experiences	was	that	the	nuclear	power	plant	is	much	
more	than	low-carbon	electricity	or	radiation	risks.	Therefore	this	chapter	is	not	
a	necessary	supplemental	part	of	this	thesis	but	the	ethnographic	perspective	is	
one	of	the	key	contributions	of	the	PhD	research.	
This	research	is	not	a	conventional	ethnography	of	a	nuclear	community	but	a	
multi-scalar	 ethnography	 of	 a	 nuclear	 megainvestment.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	the	geographies	of	the	megainvestment	are	a	key	interest	of	
the	research.	This	means	a	rethinking	of	the	ethnographic	method,	which	was	
developed	 to	 research	 bounded	 communities	 in	 isolation	 (Burawoy	 2000a;	
Marcus	 1995).	 This	 approach	 did	 not	 only	mean	 researching	 beyond	 a	 single	
site,	but	also	a	break	with	the	exclusive	reliance	on	participant	observation	by	
embracing	 diverse	methods	 to	 understand	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	 investment	
(Gusterson	 1997;	 Hannerz	 2003).	 The	 core	 of	 the	 empirical	 data	 is	 based	 on	
formal	interviews	with	both	local	residents	and	stakeholders,	outputs	of	various	
meetings	 attended	 in	 suits	 or	 in	 casual	 T-shirts,	 and	 a	 vast	 quantity	 of	
documents,	complemented	by	other	online	and	offline	sources.	Thus	the	multi-
scalar	 ethnography	 meant	 a	 “polymorphous	 engagement”	 (Gusterson	 1997)	
rather	 than	 privileging	 an	 imagined	 ‘local	 community’	 through	 participant	
observation.	 The	 more	 I	 moved	 away	 from	 the	 site	 in	 studying	 up	 the	 new	
nuclear	project,	the	less	I	relied	on	conventional	ethnographic	techniques	based	
on	personal	interaction.	
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In	 this	 chapter	 I	 address	many	questions	distinctive	 to	ethnographic	 research,	
such	as	how	empirical	data	is	not	just	an	output	but	embroiled	in	the	fieldwork	
experience,	or	how	subjectivities	are	 integral	 to	 the	study.	 In	 the	next	section	
4.2,	I	address	the	approach	and	the	design	of	the	research	with	an	emphasis	of	
developing	a	multi-scalar	ethnography	approach	with	a	diverse	set	of	research	
methods	applied.	In	the	following	section	4.3,	the	empirical	data	sources	of	the	
research	 will	 be	 presented,	 namely	 interviews,	 meeting	 ethnographies,	
documents,	 and	 various	 complementary	 sources.	 The	 applied	 data	 analysis	
reflects	on	these	diverse	sources.	Next	in	section	4.4,	questions	of	positionality	
will	 be	 addressed	 together	 with	 the	 relationship	 with	 key	 stakeholders	 and	
informants.	 After	 addressing	 research	 ethics	 in	 section	 4.5,	 I	 conclude	 this	
chapter	with	the	demonstrating	the	validity	of	the	research	in	section	4.6.	
4.2	METHODOLOGICAL	APPROACH	AND	RESEARCH	DESIGN	
This	 section	 outlines	 the	 research	 design,	 from	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 the	
approach	to	the	everyday	of	field	research	on	Anglesey.	First,	I	sketch	how	the	
research	 approach	 was	 formed	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 set	 PhD	 project.	
Second,	 the	 selection	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 as	 a	 case	 study	 site	 will	 be	 justified	
through	 addressing	 its	 generalisability.	 Third,	 the	 design	 of	 multi-scalar	
ethnographic	 research	 will	 be	 addressed	 in	 reflection	 to	 the	 challenges	 to	
conventional	ethnographic	research.	Fourth,	the	used	research	methods	will	be	
introduced	 in	 a	 ‘polymorphous	 engagement’	 beyond	 a	 mere	 participant	
observation	(Gusterson	1997).	Finally,	some	of	the	mundane	but	highly	relevant	
issues	 will	 be	 addressed,	 including	my	 everyday	 activities	 as	 a	 researcher	 on	
Anglesey.	
4.2.1	GROUNDING	NUCLEAR	FUTURES:	THE	STORY	OF	THE	RESEARCH	PROJECT	
This	 study	 is	a	 set	PhD	project	entitled	 ‘Energy	Futures:	The	 long-term	role	of	
nuclear	power	 in	meeting	the	UK’s	energy	needs’,	which	 is	part	of	 the	EPSRC-
funded	Adaptation	and	Resilience	of	Coastal	Energy	Supply	(ARCoES)	research.	
The	methodological	 approach	was	 very	much	 shaped	by	making	 sense	of	 this	
project.	 From	 the	very	beginning,	 the	aim	was	 to	understand	 the	projections,	
scenarios,	 and	 visions	 through	which	 long-term	 futures	 of	 nuclear	 power	 are	
made	 as	 inscribed	 in	 calculations,	 discourses,	 and	 organisational	 practices.	 In	
other	 words,	 the	 objective	 was	 to	 ground	macro-scale	 futures	 in	micro-scale	
practices	 and	 visions.	 The	 initial	 PhD	 research	 plan	 was	 to	 study	 key	
organisations,	 such	 as	 DECC	 and	 EDF	 Energy,	 and	 how	 nuclear	 futures	 are	
constructed	 in	 these	 organisations.	 The	 ideal	 plan	was	 to	 arrange	 short-term	
secondments	 using	 the	 connections	 and	 credentials	 provided	 by	 the	 ARCoES	
project.	Secondments	could	have	been	arranged	by	a	formal	application	to	an	
internship,	by	joining	to	an	existing	group	or	project	at	the	organisation,	or	by	
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designing	an	individual	project	together.	After	months	of	trying	to	get	access	in	
vain,	we	eventually	had	 to	drop	 this	 research	project.	Wylfa	on	Anglesey	was	
suggested	as	a	plan	B.	If	we	were	not	able	to	study	UK	new	nuclear	programme	
‘from	the	top’,	 let’s	 try	 to	build	up	an	understanding	 ‘from	the	bottom’.	After	
frustrating	waits	 for	email	 responses	 from	gate-keeper	officials	 in	London	and	
arranging	meetings	in	vain,	it	was	a	refreshing	experience	to	go	to	a	preparatory	
visit	to	this	remote	island.	On	Anglesey,	I	went	to	an	informative	open	surgery	
about	the	new	build	project,	managed	to	arrange	a	short	notice	meeting	with	
the	 programme	 director	 of	 the	 Energy	 Island	 Programme,	 and	 had	 plenty	 of	
inspiring	conversations	with	locals	just	in	a	few	days.	
The	perspectives	I	developed	before	my	exploratory	visit,	however,	shaped	the	
eventual	 research	 on	 the	 island.	 Coming	 from	 the	 aim	 to	 understand	 the	 big	
picture,	 I	 tried	 never	 to	 lose	 sight	 of	 what	 is	 beyond	 the	 island.	 This	 PhD	
research	project	 is	not	an	ethnography	of	the	Cemaes	area	as	bounded	place,	
but	an	ethnography	of	the	new	nuclear	programme	with	an	in-depth	focus	on	
the	Wylfa	Newydd	project.	Understanding	the	entangled	connections	between	
‘global’,	 ‘national’,	 and	 ‘local’	 in	 the	 new	 nuclear	 project	 is	 central	 to	 the	
research.	
Also,	the	long	months	spent	to	understand	key	top-level	organisations	were	not	
done	 for	nothing.	 I	 started	my	Anglesey	 fieldwork	with	an	 in-depth	 familiarity	
with	official	documents,	from	DECC	policy	papers	to	the	annual	reports	of	EDF,	
and	with	substantial	efforts	 spent	on	understanding	 the	everyday	practices	of	
these	 organisations	 and	 their	 potential	 relevance	 to	 social	 science	 research.	
These	 understandings	 have	 become	 invaluable	 in	 situating	 my	 Anglesey	
fieldwork	experiences	in	national	policies	and	often	global	processes.	
4.2.2	CASE	STUDY	APPROACH	AND	SITE	SELECTION	
What	can	a	study	of	a	single	nuclear	new	build	project	tell	us	about	the	whole	
UK	new	nuclear	programme?	A	common	criticism	of	case	study	research	is	that	
cases	 are	 accidental,	 like	 black	 swans,	 thus	 have	 a	 very	 limited	 potential	 to	
generalise.	 The	 planner	 Bent	 Flyvbjerg	 (2006),	 however,	 argues	 that	 case	
studies	can	provide	exemplars	that	can	be	far	more	illuminating	about	a	wider	
issue	 than	 a	 generalisation	 deduced	 from	 some	 kind	 of	 context-independent	
abstraction.	 The	 quest	 for	 the	 ‘force	 of	 example’	 leads	 to	 the	 question	 of	
selection.	
In	 this	 thesis	 I	 argue	 that	Wylfa	Newydd	 is	 illustrative	of	 the	wider	 issue	of	 a	
new	 era	 of	 megainvestments,	 even	 beyond	 the	 ongoing	 UK	 new	 nuclear	
programme.	 I	 had	 two	 methodological	 considerations	 to	 strengthen	 this	
argument.	First,	this	thesis	is	not	just	a	study	of	a	nuclear	site	in	isolation,	but	a	
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drilling	through	 local	and	national	matters,	as	well	as	micro	and	macro	 issues.	
This	 is	 a	 case	 study	 of	 both	 the	 Wylfa	 investment	 and	 UK	 new	 nuclear	
programme.	 Second,	 I	 did	 not	 research	 Wylfa	 in	 isolation	 but	 following	 the	
other	new	build	projects	and	the	wider	issues	at	stake.	Thus	the	generalisability	
of	 issues	was	constantly	 in	my	mind,	while	researching	Wylfa.	Throughout	the	
thesis,	similarities	and	differences	are	articulated	between	the	different	sites.	It	
should	 be	 added	 that	 a	 comparison	 of	 two	 (or	 even	 more)	 nuclear	 projects	
might	have	been	an	 interesting	avenue,	but	we	concluded	that	a	comparative	
approach	would	 have	 been	 a	 considerable	 compromise	 on	 the	 level	 of	 detail	
compared	 to	 a	 single	 case	 and	probably	 infeasible	 due	 to	 restrictions	of	 time	
and	access.	
Currently,	 there	 are	 six	 new	 nuclear	 sites	 in	 the	 UK	 but	 only	 three	 with	
substantial	 ongoing	 works	 (Hinkley	 Point	 C	 in	 Somerset	 by	 EDF	 Energy,	
Moorside	 in	 Cumbria	 by	 NuGeneration,	 and	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 on	 Anglesey	 by	
Horizon).	Among	these	Wylfa	was	the	most	practical	choice	for	several	reasons.	
First,	there	is	substantially	less	political	spotlight	on	Wylfa	than	on	the	flagship	
HPC	project.	The	sensitiveness	of	the	issue	was	exacerbated	with	the	negative	
experiences	of	colleagues	working	together	with	EDF	Energy	on	the	Hinkley	site.	
Second,	 there	 was	 a	 major	 public	 consultation	 event	 during	 the	 intended	
fieldwork	 period.	 At	 Hinkley,	 Pre-Application	 Consultation	 has	 already	 been	
finished	and	planning	consent	granted,	while	at	Moorside	formal	consultations	
hadn’t	 started	 at	 the	 time.	 Third,	 Anglesey	 was	 the	 closest	 new	 nuclear	 site	
from	 Liverpool.	 Overall,	 Wylfa	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	 best	 choice,	 which	 was	
confirmed	by	the	preparatory	visit	before	the	main	fieldwork	phase.	
The	 representativeness	of	Wylfa	Newydd	 to	nuclear	new	build	projects	 in	 the	
UK	 is	 a	difficult	 question	as	 there	 are	only	 three	progressing	 sites.	As	 coming	
chapters	address,	many	of	the	aspects	of	a	nuclear	megainvestment	are	shared,	
but	it	is	also	important	to	bear	the	differences	in	mind.	Compared	to	the	other	
two	 constructions,	 Wylfa	 raises	 different	 questions	 with	 regards	 to	 Welsh	
language	concerns,	boiling	water	reactor	technology	(both	EPR	and	AP1000	are	
pressurised	water	 reactors),	 and	 that	 associated	developments	 are	 subject	 to	
the	 consent	 of	 the	 local	 planning	 authority	 in	 Wales	 through	 the	 Town	 and	
Country	 Planning	Act	 not	 to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 through	 the	Development	
Consent	Order	as	part	of	the	main	investment.	It	is	worth	keeping	in	mind	that	
the	other	two	constructions	have	their	own	specificities.	For	the	Hinkley	Point	
C,	 key	 specificities	 include	 the	 exceptional	 political	 sensitivity,	 the	 ongoing	
European	 constructions	 of	 the	 technology,	 and	 the	 remarkable	 financial	 and	
technical	 troubles	 of	 the	 developer	 company	 EDF.	 For	 the	 Moorside	
construction,	many	issues	are	related	to	the	location	at	UK’s	main	nuclear	site,	
Sellafield,	meaning	available	workforce,	high	public	support,	existing	radioactive	
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waste	 facilities,	 etc.	 While	 the	 above	 distinctive	 aspects	 have	 to	 be	 kept	 in	
mind,	 that	 the	 similarities	 of	 how	 these	 megainvestments	 are	 governed,	 are	
overwhelming	(Cotton	2011;	DCLG	2015;	DECC	2011b;	HM	Treasury	2016,	2014;	
Infrastructure	for	business	2012;	IPPR	2012).	
4.2.3	A	MULTI-SCALAR	ETHNOGRAPHY	
In	 transition	 literature	 it	 is	 fairly	 common	 to	 use	 case	 study	 approach	 (Geels	
2014,	 2002)	 but	 uncommon	 to	 use	 ethnography	 as	 a	 methodology.	
Sociotechnical	 transitions	 research	and	ethnography	 rarely	meet	 (Morton	and	
Müller	2016).	On	the	one	hand,	transition	research	mostly	concentrate	on	the	
national	level	dynamics	(Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012a)	by	individual	single	
country	case	studies	or	cross-country	comparisons	(Bergek	and	Jacobsson	2003;	
Geels	 2014,	 2002;	 Jacobsson	 and	 Lauber	 2006),	 and	 rarely	 on	 more	 ‘global’	
transitions	(Geels	et	al.	2011;	Raven,	Verbong,	and	Rotmans	2012;	Shove	2012;	
van	der	Vleuten	and	Högselius	2012).	There	are	only	few	examples	of	transition	
case	 studies	 below	 the	 national	 level,	 such	 as	 energy	 regions	 (Späth	 and	
Rohracher	2010)	or	low-carbon	cities	(Bulkeley	et	al.	2010;	Hodson	and	Marvin	
2010).	 These	 subnational	 levels	 are,	 however,	 often	 addressed	 as	 bounded	
places	 (an	 exception	 is	 Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 2013).	 Moreover,	 transition	
research	is	often	based	on	secondary	sources	(Geels	2011:	36;	Genus	and	Coles	
2008).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 ethnography	 as	 a	 social	 science	method	 has	 been	
developed	 –	 and	 exemplified	 by	 canonical	 texts	 –	 in	 anthropology	 and	 later	
sociology	 to	study	marginal	groups	often	 in	a	bounded	place,	such	as	 isolated	
exotic	tribes	(Malinowski	2003)	or	deprived	city	neighbourhoods	(Whyte	2012).	
Albeit	ethnography	has	spread	to	new	realms,	such	as	laboratory	studies	in	STS	
(Knorr	1981;	Latour	and	Woolgar	1979;	Lynch	1985;	Traweek	1992),	classroom	
ethnographies	 in	 education	 research	 (Erickson	 1984;	 Hammersley	 1990;	
Watson-Gegeo	1997),	or	organisational	ethnographies	 (Neyland	2008;	Watson	
2011),	it	is	still	often	bound	to	study	‘small	places,	large	issues’	(Eriksen	2001).	
Conventional	ethnographic	research	has	often	focused	places	in	isolation.	
In	 this	 empirical	 case	 study,	 I	 highlight	 that	 ethnographic	 research	 can	 enrich	
our	understanding	of	sociotechnical	transitions.	First,	ethnography	provides	an	
opportunity	 to	 go	 beyond	 conscious	 representations	 (e.g.,	 interviewing,	
document	 analysis)	 and	 to	 look	 more	 on	 the	 practices.	 Second,	 the	
methodology	 embraces	 the	 cultural	 and	material	 dimensions	 often	 neglected	
by	 other	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 social	 science	 methods.	 Third,	
ethnography	 contributes	 to	 embracing	 the	 spatial	 differences	 of	 the	 nuclear	
site.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 ethnography	 concentrates	 on	 the	 nitty-gritty	 details	
macro	case	studies	often	miss.	
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To	 develop	 an	 ethnographic	methodology	 that	 suits	 to	my	 research	 aim	 (see	
Chapter	 1),	 it	 was	 crucial	 to	 overcome	 shortcomings	 associated	 with	
ethnography,	in	particular	the	implicit	assumption	of	a	bounded	place,	together	
with	 a	 territorialised	 and	 homogenised	 sense	 of	 culture	 (Gupta	 and	 Ferguson	
1997a,	 1997b,	 1992).	 The	 challenge	 of	 addressing	 globalisation	 has	 enriched	
both	 anthropological	 theory	 (Appadurai	 1996,	 1995;	 Burawoy	 2000a;	 Gille	
2012;	Lapegna	2009)	and	ethnographic	research	practice	(Burawoy	2000a;	Ong	
and	 Collier	 2008;	 Tsing	 2005)	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades.	 Among	 these	 novel	
methodological	approaches,	the	most	well	known	are	‘multi-sited	ethnography’	
(Marcus	 1995)	 and	 ‘global	 ethnography’	 (Burawoy	 2000b;	 Gille	 2012).	 These	
approaches	are	very	much	in	line	with	recent	geography	debates	on	the	global	
sense	of	place	(Massey	2005),	and	the	social	construction	of	geographic	scales	
(Jessop,	 Brenner,	 and	 Jones	 2008;	 Marston	 2000;	 Marston,	 Jones,	 and	
Woodward	 2005).	 In	 human	 geography,	 however,	 ethnography	 has	 for	 long	
been	neglected	(Herbert	2000).	In	my	research	I	am	putting	geographies	in	the	
centre	on	my	ethnographic	research,	especially	how	the	places	and	geographic	
scales	are	connected	through	the	Wylfa	construction	project.	A	central	interest	
of	 this	 research	 of	 how	 is	 this	 nuclear	 project	 produced	 through	 various	
geographic	scales,	and	what	perspective	the	studying	of	a	nuclear	site	provides	
on	a	national	nuclear	programme.	
I	call	the	methodological	approach	of	the	thesis	a	multi-scalar	ethnography.	The	
research	methodology	addresses	Wylfa	Newydd	project	on	various	geographic	
scales	at	 the	 same	 time	without	adopting	a	multi-sited	or	global	ethnography	
terminology.	 This	 research	 is	 not	 a	 mere	 multi-sited	 ethnography,	 where	
fieldwork	 simply	 takes	 place	 on	 more	 than	 one	 site,	 but	 also	 conceptually	
addressing	 how	 a	 UK	 nuclear	 programme,	 low-carbon	 Wales,	 the	 Anglesey	
Energy	 Island	or	rebuilding	 local	communities	are	made	 in	 interplay	with	each	
other.	Nor	is	my	study	a	global	ethnography,	as	to	a	large	extent	it	does	try	to	
make	 sense	how	a	 ‘national’	 programme	 is	 played	out	 together	with	 a	 ‘local’	
development	plan.	Multi-scalarity,	however,	does	not	mean	 that	 the	 research	
used	 similar	 methods	 on	 each	 scale.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 different	 research	
methods	seemed	apt	on	different	scales.		
4.2.4	BEYOND	PARTICIPANT	OBSERVATION:	POLYMORPHOUS	ENGAGEMENT	
Ethnography	 is	 often	 associated	 with	 participant	 observation.	 This	 intricate	
relationship,	 however,	 has	 been	 challenged	 with	 ethnography	 venturing	 into	
novel	 contexts.	 In	 particular,	 the	 call	 for	 ‘studying	 up’	 highlighted	 that	
ethnography	 needs	 to	 be	 rethought	 to	 be	 able	 to	 study	 key	 institutions	 of	
modern	 societies,	 from	 law	 firms	 to	 the	US	Congress	 (Gusterson	1997;	Nader	
1972).	‘Studying	up’	important	and	busy	people	means	very	different	challenges	
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in	 terms	 of	 access,	 ethical	 considerations,	 or	 establishing	 rapport	 with	
informants	 than	 ‘studying	 down’	 in	 conventional	 ethnographic	 research.	
Consequently	 a	 very	 different	 set	 of	 methods	 is	 necessitated	 to	 study	 Wall	
Street	investment	bankers	(Ho	2009)	or	nuclear	weapons	scientists	(Gusterson	
1998)	than	marginalised	groups	in	Chicago	neighbourhoods	(Whyte	2012)	or	in	
Amazonian	 rainforests.	 This	 unconventional	 mode	 of	 doing	 ethnographic	
research	is	aptly	summarised	by	the	notion	of	‘polymorphous	engagement’.	
“Polymorphous	engagement	means	interacting	with	informants	across	a	
number	of	dispersed	sites,	not	just	in	local	communities,	and	sometimes	
in	virtual	form;	and	it	means	collecting	data	eclectically	from	a	disparate	
array	 of	 sources	 in	 many	 different	 ways.	 Polymorphous	 engagement	
preserves	 the	 pragmatic	 amateurism	 that	 has	 characterized	
anthropological	 research,	 but	 displaces	 it	 away	 from	 a	 fetishistic	
obsession	 with	 participant	 observation.	 [...]	 However,	 polymorphous	
engagement	also	involved	an	eclectic	mix	of	other	research	techniques:	
formal	 interviews	 of	 the	 kind	 often	 done	 by	 journalists	 and	 political	
scientists;	extensive	reading	of	newspapers	and	official	documents,	and	
careful	 attention	 to	 popular	 culture,	 for	 example.”	 (Gusterson	 1997:	
116)	
As	 my	 research	 was	 not	 a	 traditional	 ethnography	 of	 a	 North	 Anglesey	
community	but	studying	a	megainvestment,	I	found	this	imperative	particularly	
useful.	 The	 challenge,	 however,	 is	 how	 to	 redefine	 the	 ethnographic	 field	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 research	 methodology.	 This	 case	 study	 of	 nuclear	
megainvestments	cutting	across	various	layers	instead	of	being	confined	to	the	
study	 of	 local	 community	 or	 top-level	 decision-making.	 The	 diverse	 set	 of	
research	methods	reflects	this	polymorphous	engagement.	
Multi-scalar	 ethnography	 and	 polymorphous	 engagement	 are	 not	
interchangeable	 terms.	 The	 former	 denotes	 a	 more	 generic	 methodological	
orientation	to	address	the	Wylfa	Newydd	project	on	multiple	geographic	scales	
without	much	 regard	 to	 the	 specific	methods	 and	 techniques	 used.	 The	 later	
outlines	 some	 rather	 practical	 considerations	with	 regards	 to	 the	 appropriate	
research	 design	 and	 data	 collection	 methods.	 The	 applied	 research	
methodology	 varied	 greatly	 with	 geographical	 scale.	 In	 researching	 the	 local	
community,	 I	 largely	 relied	 on	 conventional	 ethnographic	 methods,	 primarily	
participant	observation	and	 interviewing.	The	more	 the	 research	moved	away	
from	 the	 site,	 the	 less	 it	 relied	 on	 the	 personal	 interactions	 that	 characterise	
ethnographic	 research.	 In	 studying	 up	 government	 bodies	 and	 companies,	 I	
mainly	applied	the	non-conventional	techniques	advocated	by	Gusterson	(1997)	
due	 to	 considerations	 of	 access	 limitations,	 time	 constraints,	 etc.	 The	 actual	
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research	 design	 aimed	 to	 reconcile	 the	 ethnographic	 orientation	 towards	
multiple	 geographic	 scales	 with	 the	 practical	 considerations	 highlighted	 by	
polymorphous	engagement.	
4.2.5	RESEARCH	DESIGN	IN	EVERYDAY	
In	 practice,	 the	 research	 design	 had	 two	 key	 elements:	 the	 Anglesey-based	
fieldwork	 and	 the	 desktop	 research	 together	with	 a	 few	 event	 participations.	
On	Anglesey	 I	was	 a	 researcher	 twenty-four	 hours	 a	 day,	 seven	days	 a	week.	
During	my	entire	Anglesey	fieldwork,	I	lived	in	a	shared	house	on	Cemaes	High	
St	mainly	with	 contract	workers	of	 the	existing	plant.	 Their	everyday	 routines	
were	intersecting	with	my	daily	life	in	the	house	when	they	started	the	shift	in	
the	morning	or	went	home	from	the	pub	or	the	chippy	in	the	evening.	Living	on	
the	High	Street,	I	was	immersed	in	the	village	life	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	
research	 from	buying	 the	 local	paper	 in	 the	morning,	 to	 talking	 to	one	of	 the	
shopkeepers	or	residents	on	the	street	during	the	day,	or	dropping	by	the	a	pub	
or	the	local	gym	in	the	evenings.	I	often	shadowed	a	local	councillor	by	going	to	
community	council	meetings	with	him	and	hanging	around	in	his	High	St	shop	
hearing	local	stories	and	meeting	people	dropping	by.	
In	the	first	months,	I	used	every	opportunity	to	go	to	village	events,	from	local	
council	meetings	 to	 the	 Cemaes	 in	 Bloom	 competition,	 including	 information	
and	consultation	events	on	Wylfa	Newydd.	These	helped	me	to	understand	the	
place	and	the	 issues	more,	and	also	to	build	up	a	credential	and	a	network	of	
informants.	 Some	of	 them	 I	 interviewed	 later	 also	 formally,	 some	not.	 In	 the	
latter	part	of	my	fieldwork	I	did	more	formal	interviews,	often	by	suiting	up	and	
taking	 the	 local	 bus	 to	 Llangefni.	 This	 coincided	 with	 the	 Pre-Application	
Consultation	Stage	1	of	Horizon	from	29	September	2014,	including	the	release	
of	 the	 first	 substantial	 project	 plans,	 which	 provided	 a	 timely	 basis	 of	
conversations.	
Unlike	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 the	 people,	 I	 didn’t	 have	 a	 car.	 Relying	 on	 public	
transport	 showed	 the	 precariousness	 of	 the	 infrastructure	 there.	 Similarly,	
cycling	provided	an	opportunity	to	have	a	more	intimate	relationship	with	the	
physical	 and	 social	 geography	 of	 the	 island.	 I	 did	 not	 learn	 Welsh	 language,	
however,	which	would	have	provided	further	ways	to	explore	cultural	aspects.	
However,	 the	 majority	 of	 my	 time	 was	 not	 spent	 with	 people	 and	 these	
activities.	 Generally,	 I	 spent	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 the	 day	 with	 reading	
documents,	doing	desktop	research	and	writing	up	my	notes.	Moreover,	I	spent	
considerable	time	on	the	interviewing	process,	including	making	arrangements,	
preparing	 in	 advance,	 travelling	 to	 site,	 and	 recording	 the	 interview	 itself.	 A	
	 98	
polymorphous	 engagement	 probably	 meant	 a	 more	 structured	 and	 focused	
everyday	ethnographic	work	than	a	conventional	ethnography.	
4.3	KEY	SOURCES	
4.3.1	ASSEMBLING	DATA	
Using	 a	 heterogeneous	 ethnographic	 methodology	 highlighted	 that	 different	
research	methods	 do	 not	 automatically	 translate	 to	 robust	 sources	 and	 solid	
material	 data	 for	 analysis	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 A	 participant	 observation,	
interviewing,	 or	 desktop	 research	 produces	 distinctive	 material	 outcomes	 or	
‘data’.	 There	 are	 different	ways	 of	 data	 analysis	 possible	with	 these	 sources,	
associated	with	different	sorts	of	academic	robustness.	This	overview	therefore	
focuses	not	primary	on	what	I	did	in	the	field	but	how	I	used	the	outputs	of	my	
field	research.	For	example,	informal	participant	observation	in	the	village	was	
integral	part	of	my	fieldwork	in	Cemaes,	but	it	is	less	prevalent	in	my	analysis	or	
in	 backing	 up	 my	 arguments.	 The	 outputs	 of	 participant	 observation	 –	 my	
written	 fieldnotes	and	blurring	memories	–	are	 less	 robust	sources	of	analysis	
than	 interview	 transcripts	 or	 documents.	Moreover,	 the	 informed	 consent	 in	
participant	observation	is	a	less	clear-cut	exercise	than	in	interviewing.	
The	four	main	sources	I	am	using	are	interview	transcripts,	meeting	notes	(my	
own	notes	often	together	with	official	meeting	minutes	or	transcripts),	various	
documents,	and	various	complementary	sources.	There	is	an	interesting	inverse	
relationship	between	robustness	and	richness	of	data.	The	richest	sources,	such	
as	my	own	notes	from	a	vibrant	and	outspoken	council	meeting	are	sometimes	
less	 robust	 than	 the	 official	 transcript	 of	 the	 same	 meeting	 or	 a	 written	
document	on	the	topic.	The	very	robust	sources,	such	as	carefully	crafted	policy	
documents	 that	 presumably	went	 through	multiple	 revision	 rounds,	 often	 do	
not	manifest	the	same	richness	of	insight	as	a	more	informal	conversation	with	
its	 authors.	 Interviews	 are	 generally	 more	 balanced	 with	 regards	 to	 this	
dichotomy.	 These	 are	 conscious	 representations,	 especially	 more	 formal	
stakeholder	 interviews,	 but	 often	 using	 vivid	 expressions.	 Therefore	when	 an	
argument	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 supported	 by	 multiple	 sources,	 I	 have	 preferred	
primarily	documentary	sources,	then	interview	quotes,	and	only	lastly	my	notes	
(e.g.,	 meeting	 notes)	 and	 other	 sources.	 This	 sounds	 quite	 at	 odds	 with	
ethnographic	 research,	 but	makes	my	 argument	more	 robust.	Moreover,	 this	
approach	 also	 helped	 me	 not	 to	 get	 bogged	 down	 to	 the	 intricacies	 of	 the	
locality	and	reach	beyond	more	general	questions	with	regards	to	the	nuclear	
industry.	 Nevertheless,	 participant	 observation	 during	 the	 fieldwork	 was	
essential	 in	 formulating	 the	overall	 framework	of	 the	 thesis,	 and	many	of	my	
arguments.	
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4.3.2	INTERVIEWS	
In-depth	 formal	 interviews	 provide	 more	 robust	 qualitative	 data	 than	
conventional	 ethnographic	 engagements,	 like	 participant	 observation	 and	
informal	 interviews.	 Voice-recorded	 interviews	 provide	 a	 solid	 source	 to	
substantiate	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 thesis.	 In	 addition	 to	 scientific	 robustness,	
this	 consideration	 is	 aggravated	 by	 the	 potential	 political	 and	 commercial	
sensitivity	of	 the	topic.	Furthermore,	signed	consent	 forms	provide	a	palpable	
form	of	informed	consent.	In	more	participant	observation-based	ethnographic	
research,	 informed	 consent	 is	 often	 an	 ambiguous	 area.	 Therefore	 formal	
interviewing	 was	 selected	 as	 a	 key	 method	 of	 data	 collection,	 despite	 its	
relatively	time-consuming	nature.		
The	interviewee	selection	followed	two	key	strategies.	First,	I	made	my	research	
activities	visible	to	key	stakeholder	organisations,	Horizon	and	the	Energy	Island	
Programme	in	particular,	from	the	very	beginning.	These	official	channels	were	
important	to	arrange	stakeholder	interviews	(and	documents),	which	often	took	
several	weeks	or	months	to	set	up.	Second,	I	have	built	up	a	web	of	informants	
through	 immersing	 myself	 in	 local	 societies	 and	 stakeholder	 networks.	 The	
underlying	aim	was	to	circumvent	some	of	the	problems	associated	with	official	
channels,	 like	 contingency	 of	 access,	 strong	 image	 and	 information	
management,	etc.	(Gusterson	1998;	Ho	2009).	As	I	immersed	myself	in	the	local	
stakeholder	 scene,	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	 connections	 strengthened	 each	
other	through	developing	my	credentials	as	a	researcher.	
In	 total,	 38	 people	 were	 interviewed,	 including	 one	 couple,	 mostly	 local	
residents	 and	 stakeholders	 (see	 Appendix	 1	 for	 details).	 I	 interviewed	 the	
majority	of	key	local	stakeholders	I	 identified	but	not	all	(e.g.,	the	MP	and	AM	
for	 Ynys	Môn).	 Despite	my	 original	 plans,	 I	 did	 not	 interview	more	 ‘national’	
stakeholders	 (DECC,	PINS,	etc.).	 The	 length	of	 the	 interviews	was	between	30	
minutes	 and	 2-3	 hours.	 Two	 people	 were	 interviewed	 on	 two	 separate	
occasions,	and	another	two	informants	three	times	in	total.	The	interviews	fell	
into	 two	 broad	 categories.	 First,	 I	 interviewed	 local	 residents	 in	 often	 long	
informal	 conversations	 over	 the	 dinner	 table	 –	 sometimes	 the	 recording	was	
interrupted	by	actual	dinners	together	–	by	frequently	meandering	to	topics	not	
strictly	 related	 to	 Wylfa	 (e.g.,	 local	 identities,	 geographies,	 histories	 and	
stories).	 Second,	 I	 had	 more	 formal	 ‘suited-up’	 interviews	 with	 local	
stakeholders,	 officers	 and	 some	 politicians,	 in	 their	 working	 hours	 when	 we	
generally	 had	 a	 more	 focused	 and	 structured	 conversation.	 While	 the	 latter	
interviews	were	invaluable	to	conduct	a	robust	academic	research,	the	former	
were	often	more	important	to	clarify	the	background	of	the	key	issues.	
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The	 interviews	 were	 semi-structured	 (see	 Appendix	 2	 for	 a	 sample	
questionnaire),	 though	 with	 a	 great	 variability	 between	 the	 individual	
interviews	 reflecting	 both	 the	 interviewee	 profile	 and	 the	 progression	 of	 the	
fieldwork.	 I	 had	 very	 different	 discussions,	 for	 example,	with	 a	 local	 amateur	
historian,	 an	 anti-nuclear	 activist,	 or	 a	 key	 Energy	 Island	 Programme	 official.	
Interviews	often	started	with	the	interviewee’s	personal	background	and	more	
generic	questions	to	establish	rapport.	At	the	end,	there	was	often	an	informal	
reflection	 after	 the	 recorder	 was	 switched	 off,	 and	 suggestions	 for	 further	
interviewees.	
The	 interviews	 were	 voice-recorded	 with	 two	 exceptions	 but	 I	 also	 took	
handwritten	 notes	 during	 the	 conversations.	 Prior	 to	 the	 interview,	 I	 often	
prepared	already	some	digital	notes,	to	which	I	added	some	basic	 information	
immediately	after	the	interview	on	the	interview	setting,	impressions	and	some	
key	 items	 from	 the	 discussion	 (e.g.,	 documents	 mentioned).	 The	 recordings	
were	often	transcribed	months	after	the	interview.	Transcriptions	were	a	mix	of	
verbatim	transcriptions	and	dense	annotations	(e.g.,	personal	background	and	
other	 less	 relevant	 parts).	 Interviews	with	 key	 stakeholders	were	 almost	 fully	
transcribed,	but	from	the	often	hours-long	interviews	with	local	residents	only	
the	key	segments	were	transcribed	word	for	word.	 I	 transcribed	all	 interviews	
myself	 with	 the	 help	 of	 the	 software	 ExpressScribe.	 This	 work	 in	 total	 took	
several	tiresome	months	after	the	Anglesey	fieldwork.	The	interview	notes	and	
transcripts	are	around	600	pages	long	in	total.	
4.3.3	MEETINGS	
Meetings	are	increasingly	recognised	places	for	ethnographers	from	community	
gatherings	 to	 corporate	 meetings	 (Thedvall	 2006;	 Duffy	 2014;	 Schwartzman	
1989).	During	my	fieldwork,	I	tried	to	use	every	opportunity	to	go	to	meetings.	I	
generally	 spent	 2-3	 hours	 in	 the	 monthly	 open	 surgeries	 of	 Horizon	 Nuclear	
Power,	but	also	went	 to	all	kinds	of	meetings	 related	to	Wylfa.	 I	also	went	 to	
meetings	 of	 local	 community	 groups	 or	 council	 meetings,	 which	 were	 not	
directly	 related	 to	 Wylfa,	 but	 were	 important	 to	 establish	 connections	 and	
credentials,	and	to	understand	many	issues	in	the	background.	In	total,	 I	went	
to	almost	80	meetings	(see	Appendix	5).	
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Here	is	a	broad	typology	of	the	meetings	attended:	
1. Formal	 meetings	 about	 both	 the	 existing	 and	 the	 proposed	 Wylfa	
stations,	
including	new	Wylfa	Public	Liaison	Group	(PLG)	meetings,	existing	Wylfa	
Site	Stakeholder	Group	 (SSG)	meetings,	community	and	county	council	
discussions	 on	 the	 subject	 of	Wylfa	 (e.g.,	 PAC1	 consultation	 response,	
Supplementary	Planning	Guidance	[SPG]);	
2. Formal	meetings,	only	partially	or	distantly	related	to	Wylfa,	 	
including	 Llanbadrig	 [Cemaes	 area]	 and	 Mechell	 [Llanfechell	 area]	
community	council	meetings,	Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council	meetings,	
One	Voice	Wales	meeting,	etc.;	
3. Informal	consultations	of	Horizon	Nuclear	Power,	 	
including	 monthly	 drop-in	 sessions	 mostly	 in	 Cemaes	 (but	 also	 in	
Amlwch	 and	 Llangefni),	 PAC1	 consultation	 events	 in	 various	 parts	 of	
Anglesey	and	Gwynedd	during	Oct-Dec	2014;	
4. Industry	events,	 	
including	industry	conferences,	supply	chain	events,	career/recruitment	
events,	school	outreach	events;	
5. Anti-nuclear	events,	 	
including	public	talks,	demonstrations,	operative	meetings;	
6. Community	and	voluntary	organisation	events,	 	
including	village	festivities,	tea	and	raffle	events,	public	talks,	voluntary	
activities	in	Cemaes	and	Llanfechell.	
In	 the	meetings	 I	 generally	 introduced	myself	 and	asked	 for	 consent	 to	make	
use	of	the	experience	in	my	PhD	study	whenever	it	was	possible	(e.g.,	at	a	small	
community	council	meeting	but	not	at	a	large	industry	conference).	I	took	hand-
written	 notes,	 generally	 at	 more	 formal	 ‘sit-in’	 events,	 like	 public	 meetings,	
consultation	events,	and	industry	conferences.	I	hardy	took	notes	in	community	
events	in	the	village	and	similar	activities.	I	have	filled	up	five	notebooks	during	
my	 fieldwork,	mainly	with	meeting	 and	 interview	 notes.	 After	 key	meetings	 I	
often	typed	up	my	notes	on	my	laptop,	clarified	the	information,	and	amended	
the	digital	notes	with	additional	information.	
Formal	 meetings	 often	 have	 their	 meeting	 minutes	 (local	 community	 and	
county	 council	 meetings,	 Wylfa	 stakeholder	 meetings)	 or	 even	 a	 full	
transcription	of	the	events	(e.g.,	 industry	conferences,	parliamentary	hearings)	
published	 either	 on	 a	 homepage	 or	 upon	 request.	 I	 visited	 some	 of	 these	
meetings,	 but	 sometimes	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 (e.g.,	 Energy	 Island	 Programme	
workstreams).	 While	 I	 have	 become	 very	 much	 aware	 of	 how	 tensions	 and	
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controversies	of	meetings	are	often	watered	down	in	the	formal	minutes,	these	
are	nevertheless	important	sources.	
4.3.4	DOCUMENTS	
Governing	 the	 nuclear	 programme	 is	 about	 producing	 documents.	 These	
documents	 provide	 robust	 evidence	 in	 areas	 where	 access	 is	 often	 difficult,	
especially	 as	 written	 representations	 of	 top-level	 industry	 and	 government	
perspective.	 Documents	 are	 formal	 and	 cross-checked	 representations,	 in	
which	 often	 every	word	 is	 carefully	 phrased,	 thus	 these	 provide	more	 robust	
sources	 in	 some	 sense	 than	 an	 interview	 excerpt	 or	 a	 meeting	 note.	 Official	
documents,	 however,	 are	often	 ‘black	boxes’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	understanding	
the	way	 these	 are	 crafted	 –	 a	 frequent	 topic	 in	my	 stakeholder	 interviews	 –	
reveals	often	more	than	the	document	itself.	
Here	is	a	broad	typology	of	the	documents	studied:	
1. Key	official	documents	related	to	Wylfa,	 	
including	 government	 new	 nuclear	 policy	 documents,	 Wylfa	
consultation	documents,	Energy	Island	scoping	studies;	
2. Associated	official	documents,	 	
including	 local	 development	 plans,	 related	 government	 policies	 (e.g.,	
decommissioning),	 parliamentary	 reports	 and	 Hansard,	 government	
grey	literature;		
3. Industry	reports	and	studies,	 	
Including	 national	 and	 international	 nuclear	 association	 studies,	
conference	reports,	corporate	reports;	
4. Independent	and	anti-nuclear	materials.	
Most	of	 these	documents	are	available	online,	and	 I	built	up	a	 semi-coherent	
register	of	 these	documents	with	detailed	tags	by	using	bibliography	software	
Zotero.	 I	 printed	 out	 the	 hardcopies	 only	 of	 key	 documents.	 The	 electronic	
version	 was	 not	 available	 for	 historic	 documents	 from	 the	 archives.	 I	 have	
systematically	 processed	 the	 relevant	 documents	 of	 the	 Anglesey	 Archives	 in	
Llangefni,	and	also	paid	a	visit	to	the	Gwynedd	Archives	in	Caernarfon	and	the	
National	 Archives	 in	 Kew,	 London.	 Key	 archival	 documents	 were	 either	
photographed	 or	 copied,	 plus	my	 digital	 notes	 took	 up	 a	 36-page	 document.	
The	 documents	 analysed	 are	 found	 among	 the	 primary	 sources	 of	 the	 thesis,	
mostly	contemporary	documents	but	also	archival.	
4.3.5	COMPLEMENTARY	SOURCES	
In	the	polymorphous	engagement,	various	other	sources	were	used	in	addition	
to	 the	 three	 key	 data	 sources,	 interviews,	 meeting	 notes,	 and	 documents.	
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Several	 local	 residents	 offered	me	 records,	 both	 contemporary	 and	 historical	
(e.g.,	newspaper	 clippings,	old	 council	documents).	During	my	 fieldwork	a	 full	
cardboard	 box	 of	 physical	 documents	 were	 collected	 in	 addition	 to	 various	
online	 sources.	 Furthermore,	 an	 electronic	 repository	 was	 built	 with	 the	
software	Zotero	for	online	and	other	digital	sources.	
1. Local	and	national	news:	 	
During	the	Anglesey	fieldwork	(May-Dec	2014),	I	filed	newspaper	articles	
related	to	nuclear	power	and	other	relevant	 issues	(e.g.	wind	turbines)	
from	the	 local	paper	 ‘(North	Wales)	Daily	Post’,	and	the	weekly	papers	
‘Holyhead	and	Anglesey	Mail’	and	‘North	Wales	Chronicle’.	In	addition,	I	
have	 obtained	 Wylfa	 related	 news	 clippings	 from	 various	 local	
informants.	Wylfa	 related	new	 from	the	national	media	were	 followed	
via	Google	Alert,	and	key	nuclear	news	were	archived	electronically.	
2. Brochures,	information	leaflets,	flyers,	newsletters,	etc.:	 	
Various	 primarily	 paper-based	materials	 have	 been	 collected	 at	 public	
talks,	conferences,	and	other	events,	as	well	as	in	the	Wylfa	information	
centre,	in	the	Energy	Island	Programme	Office	and	other	offices.	
3. Official	homepages	and	other	online	sources:	 	
These	 included	 government	 portals,	 corporate	 homepages,	 official	
industry	association	and	NGO	websites,	as	well	as	other	official	channels	
(e.g.,	Horizon	Nuclear	Power	Youtube	channel).	
4. Social	media	and	email	lists:	 	
Social	 media	 was	 an	 important	 means	 to	 be	 up-to-date	 with	 mostly	
industry	 news,	 especially	 industry	 twitter	 accounts	 and	 some	 anti-
nuclear	email	lists.	There	were	a	few	online	sources	(e.g.,	‘Wylfa	Walker’	
blog	and	the	‘Cemaes	Bay	in	Days	Gone	By’	Facebook	group)	that	played	
crucial	part	on	how	 the	progress	with	 the	new	Wylfa	 site	affected	 the	
community.	
5. Popular	culture:	 	
Nuclear	 power-themed	movies,	 books,	 etc.,	 were	 especially	 important	
to	understand	the	historical	eras,	along	with	some	more	contemporary	
sources	related	to	the	area	or	Wylfa	(Jones	2013).	
6. Freedom	of	Information	releases:	 	
Published	releases	to	FOI	requests	were	sometimes	useful	sources,	but	I	
did	not	submit	any	FOI	request.	
7. Statistical	data:	 	
Albeit	the	overall	research	was	an	in-depth	qualitative	case	study,	I	used	
quantitative	 statistics	 official	 statistical	 data,	 plus	 primary	 data	 from	
account	and	annual	reports	of	both	public	and	private	bodies.	
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Though	 the	 above	 sources	 were	 systematically	 collected,	 these	 were	 not	
analysed	 as	 systematically	 as	 my	 interview	 transcripts,	 meeting	 notes,	 and	
documents.	 Some	 of	 these	 were	 important	 to	 shape	 my	 understanding,	 and	
some	others	are	even	referenced	in	this	thesis	to	substantiate	my	argument.	
4.4	DATA	ANALYSIS	
In	ethnographic	research,	data	collection	and	analysis	are	not	distinct	stages	as	
in	 quantitative	 social	 science	 research,	 or	 in	 some	 qualitative	 research	 (e.g.,	
document	 analysis)	 (Hammersley	 and	 Atkinson	 2007).	 An	 ethnographic	
fieldwork	is	a	reflexive	process.	A	substantial	part	of	the	argument	of	thesis	has	
been	 formed	 during	 my	 Anglesey	 fieldwork,	 upon	 attending	 other	 industry	
meetings,	or	while	transcribing	my	interviews.	
Nevertheless,	 I	 deliberately	 aimed	 to	 build	 up	 a	 robust	 framework	 to	 analyse	
the	collected	empirical	data.	A	solid	analytical	 framework	 is	not	a	suppression	
of	 the	 inherent	 subjectivity	 of	 ethnographic	 research	 but	 rather	 a	 structured	
reflection	on	it.	It	was	a	difficult	effort	to	design	a	robust	framework	to	analyse	
this	 rich	 and	 heterogeneous	 data	 resulting	 from	 the	 polymorphous	
engagement.	 Methodology	 textbooks	 generally	 focus	 on	 analysing	 only	 one	
source	(e.g.,	 interview	transcripts,	documents),	or	at	most	a	mix	of	qualitative	
and	quantitative	data	(Grbich	2012;	Silverman	2011).	Similarly,	some	common	
approaches	 to	 data	 analysis	 seemed	 unsatisfactory.	 After	 long	 months	 of	
intense	fieldwork	and	even	longer	months	reflection,	it	seemed	naïve	to	act	as	
if	 there	 is	 a	 clean	 sheet	 as	 grounded	 theory	 (Glaser	1998;	 Strauss	 and	Corbin	
1998)	 or	 situational	 analysis	 (Clarke	 2005)	 or	 a	 similar	 approach	 suggests.	
Similarly,	 I	 found	 analytic	 induction,	 i.e.	 testing	 a	 theory-based	 hypothesis,	
leading	to	a	loss	of	much	of	the	richness	an	ethnography	could	provide.	
Interview	 transcripts	 were	 coded	 digitally	 with	 the	 computer	 assisted	
qualitative	 data	 analysis	 software	 (CADQAS)	NVivo	 10.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 coding	
was	 to	 create	 a	 robust	 and	 structured	 overview	 of	 the	 interview	 data	 from	
which	interview	quotes	can	be	easily	searched	and	retrieved.	A	detailed	coding	
tree	was	created	(in	NVivo	codes	are	called	nodes).	Broad	code	categories	often	
reflected	 analytical	 themes	 (e.g.,	 governance,	 public	 engagement),	 while	
detailed	coding	reflected	the	empirical	issues	from	the	fieldwork	material,	often	
using	 in	 vitro	 codes.	 Coding	 was	 not	 used	 for	 quantitative	 analysis	 (e.g.,	
frequencies	 and	 correlations	of	different	 codes),	 as	 the	 topics	discussed	were	
very	much	driven	by	my	questions.	No	formal	textual	analysis	methods,	such	as	
discourse	 analysis	 or	 content	 analysis,	 were	 used.	 I	 was	 not	 focusing	 on	 the	
intricacies	 of	 the	 language	 or	 on	 revealing	 undercurrent	 patterns	 but	 on	 the	
explicit	discussion	of	key	issues.	
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The	collected	documents	were	not	coded	 formally	due	 to	 the	vast	 length	and	
the	 heterogeneity,	 but	 hardcopies	 were	 generally	 annotated.	 Similarly,	 my	
meeting	 notes	 were	 not	 coded,	 I	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 quote	 those	 verbatim.	
Formal	meeting	minutes	were	similarly	annotated	as	documents.	
4.5	RESEARCH	INTEGRITY,	POSITIONALITY	AND	REFLEXIVITY	
Ethnography	 is	 a	 reflexive	 research	 process	 where	 the	 positionality	 and	
personality	 of	 the	 researcher	 is	 of	 central	 importance.	 There	 is	 no	 clearcut	
distinction	 between	 the	 ‘observer’	 and	 the	 ‘observed	 phenomena’.	 The	
subjectivities	 of	 the	 researcher	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 doing	 ethnographic	
research.	
Moreover,	 in	 a	multi-scalar	 research	 the	 sometimes	 conflicting	 identities	 and	
positionalities	 can	 become	 an	 even	 more	 salient	 issue	 to	 work	 on	 than	 in	
studying	 a	 single	 community.	My	 subjectivities	 as	 a	 researcher	 are	 not	 some	
bias	or	a	diversion	from	some	ideal	objectivity,	but	rather	an	acknowledgement	
that	there	is	no	neutral	observer,	especially	 in	ethnographic	research.	There	is	
no	 objective	 account,	 rather	 stories	 with	 inherently	 subjective	 elements	
(Clifford	and	Marcus	1986).	A	 reflection	on	my	positionalities	 in	 the	 field,	 the	
challenges	 to	 my	 research	 identity,	 and	 my	 values	 and	 loyalties	 enrich	 my	
ethnography	rather	than	impoverish.	This	does	not	mean	that	this	ethnographic	
research	 is	a	 subjective	monologue.	More	 the	opposite,	 I	made	efforts	 to	put	
myself	in	the	shoes	of	the	various	people	I	have	talked	to,	even	if	those	weren’t	
the	 shoes	 I	 would	 buy	 for	 myself.	 I	 tried	 to	 enmesh	 myself	 in	 the	 multiple	
perspectives	 on	 the	 project,	 even	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 challenging	 my	 starting	
points,	rather	than	to	approach	it	from	one	pre-defined	point	of	view.	This	does	
not	mean	that	this	multi-scalar	ethnography	is	not	partial.	Somebody	else	might	
have	noticed	very	different	aspects	all	things	being	otherwise	equal.	
In	the	first	subsection,	I	address	the	challenge	of	the	‘being	native’	at	different	
places,	and	the	different	 levels	of	 rapport	with	 the	people	 in	my	 fieldwork.	 In	
the	 second	 subsection,	 I	 sketch	 my	 relationship	 with	 the	 different	 key	
stakeholder	 organisations,	 especially	 with	 delicate	 cooperation	 with	 the	
developer	company	Horizon	Nuclear	Power	staff.	In	the	third	section,	I	make	my	
positions	towards	the	nuclear	power	and	the	new	Wylfa	explicit	through	some	
personal	histories,	including	how	my	research	and	fieldwork	experience	shaped	
my	views	on	nuclear	power	and	nuclear	communities.	
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4.5.1	BEING	NATIVE…BUT	WHERE?	
In	moving	 beyond	 a	 single	 site	 of	 ethnography,	 it	 is	 challenging	 to	 go	 native	
(Hannerz	2003).	For	many	traditional	ethnographers	in	line	with	the	emic	view,	
the	ultimate	success	measure	of	ethnography	is	to	be	native	in	the	field.	In	my	
case,	however,	there	was	no	single	social	group	to	become	part	of.	Moreover,	
the	 multi-scalar	 ethnography	 approach	 addressed	 exactly	 the	 spatial	 and	
cultural	differences	 in	 relation	to	 the	nuclear	construction.	Therefore	 it	would	
have	 been	 overly	 naïve	 to	 simultaneously	 ‘become	 native’	 to	 the	 village	
communities,	 the	 nuclear	 industry,	 the	 local	 councils,	 and	 the	 anti-nuclear	
groupings.	 The	 fieldwork	 was	 rather	 a	 process	 of	 finding	 the	 opportunities,	
means,	 and	 limitations	 of	 associating	 with	 different	 ‘communities’.	 In	 many	
cases,	a	constructive	relationship	was	a	more	realistic	aim,	especially	with	the	
nuclear	company	Horizon	or	the	county	council.	Even	in	Cemaes	village,	an	in-
depth	immersion	in	the	community	with	an	open	eye	seemed	a	more	realistic	
effort	 than	concentrating	all	my	efforts	 to	becoming	one	of	 ‘them’.	Becoming	
native	 to	 Cemaes	 also	 seemed	 infeasible	 because	 there	 were	 many	 kinds	 of	
natives	 in	 a	 sense	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 deep-rooted	 cultural	 divides	 between	
Welsh-speakers	and	English	incomers.		
The	 challenge	 was,	 however,	 to	 manage	 the	 relationships	 with	 the	 very	
different	kinds	of	social	collectives	I	was	engaged	with.	I	was	aware	that	while	
some	of	 these	affiliations	can	reinforce	each	other	 (e.g.,	 familiarity	 in	Cemaes	
and	 acceptance	 by	 council	 officials),	 others	 rather	 interfere	 with	 each	 other	
(e.g.	 relationships	 with	 the	 developer	 company	 and	 the	 anti-nuclear	 group).	
Taking	the	classic	 typology	of	Gold	 (1958),	my	positions	shifted	from	observer	
(e.g.,	 industry	 conferences)	 to	 observer-as-participant	 (e.g.,	 open	 surgery	
session)	 and	 participant-as-observer	 (e.g.,	 village	 community	 groups).	 As	 a	
result	of	this	I	had	to	become	always	had	to	be	conscious	about	my	identities,	
and	 how	 the	 things	 I	was	 telling	 or	 doing	 (e.g.,	 going	 to	 an	 anti-nuclear	 talk)	
might	 affect	 other	 identities.	My	 aim	 to	 build	 trust	 with	 key	 informants	 was	
therefore	 connected	 to	 being	 upfront	 about	 how	 I	 communicated	with	 other	
people	during	the	research.	
4.5.2	RELATIONSHIP	WITH	STAKEHOLDER	ORGANISATIONS	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 outline	 the	 relationship	 during	 the	 fieldwork	 with	 the	 key	
organisations,	 namely	 the	 community	 councils,	 the	 county	 council,	 the	
developer	 company	Horizon,	 and	 the	 local	 anti-nuclear	group	PAWB,	plus	 the	
village	community	in	Cemaes.	These	relationships	did	not	only	affect	what	kind	
of	 information	 I	received	but	also	the	experiences	themselves	were	 important	
ways	of	understanding	how	these	organisations	operate.	
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In	 Cemaes,	 my	 concerns	 of	 going	 to	 the	 village	 as	 a	 foreigner	 were	 quickly	
evaporated	when	 I	 arrived	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 The	 openness	 and	 support	 was	
overwhelming.	After	some	time,	there	were	always	familiar	faces	on	the	street	
and	 in	 the	pub.	 I	 tended	 to	 talk	more	with	 the	elder	generation	about	village	
life,	 histories,	 and	 community	 events	 than	with	my	 own	 generation.	 Towards	
the	 end	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 I	 gave	 a	 talk	 in	 the	 village	 hall	 on	 my	 still	 ongoing	
research.	While	 I	had	many	 familiar	 faces	and	good	chats	 in	 the	village,	 I	was	
also	a	bit	of	an	oddity,	a	non-native	speaker	doing	some	kind	of	study	about	the	
community	and	Wylfa	 (see	my	articles	 in	 the	village	 community	newsletter	 in	
Appendix	 6).	 We	 even	 joked	 with	 some	 people	 that	 I	 was	 a	 Russian	 spy.	
Towards	the	end	of	the	research,	a	number	of	people	noted	that	I	was	already	
‘part	of	the	village’	as	I	was	preparing	to	leave.	Indeed,	probably	the	best	part	
of	my	research	was	to	be	part	of	the	village	life	of	this	nuclear	community.	
At	 local	community	council	meetings	I	was	a	regular	visitor,	sitting	 in	the	back	
and	taking	notes.	I	have	built	up	a	good	personal	relationship	with	several	key	
councillors,	 both	 in	 Llanbadrig	 (Cemaes)	 and	 in	Mechell	 (Llanfechell)	 councils.	
These	 meetings	 offered	 a	 perspective	 into	 the	 local	 politics,	 and	 also	 an	 in-
depth	 understanding	 of	 the	 issues	 the	 councils	 and	 their	 communities	 were	
facing,	from	public	toilet	closures	to	responding	to	Wylfa	consultations.	Council	
meetings	were	mostly	in	Welsh	(with	interpreter	services	provided),	and	it	was	
not	 always	 easy	 to	 follow	 the	 intricacies	 of	 the	 arguments.	 By	 sometimes	
shadowing	a	community	councillor,	I	have	also	learnt	the	works	and	challenges	
of	a	councillor.	
With	 County	 Council	 officials,	 we	 built	 up	 a	 constructive	 arrangement	with	 a	
seeming	interest	on	their	behalf	in	my	research.	I	conducted	several	interviews	
with	the	Energy	Island	Programme	team	and	other	council	officials.	I	have	also	
arranged	 to	 visit	 a	 Strategic	 Forum	meeting	 of	 the	 Energy	 Island	Programme,	
which	is	normally	invitation-only.	I	had	an	informative	working	relationship	with	
the	council,	albeit	certain	boundaries	were	always	kept	 (e.g.,	no	access	to	the	
inner	workings	of	the	programme	office	or	sometimes	it	was	difficult	to	get	hold	
of	documents).	
My	relationship	with	Horizon	was	the	most	crucial	during	the	fieldwork,	and	it	
was	 not	 always	 easy.	 The	 informative	 and	 open	 communication	 of	 company	
staff	 during	my	 preliminary	 visit	 to	 Anglesey	 played	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 choosing	
Wylfa	as	a	case	study.	I	was	a	regular	visitor	at	these	open	surgeries	and	later	in	
the	 formal	 consultation	 events,	 often	 spending	 hours	 asking	 questions	 and	
taking	notes.	In	my	behaviour	I	always	tried	to	be	polite	but	also	firm	that	these	
are	rare	and	precious	opportunities	for	me	as	a	researcher.	I	was	not	a	‘stalker’	
with	 a	 hidden	 agenda,	 but	 these	 events	 were	 essential	 sources	 for	 me	 as	 a	
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researcher	 to	 shape	my	understanding	of	 the	project,	while	 I	use	quotes	only	
from	 formal	 interviews.	As	my	 research	progressed	 sometimes	 I	 felt	 a	 certain	
unease	on	behalf	of	some	of	the	staff	with	my	presence.	After	I	attended	a	local	
community	council	meeting	at	which	a	company	representative	gave	a	project	
update,	 I	 was	 reminded	 to	 establish	my	 credentials	 with	 a	 formal	 university-
headlined	 letter	 from	 my	 supervisors.	 The	 Principal	 Investigator	 of	 ARCoES	
readily	answered	questions	on	the	phone	and	in	writing	to	Horizon	staff.	During	
the	 latter	 part	 of	 fieldwork,	 however,	 I	 have	 received	more	 and	more	 polite	
requests	 advising	 not	 to	 go	 to	 semi-closed	 events.	 For	 example,	 while	 the	
quarterly	 Public	 Liaison	 Group	 meetings	 of	 Horizon	 are	 formally	 open	 to	 all	
members	of	public	not	just	stakeholder	representatives,	I	was	suggested	by	the	
local	 stakeholder	 manager	 that	 I	 had	 better	 not	 to	 go	 to	 the	 well-awaited	
meeting	due	 to	 potentially	 limited	 seating.	 I	went	 there	 and	 seating	wasn’t	 a	
problem.	 The	most	 sobering	 experience	was,	 however,	with	my	 article	 series	
concentrating	on	the	history	of	the	Wylfa	A	station	in	Cemaes	Voice,	the	village	
newsletter	sponsored	by	Horizon	(see	Appendix	6).	First,	I	was	politely	asked	to	
send	 the	 articles	 to	 the	 stakeholder	 manager	 of	 the	 company	 in	 advance	 to	
avoid	any	“factually	incorrect”	information,	then	I	was	gently	asked	not	to	write	
any	 more	 articles	 unless	 I	 would	 like	 to	 jeopardise	 my	 relationship	 with	 the	
company.	We	decided	with	 the	supervisory	 team	not	 to	write	more	articles.	 I	
was	 hoping	 to	 interview	 company	 staff	 with	 various	 specialisms	 and	 on	
different	levels,	most	of	them	I	already	knew	in	person	from	various	meetings,	
but	 I	 have	 only	 managed	 to	 conduct	 one	 formal	 interview	 with	 a	 company	
representative.	Besides	 these	 small	 impediments,	 the	overall	 relationship	was	
respectful	 and	 cooperative.	 The	 open	 surgeries	 and	 consultation	 events	
provided	invaluable	knowledge	and	insights	about	the	project.	In	summary,	this	
relationship	 was	 sometimes	 difficult,	 but	 it	 also	 provided	 key	 learning	
opportunities	about	how	the	industry	works.	
	
Generally,	 PAWB	 members	 entrusted	 me	 and	 sometimes	 actively	 sought	
opportunities	 to	 engage	 with	 me.	 They	 saw	me	 as	 a	 potential	 ally,	 though	 I	
made	always	made	clear	that	I	was	not	there	to	campaign	against	Wylfa	but	to	
understand	 the	 local	 communities	 and	Wylfa.	 Interestingly,	 this	 position	 was	
challenged	 once	 when	 I	 was	 invited	 to	 a	 PAWB	 organiser	 meeting.	 After	
introducing	 myself	 I	 was	 immediately	 confronted	 with	 the	 view	 that	
understanding	the	nuclear	construction	is	not	the	“right	question”,	and	I	should	
debunk	 the	 “corruption	 of	 democracy”	 behind	 the	 nuclear	 programme.	 This	
challenge	also	shows	that	PAWB	members	generally	discussed	issues	openly	in	
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front	of	me,	and	often	I	was	the	one	who	tried	to	draw	a	boundary	of	being	a	
researcher	there,	not	an	activist	like	them.		
4.5.3	“SO	ARE	YOU	PRO	OR	ANTI-NUCLEAR?”	
Surprisingly,	 the	 above	 question	 was	 asked	 more	 often	 elsewhere	 than	 on	
Anglesey.	Nevertheless,	upon	moving	to	Anglesey	I	was	immediately	confronted	
with	the	challenge	to	position	myself,	if	not	explicitly	through	the	question	then	
through	my	very	habitus.	It	is	not	usual	on	Anglesey	to	cycle	instead	of	driving,	
or	to	eat	vegetarian	food	but	 I	have	tried	my	best	not	to	be	seen	as	an	urban	
greenie	 going	 to	 Anglesey	with	 the	 obligatory	 urban	 greenie	 opinions.	 I	 have	
rather	 challenged	my	 values	 and	 dispositions	 than	 to	 take	 a	 clear	 stance	 on	
Wylfa	or	nuclear	power.	
My	 simple	 answer	 during	 the	 fieldwork	was	 ‘I	 am	 here	 to	 understand	 not	 to	
judge’.	Most	of	the	people	I	talked	to	during	my	fieldwork	respected	that	I	tried	
to	have	a	balanced	position,	while	entrusting	and	challenging	my	informants	at	
the	same	time.	Nevertheless,	 I	have	personal	opinions.	Ten	years	ago,	when	 I	
became	 interested	 in	 understanding	 more	 about	 nuclear	 power	 I	 had	 rather	
ambiguous	views.	I	still	remember	the	moment	when	I	refused	to	sign	a	petition	
against	 the	 Hungarian	 nuclear	 plant	 while	 being	 environmentalist.	 Nuclear	
power	is	a	low-carbon	technology,	and	I	didn’t	feel	informed	enough.	As	I	learnt	
more	about	the	topic,	including	writing	a	BSc	and	an	MA	thesis,	I	have	become	
more	aware	of	the	critical	aspects,	economics	and	nuclear	waste	in	particular.	I	
was	even	involved	in	Greenpeace	and	the	green	party	LMP	in	Hungary,	though	I	
was	 never	 really	 an	 anti-nuclear	 campaigner.	 Living	 in	 a	 nuclear	 community,	
however,	 revealed	 other	 aspects.	 I	 have	 learnt	 the	 salience	 of	 livelihoods	
connected	 to	 nuclear	 power,	 in	 particular	 the	 identity	 and	 relative	 prosperity	
Wylfa	 provided	 to	 the	 Cemaes	 area	 though	 not	 without	 contradictions.	With		
regards	 to	 the	big	picture,	my	preference	would	go	 for	a	 transition	 towards	a	
low-carbon	economy	through	radical	reductions	in	electricity	demand	as	well	as	
decentralised	and	preferably	community-owned	renewable	generations.	Living	
on	Anglesey,	however,	taught	me	to	respect	the	diversity	of	energy	futures	that	
are	rooted	in	differences	in	places,	peoples	and	histories.	
The	vast	majority	of	the	social	science	literature	on	nuclear	power	is	inclined	to	
an	anti-nuclear	position,	either	 implicitly	or	explicitly	 (Beck	1992;	Hecht	2012;	
Slovic,	 Flynn,	 and	 Layman	 1991;	Wynne	 2011;	Wynne,	Waterton,	 and	 Grove-
White	 1993).	 In	many	 social	 scientists,	 there	 is	 an	 urge	 to	 take	 some	 kind	 of	
political	stance.	This	 is	not	my	position.	My	political	stance	is	for	a	democratic	
debate	and	for	a	diversity	of	legitimate	perspectives	rather	than	for	a	particular	
position.	 In	 this	 PhD	 thesis,	 I	 try	my	 best	 to	 honestly	 represent	 the	 different	
perspectives.	In	particular,	during	and	after	living	in	a	nuclear	community	I	felt	
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uncomfortable	 how	 these	 communities	 are	 often	 depicted.	 In	 the	 literature,	
people	 around	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 often	 appear	 to	 be	 passive	 objects	
exposed	to	living	in	high-risk	environment,	sometimes	coupled	with	a	sense	of	
refusal	or	normalisation	of	risks,	blindfolded	support	for	the	industry,	or	social	
or	economic	marginalisation.	In	contrast,	I	would	like	to	draw	a	different	picture	
of	living	around	nuclear	plant.	I	would	like	to	show	that	the	people	living	around	
a	 nuclear	 plant	 are	 not	 brainwashed	 zombies	 but	 people	 with	 deep-rooted	
social	knowledges,	complex	identities,	and	sometimes	dilemmas.	
4.6	RESEARCH	ETHICS	
Ethnographic	 research,	 especially	 participant	 observation	 (e.g.,	 meeting	
ethnographies)	 raises	 questions	 that	 are	 less	 clear-cut	 than	 in	 most	 other	
qualitative	research	methods	(e.g.,	interviewing,	focus	groups).	Who	counts	as	a	
research	participant?	What	does	informed	consent	mean	for	different	research	
participants?	
The	 University	 of	 Liverpool	 ethics	 review	 process	 is	 mainly	 suited	 to	 clinical	
research	 (e.g.,	potential	physical	or	psychological	 adverse	effects),	 it	does	not	
provide	detailed	guidance	applicable	to	this	kind	of	ethnographic	research.15	My	
research	 thus	also	 followed	the	guidelines	of	 the	Research	Councils	UK	 (RCUK	
2015),	the	British	Sociological	Association	(BSA	2004),	and	the	Royal	Geographic	
Society	(RGS-IBG	2006).	The	research	methodology	went	through	an	expedited	
review	 of	 the	 School	 of	 Environmental	 Sciences	 Ethics	 Committee	 in	 January	
2014.		
The	research	was	fully	overt.	Informed	consent	was	sought	from	all	participants	
of	the	research.	All	interviewees	were	provided	written	information	sheet	(see	
Appendix	3)	and	a	consent	form	(see	Appendix	4)	before	the	meeting.	The	latter	
included	 options,	 for	 example,	 for	 voice	 recording	 or	 anonymity.	 During	 my	
entire	 research,	 including	 fieldwork	 based	 in	 Cemaes,	 I	 always	 made	 my	
research	 explicit	 to	 all	 people	 I	 interacted	 with.	 When	 I	 had	 a	 personal	
discussion	or	participated	in	more	formal	talks	(e.g.,	Horizon	open	surgeries),	I	
explicitly	 asked	 if	 I	 could	 take	 notes	 for	my	 research.	 During	 small	meetings,	
such	 as	 community	 council	 meetings,	 I	 have	 always	 introduced	 myself	 and	
explicitly	asked	attendees	whether	I	could	take	notes	that	I	will	possibly	use	in	
my	 research	 with	 some	 common-sense	 considerations	 (e.g.,	 anonymity).	 To	
larger	meetings,	 such	 as	 industry	 conferences,	 I	 registered	 as	 PhD	 researcher	
and	made	my	research	explicit	in	personal	interactions.	In	this	thesis,	I	am	only	
quoting	 people	 who	 gave	 their	 explicit	 consent	 as	 interviewees	 with	 the	
																																																						
15 	Relevant	 policies	 and	 guidelines	 are	 available	 on	 https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/research-
integrity/policies-guidance/	(Accessed	5	September	2016)	
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exception	 of	 quotes	 from	 already	 publicly	 available	 meeting	 minutes	 or	
transcripts.		
The	vast	majority	of	the	analysed	material	is	publicly	accessible,	either	online	or	
physically	(e.g.,	archives),	or	rarely	upon	request.	In	this	thesis,	I	did	not	analyse	
or	quote	any	confidential	documents.	To	the	extent	of	my	knowledge,	neither	
did	I	use	any	copyrighted	material.	
4.7	CONCLUSIONS:	METHODOLOGICAL	REFLECTIONS	
This	 chapter	 introduced	 an	 ethnographic	 research	 methodology	 as	 a	 novel	
approach	 to	 energy	 transitions.	 The	 current	 methodological	 approach,	
however,	 overcomes	 the	 limitations	 of	 conventional	 ethnographies	 in	 their	
focus	on	a	bounded	place.	I	called	the	approach	of	this	research	a	multi-scalar	
ethnography.	This	 is	a	case	study	Wylfa	Newydd	providing	a	view	of	an	era	of	
megainvestments	 in	 the	 UK	 ‘from	 the	 ground’.	 The	 fieldwork	 went	 beyond	
participant	 observation	 and	 it	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 a	 ‘polymorphous	
engagement’	 (Gusterson	 1997).	 Key	 empirical	 data	 sources	 included	 voice	
recorded	 and	 transcribed	 interviews,	 ethnographic	 meeting	 notes,	 a	
heterogenous	 set	 of	 documents,	 and	 various	 complementary	 sources.	
Ethnographic	 research	 is	 a	 reflexive	 process,	 thus	 no	 formalised	data	 analysis	
was	conducted	except	for	the	coding	of	interviews.	With	subjectivities	inherent	
of	 the	 research,	 I	 reflected	 on	 the	 positionalities,	 the	 relationships	 with	 key	
stakeholders,	and	relevant	research	ethics	challenges.	
Data	validation	is	a	particularly	difficult	question	for	an	interdisciplinary	project	
with	 a	 mixture	 of	 research	 methods.	 How	 data	 is	 approached	 and	 validated	
varies	vastly	across	disciplines	and	research	methods	used.	In	anthropology	and	
ethnographic	research,	for	example,	there	is	often	no	formal	assessment	in	the	
validation	 process	 of	 data	 but	 a	 reflection	 on	 how	 the	 research	 has	 been	
conducted	 throughout	 the	 process.	 In	 ethnographic	 research,	 reliability	 and	
representativeness	of	data	 is	dependent	on	 the	subjective	 ‘common	sense’	of	
the	researcher.	Thus	I	made	my	methodological	choices	explicit	throughout	this	
chapter,	 such	 as	 designing	 the	 research	 framework,	 using	 and	 analysing	
different	sources,	my	positionalities	and	ethical	considerations.	
This	 chapter	 sets	 the	 frame	 for	 the	 coming	 three	 empirical	 chapters.	 These	
chapters	will	provide	further	illustrations	of	the	research	methodology	by	how	
the	 data	 is	 used,	 such	 as	 interview	 quotes,	 excerpts	 from	 documents,	
references	to	primary	sources,	and	ethnographic	vignettes	and	notes.	 In	these	
chapters,	 only	 a	 fragment	 of	 the	 sources	 collected	 and	 analysed	 are	
represented.	There	are	several	interviews	that	I	did	not	quote	eventually,	not	to	
mention	 a	 vast	 quantity	 of	 documents	 or	 complementary	 sources.	 Even	 the	
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sources	that	were	not	directly	used	were	important	in	providing	a	background	
understanding	and	in	outlining	topics	I	eventually	did	not	develop	in	this	thesis.	
The	above	dilemmas	nevertheless	demonstrate	that	ethnography,	especially	by	
moving	beyond	conventional	participant	observations	in	bounded	communities,	
is	 a	 productive	 and	 useful	 methodological	 approach	 to	 understand	 energy	
transitions.	 	
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CHAPTER	 5.	 NEGOTIATING	 GEOGRAPHIES:	 PLACES,	 VISIONS,	
AND	PRACTICES	
5.1	GEOGRAPHIES	OF	A	MEGAINVESMENT	
When	one	looks	on	the	map	of	new	nuclear	sites	in	Britain,	Wylfa	is	a	just	dot.	A	
nuclear	site,	however,	is	far	from	just	a	mere	location.	Wylfa	Newydd	is	in	the	
junction	of	spaces	of	experimentation,	the	distinctive	visions	of	how	low-carbon	
Britain	 is	 made	 on	 various	 scales	 (Hodson	 and	Marvin	 2013).	 The	 new	 build	
project	 is	 central	 to	negotiating	different	 geographies.	 Is	 the	 large	building	of	
the	current	Wylfa	part	of	the	rugged	Anglesey	coastal	landscape	or	an	intrusion	
to	that?	How	did	the	new	build	become	less	controversial	on	Anglesey	than	the	
wind	farms	and	the	proposed	new	pylons?	How	is	Anglesey	becoming	an	Energy	
Island?	What	does	a	Nationally	Significant	 Infrastructure	project	mean?	In	this	
chapter,	 I	 address	 Research	 Question	 3	 ‘How	 is	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
megainvestment	made	 on	 different	 scales?’	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 geographies	 of	
Wylfa	Newydd,	often	beyond	just	scale.	
This	 chapter	 outlines	 that	 how	 the	 new	 Wylfa	 is	 envisioned	 and	 made	 at	
different	 places	 and	 on	 different	 scales.	 I	 referred	 to	 my	 methodology	 as	 a	
multi-scalar	ethnography	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	discussions	about	Wylfa	
Newydd	are	different	at	 the	 local	pub	 in	Cemaes,	at	 the	meeting	of	PAWB,	 in	
the	 planning	 offices	 of	 the	 local	 council,	 in	 the	 corridors	 of	Westminster,	 or	
headquarters	 in	 Hitachi	 City	 in	 Japan.	 These	 are	 not	 just	 differences	 in	 the	
visions	of	Wylfa	Newydd,	but	also	 in	the	social	and	organisational	practices	of	
engaging	with	the	investment.	
The	 study	 of	 geographies	 of	 transitions	 is	 an	 emerging	 research	 area.	 In	 the	
literature	chapter,	I	highlighted	three	relevant	topics	of	interest,	namely	spatial	
embeddedness,	 multi-scalarity,	 and	 landscapes	 (Becker,	 Moss,	 and	 Naumann	
2016;	Bridge	et	al.	2013;	Coenen,	Benneworth,	and	Truffer	2012;	Hansen	and	
Coenen	2015;	Raven,	Schot,	and	Berkhout	2012b;	Späth	and	Rohracher	2014).	I	
have	 also	 turned	 to	 the	 discussions	 in	 the	 geography	 literature	 on	 relational	
geographies	with	the	aim	to	provide	a	conceptual	understanding	of	a	‘national	
sense	of	place’	for	a	new	nuclear	site	(Massey	2010,	2005).	Geography	provides	
rich	understandings	 that	can	go	beyond	 fixed	notions	of	place	 (Massey	2010),	
scale	 (Marston	 2000;	 Swyngedouw	 1997),	 region	 (Allen	 and	 Cochrane	 2007;	
Paasi	2013,	2003)	and	nation	state	(Brenner	et	al.	2008).	The	concept	of	multi-
level	 governance	 is	 particularly	 useful	 to	 address	 the	 politics	 and	practices	 of	
negotiating	 Wylfa	 between	 different	 geographic	 scales	 (Jessop	 2004;	 Smith	
2007;	Stubbs	2005).	There	are	only	a	few	in-depth	empirical	case	studies	in	the	
emerging	geographies	of	transitions,	and	even	those	focus	on	cities	in	particular	
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(Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Mike	 Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 2013;	 Rohracher	 and	 Späth	
2014),	and	rarely	on	regions	(Späth	and	Rohracher	2010).	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 address	 how	Wylfa	 Newydd	 project	 is	 envisioned	 and	 what	
practices	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 project	 at	 different	 places	 across	 multiple	
scales.	 In	 the	next	 section	5.2,	 I	 ask	whether	 the	new	nuclear	building	will	be	
situated	in	the	local	physical	and	social	landscape	as	an	addition	or	an	intrusion	
by	 referring	 to	 the	 existing	Wylfa	 A	 station	 and	 the	 local	 opposition	 against	
wind	 turbines.	 In	 section	 5.3,	 I	 outline	 how	 the	 expectations	 in	 Cemaes	 are	
rooted	 in	the	 lived	experiences	with	the	current	station	around	 issues	such	as	
Welsh	 language	 and	 cultural	 change,	 local	 livelihoods,	 and	 construction	
disturbance.	 In	 section	 5.4,	 I	 take	 a	 broader	 picture	 and	 address	 how	 the	
geographic	 differences	 are	 articulated	 on	 Anglesey	 and	 beyond.	 In	 the	 next	
sections	5.5	to	5.8,	I	address	the	multiple	levels	of	governance	involved	in	Wylfa	
Newydd.	 In	 section	 5.5,	 I	 highlight	 the	 challenges	 of	 small	 local	 community	
councils	 in	 engaging	 with	 a	 megainvestment.	 Section	 5.6	 shows	 how	 Isle	 of	
Anglesey	 County	 developed	 the	 Energy	 Island	 as	 a	 local	 development	 plan	 to	
engage	with	Wylfa	Newydd.	 Section	 5.7	 outlines	 the	 challenges	 the	 devolved	
Welsh	 Government	 is	 facing	 to	 build	 up	 capacity	 to	 engage	 with	 the	
megainvestment.	In	section	5.8,	I	outline	the	UK	government	approach	towards	
the	new	nuclear	programme,	which	was	recently	repositioned	from	framing	the	
new	 nuclear	 projects	 as	 large-scale	 decarbonisation	 solutions	 to	 attracting	
global	 investment	 to	 reindustrialise	 the	 country.	 Also	 a	 novel	 government	
approach	 is	 outlined	 to	 de-risk	 private	 investments	 in	 a	 liberalised	 market	
through	streamlining	planning	and	regulation,	provision	of	financial	guarantees,	
and	direct	involvement	in	R&D,	education	and	training.	In	section	5.9,	I	highlight	
how	 the	 UK	 became	 a	 showcase	 for	 global	 nuclear	 vendors	 together	 with	
changes	in	the	industry	in	terms	of	financing	nuclear	projects,	supply	chain,	and	
licensing	 and	 building	 technologies.	 In	 the	 final	 section	 5.10,	 I	 draw	 some	
conclusions	 on	 how	 geographies	 are	 a	 key	 to	 understand	 these	 nuclear	
megainvestments.	
5.2	LANDSCAPES	OF	POWER:	MODERNISATION	OR	INTRUSION?	
The	current	Wylfa	station	 is	a	 landmark	 feature	of	 the	rugged	North	Anglesey	
landscape.	When	you	are	approaching	 it	 on	 the	A2025	 road	 from	either	way,	
the	 station	appears	and	disappears	as	 the	 road	goes	up	and	down	 the	 rolling	
North	Anglesey	landscape	scattered	with	drumlins.	As	you	get	closer	to	Cemaes,	
the	 plant	 suddenly	 appears	 as	 a	 striking	 feature	with	 a	 substantial	 size.	 Soon	
after	I	moved	to	Anglesey,	a	local	lady	told	me	in	her	house	on	Cemaes	High	St	
that	 the	 sight	 of	 Wylfa	 after	 a	 long	 drive	 means	 home	 for	 her,	 by	 finally	
approaching	 the	 familiar	 village.	 I	 was	 perplexed	 by	 the	 contrast	 that	 before	
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setting	off	for	fieldwork	many	friends	and	colleagues	jokingly	noted	that	I	would	
have	been	better	to	be	careful	of	 the	station	blowing	up.	Similarly,	 in	popular	
culture	(e.g.,	the	US	cartoon	series	Simpsons),	especially	in	the	‘white	heat	era’	
1980s	 (e.g.,	When	 the	 wind	 blows,	 1986),	 nuclearity	 is	 often	 pictured	 as	 the	
looming	threat	on	the	safety	and	comfort	of	domestic	life.	
	
Picture	5.1.	Wylfa	A	station	photographed	from	above	Llanbadrig	Church	with	Wylfa	Head	on	the	right	of	
the	station	and	Cemaes	Bay	just	outside	the	picture	on	the	left	hand	side.	Photo	by	Marton	Fabok.	
How	 did	 this	 “clumsy”	 (Interview	 2)	 and	 “big	 and	monolithic”	 (Interview	 32)	
power	station	become	a	familiar	view	in	the	area	(see	Picture	5.1)?	There	was	
an	 interesting	 debate	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	 when	Wylfa	 was	 established.	 In	 its	
short	leaflet	for	the	opening	public	exhibitions	in	6	June	1962,	CEGB	claimed	the	
following:	
“The	stations	will	also	attract	tourists,	for	they	excite	wonder	wherever	
they	 are.	 These	 are	 the	 new	 castles	 of	 North	 Wales,	 and	 never	 did	
Edward	I	employ	better	architects.	There	is	no	fear	that	they	will	harm	
the	landscape,	for	the	[CEG]	board	is	required	by	the	Act	of	Parliament	
to	 provide	 electricity	 for	 the	 nation	 as	 cheaply	 as	 possible	 and	 at	 the	
same	 time	 to	 respect	 and	 to	 safeguard	 the	 character	 of	 the	
countryside.”	(CEGB	1962,	emphasis	added)	
In	 his	 opening	 of	 the	 public	 exhibitions,	 the	 Marquess	 of	 Anglesey	 however	
challenged	this	view.	
“Do	 the	 people	 of	 Anglesey	 wish	 their	 island	 to	 become	
indistinguishable	 from	 the	 Black	 County,	 from	 the	 Potteries,	 from	 the	
Ruhr,	 from	 Nagasaki,	 from	 Pittsburg[h],	 from	 the	 valleys	 of	 South	
Wales?	If	they	do,	well	let	it	be	so;	but	I	don’t	believe	they	wish	anything	
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of	 the	 sort.	 I	 am	 sure,	 too,	 that	 the	 ever-increasing	number	of	 people	
who	 come	each	 year	 to	 ‘the	 sunny	 Isle	 of	Anglesey’	most	 certainly	 do	
not	 wish	 to	 find	 themselves	 on	 their	 holidays	 plunged	 into	 the	
atmosphere	and	ugliness	of	 their	everyday	working	 lives.	 […]	First,	 it	 is	
obvious	that	to	plant	vast	buildings	however	carefully	their	design	may	
be	 contrived	 to	 reduce	 their	 inherent	 unlovliness,	 upon	 an	 almost	
untouched	 coastal	 strip	 of	 great	 beauty,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 amenity	
improvement.”	
The	effect	on	the	landscape,	or	as	it	was	then	called	the	“amenity	value”	of	the	
transmission	 cables	 across	 the	 island	 was	 the	 central	 question	 of	 the	 short	
public	 inquiry	 in	Amlwch	a	 year	before	 (“Wylfa	Public	 Inquiry”	1961).	Besides	
Anglesey,	 local	 contestations	 sparked	 across	 the	 country	 against	 the	 new	
transmission	 lines	 and	 power	 stations	 (Cochrane	 1990;	 Welsh	 1993).	 As	 a	
response,	CEGB	appointed	 the	pre-eminent	British	planner	of	 the	 time	 to	 the	
Board.	 In	 his	 influential	 inauguration	 speech,	 Lord	Holford	made	 a	 distinction	
between	the	preservationist	[of	amenity]	approach	of	“nothing	better	than	it	is	
already	 there”	 and	 his	 architect	 and	 planner	 approach	 of	 “while	 striving	 to	
create	also	learns	where	to	destroy”	when	he	introduced	his	principles	of	siting	
power	lines	still	in	usage	(C.	Hinton	and	Holford	1960).		
Also,	the	modernist	original	design	of	Wylfa	(CEGB	Northern	Project	group,	n.d.,	
see	 Picture	 5.2;	 CEGB	 postcard,	 n.d.)	 was	 modified	 by	 prominent	 landscape	
architect	 Dame	 Sylvia	 Crowe	 (Crowe	 1958;	 Powell	 and	 Collens	 2000).	 The	
innovative	 design	 meant	 efforts	 to	 blend	 the	 station	 in	 to	 the	 surrounding	
coastal	landscape	rather	than	making	it	a	striking	feature	standing	out	from	its	
environment.	There	were	artificial	moulds	built	around	the	power	station	from	
the	excavated	material,	 similar	 to	 the	drumlins	 in	 the	area,	and	 softening	 the	
features	of	the	current	station	(see	the	wood-covered	mould	on	the	right	that	
hides	the	plant	from	the	Cemaes	area	on	Picture	5.1).	Also,	the	buildings	were	
coloured	 similarly	 to	 the	 dominant	 features	 of	 the	 surrounding	 coastal	
landscape,	 like	grey	of	 rocks,	green	of	grass	and	 the	yellow	of	heather.	Wylfa	
station	 did	 not	 become	 “the	 new	 castle	 of	North	Wales”	 as	 the	 CEGB	 (1962)	
leaflet	claimed,	but	it	has	become	a	familiar	view	of	the	landscape.		
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Why	 is	 this	 half-a-century	 old	 story	 interesting	 for	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
investment?	Currently,	 the	 low-carbon	energy	 investments	making	 the	energy	
island	 are	 facing	 very	 similar	 challenges.	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 local	 opposition	
against	 wind	 farms	 on	 the	 island	 (Anglesey	 Against	Wind	 Turbines),	 and	 also	
against	the	proposed	new	line	of	transmission	pylons	(Anglesey	Against	Pylons).	
When	a	local	resident	told	me	“I’m	dead	against	[wind	turbines],	a	blot	on	the	
landscape!”	(Interview	31),	he	was	far	from	alone	with	his	opinion.	In	contrast,	
the	same	person	said	that	the	power	station	in	comparison	is	not	that	bad.	
“Wylfa	is	a	blot	on	the	landscape,	but	as	far	as	power	stations	generally	
go,	it’s	not	bad.	[…].	It’s	not	just	a	big	drab	concrete	building,	there	is	a	
bit	 to	 colour	 to	 it	 to	 blend	 in,	 it’s	 got	 trees	 round	 it.	 […]	 It’s	 the	 best	
power	station	I	have	seen,	and	unlike	the	others	I	have	been	to,	which	
were	just	black	coal	and	smoke	coming	out	of	the	chimneys,	it’s	not	bad.	
[…]	 Some	 people	 [holiday-makers]	 surprised	 about	 a	 nuclear	 power	
plant	here,	and	find	probably	first	a	bit	strange	to	go	to	the	beach,	but	
even	for	them	becomes	normal	after	some	time.”	(Interview	31)	
While	wind	turbines	were	widely	seen	as	blots	on	the	landscape,	most	people	
got	 used	 to	 the	 existing	 Wylfa	 station	 (Interviews	 22,	 23).	 What	 makes	 the	
difference	that	a	large	monolithic	building	is	less	of	a	blot	in	the	landscape	as	a	
few	slender	wind	turbines?	I	would	like	to	argue	that	the	landscapes	of	power	
are	not	 just	 the	physical	 landscapes	but	 the	 social	 landscapes	of	 these	power	
stations	and	how	they	are	embedded	to	local	societies.	
The	 existing	Wylfa	 station	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 social	 landscape.	 People	work	
there,	 everybody	 knows	 people	 there,	 and	Magnox	 put	 substantial	 efforts	 to	
Picture	 5.2.	 Architectural	 design	 of	 Wylfa	 nuclear	 station.	 Source:	 CEGB	
Northern	Project	group,	n.d.		
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become	 a	 ‘good	 neighbour’	 as	 Chapter	 7	 discusses	 (subsection	 7.5.2).	 The	
opinion	of	this	local	resident	resonates	with	a	number	of	discussions	I	had:	
“There	 is	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 in	 the	 village	who	 live	 now	 in	 lovely	 houses,	
because	financially…[…]	Whoever	works	at	Wylfa,	even	the	cleaners,	go	
home	with	 reasonable	money.	Many	 people	 are	 there	with	 degrees.	 I	
can’t	condemn	Wylfa,	I	have	worked	there.	My	son-in-law	works	there,	
probably	my	grandchildren	can	work	there,	they	are	in	the	sixth	[form]	
now,	 so	quite	possibly	 they	will	work	on	 the	new.	 So	 I	 can’t	 condemn	
new	built	or	old	built,	and	anybody	with	their	heads	here…I	have	some	
friends	[living	in	a	house	close	to	the	station],	and	the	man	of	the	house	
used	to	say	bloody	Wylfa	all	the	time,	that	he	could	see	it	form	his	land	
and	everything.	And	now	his	wife	 is	working	there	now,	so	he	can’t	all	
condemn	anything	[about]	it	for	our	peace	of	mind.	Is	he	[going	to]	stay	
[with	 the	 new	 build	 just	 at	 Cemlyn]	 as	 they	 get	 good	 living	 from	 it?”	
(Interview	23)	
Wind	 turbines,	 in	 contrast,	 are	 intrusions	 by	 multinational	 companies.	 These	
don’t	provide	local	employment,	nor	any	benefits	apart	from	owner	of	the	land.	
While	 recently	 community	 benefit	 contributions	 have	 become	 common	
practice,	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 (subsection	 6.3),	 but	 the	 damage	 has	
been	done	in	the	local	uptake	of	wind	turbines.	These	turbines	are	often	seen	
as	 “just	 a	money-making	 exercise	 [of	 which	 the	 community	 does	 not	 benefit	
from]“	(Interview	34).	Wind	turbines	are	seen	as	blots	on	the	landscapes	for	the	
local	 communities,	 while	 the	 benefits	 go	 elsewhere.	 As	 one	 local	 community	
councillor	 summarised	 “It’s	 designed	 to	 provide	 electricity	 for	 the	 grid,	 but	
maybe	 it	 [should]	 provide	 back	 money	 for	 the	 village.”	 (Interview	 22)	 She	
summarised	 her	 views	 about	 the	 landscape	 and	 low-carbon	 investments	 the	
following	way:	
“I	 know	 Anglesey	 is	 an	 energy	 island,	 but	 I	 don’t	 want	 the	 island	 to	
become	 full	 of	 turbines.	 Because	what’s	 the	 point	 of	 living	 here,	 look	
one	way	and	turbines,	the	other	and	solar	panels,	and	again	Wylfa,	and	
the	pylons…I’m	surrounded!”	(Interview	22)	
These	examples	highlight	that	a	crucial	challenge	for	making	Anglesey	an	energy	
island	 –	 and	 elsewhere	 (Cass,	 Walker,	 and	 Devine-Wright	 2010;	 Cotton	 and	
Devine-Wright	2013)	–	whether	a	low-carbon	installations	(a	new	nuclear	plant,	
a	wind	turbine)	becomes	an	added	feature	of	or	an	intrusion	to	the	landscape.	
This	 challenge	 highlights	 that	 this	 is	 not	 just	 a	 question	 of	 the	 physical	
landscape	but	also	the	cultural	and	social	landscape	of	the	island.	In	the	Wylfa	
Newydd	 consultations	 there	 is	 an	 explicit	 reference	 by	 Horizon	 to	 the	 Dame	
Sylvia	 Crowe	 with	 design	 options	 for	 ‘bold’	 and	 ‘blend’	 features	 (Horizon	 NP	
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2014e,	 2014f),	 but	 probably	 the	 question	 will	 be	 as	 much	 as	 whether	 the	
investment	will	be	seen	as	beneficial	or	a	rip-off	for	the	local	communities.	
5.3	CEMAES	BAY:	LIVING	WITH	NUCLEAR	NEW	BUILD	
The	discussions	across	Anglesey	on	Wylfa	Newydd	are	intimately	shaped	by	the	
lived	experiences	of	these	communities	profoundly	tied	to	the	existing	nuclear	
station.	In	this	section	I	will	first	outline	living	in	a	nuclear	community	through	
my	 ethnographic	 experiences	 of	 staying	 in	 Cemaes	 for	 seven	 months,	
highlighting	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 Welsh-English	 divide	 in	 villages,	 and	 the	
livelihoods	 in	 the	 nuclear	 community.	 The	 expectations	 towards	 the	 Wylfa	
Newydd	are	embedded	in	these	lived	histories.	
First,	Wylfa	is	more	than	just	an	industrial	facility	or	an	employer.	I	have	often	
started	interviewing	local	residents	with	the	question	of	what	would	Cemaes	be	
like	if	Wylfa	hadn’t	been	built	in	the	1960s.	One	local	resident	summarised	what	
many	people	said:	
“If	 Wylfa	 wasn’t	 built	 in	 the	 1960s,	 [Cemaes]	 would	 be	 similar	 to	
Aberffraw	and	Newborough	[Welsh-speaking	villages	 in	 the	south-west	
corner	 of	 Anglesey].	 No	 shops,	 no	 pubs,	 a	 dead	 village,	 that’s	 what	
Cemaes	 would	 be.	 Because	 holidaymakers	 alone	 wouldn’t	 sustain	
Cemaes,	not	like	Benllech	[a	popular	holiday	village	on	the	east	coast	of	
the	 island	with	a	growing	number	of	people	retiring	there	mainly	 from	
the	North	of	England].	It	would	still	be	a	village,	a	community,	but	if	you	
go	 to	 other	 villages	 of	 the	 island,	 houses	 are	 run	 down,	 not	 painted,	
everywhere	look	shabby.	You	don’t	get	that	here,	because	of	the	power	
station.”	(Interview	31)	
Most	of	my	 informants	 imagined	 that	north	Anglesey	would	be	 similar	 to	 the	
aging	 and	 shrinking	 Welsh-speaking	 communities	 of	 the	 Aberffraw	 area	 or	
further	on	 the	north	coast	of	 the	Llŷn	Peninsula	 (Interview	34).	 “Quiet,	 full	of	
old	people,	no	 industry,	no	work”	 (Interview	22).	Wylfa	A	 is	 seen	 to	be	a	key	
driver	behind	 the	busy	village	high	street,	 the	 thriving	community	groups	and	
the	 prospects	 for	 the	 successive	 generations	 to	 establish	 themselves	 in	 the	
village.	The	power	plant	provided	long-term	and	relatively	well-paid	jobs	across	
a	wide	range	of	professions.	As	a	 local	 resident	said	“Everybody	made	money	
from	 Wylfa,	 because	 either	 working	 there	 or	 relatives	 working	 there,	 or	
providing	accommodation	or	keeping	a	shop”	(Interview	23).		
To	many	extent,	Wylfa	is	rather	seen	in	Cemaes	as	the	factory	where	people	go	
to	work	than	a	high-risk	technology.	
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“People	have	realised	the	significance	and	the	importance	of	the	power	
station	to	the	local	community.	As	if	it	was	a	factory,	[…]	the	fact	that	it	
is	a	major	employer	in	the	locality	is	a	key	thing.”	(Interview	15)	
The	power	 station	 is	 not	 just	 a	workplace	providing	 livelihoods,	 it	 is	 a	 hub	of	
social	connections	and	loyalties.	
Second,	the	power	station	has	substantively	shaped	local	culture,	especially	the	
long-held	 frictions	 between	Welsh	 and	 English.	 The	 area	 is	 characterised	 that	
“Wylfa	 has	 created	 a	 population	which	 is	more	 divided	 [between	Welsh	 and	
English]”	 (Interview	 4).	 There	 has	 been	 a	 major	 cultural	 shift	 since	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 station	 associated	 with	 the	 incoming	 workforce	 of	 the	
station.	Ever	since	the	construction	of	Wylfa,	there	has	been	a	cultural	divide	in	
the	 locality	between	Welsh-speakers	and	monoglot	English-speakers,	between	
long-time	 residents	 and	 incomers	 (Wassink	 1987).	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	
the	construction	meant	that	Welsh	language	lost	its	prominence	all	at	once	on	
the	street	or	in	the	schools	together	with	a	pattern	of	life	(Wassink	1987).	The	
cultural	 frictions	 still	 dominate	 village	 life.	 As	 one	 local	 elder	 highlighted	 that	
there	 is	 a	 “relative	 classlessness”	 (Interview	 4)	 in	 Cemaes,	 but	 the	 “biggest	
cultural	 divide	 in	 the	 village	 is	 between	 Welsh	 and	 English,	 […]	 between	
primarily	Welsh-speakers	and	monoglot	English	speakers.”	(Interview	4).	
This	cultural	divide	is	not	limited	to	language,	the	two	languages	are	associated	
with	different	cultures.	Welsh	is	a	language	of	local	belonging,	community,	and	
histories,	English	 is	 the	global	 language	of	commerce,	ambition,	and	progress.	
As	one	Welsh-speaker	explained	to	me	that	Welshness	means	to	him	“a	sense	
of	 identity,	 a	 sense	 of	 community,	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 an	 area	 or	 patch,	
brogarwch	 it’s	 called,	 an	 affinity	 to	 a	 particular	 patch,	 and	 also	 language.	 A	
sense	of	 loss	with	the	language.”	(Interview	30).	A	local	historian	told	me	that	
“It’s	 the	 poetry,	 the	 singing,	 the	 attitude…there	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 the	
English	 and	 the	Welsh,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	Welsh	 are	 much	more…I	 don’t	
know	the	English	word	 is	–	 [asking	his	wife	 in	Welsh]	gwasaidd	yn	saesneg?	–	
servitude.”	 (Interview	 34)	While	 the	Welsh	 are	 associated	with	 a	more	 equal	
attitude	 (Interview	 31),	 or	 “the	 nail	 that	 sticks	 out	 gets	 hammered	 down”	
(Interview	 8a),	 it	 is	 also	 rooted	 in	 risk-aversion	 (Interviews	 8a,	 31,	 36).	 An	
interviewee	summarised	the	differences	the	following	way:	
“Primary	Welsh	 speakers	 tend	 to	be	more	 family-oriented,	 they	 rather	
spend	 their	 time	 with	 the	 family	 rather	 than	 doing	 something.	 They	
seem	 to	 be	 less	 mobile,	 comfortable	 in	 a	 small	 geographic	 territory.	
They	cultural	interests	are	arts-related.	The	Welsh	culture	is	around	arts,	
singing	and	the	like,	see	the	organisations	around	the	village.	They	go	to	
the	 Anglesey	 Show	 and	 Eisteddfod,	 meet	 everyone	 there,	 they	 go	 to	
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catch	up.	There	 is	an	 intertwinement	with	 the	agricultural	 community,	
because	everybody	has	origins	there.	
They	 are	 interested	 in	 people’s	 origins,	 who	 your	 parents	 and	
grandparents	 were.	 It’s	 strange	 for	modern	mobile	 people,	 for	 whom	
the	 interesting	 is	 just	 who	 you	 are.	 But	 in	 the	 Welsh-speaking	
community	they	often	ask	where	you	are	from.	And	what	they	mean	is	
where	 your	 family	 is	 from,	 what	 is	 your	 father	 doing,	 etc.	 It’s	 an	
identification	with	you	and	your	place	of	origin.	
When	I	came	here	the	first	time,	people	were	sometimes	called	by	their	
origin.	 John	 [anonymised	 local	 Welsh	 place	 name]	 –	 called	 after	 the	
house,	because	he	was	born	there.	It’s	part	of	that	culture,	identification	
of	place.	We	are	foreign	[as	incomers],	however,	we	don’t	have	this	kind	
of	identity.”	(Interview	4)	
Over	 the	 decades	 these	 divides	 have	 probably	 softened.	 The	 younger	
generations	 are	 often	 feel	 similarly	 comfortable	 with	 both	 languages.	 Unlike	
their	 grandparents,	 children	 from	 Welsh-speaking	 families	 feel	 equally	
comfortable	expressing	themselves	 in	English	(Interviews	4,	22).	Also,	children	
with	English	monoglot	parents	learn	Welsh	at	school	and	identify	themselves	as	
Welsh.	One	long-time	incomer	spoke	about	this:	
Interviewee:	 “My	 children	 are	 fluent	 Welsh-speakers,	 we	 made	 the	
decision	when	 they	were	 young.	 Because	 if	 they	want	 to	work	on	 the	
island,	they	have	to	speak	Welsh.”	
MF:	“Do	they	see	themselves	as	Welsh	or	English?”	
Interviewee:	 “Welsh.	 They	 were	 born	 here.	 Especially	 my	 daughter,	
strong-strong	Welsh.	Their	father	is	from	Jamaica,	I’m	from	Liverpool.”	
The	Welsh-English	 divide	 is	 not	 some	 kind	 of	 sectarian	 conflict,	 but	 rather	 a	
friction.	 In	 many	 senses,	 “Cemaes	 is	 tolerant”	 (Interview	 31)	 due	 to	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 the	 place	 with	 contractors	 and	 holiday-makers	 coming	 and	
going	(and	coming	back).	
Apart	from	PAWB	activists,	mainly	from	the	other	side	of	the	island,	there	were	
hardly	people	who	talked	about	the	risks,	not	that	 I	 felt	 it	was	a	taboo.	There	
was	 not	 an	 aura	 of	 immanent	 danger	 looming	 over	 the	 area.	 The	 archival	
sources	indicate	that	in	the	1980s	and	early	1990s,	there	were	more	reports	on	
potential	cancer	clusters,	radioactive	leakages,	nuclear	hazards	and	generally	a	
suspicion	 towards	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 plant	 (“Heritage	 of	 PAWB	 Activist	
Megan	Môn	 Prytherch,”	 n.d.,	 “Heritage	 of	 PAWB	 Activist	 Nan	Morgan,”	 n.d.;	
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see	 also	 Wassink	 1987:	 93-97).	 It	 doesn’t	 mean	 that	 currently	 there	 is	 no	
awareness	of	nuclear	safety.	In	confidential	settings,	people	shared	me	stories	
of	 safety	 violations	within	 the	plant,	mostly	 historic	 ones.	 For	 example,	 I	was	
told	 by	more	 than	 one	 person	 in	 the	 village	 about	 the	 radioactive	 pipe	 leaks	
causing	 a	 prolonged	 outage	 in	 the	 Wylfa	 reactor	 1	 before	 the	 event	 was	
officially	confirmed	in	the	local	press	(Barker	2014).	This	duality	between	having	
more	knowledge	about	safety	breaches	 in	the	plant	and	more	assurance	in	 its	
safe	operation	does	not	constitute	an	ambiguity,	but	rather	the	co-existence	of	
diverse	experiences	and	views	that	often	do	not	form	a	explicitly	conflict	with	
each	other	dilemma.	As	one	very	close	resident	explained	it:	
“The	vast	majority	of	 the	people	have	no	anxieties	about	 the	safety	of	
nuclear	 power.	 The	 ‘apprehension	 for	 the	 uneducated’	 isn’t	 here.	 The	
nuclear	power	station	is	a	near	neighbour.	The	only	occasion	when	there	
was	 a	 panic	 in	 the	 area	 was	 Chernobyl.	 All	 places	 in	 the	 area	 have	
monitoring	 devices,	 and	 [suddenly]	 radiation	 triggered,	 particularly	 at	
the	power	plant.	One	friend	was	a	duty	manager,	he	sets	off	the	alarms	
at	the	control	 room.	But	they	quickly	 identified	the	radiation,	 it	wasn’t	
from	here.	No	other	significant	issues	with	safety.”	(Interview	7)	
Even	more,	this	in-depth	knowledge	of	how	safety	is	practiced	in	the	plant,	is	a	
reminder	that	while	minor	incidents	do	happen,	a	major	accident	is	a	different	
case.	As	one	resident	talked	about	evacuation		
“And	there	are	[evacuation]	plans	in	place	[…],	they	know	what	happens	
if	 they	 get	 into	 that	 stage.	 You	 do	 know	 that	 Magnox	 [is	 doing	
something]…the	reactors	are	playing	that,	because	 it	blows	steam.	You	
know	there	is	something	going	on	there.	You	can	sort	of	figure	out,	they	
must	 be	 around	 [a	 certain	 safety	 level],	 because	 steam	 is	 coming	 out.	
And	 they	 are	 very	 good,	when	 I	 took	part	 of	 this	 drill	 exercise,	we	hit	
level	4,	the	evacuation,	it	went	like	clockwork.”	(Interview	22)	
One	of	the	few	anti-nuclear	people	in	the	village,	however,	also	highlighted	the	
difficulties	in	the	tight	nuclear	communities	to	talk	about	risks.	
“But	 it’s	 such	 a	 strong	 argument	 that	 people	 want	 work.	 There	 is	 a	
family	 across	 the	 road	 [points	 to	 the	 house],	 he	 was	 working	 at	 the	
power	 station,	 and	 it’s	 a	 very-very	 difficult	 thing	 for	 me,	 because	 all	
around	me	there	are	people	who	work	there.	From	whatever	direction	
the	 work	 comes	 to	 the	 people,	 they	 have	 to	 protect	 that,	 however	
danger	it	can	be.“	(Interview	1b)	
The	expectations,	hopes,	and	concerns	 towards	Wylfa	Newydd	are	very	much	
built	 on	 the	 experiences	 of	 career	 prospects,	 incoming	 people	 and	 cultural	
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frictions.	 The	 living	memory	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 current	 station	 shows	
that	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 will	 mean	 a	 major	 transformation.	 The	 big	 hope	 is	 to	
provide	long-term	and	good	livelihoods	for	local	people,	especially	in	the	face	of	
outmigration,	 while	 concerns	 in	 the	 immediate	 communities	 are	 more	
concentrated	 on	 the	 influx	 of	 workers	 and	 its	 effects	 on	 everyday	 life,	 from	
housing	to	schools,	from	healthcare	provision	to	Welsh	language	use.	
When	I	was	doing	my	fieldwork	on	Anglesey	in	 late	2014,	the	coming	changes	
were	already	noticeable.	 There	were	houses	 recently	demolished	 in	 the	area,	
the	 site	 was	 scattered	 with	 the	 drilling	 holes,	 and	 in	 the	 village	 there	
contractors	 going	 from	 the	 ground	 investigations	 company	 or	 from	 other	
consultancies	 doing	 surveys.	 These	were	 negligible	 changes	 compared	 to	 the	
overall	 construction,	 but	 already	 made	 the	 investment	 visible	 and	 helped	 to	
realise	the	extent	of	changes.	
The	 challenge	 local	 residents,	 council	 officials,	 and	 visiting	 ethnographic	
researchers	is	to	imagine	the	area	during	the	peak	of	the	construction	and	after.	
I	have	already	indicated	the	size	of	the	Wylfa	construction	in	the	introduction	of	
this	thesis	(see	section	1.1)	but	the	challenge	is	what	this	means	in	social	terms.	
A	senior	local	nuclear	industry	professional	reaffirmed	that	“the	consequences	
of	 the	 construction	 and	 operation	 are	 ‘socially	 unclear’”	 and	 he	 added	 the	
question	that	was	driving	many	people	around,	“what	is	[the	new	Wylfa]	gonna	
be	like	and	feel	like?“	(Interview	36).	
It	is	impossible	to	draw	a	comprehensive	picture	on	what	the	megainvestment	
will	 be	 like.	 Reading	 through	 the	 consultation	 documents,	 one	 realises	 how	
many	 issues	 are	 connected	 to	 the	 construction,	 from	 the	 relocation	 of	 the	
popular	Anglesey	coastal	footpath	to	the	qualification	needs	for	subcontractors,	
from	 the	 working	 hours	 on	 site	 to	 the	 sudden	 rise	 of	 class	 sizes	 and	
compositions	 at	 schools.	 The	 very	 experience	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 was	 to	
understand	 the	 vast	 complexity	 of	 issues	 the	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment	
means.	 In	 the	 following	 paragraphs	 I	 highlight	 two	 issues	 to	 indicate	 the	
complexity	of	 these	conversations.	First,	 I	outline	 the	question	of	 local	 jobs	 in	
the	context	of	outmigration	and	skills	trainings.	Second,	I	address	the	challenge	
for	maintaining	Welsh-speaking	culture	 in	the	face	of	a	 large	 incoming	Welsh-
speaking	workforce.	
First,	 10,270	 people	 are	 expected	 to	 work	 on	 the	 station	 and	 associated	
developments	in	the	peak	construction	phase,	and	a	further	1000	will	operate	
the	plant	 (Horizon	NP	2016a).	Who	will	 be	building	 the	new	Wylfa?	And	who	
will	operate	 the	station?	On	Cemaes	High	Street	and	 in	 the	 local	pubs	 I	often	
bumped	 into	 these	 conversations	 (Interviews	 6,	 8b,	 13,	 21,	 22,	 31),	 not	 to	
mention	 the	 relevant	 Energy	 Island	 Programme	 workstreams	 and	 even	 high-
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level	industry	and	government	discussions	(CITB	2012;	Cogent	and	NSAN	2010,	
2009;	 DECC	 2015a;	 HoC	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change	 Committee	 2013;	 NESA	
2015;	OECD	-	NEA	2012).	As	one	local	councillor	shared	the	dilemma:	
“No	guarantee	 the	 jobs	will	 go	 to	 local	people.	They	say	 so,	but	 if	 you	
are	 not	 trained	 for	 the	 job,	 they	will	 give	 that	 to	 other	 people.	When	
they	built	the	old	one	they	told	that	those	will	be	jobs	for	local	people,	
but	 they	 brought	 over	 Irish	 navvies	 and	 people	 all	 over	 from	England.	
And	they	were	very	 few	jobs	for	 local	people…Will	 this	one	will	be	the	
same?”	(Interview	22)	
On	Anglesey,	Wylfa	Newydd	is	promoted	as	a	“once	in	a	 lifetime	opportunity”	
(e.g.,	 IACC	 2014c:	 4).	 The	 operation	 of	 the	 plant	 offers	 long-term	 secure	
employment	 in	well-paid	and	often	highly	skilled	 jobs.	The	megainvestment	 is	
seen	by	many	as	probably	the	only	alternative	to	outmigration	of	the	younger	
generation.	As	one	resident	summarised	the		
“It	is	a	community.	Do	we	want	our	kinds	to	leave	Cemaes	to	get	some	
work?	Two	options,	either	stay	here	and	get	on	benefits,	or	to	leave	and	
get	a	work."	(Interview	31)	
These	 opportunities	 are	 already	 promoted	 at	 local	 schools	 by	 STEM	
engagement	 sessions.	 As	 I	 have	 been	 reminded	 multiple	 times,	 the	 current	
sixth-grade	 students	 might	 be	 the	 operators	 of	 the	 plant	 when	 it	 begins	
electricity	generation.	Horizon	paves	career	opportunities	 in	the	 industry	from	
primary	school	up	until	retirement.	As	a	company	official	highlighted,	“the	kids	
in	school	now,	are	the	future	managers	of	the	plant”	(Interview	16).	In	addition	
to	the	schools	outreach	programmes,	the	local	higher	education	college,	Coleg	
Menai	 in	 Llangefni,	 is	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 this	 programme.	 The	 college	 is	
undergoing	a	substantial	expansion	with	a	new	Energy	Centre	and	Heavy	Plant	
Training	Centre.16	A	local	councillor,	however,	articulated	the	concern	of	many	
people.	
“I	do	know	as	well	that	Horizon	is	working	really	hard	at	Coleg	Menai	to	
have	the	staff	to	be	able	to	work.	But	these	guys	will	finish	in	two	years	
time.	What	 they	gonna	do	 in	 the	next	15	years	 till	 this	 frickin’	 thing	 is	
up?	 They	 are	 not	 gonna	 stay,	 they	 gonna	 move	 away,	 will	 they	 ever	
																																																						
16	Similar	 investment	 in	 the	 HE/FE	 (higher	 education	 and	 further	 education)	 sector	 for	 the	 Hinkley	 and	
Moorside	 projects	 is	 the	 Energy	 Skills	 Centre	 at	 Bridgwater	 College,	 Britain’s	 Energy	 Coast	 Construction	
Skills	Centre	respectively,	where	also	the	National	College	for	Nuclear	will	be	formed	(DECC	2015a).	
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come	back?	No,	I	don’t	have	much	faith	in	jobs	for	local	people,	I	really	
don’t.”	(Interview	31)	
Second,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 language	 and	 linguistic	 profile	 of	 the	
incoming	workforce	was	central	discussion	topic	based	on	the	cultural	changes	
Wylfa	 induced	 by	 the	 sudden	 shift	 from	 a	 Welsh-speaking	 to	 a	 bilingual	
community.	 The	 “fate	 of	 the	 language”	 (Lewis	 1962)	 was	 a	 key	 concern	 of	
Welsh-speakers.	As	the	Welsh-speaking	pastor	summarised	it:	
“On	a	small	island,	with	the	small	population	we	have,	an	influx	of	that	
size	will	for	a	very-very	far	extent	destroy	the	way	of	 life.	 It’s	bound	to	
do	this,	you	can’t	help	it.”	(Interview	3)	
This	was	recognised	by	Horizon	to	put	emphasis	on	the	language	by	‘renaming’	
the	plant	from	Wylfa	B	to	Wylfa	Newydd	by	breaking	with	the	national	industry	
standard	(Horizon	NP	2013a),	translating	all	public	documents	to	Welsh	except	
for	 a	 few	 technical	 ones,	 having	 Welsh-speaking	 local	 representatives,	
establishing	 an	 independent	Welsh	 Language	 Impact	 Assessment	 and	 policies	
(Horizon	NP	2016e).		
There	 is	 a	 reframing	 of	 the	 language	 issue	 highlighting	 that	 ‘heb	 gwaith,	 dim	
iaith’,	 there	 is	 ‘no	 language	 without	 jobs’	 that	 keep	 Welsh-speaking	 young	
people	 on	 the	 island.	 As	 a	 Welsh-speaking	 county	 councillor	 from	 the	 area	
summarised	this	approach:	
“Facing	 challenges	 in	 the	 Welsh-speaking	 [community]	 is	 probably	
coming	 less	 [prominent].	Wylfa	can	be	seen	as	an	opportunity	 to	keep	
our	young	people	on	the	island,	keep	them	in	well-paid	jobs,	so	that	we	
would	be	able	to	keep	the	fabric	of	our	society	going.	That’s	how	I	see	
it.”	
There	was	much	speculation	not	only	on	how	many	jobs	will	be	local,	but	where	
the	workforce	will	be	coming	from.	There	was	an	expectation	that	this	will	be	a	
more	multicultural	workforce.	
“The	 biggest	 difference	 [between	 building	 the	 old	Wylfa	 and	 the	 new	
construction]	gonna	be	the	people	who	are	here.	The	original	Wylfa	was	
built	 by	 the	 Irish,	 this	 gonna	 be	 built	 by	whoever.	 Eastern	 Europeans,	
Greeks,	Italians	maybe,	every	[kind	of]	men.	But	we	gotta	have	maybe	5	
years	of	the	village	gonna	be	unsettled,	the	village	will	grow,	more	shops	
will	appear,	property	prices	will	go	up.”	
A	megainvestment	means	a	large	amount	of	often	very	international	workforce.	
The	 flagship	 European	 nuclear	 construction,	 Olkiluoto	 3	 in	 Finland,	 has	 been	
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described	as	a	“veritable	tower	of	Babel”	(Lillie	and	Sippola	2011:	299).17	While	
many	 issues	are	now	connected	to	bilingualism,	the	build	might	mean	a	more	
multicultural	place.	
The	above	 issues	provide	some	hints	about	 living	with	a	nuclear	power	plant,	
and	the	discussions	about	the	new	nuclear	plant.	In	this	section	I	tried	to	make	
sense	of	Cemaes	as	a	place	as	heterogeneous,	interconnected,	and	in	flux.	I	also	
tried	to	show	that	living	with	nuclear	power	is	more	than	just	being	exposed	to	
potential	 risk.	 In	particular,	 I	aimed	to	highlight	 that	Wylfa	Newydd	will	mean	
major	transformations	of	the	place.	Many	of	my	discussions	in	the	village	were	
about	what	kind	of	place	will	Cemaes	be	during	the	construction	and	after.	
5.4	GEOGRAPHIES	OF	DIFFERENCE	ON	ANGLESEY	
While	attitudes	towards	the	new	build	are	very	much	rooted	in	the	experiences	
with	Wylfa	A,	a	nuclear	construction	is	very	different	than	operation.	Living	with	
nuclear	new	build	has	intricate	geographic	patterns.	The	distribution	of	adverse	
and	beneficial	aspects	is	not	even.	For	the	closest	neighbours,	like	in	the	small	
hamlet	of	Tregele,	and	along	the	A5125	road,	there	is	a	concern	about	having	a	
major	 construction	 next	 door	 making	 the	 beautiful	 area	 inhabitable	 and	 the	
homes	unsellable.	In	the	neighbouring	villages,	there	was	an	overall	expectation	
of	 the	 revival	 of	 communities	 primarily	 through	 providing	 good	 career	
prospects	for	the	future,	but	with	concerns	about	construction	disturbance	and	
the	 influx	 of	 workers.	 Going	 further	 away	 from	 North	 Anglesey,	 there	 is	
probably	less	support	as	the	immediate	benefits	in	jobs	are	less	visible,	but	the	
concern	over	safety	is	growing.	Nevertheless,	these	are	not	concentric	circles.	In	
the	 industrial	 town,	 like	Holyhead,	 there	 is	more	 aspiration	 towards	 the	 new	
build	 than	 in	 the	 nearby	 holiday	 village,	 like	 Trearddur	 Bay.	 As	 one	 council	
officer	 outlined	 their	 experiences	 with	 consultation	 events	 on	 the	
Supplementary	Planning	Guidance	 for	Wylfa	Newydd	 (IACC	2014c)	 in	Cemaes,	
Holyhead,	and	county	centre	Llangefni	respectively:	
“But	 [there	 were]	 different	 experiences…In	 Cemaes,	 where	 they	 are	
accepted	 the	development,	 but	wanted	 to	make	 sure	 that	 local	 issues	
and	local	concerns	–	such	as	light,	noise,	dust	–	are	dealt	with.	Holyhead	
																																																						
17	According	 to	 union	 and	 Finnish	 authority	 sources,	 75%	 of	 the	 peak	workforce	 came	 from	 at	 least	 60	
different	 foreign	 countries	 (Eurodetachement	 2013).	 This	 situation	 was	 characterised	 by	 serious	
communication	 problems,	 strained	 industrial	 relations	 on	 the	 construction	 site,	 and	 deprived	 living	 and	
working	conditions	 for	a	 substantial	number	of	migrant	workers	 (Eurodetachement	2013;	Kontula	2010;	
Lillie	and	Sippola	2011).	While	the	peak	workforce	expected	to	Wyfla	Newydd	will	almost	a	double,	around	
9000	 compared	 to	 4700	 (Eurodetachement	 2013),	 there	 are	 key	 differences,	 like	 a	 more	 substantial	
domestic	 construction	workforce,	 a	more	 sizeable	 nuclear	 industry,	 and	 English	 language.	 The	 influx	 of	
transient	workers	from	Britain	and	migrant	workers	is	one	of	the	most	important	issues.	
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[is]	very	supportive,	just	wanted	the	jobs.	And	in	Llangefni,	you	probably	
had	 a	 more	 broad	 perspective,	 and	 that’s	 when	 we	 have	 probably	
experienced	that	some	people	are	probably	more	negative	as	well.	And	
that’s	 probably	 more	 reflective	 of	 the	 location,	 and	 the	 Llangefni	
[consultation]	probably	drew	more	island-wide	people	to	it.	Because	we	
specifically	 did	 on	 market	 day	 as	 well,	 so	 people	 will	 be	 in	 town.”	
(Interview	14)	
The	boundary	of	the	designated	by	the	National	Policy	Statement	or	NPS	(DECC	
2011b),	 for	 example,	 for	 the	 new	 build	 site	 makes	 a	 big	 difference	 for	 local	
properties.	As	local	rumour	goes,	a	few	farmers	received	astronomical	amounts	
for	their	 land	sold	for	the	development	area.	Some	of	the	nearest	neighbours,	
however,	 face	 an	 enormous	 construction	 site	 next	 door,	 and	 a	 protracted	
anxiety	about	whether	they	are	able	to	sell	their	house	and	move	out	from	the	
immediate	area.	According	to	a	near	neighbour:	
“When	nuclear	come	back	on	the	agenda,	it	was	like	a	gold	rush,	it	was	a	
land	grab!	The	French	[EDF]	bought	lots	of	land	over	there,	on	the	west.	
The	Germans	[bought]	land	over	here	on	the	east	side,	from	here	to	the	
village.	 In	this	amazing	 land	grab	a	number	of	people	were	bought	out	
for	 breath-taking	 sums,	 being	 bought	 out	 by	 EDF	 or	 RWE-EON.	 It	 was	
like	winning	the	lottery!”	(Interview	7)	
As	the	nuclear	new	build	programme	became	a	realistic	prospect,	EDF	bought	
up	 land	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	Wylfa	 station.	 The	 government,	 however,	 agreed	 to	
sell	the	CEGB	successor	company	British	Energy	to	EDF	in	September	2008	only	
with	 the	condition	 that	 the	French	company	sell	 their	 land	acquisitions	 in	 the	
Wylfa,	 Oldbury	 and	 Bradwell	 areas	 to	 enable	 other	 potential	 developers	 to	
build	 new	 nuclear	 stations	 on	 these	 sites	 (HoC	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change	
Committee	 2010:	 Ev	 346).	 EDF	 Energy	 announced	 to	 sell	 their	 178	 hectares,	
while	 Nuclear	 Decommissioning	 Authority	 also	 sold	 some	 land	 adjacent	 to	
Wylfa	A	station	(NDA	2008)	before	Wylfa	was	officially	nominated	as	a	potential	
site	on	28	December	2008.	The	buyer	was	Horizon	Nuclear	Power,	the	newly	set	
up	 joint	 venture	of	 the	German	utilities,	 E.ON	UK	and	RWE	npower.	The	 land	
purchases	attracted	wide	publicity	when	a	local	Welsh-speaking	farmer	Richard	
Jones	refused	to	sell	his	land	provoking	a	protest	organised	by	the	anti-nuclear	
group	 PAWB,	 Greenpeace	 and	 the	 language	 organisation	 Cymdeithas	 yr	 Iaith	
(BBC	 2011b).	 According	 to	 a	 PAWB	 activist,	 the	 controversy	 gave	 “negative	
publicity	for	Horizon,	as	a	big	bully	for	threatening	the	livelihood	of	an	honest,	
deep-rooted	Welsh	family.	Caerdegog	was	owned	for	generations	by	the	same	
people”	(Interview	6).	
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A	number	of	residents	outside	of	the	NPS	site	has	expressed	anxiety	whether	to	
sell	 or	 not	 to	 sell	 their	 homes	 as	 the	 vicinity	 was	 seen	 as	 becoming	
uninhabitable	during	 the	main	 construction	 (Interviews	7	and	23).	With	much	
uncertainty	 previously	 about	 changing	 their	 plans,	 Horizon	 is	 currently	
developing	a	Neighbourhood	Support	Scheme,	including	Property	Price	Support	
for	 those	 long-term	 residents	 selling	 their	 house,	 and	 Disturbance	Mitigation	
(Horizon	NP	2015a).	
Controversies	 often	 focus	 on	 how	 distinctions	 are	 drawn	 between	 locals	 and	
non-locals.	I	have	already	mentioned	that	the	‘local’	workforce	is	a	crucial	issue.	
There	 is	a	90-minute	travel-to-work	area.	As	one	council	official	discussed	the	
issue:	
MF:	“How	do	you	define	local?”	
Interviewee:	“I	tried.	Not	everyone	agrees.	It’s	very	difficult	I	think.	You	
can	almost	change	the	definition	depending	what	you	are	trying	to	do.	
But	certainly	island-wide	in	the	first	instance	is	the	right…You	can	look	at	
Cemaes	 as	 a	 doorstep	 community,	 and	 that’s	 only	 right.	 But	 certainly	
looking	 at	 as	 an	 island,	 you	 can	 argue	 that	 it	 extends	 further	 towards	
NW	Wales.	You	have	that	travel-to-work	area.	And	there	is	almost	two-
way	 between	 Cemaes	 and	 Trawsfynydd.	 […]	 People	 have	 accepted	
[commuting]	and	it’s	part	of	a	life.”	
MF:	“Was	there	a	change	in	this	commuting	distance	to	90	minutes?”	
Interviewee:	“That’s	from	Horizon’s	perspective.	Yeah,	what	does	travel	
to	work	also	mean	when	you	factor	in	the	security	checks	and	getting	on	
the	bus	to	site?	 It	becomes	two	hours	or	 two	and	a	half.	That’s	where	
we	are	almost	at	the	tipping	point	of	information.”	(Interview	14)	
The	 quote	 highlights	 that	 the	 designations	 of	 territorial	 boundaries	 are	 not	
taken-for-granted.	 These	 boundaries	 have	 salience.	 A	 particular	 issue	 to	
highlight	 this	 is	 the	 distribution	 of	 community	 benefit	 contributions	 whether	
the	nearby	villages	get	a	priority	over	the	rest	of	Anglesey,	or	how	much	these	
extend	 beyond	 Anglesey.	 A	 Horizon	 official	 responded	 to	 the	 question	 of	
community	benefits	beyond	the	island	as:	
“Obviously,	 you	 are	 not	 in	 negotiations	 yet…	You	 know,	Gwynedd	 is	 a	
near	neighbour,	but	we	discuss	with	the	local	planning	authority,	which	
is	 Anglesey	 Council.	 It	 depends,	 community	 benefits,	 you	 could	 say,	 if	
you	are	totally	cold-blooded	about	it,	that	community	benefits	are	that	
‘hey,	you	gonna	provide	work	for	thousands	of	people	for	ten	years,	for	
a	thousand	of	people	for	85	years	after	that’.	So	the	economic	benefits	
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are	 that	 you	 are	 creating	 jobs	 for	 people,	 who	 are	 spending	 money	
locally	 and	 keep	 the	 businesses	 running.	 So	 how	 far	 the	 voluntary	
benefits	 scheme	 would	 run?	 I’m	 not	 sure	 what	 the	 framework	 is,	
whether	 it	 could	 extend	 off	 the	 island	 or	 not,	 I	 don’t	 know.	 Anglesey	
Council	 as	 the	 planning	 authority	 has	 otherwise	 drawn	 up	 the	
guidelines.”	(Interview	16)	
These	 examples	 highlight	 that	 there	 are	 geographical	 differences	 between	
different	 areas	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits.	 The	
boundaries	are	negotiated.		
5.5	COMMUNITY	COUNCILS	
“We	have	major-major	problems	now	with	 the	Wylfa	Newydd	 taking	a	
lot	of	my	free	time.	The	strain	on	the	council	 is	quite	high.	I	don’t	get	a	
lot	of	money	to	run	the	council.	The	work	with	Wylfa	Newydd	is	taking	a	
lot	 of	 the	 time.	 And,	 obviously,	 in	 the	 community	 council	 it’s	 only	 the	
clerk	 that	 gets	 paid.	 […]	 I	 don’t	 know	 which	 way	 we	 are	 going.	 And	
structurally,	 I	 don’t	 know	 whether	 we	 are	 big	 enough	 to	 take	 Wylfa	
Newydd	on.	[…]	Not	the	fight	against	them,	but	to	work	with	them	to	the	
best	 advantage	 for	 the	 area	 of	 Tregele,	 and	 Cemlyn	 and	 Cemaes	 –	
because	 it’s	not	gonna	be	a	nice	place	to	 live	[during	the	construction],	
and	 I	 think	 we	 need	 to	 get	 the	 best	 of	 that.	 And	 for	 the	 future	
generations,	because	it	will	be	here	for	a	hundred	years.”	
(Chair	of	Llanbadrig	Community	Council,	Interviewee	29)	
The	Llanbadrig	Community	Council	meets	on	every	third	Monday	of	the	month	
in	 the	 small	 Cemaes	 Library.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 village,	 it	 also	 represents	 the	
small	 hamlet	 of	 Tregele,	 just	 next	 to	Wylfa,	 and	 the	 some	 small	 farms	 in	 the	
area.	The	overall	population	is	less	than	1400	people,	with	less	than	a	thousand	
in	 Cemaes	 village	 itself.18	Community	 councillors	 are	 mostly	 long-established	
locals	working	 at	 small	 businesses	 in	 the	 area,	 such	 as	 a	 garage,	 the	 framing	
shop	or	a	fish	&	chips	shop.	The	Council	meetings	are	generally	 in	Welsh	with	
translation	 services	 provided	 for	 the	 one	 English-speaking	 member,	 not	 to	
mention	 the	 occasional	 PhD	 researcher.	 The	 council	 meetings	 are	 mostly	 on	
practical	 issues,	 such	as	changing	 tourist	 signposts	or	commenting	on	housing	
planning	applications.	During	my	time,	recurring	issues	included	the	reopening	
of	 the	 public	 toilets	 in	 the	 village,	 the	 dangerous	 pedestrian	 crossing	 of	 the	
A5025	road	near	the	primary	school,	or	Christmas	lights	for	the	festive	season.	
																																																						
18 	See	 data	 from	 the	 2011	 census	 on	 http://www.ukcensusdata.com/llanbadrig-
w05000017#sthash.ikRz4NbS.dpbs	(Accessed	28/06/2016)	
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Rather	than	a	pillar	of	local	democracy,	the	council	seemed	to	me	more	like	one	
of	the	many	local	groups,	a	gathering	of	volunteers	to	solve	practical	problems.	
The	 candidates	 are	 almost	 never	 elected;	 there	 are	 simply	 not	 enough	
candidates	 to	 contest.	 The	new	nuclear	 site	 is	 on	 the	 boundary	 of	 Llanbadrig	
and	 Mechell,	 where	 a	 similarly	 small	 council	 represents	 the	 hamlets	 of	
Llanmechell,	 Carreglefn	 and	Mynydd	Mechell.	 There	 is	 a	working	 relationship	
with	Horizon	with	 the	 company’s	 local	 stakeholder	manager	 regularly	 visiting	
the	meetings	 with	 project	 updates,	 and	 community	 councillors	 attending	 the	
quarterly	Wylfa	Newydd	Project	Liaison	Group	(PLG)	meetings.	As	 the	existing	
Wylfa	 transformed	 the	 communities,	 council	 representatives	 are	 aware	 that	
similar	 changes	 are	 coming.	 But	 how	 to	 engage	 with	 a	 £14	 billion	 dollar	
development	when	you	are	overwhelmed	with	everyday	tasks	involving	maybe	
a	hundreds	of	pounds?	For	 the	councils,	even	organising	a	 special	meeting	 to	
discuss	 the	PAC1	proposals	of	Horizon	was	a	 challenge.	Most	 councillors	 read	
the	 short	 summary	 documents	 at	 most,	 but	 not	 the	 hundreds	 of	 pages	 of	
detailed	 documentations	 to	 respond	 to.	 This	 discrepancy	 was	 sometimes	
shocking.	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 Wylfa	 plant	 in	 the	 60s	 has	 enormously	
transformed	these	small	places,	and	the	coming	changes	mean	an	even	 larger	
construction,	but	it	is	particularly	challenging	for	the	a	bunch	of	ordinary	people	
committed	 to	 the	 community	 but	 overwhelmed	 with	 everyday	 problems	 to	
engage	with	a	project	of	this	scale.	
5.6	ISLE	OF	ANGLESEY	COUNTY	COUNCIL:	MAKING	THE	ENERGY	ISLAND	
“The	 programme	was	 developed	 in	 relation	 to	 track	 down	 investment,	
which	is	Energy	Island	is	about,	really.	Energy	Island	is	about	attracting	
investment	for	Anglesey	to	create	jobs.	The	fact	that	it	is	in	energy	sector	
is	irrelevant,	it’s	an	inward	investment	programme.”	
(Key	Energy	Island	Programme	official,	Interview	13)	
Anglesey	 has	 the	 lowest	 Gross	 Value	 Added	 per	 capita	 of	 all	 the	 173	 local	
authorities	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 around	 half	 the	 UK	 average	 (HoC	 Library	
2016b).	 The	 long	 “permanent	decline”	 (Interview	7)	has	been	exacerbated	by	
the	closure	of	industries,	such	as	Anglesey	Aluminium	near	Holyhead,	the	Shell	
factory	and	the	bromine	plant	around	Amlwch,	and	more	recently	the	Wylfa	A	
reactors	 under	 decommissioning.	 This	 is	 closely	 linked	 with	 outmigration,	
especially	 for	 the	younger	generations.	The	environment,	however,	 is	a	driver	
for	 retirees	 and	 second	 home	 owners	 to	 move	 to	 the	 area,	 especially	 from	
Merseyside	and	Greater	Manchester.	
As	 the	 above	 quote	 highlights,	 the	 Energy	 Island	 emerged	 as	 an	 economic	
development	plan	 rather	 than	a	decarbonisation	plan.	The	 low-carbon	energy	
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sector	was	identified	as	an	investment	opportunity	where	the	peripheriality	of	
the	island	can	be	turned	from	a	disadvantage	to	an	advantage	(Interview	3,	10,	
14,	15,	21).	As	the	director	of	the	Energy	Island	Programme	explained	it.	
“Anglesey	is	on	the	wrong	end	of	the	A55,	the	back-end	of	the	road,	the	
back-end	of	everything	 in	terms	of	transport.	So	 it’s	far	away	from	any	
market.	So	in	terms	of	development,	 logically,	whatever	that	can	make	
use	 the	 natural	 assets	 of	 the	 locality.	 Power	 generation	 is	 an	 obvious	
one	 then,	 and	particularly	 nuclear	 generation,	 based	on	 the	 expertise,	
and	 so	 naturally	 flows	 [as	 a	 key	 option].	 It’s	 interesting	 that	 since	 the	
1980s	and	all	 those	people	being	against	 the	new	Wylfa	development,	
there	 has	 not	 been	 anything	 to	 actually	 attract	 any	 economic	
development	in	the	locality.”	(Interview	15a)	
Thus	 projects,	 like	 development	 of	 Holyhead	 Port,	 were	 part	 of	 the	 Energy	
Island	 scheme,	while	decentralised	generation,	 like	on-shore	wind	 turbines	or	
solar	 farms	 were	 not	 one	 of	 the	 priority	 projects.	 In	 addition	 to	 political	
sensitivities	 of	 wind	 turbines,	 these	 decentralised	 and	 community	 initiatives	
were	 seen	 as	 too	 small	 to	 focus	 the	 precious	 resources	 of	 the	 Council	 on.	
Initially,	 however,	 ‘behaviour	 change’	 had	 a	 workstream	 in	 the	 Energy	 Island	
programme,	but	it	subsequently	neglected.19	Similarly,	home	insulation	was	left	
to	the	Arbed	initiative	of	the	Welsh	Government,	and	the	Green	Deal	of	the	UK	
one.	 From	 the	 very	 beginning,	 this	 socioeconomic	 vision	was	 centred	 around	
and	dominated	by	the	new	nuclear	construction	at	Wylfa.	There	was	a	change	
of	the	other	projects.	For	example,	the	up	to	2.2GW	Rhiannon	wind	farm	in	the	
Irish	Sea	19	km	north	 to	Anglesey	was	suspended	 in	2014,	while	Morlais	 tidal	
stream	demonstration	zone	off	Holyhead	was.	Nevertheless,	 the	vast	majority	
of	the	work	of	programme	officers	is	on	Wylfa	Newydd.	
The	Energy	Island	Programme	was	initiated	by	a	handful	of	council	officials	from	
the	Economic	Development	Unit.	Later,	the	programme	didn’t	just	become	the	
main	economic	development	vision	for	the	island,	but	a	major	driver	behind	the	
restructuration	of	the	very	working	of	the	Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council.	The	
Energy	Island	Programme	Office	is	a	small	team,	but	central	to	remodelling	the	
working	of	the	council	to	cope	with	Wylfa	Newydd	especially.	Initially	the	aim	of	
the	 small	 team	 was	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 potential	 investors,	 to	
understand	 how	 multinational	 private	 investor	 companies	 think.	 An	 often	
repeated	claim	was	to	adapt	a	 ‘project	management	approach’	as	opposed	to	
the	 traditional	 regulatory	 and	 service	 provision	 approach	 of	 the	 municipal	
																																																						
19 	See	 the	 meeting	 minutes	 of	 the	 Energy	 Island	 workstreams	 on	
http://www.anglesey.gov.uk/business/energy-island/running-the-energy-island-programme/energy-
island-minutes-of-meetings/	(Accessed	23-09-2016)	
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authorities.	 In	 the	search	 for	external	business	expertise,	key	members	of	 the	
project	 team	 were	 seconded	 from	 business	 background	 and	 a	 contractual	
relationship	 was	 established	 with	 consultancies.	 The	 Energy	 Island	 operates	
through	workstreams	where	private	and	public	sector	organisations	meet	and	
discuss	 issues	 on	 a	 regular	 basis.	 EIP	 was	 a	 major	 driver	 behind	 designing	
Anglesey	 as	 one	of	 the	 Enterprise	 Zone	 areas	with	 a	 specialisation	 on	 energy	
issues	 by	 the	 Welsh	 Government.	 This	 approach	 didn’t	 only	 receive	
acknowledgement	as	best	practice	(CREW	Regeneration	Wales	2014),	but	also	
gradually	become	a	model	framework	in	the	wider	region,	particularly	through	
the	establishment	of	the	North	Wales	Economic	Ambition	Board.		
In	 the	 second	 stage,	 after	 the	 cardinal	 investment	 project	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
seemed	 to	 be	 secured	 the	 aim	 changed	 to	 make	 the	 investments	 actually	
beneficial	socioeconomically	for	the	island	and	the	wider	northwest	Wales.	This	
was	built	on	the	realisation	that	while	the	interest	of	the	developer	is	to	build	
the	power	plant	the	most	cost	efficient	way	possible,	the	aim	for	the	council	is	
to	maximise	local	opportunities	in	jobs,	supply	chain	and	legacy	benefits,	and	to	
minimise	adverse	effects	 (Interview	13	and	15).	This	resulted	 in	relabeling	the	
council	structure	to	separate	statutory	and	non-statutory	side	and	establishing	
the	Project	Management	Office	 (PMO)	 to	press	Horizon	more	effectively.	 The	
statutory	 side	 establishes	 a	 baseline	 evidence	 of	 the	 environmental	 and	
socioeconomic	conditions	on	the	island,	against	which	the	statutory	mitigation	
measures	 can	 be	 taken.	 The	 non-statutory	 side	 negotiates	 the	 community	
benefit	contributions.	
Talking	to	local	residents,	the	question	whether	the	council	is	up	to	the	jobs	was	
often	 raised	 (Interviewees	 19,	 29,	 31,	 34).	 The	 local	 council	 is	 so	 far	 the	only	
council	 that	was	effectively	 taken	over	by	commissioners	 (BBC	2011a).	Before	
the	2011	decision	of	the	Welsh	Government,	the	council	was	characterised	with	
infightings,	and	numerous	corruption	scandals	 (WG	Commissioners	2013).	The	
largest	group	of	the	council	is	the	independents,	then	Labour	and	Plaid	follows.	
The	Energy	Island	Programme	is	used	to	establish	the	credentials	of	the	Council	
as	 a	 politically	 capable	 and	 professional	 body,	 especially	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
prospect	of	re-merger	with	Gwynedd	as	proposed	by	the	Welsh	government	in	
its	local	government	reform	(Andrews	2015).	The	Wylfa	investment	was	used	by	
councillors	to	oppose	the	merger:	
“It’s	clearly	something	that	has	been	tried	before	and	has	not	worked.	
We	have	major	developments	like	Wylfa	Newydd	about	to	take	place.	It	
would	be	a	travesty	if	local	decision	making	is	taken	out	of	this	process.”	
(Cllr	Aled	Morris	Jones,	quoted	in	Wyn-Williams	2014)	
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In	summary,	the	Energy	Island	is	both	a	long-term	socioeconomic	vision	for	the	
island	 by	 attracting	 investors	 and	 a	 key	 driver	 behind	 how	 local	 authorities	
remodel	 their	 working	 on	 Anglesey	 and	 across	 North	 Wales	 (CREW	
Regeneration	Wales	2014;	RTPI	Cymru	2013).	 In	the	next	chapter,	 I	address	 in	
two	 case	 studies	 the	 organisational	 change	 induced	 by	 the	 Energy	 Island	
Programme	and	the	statutory	engagement	with	Horizon	respectively.	
5.7	WELSH	 GOVERNMENT:	 KNITTING	 TOGETHER	 A	 NATION	 FOR	 A	 LOW-CARBON	
ERA	
“So,	should	Wales	have	more	powers	over	energy?	Potentially,	yes,	but	I	
think,	 from	experience	of	working	 in	 the	sector,	 […]	 if	Wales	 is	 to	have	
increased	powers,	with	that	comes	responsibility.	And,	with	that	comes	
the	 need	 for	 a	 vision,	 for	 policy	 and	 for	 expertise	 to	 deliver	 those	
projects.	So,	that	expertise	needs	to	start	within	Welsh	Government.	[…]	
DECC	 has	 hundreds	 of	 civil	 servants	 developing	 energy	 policy.	 I	 don’t	
know	what	 the	 current	 situation	 is	 in	Welsh	Government,	 it’s	 probably	
no	more	than	five	to	ten	people	in	energy	division.	That	has	to	change	if	
Wales	 is	 going	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	 role	 that	 it	 wants	 to	 have	 within	
energy	[policy].”	
Presentation	 by	 Simon	 Power,	 Director	 of	 ARUP,	 ‘Realising	 Wales’	
potential	 for	 energy	 production	 -	 challenges	 and	opportunities‘	 (Policy	
Forum	for	Wales	Keynote	Seminar	2014:	14)	
Upon	participating	in	an	annual	industry	conference	on	energy	policy	in	Wales,	
already	 the	 introductory	presentation	highlighted	“many	mixed	messages	and	
lack	of	common	narrative”	(Policy	Forum	for	Wales	Keynote	Seminar	2014:	9),	
resonating	 with	 the	 “frustrations”	 raised	 by	 the	 chair	 (ibid.,	 9),	 which	
culminated	 in	a	more	detailed	analysis	 in	 the	presentation	quoted	above.	The	
lack	of	powers	and	capabilities,	however,	wasn’t	just	an	issue	of	the	conference.	
This	 was	 also	 inscribed	 in	 the	 material	 setting	 when	 I	 interviewed	 a	 senior	
energy	policy	advisor	the	day	before.	I	was	escorted	to	a	small	office	in	the	New	
Crown	 Building	 in	 Cathays	 Park,	 Cardiff,	 the	main	WG	 office	 building	 hosting	
several	departments.	While	 there	are	a	number	of	Welsh	Government	offices	
scattered	around	the	country,	I	was	intrigued	that	a	majority	of	departments	fit	
into	one	office	building.	
After	the	1997	referendum,	the	devolved	Welsh	Assembly	and	the	Government	
was	established	in	1999.	Energy	policy	in	general	was	not	among	the	devolved	
issues.	 In	 the	 book	 Low	 carbon	 nation?,	 however,	Hodson	 and	Marvin	 (2013)	
describe	 an	 ambitious	 yet	 fragile	 low-carbon	 vision	 set	 by	 the	 Welsh	
Government	based	mainly	on	the	indigenous	renewable	capacity.	They	describe	
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the	 efforts	 of	Welsh	 Government	 to	 both	 define	 itself	 vis-á-vis	Westminster,	
and	 to	 spatially	 integrate	 the	 fragmented	 nation	 by	 creating	 a	 distinctively	
Wales	 low-carbon	 pathway,	 in	 line	with	 their	 sustainability	 agenda,	 based	 on	
policies	like	the	Wales	Spatial	Plan	(WAG	2008),	A	Low	Carbon	Revolution	(WAG	
2010),	 and	 the	Energy	Wales:	A	 Low	Carbon	Transition	 (WG	2012b).	 The	new	
Wylfa	 plans	 are	 identified	 a	 key	 point	 of	 contention	 between	 the	 above	
pathway	 promoted	 by	 Cardiff	 and	 the	 strategic	 priorities	 imposed	 by	 London	
(Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 2013:	 118,	 121,	 125-126).	 In	 contrast	 to	 this	 picture,	
however,	there	was	a	change	of	winds	in	Cardiff	politics	than	when	I	was	doing	
my	own	fieldwork	just	a	few	years	after	Hodson	and	Marvin	(2013).	
The	Welsh	Government	became	clearly	a	promoter	of	the	Wylfa	development,	
following	 changes	 in	 the	 cabinet,	 together	 with	 all	 parties	 in	 the	 Assembly	
supportive	to	varying	extent.	Moreover,	the	Anglesey	Energy	Island	Programme	
has	not	just	been	celebrated	as	a	leading	initiative,	but	adopted	as	a	deliverable	
programme	 (LCEE	 2014:	 5-6;	WG	 2014:	 21-22,	 2012a:	 61,	 2012b:	 21-22).	 The	
Energy	Island	Programme	is	supported	financially	(IACC	2014b)	as	well	as	with	
the	 secondment	 of	 Gareth	 Hall,	 the	 last	 chief	 executive	 of	 the	 former	Welsh	
Development	Agency	(WDA).	The	motives	behind	the	support	to	Energy	Island	
is	more	regional	development	than	decarbonisation,	exemplified	by	the	Wales	
Infrastructure	Investment	Plan	(WIIP)	(WG	2012a).	The	megainvestment	project	
shows	 both	 that	Wales	 is	 both	 “open	 for	 business”	 (WG	 2012b:	 5),	 and	 that	
Cardiff	is	committed	to	the	regional	development	in	one	of	the	poorest	corners	
of	 Wales.	 An	 additional	 driver	 might	 be	 that	 Anglesey	 is	 a	 marginal	
constituency,	 where	 there	 is	 both	majority	 support	 for	Wylfa	 Newydd	 and	 a	
feeling	of	being	neglected	by	Cardiff	and	Westminster.		
The	challenge	for	the	Welsh	Government	is	how	to	make	a	mark.	The	proposed	
2700	 MW	 capacity	 of	 the	 two	 new	 Wylfa	 reactors	 can	 generate	 almost	 the	
double	of	the	current	consumption	of	entire	Wales.	A	WG	official	highlighted,	a	
£8m	cost	of	Wylfa	Newydd	budget	 is	compared	to	around	6-month	budget	of	
the	overall	Welsh	Government	budgets	 (Interview	39)	with	 the	current	£14bn	
estimate	makes	 it	 closer	 to	a	 full	 year.	As	 the	Welsh	Government	neither	has	
the	 powers	 (e.g.,	 planning	 consent	 of	 NSIPs,	 like	 Wylfa	 Newydd),	 nor	 the	
resources	 (e.g.,	 providing	 loan	 guarantee	 or	 feed-in-tariffs)	 to	 meaningfully	
influence	the	investment,	the	focus	is	on	maximising	the	Welsh	content	in	the	
megainvestment	 project.	 Thus	 the	 underlying	 framework	 is	 enhancing	
economic	 development,	 especially	 in	 the	 North	 West	 Wales	 region,	 and	
showcasing	 that	 Wales	 is	 open	 for	 (global)	 business.	 This	 includes	 direct	
interventions	in	four	areas	(WG	Business	and	Economy	sector	2013;	WG	Energy	
and	Environment	sector	panel	2015).	First,	WG	supports	skills	development	and	
training	of	the	future	workforce	(e.g.,	£5m	to	fund	a	Coleg	Menai	centre	train	
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construction	 workforce)	 and	 the	 wider	 educational	 needs	 of	 the	 investment	
(STEM	 teaching	 in	 schools).	 Second,	 a	 key	 aim	 is	 to	 develop	 the	 supply	 chain	
capacity,	 through	 a	 ‘business	 readiness’	 for	 potential	 supply	 chain	 companies	
and	 an	 employment	 brokerage	 programme,	 especially	 in	 the	 North	 Wales	
region	 (Miller	 Research	 2015).	 Third,	 there	 is	 also	 some	 support	 to	 develop	
innovation	 and	 research	 capacities	 (e.g.,	 £10m	 support	 to	 establishing	Menai	
Science	Park).	Fourth,	WG	supports	the	development	of	strategic	infrastructure	
in	 transport	 (e.g.,	Anglesey	Airport)	and	 ICT	 (SuperFast	Cymru	broadband	roll-
out).	 In	addition,	Anglesey	was	established	as	an	Enterprise	Zone	in	2012	with	
an	 energy	 focus,	 and	 linked	 with	 similar	 initiatives	 in	 Snowdonia	 and	 the	
Deeside,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 nuclear	 skills	 (Trawsfynydd)	 and	 advanced	
manufacturing	 respectively.	 In	 late	 2014,	 a	 cross-departmental	 Nuclear	
Programme	Board	was	established	to	coordinate	activities.	Depite	these	efforts,	
the	Welsh	Government	does	not	have	 the	 same	powers	and	capability	as	 the	
UK	Government.	
5.8	WHITEHALL:	ATTRACTING	GLOBAL	INVESTMENT	
There	was	a	gradual	shift	in	the	terms	of	and	declared	policy	drivers	behind	the	
new	nuclear	programme	in	Westminster	discussions	and	Whitehall	documents.	
As	 Chapter	 2	 discussed,	 nuclear	 was	 ‘rehabilitated’	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	
ambitious	 decarbonisation	 targets	 around	 the	 late	 2000s	 (DTI	 2006).	 There	
were	widespread	efforts	in	policy-making	and	in	the	media	to	reframe	nuclear	
power	 as	 a	 low-carbon	 technology,	 one	 technological	 solution	 in	 the	 low-
carbon	energy	mix	 (Bickerstaff	et	al.	2008;	Doyle	2011).	 Soon	enough,	energy	
security	 rose	 to	a	 similarly	 important	concern	with	discussions	on	 the	 ‘energy	
gap’	 between	 growing	 electricity	 demand	 and	 shrinking	 generating	 capacity	
emerged	(BERR	2008;	DTI	2007).	This	was	particularly	connected	to	the	closure	
of	aging	coal	and	nuclear	plants	by	the	2020s	and	2030s,	which	led	efforts	for	
‘keeping	 the	 lights	 on’	 envisioned	 by	 potential	 blackouts	 (Ofgem	 2014).	With	
the	 rise	 of	 discussions	 of	 household	 electricity	 and	 gas	 prices,	 as	well	 as	 fuel	
poverty,	currently	the	‘energy	trilemma’	 is	the	dominant	framework	of	energy	
policy	 discussions,	 highlighting	 the	 choices	 between	 climate	 change,	 energy	
security	and	affordability	issues	(DECC 2014b, 2011d).	With	regards	to	energy	
prices,	 nuclear	 power	 is	 rarely	 seen	 as	 a	 cheap	 source	 of	 energy.	 It	 was	
legitimised	the	opposite	way.	Based	on	the	assumption	that	energy	prices	are	
going	 to	 rise	 in	 the	 long-term,	 nuclear	 can	 provide	 a	 competitive	 baseload	
capacity	in	comparison	with	other	technologies,	like	renewables	and	clean	coal		
As	policy	discussion	moved	from	strategic	aims	of	a	reformed	energy	policy	to	
the	deliverable	means,	the	emphasis	was	on	attracting	investment	in	large-scale	
projects,	 like	 new	 nuclear	 (DECC	 2011b,	 2011c,	 2011d).	 Topics,	 like	 energy	
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efficiency	 (e.g.,	 the	Green	Deal)	or	distributed	generation	(e.g.,	onshore	wind)	
became	less	prominent	in	policy	discussions,	the	focus	is	clearly	on	investing	in	
large-scale	generating	capacity,	such	as	nuclear	(DECC	2014b).	The	new	nuclear	
investments,	 especially	 Hinkley	 Point	 C,	 are	 discussed	 in	 connection	 to	 other	
current	 UK	 infrastructural	megaprojects	 (HM	 Treasury	 2014),	 like	 the	 London	
Olympics,	Crossrail,	or	HighSpeed	 rail	 (HS2)	 (BIS	&	DECC	2013d:	18).	 Thus	 the	
key	 challenge	 has	 been	 reformulated	 to	 attract	 investment	 in	 large-scale	
generating	capacity.	
This	is	not	just	a	shift	in	the	terms	of	public	discourse	and	political	legitimation	
behind	 the	 nuclear	 power	 programme,	 but	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 institutional	
arrangements.	 The	 Department	 of	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change	 (DECC)	 was	
created	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 decarbonisation	 agenda	 the	 Climate	 Change	 Act	
(2008),	 as	 there	was	 no	ministerial	 department	 responsible	 for	 energy	 policy	
since	privatisation.	Subsequently,	however,	 the	emphasis	moved	 from	climate	
change	 to	 energy	 policy	 in	 the	 budget	 and	 organisational	 structure	 of	 DECC.	
During	 the	 coalition	 years	 (2010-2015),	 there	 were	 more	 and	 more	 reports	
about	the	Treasury	control	of	DECC	activities,	together	with	struggles	between	
the	LibDem	State	Secretary,	and	the	Tory	Chancellor	and	DECC	junior	ministers.	
For	 example,	 negotiations	with	 the	 potential	 Chinese	 partners	 of	 the	 Hinkley	
project	were	mainly	done	by	 the	Chancellor	of	Exchequer	 (BBC	2015a).	 In	 the	
next	chapter	I	will	provide	a	concise	case	study	of	how	DECC	aimed	to	engage	
with	 large	 global	 investors	 through	 acquiring	 commercial	 skills	 and	
collaborating	 with	 industry.	 The	 overarching	 industry	 support	 scheme	 for	
development	 of	 new	 nuclear	 capacity	 recently	 became,	 however,	 more	 and	
more	an	industrial	policy	in	a	liberalised	market,	with	strong	involvement	of	the	
Department	 of	 Business,	 Innovation	 &	 Science	 (BIS	 &	 DECC	 2013a,	 2013b,	
2013c;	BIS	&	DECC	2013e;	DECC	&	BIS	2013)	than	an	energy	policy.	In	July	2016,	
DECC	was	 abolished	 by	 the	 new	 PM	 Theresa	May	 and	merged	with	 BIS,	 and	
while	the	energy	portfolio	 is	represented	in	the	name	of	the	new	Department	
for	 Business,	 Energy	 and	 Industrial	 Strategy	 (BEIS),	 climate	 change	 not.	 The	
abolishment	 of	 DECC	 concludes	 this	 clear	 shift	 that	 investment	 in	 the	 energy	
sector	 became	 the	 declared	 aim	 behind	 the	 nuclear	 programme	 instead	 of	
climate	 change	 goals	 and	 decarbonisation	 targets.	 In	 the	 next	 subsections,	 I	
outline	how	the	steering	of	the	new	nuclear	programme	offered	new	ways	for	
the	 government	 to	 forge	 a	 new	 industrial	 policy	 by	 de-risking	 private	
investment.	
In	 this	 section	 I	 outline	 some	 key	 processes	 in	 this	 recent	 shift	 from	 the	
reframing	of	nuclear	power	as	a	low-carbon	technology	to	reindustrialising	the	
nuclear	 engineering	 sector	 through	 attracting	 global	 investment.	 The	 current	
UK	government	approach	is	to	revitalise	the	nuclear	industry	through	attracting	
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global	 investors.	 This	means	a	 redefinition	of	 the	 role	of	 state	 in	 a	 liberalised	
electricity	sector	to	de-risking	investment.	 In	the	coming	subsections	I	address	
the	key	policy	 changes	 in	de-risking	nuclear	 investments,	namely	 streamlining	
the	 planning	 (e.g.,	 National	 Policy	 Statements,	 Nationally	 Significant	
Infrastructure	Project	designation)	and	regulatory	process	(e.g.,	Generic	Design	
Assessment),	providing	financial	guarantees	(e.g.,	Contracts	for	Difference	with	
Feed-in	Tariffs,	UK	Loan	Guarantee	Scheme),	and	direct	industry	intervention	in	
nuclear	R&D,	supply-chain	development	and	skills	training.	
5.8.1	A	NEW	ROLE	FOR	GOVERNMENT:	DE-RISKING	PRIVATE	INVESTMENT	
“Government	sets	the	framework	and	companies	make	the	investment”	
(DTI	2006:	95)	
“The	 Government	 believes	 new	 nuclear	 power	 stations	 should	 have	 a	
role	 to	 play	 in	 this	 country’s	 future	 energy	 mix	 alongside	 other	 low-
carbon	 sources;	 that	 it	would	 be	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 to	 allow	 energy	
companies	 the	 option	 of	 investing	 in	 new	 nuclear	 power	 stations;	 and	
that	 the	Government	 should	 take	active	 steps	 to	 facilitate	 this.”	 (BERR	
2008:	7)	
What	 can	 a	 government	 do	 in	 a	 liberalised	 electricity	market?	 How	 to	make	
energy	 policy	 without	 actually	 owning	 the	 electricity	 system?	 After	 the	
privatisation	 of	 the	 electricity	 industry	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 the	 need	 for	 a	
comprehensive	 energy	 policy	 seemed	 to	 be	 largely	 redundant,	 and	 even	
regulation	seemed	to	be	a	mere	afterthought	(Helm	2009).	The	Department	of	
Energy	 was	 abolished	 in	 1992	 with	 many	 functions	 entirely	 abandoned,	 and	
some	 transferred	 to	 newly	 established	 regulators,	 such	 as	 the	 then	 Office	 of	
Electricity	 Regulation	 (OFFER).	 With	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 climate	 change	 agenda,	
however,	 an	 energy	 policy	 needed	 to	 be	 developed	 for	 a	 liberalised	market.	
While	 the	 first	 post-privatisation	 energy	 white	 paper	 only	 set	 out	 strategic	
decarbonisation	 targets	 envisioning	 a	 low-carbon	 economy	 (DTI	 2003),	
subsequent	 policy	 papers	 become	 gradually	 focused	 on	 how	 to	 deliver	 those	
targets	by	private	companies	(DECC	2011d;	DTI	2007,	2006).	Albeit	the	language	
was	 modest	 in	 “allowing”	 (BERR	 2008,	 see	 quote	 above),	 or	 “giving	 energy	
companies	 the	option	of	 investing	 in	new	nuclear	stations”	 (DTI	2007:	205),	 it	
meant	a	step-by-step	designing	of	a	novel	policy	and	regulation	framework	for	
nuclear	investments.		
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Since	nuclear	is	back	on	the	political	agenda,	the	role	for	government	has	been	
redefined	 as	 reducing	 policy	 and	 regulatory	 uncertainty	 for	 private	 investors	
(DTI	2006:	96).	The	various	facilitative	actions	that	have	developed	in	the	last	10	
years	 come	 under	 the	 gradually	 broadening	 umbrella	 of	 de-risking	 private	
investments.	Somewhat	ironically	the	role	of	government	in	nuclear	strategy	is	
currently	 to	 de-risk	 private	 investments,	while	 key	 driver	 behind	 privatisation	
was	the	idea	that	the	private	businesses	are	better	at	taking	risk	(Helm	2014).	
The	 engagement	 with	 businesses	 in	 de-risking	 their	 investment	 went	 further	
and	further	until	the	point	that	now	energy	policy	experts	claim	that	“nuclear	is	
obviously	a	state	project”	(Helm	2014:	4).	
In	2005,	the	Keith	Parker	the	Chief	Executive	of	the	Nuclear	Industry	Association	
stated	 that	 a	 successful	 nuclear	 programme	 necessitates	 four	 key	 changes	 in	
government	policy.	 “[First,…]	 to	 change	 the	 rules	 so	 that	 planning	permission	
for	nuclear	power	stations	can	be	granted	more	swiftly.	[Second,…]	government	
money	for	inspectors	to	certify	new	reactor	designs	for	use	in	Britain.	[Third,…]	
to	 guarantee	 a	 minimum	 price	 for	 nuclear	 electricity	 to	 prevent	 it	 being	
rendered	 unprofitable	 if	 other	 ways	 of	 generating	 power	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
cheaper.	 Finally,	 […]	 to	 be	 able	 to	 build	 a	 large	 number	 of	 identical	 reactors,	
probably	 10,	 that	 would,	 in	 theory,	 lower	 the	 cost	 because	 of	 economies	 of	
scale.”	 (Meek	 2005).	 The	 first	 three	 requests	 gradually	 became	 the	
cornerstones	 of	 the	 governance	 framework.	 First,	 the	 planning	 process	 was	
‘streamlined’	(DCLG	et	al.	2007;	DTI	2007;	Planning	Act	2008)	and	a	reactor	pre-
licensing	 regime	 established	 by	 the	 regulators.	 The	 only	 slight	modification	 is	
that	investor	companies,	not	the	government,	pay	for	the	pre-licensing	process,	
also	 known	 as	 the	 Generic	 Design	 Assessment.	 More	 recently	 a	 guaranteed	
strike	 price	 and	 other	 financial	 support	 mechanisms	 were	 introduced	 in	 the	
Electricity	Market	Reform	(DECC	2011d),	in	particular	the	so-called	Contracts	for	
Different	 (CfD)	 scheme.	 The	 fourth	 request	 turned	out	 be	 opposite:	 currently	
three	different	companies	are	planning	to	build	their	own	reactor	designs	each,	
as	I	address	in	the	next	section.	In	establishing	a	framework	of	de-risking	private	
investment,	 probably	 the	most	 important	 governance	 change	was	 simply	 the	
stabilisation	 of	 support	 by	 building	 up	 a	 consensus	 among	 the	main	 political	
parties	 over	 the	 years.	 In	 the	 following	 subsections,	 I	 address	 the	 gradual	
emergence	 of	 a	 governance	 framework	 around	 de-risking	 private	 investment	
with	steps	of	streamlining	the	planning	process	(subsection	5.8.2),	streamlining	
the	 regulation	 (subsection	 5.8.3),	 offering	 financial	 guarantees	 (subsection	
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5.8.4),	and	íq10direct	involvement	in	the	hinterland	of	the	industry	(subsection	
5.8.5).	
5.8.2	STREAMLINING	THE	PLANNING	PROCESS	
“In	 the	past,	 the	planning	process	 for	nuclear	power	 stations	has	been	
inefficient,	costly	and	lengthy,	and,	in	some	cases	may	not	have	provided	
sufficient	 opportunity	 for	 consideration	 of	 local	 issues	 because	 they	
spent	 much	 of	 their	 time	 dealing	 with	 broader	 national	 issues.	 For	
example,	 the	 nuclear	 power	 station	 Sizewell	 B	 took	 six	 years	 to	 secure	
planning	 consent,	 costing	 £30	 million,	 and	 only	 30	 of	 the	 340	 inquiry	
days	were	devoted	to	local	issues.	The	planning	reforms	to	be	introduced	
through	 the	 Planning	 Bill	 increase	 transparency	 and	 participation	 and	
will	deliver	a	number	of	important	improvements	to	the	planning	process	
for	 the	 development	 of	 nationally	 significant	 infrastructure,	 including	
energy	projects,	such	as	new	nuclear	power	stations.”	
Meeting	the	Energy	Challenge:	A	White	Paper	on	Nuclear	Power	(BERR	
2008:	137-138)	
In	establishing	the	case	for	the	nuclear	new	build	programme,	the	2006	Energy	
Review	highlighted	the	73-month	length	of	the	1980s	Sizewell	Inquiry	on	three	
different	occasions	(DTI	2006:	121,	134,	144).	Public	inquiries	were	identified	as	
a	 major	 problem	 to	 deliver	 large-scale	 infrastructure	 investments	 (e.g.,	
Heathrow	 Terminal	 5,	 North-Yorkshire	 grid	 upgrade),	 especially	 in	 electricity	
generation	(DCLG	et	al.	2007:	27-31).	The	concern	that	public	inquiries	are	the	
main	burden	on	a	nuclear	new	build	programme	was	widely	echoed	in	industry	
(RAE	2006)	and	government	(BERR	2008:	137-139;	DCLG	et	al.	2007;	DTI	2007:	
253-274,	2006).20	The	subsequent	planning	reform	(Planning	Act	2008)	set	out	
the	framework	for	Nationally	Significant	Infrastructure	Projects	(NSIP)	on	a	fast-
track	(Cowell	and	Owens	2010,	2006;	Johnstone	2014,	2010).	
This	has	become	known	as	streamlining	the	planning	process.	A	key	idea	behind	
this	is	to	break	up	the	planning	process	into	‘local’	and	‘national’	issues	in	three	
separate	 stages,	 namely	 the	 strategic,	 pre-application,	 and	 regulatory	 stages.	
First,	the	strategic	stage	addresses	the	common	‘generic’	or	national	issues	for	
the	individual	projects,	as	these	issues	were	seen	making	the	public	inquiries	a	
long,	costly	and	divisive	process,	mainly	through	entrenched	debates	about	the	
need	 of	 nuclear	 power	 (BERR	 2008,	 see	 quote	 above).	 Second,	 the	 pre-
																																																						
20	It	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	support	of	 this	 claim	 is	not	 that	clear.	Cowell	and	Owens	 (2006:	406),	 for	
example,	 highlight	 that	 many	 critical	 arguments	 were	 later	 reflected	 in	 the	 energy	 policy	 of	 the	
government.	Similarly,	one	of	 the	veterans	of	 the	old	Wylfa	explained	 to	me	 in	 lenght	how	the	Sizewell	
Inquiry	helped	to	establish	quality	assurance	accross	the	industry	(Interview	11).	
	 140	
application	stage	allows	the	developer	to	formally	consult	with	the	public	and	
stakeholders,	including	the	regulators,	about	its	emerging	proposals	before	the	
actual	 details	 of	 the	 planning	 application	 are	 worked	 out.	 Third,	 the	 actual	
regulatory	 stage	 therefore	 is	 relatively	 short,	 and	 focusing	 on	 project-specific	
issues,	rather	than	generic	ones.	
The	strategic	stage	is	primarily	based	on	the	National	Policy	Statements	(NPS),	
issued	 to	 settle	 the	 generic	 issues	 once	 and	 for	 all.	 The	 Overarching	 NPS	 for	
Energy	 (EN-1,	see	DECC	2011c)	settle	the	main	direction	of	energy	policy,	and	
the	NPS	for	Nuclear	Power	Generation	(EN-6,	see	DECC	2011b)	nuclear	specific	
issues,	 including	 identifying	 eight	 possible	 sites.	 Both	 documents	 were	
consulted	in	two	stages	during	2009-2011,	as	I	discuss	in	Chapter	7.	In	addition	
to	 the	 NPS	 documents	 covering	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 issues,	 two	 other	 processes	
took	part	on	the	strategic	 level.	The	Strategic	Siting	Assessment	(SSA)	covered	
the	site	selection	criteria,	and	assessment	of	specific	sites,	including	Wylfa	(see	
Annex	C	of	EN-6,	DECC	2011b).	
The	 pre-application	 stage,	 for	 example,	 means	 that	 the	 developer	 bears	 the	
primary	 responsibility	 of	 consulting	with	 the	 public	 and	 stakeholders,	 not	 the	
independent	 authority	 eventually	 making	 the	 decisions.	 For	 the	 individual	
Nationally	 Significant	 Infrastructure	 Projects	 (NSIPs),	 including	 power	 plants	
over	 50	 MW	 capacity 21 ,	 the	 newly	 established	 Infrastructure	 Planning	
Commission	(IPC)	was	designed	to	make	planning	decisions	in	a	more	efficient	
and	timely	manner	than	previously.	The	Coalition	Government	abolished	IPC	in	
2012,	and	transferred	its	roles	to	Major	Infrastructure	Planning	Unit	(MIPU)	 in	
the	Planning	 Inspectorate	 (PINS),	 thus	bringing	back	ministerial	 oversight,	 but	
otherwise	keeping	the	main	elements	of	this	streamlined	planning	process.	The	
Wylfa	Newydd	 project	 is	 currently	 in	 the	 pre-application	 stage,	 after	 the	 first	
round	 of	 Pre-Application	 Consultation	 (PAC)	 in	 autumn	 2014,	 during	 my	
fieldwork,	and	the	second	round	two	years	later.	
As	planning	is	a	largely	devolved	matter,	the	situation	of	Wylfa	is	different	than	
other	 NSIPs	 in	 England,	 like	 Hinkley	 Point	 C.	Whereas	 in	 England	 the	 overall	
project	is	subject	to	NSIP	legislation,	in	Wales	only	the	developments	within	the	
designated	 new	 nuclear	 site.	 The	 so-called	 associated	 developments,	 from	
temporary	accommodation	to	road	improvements,	are	subject	to	the	approval	
of	 the	 local	 council	 under	 the	 Town	 and	 Country	 Planning	 Act	 (TCPA).	While	
associated	developments	account	only	about	10%	of	the	Wylfa	Newydd	overall	
project	 value,	 the	 Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	 issued	 a	 Supplementary	
																																																						
21	Onshore	windfarms	regardless	of	size,	however,	expected	to	be	taken	to	the	level	of	the	local	planning	
authority	 again	 (HoC	 Library	 2016a),	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 2015	 elections	manifesto	 of	 the	 governing	
Conservative	Party	(2015).	
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Planning	Guidance	(SPG)	for	the	New	Wylfa	with	various	attachments	outlining	
its	 position	 for	 the	 expected	 hundreds	 of	 planning	 applications	 in	 almost	 a	
thousand	 pages	 (IACC	 2014c).	 The	 transformation	 of	 how	 democracy	 is	
practiced	 in	 the	 public	 consultations	 established	 through	 streamlining	 the	
planning	process	in	comparison	to	the	past	public	inquiries	is	a	main	theme	of	
Chapter	8.		
5.8.3	STREAMLINING	REGULATION	
As	 new	 nuclear	 build	 programme	 started	 to	 take	 shape,	 government	 pushed	
authorities	in	England	and	Wales	to	streamline	regulation	by	establishing	a	pre-
licensing	framework	for	power	station,	the	so-called	Generic	Design	Assessment	
(GDA)	 (DTI	 2006:	 121-122).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 environmental	 and	nuclear	 safety	
regulation	 was	 reshaped	 similarly	 to	 the	 planning	 process.	 After	 a	 reactor	
design	 receives	 a	 GDA	 approval,	 only	 a	 few	 site-specific	 design	modifications	
will	be	the	subject	to	obtain	nuclear	site	license	and	relevant	consents	from	the	
Office	 for	 Nuclear	 Regulation	 (ONR)	 and	 environmental	 permits	 from	 the	
Natural	Resources	Wales	(the	Environmental	Agency	in	England).	An	estimated	
80%	of	the	detailed	design	is	covered	by	the	GDA	before	any	site-specific	issues	
are	addressed	 for	 the	 individual	new	build	project	 (WNA	2015:	21).	Both	EPR	
and	 the	 AP1000	 started	 the	GDA	 process	 in	 2007,	 but	 only	 EPR	 finished	 it	 in	
2012,	 and	 Toshiba	 is	 now	 finishing	 the	 GDA	 of	 the	 latter.	 The	 UK	 ABWR	 by	
Hitachi	GE	Nuclear	Energy	 (HGNE),	 selected	 for	Wylfa,	 is	currently	undergoing	
the	 last	stage,	phrase	4	of	the	GDA	process	with	an	expectation	to	finish	 it	by	
the	end	of	2017.	
The	integrated	Office	for	Nuclear	Regulation	(ONR)	was	only	established	in	April	
2011,	 and	 received	 independent	 statutory	 status	 three	 years	 after.	 The	 new	
nuclear	 authority	 integrated	 the	 previously	 separate	 function	 associated	with	
nuclear	 site	 regulation	 (Nuclear	 Installations	 Inspectorate	 at	 the	 Health	 and	
Safety	Executive	–	NII/HSE),	nuclear	security	regulation	(Office	for	Civil	Nuclear	
Security	–	OCNS),	some	of	the	environmental	regulation	(Environmental	Agency	
in	 England	 –	 EA,	 and	 Natural	 Resources	Wales	 –	 NRW),	 nuclear	 proliferation	
regulation	(UK	Safeguards	Office	–	UKSO),	and	eventually	the	transportation	of	
nuclear	materials	regulation	from	the	Department	for	Transport	(DfT).	
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5.8.4	FINANCIAL	GUARANTEES	
The	key	frame	of	the	 latest	energy	white	paper	 is	on	how	to	make	 large-scale	
investment	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 possible	 through	 government	 support	 (DECC	
2011d).	 This	 is	 a	 remarkable	 shift	 from	 the	 first	energy	white	paper	 since	 the	
privatisation	(DTI	2003)	outlining	some	broad	decarbonisation	targets	to	reach	
an	envisioned	low-carbon	economy,	and	the	subsequent	review	focusing	more	
on	 the	 delivery	 of	 these	 targets	 with	 an	 emphasis	 of	 energy-efficiency	 and	
distributed	energy	generation	as	well	(DTI	2007,	2006).	
Is	 financial	 support	 for	 novel	 low-carbon	 technologies	 an	 intervention	 to	 the	
market	 or	 facilitation	 of	 market	 forces	 to	 overcome	 incumbent	 fossil	 fuel	
technologies?	The	latter	was	the	rhetoric	of	supporting	renewable	technologies	
in	the	UK	and	elsewhere.	New	nuclear	reactors	were	positioned	in	similar	way	
as	 the	 upcoming	 Generation	 III	 design.	 The	 Electricity	Market	 Reform	 (EMR),	
following	 the	 abovementioned	 white	 paper	 (DECC	 2011d)	 and	 its	
implementation	 (Energy	Act	2013),	broadened	the	means	of	de-risking	energy	
investments	 by	 offering	 strong	 financial	 support	mechanisms	 for	 nuclear	 new	
build	projects.	This	was	also	a	U-turn	of	the	coalition	government	that	promised	
“no	 public	 subsidy”	 (Conservative	 Party	 2010:	 92)	 to	 nuclear	 power	 in	 the	
coalition	agreement	(HM	Government	2010:	17).		
There	are	different	risks	for	an	investor	in	the	construction	and	operation	of	a	
nuclear	plant.	The	Contracts	 for	Difference	 (CfD)	 is	 the	main	 financial	 support	
scheme	to	the	new	nuclear	programme	to	reduce	risks	in	the	operation	period.	
The	CfD	 is	 a	 feed-in-tariff	 (FiT)	 scheme	offering	 a	 guaranteed	 ‘strike	 price’	 by	
the	UK	government	for	a	certain	period	to	de-risk	the	investors	from	the	risk	of	
fluctuating	 prices.	 The	 government	 agreement	 offers	 £92.5	 (adjusted	 to	
inflation)	per	MWh	of	the	electricity	generated	by	Hinkley	Point	C	to	EDF	for	35	
years	 (£87.5	 if	Sizewell	C	 is	also	approved).	This	was	more	than	the	double	of	
the	 current	 wholesale	 electricity	 price	 when	 signed,	 and	 substantially	 longer	
than	the	CfDs	offered	to	renewable	technologies.	Negotiations	over	 the	strike	
price	 for	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 are	 under	 way	 with	 Horizon	 Nuclear	 Power;	 a	 final	
agreement	expected	in	2018.	In	addition	to	the	Contracts	for	Difference,	other	
mechanisms	 in	 the	 EMR	 are	 designed	 to	 support	 nuclear,	 especially	 against	
fossil	 fuels,	 like	 the	carbon	price	 floor,	emissions	performance	standard	 (EPS),	
and	capacity	mechanism	(CM).	
While	 the	 Electricity	 Market	 Reform	 de-risks	 power	 plant	 operation,	 the	 UK	
Guarantees	 Scheme	 (UKGS)	 also	 implemented	 a	 mechanism	 to	 reduce	 the	
construction	risk	and	the	cost	of	borrowing	money.	According	to	the	Treasury	
(2014:	107),	nuclear	projects	account	for	more	than	half	of	the	project	specific	
finance	opportunities.	A	cooperation	agreement	has	been	already	signed	with	
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Hitachi	 and	 Horizon	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 being	 able	 to	 agree	 an	 in-principle	 loan	
guarantee	by	the	end	of	2016	(HM	Treasury	2014:	29).	
5.8.5	DIRECT	INVOLVEMENT	IN	DEVELOPING	THE	SUPPLY	CHAIN,	SKILLS,	R&D	
	“The	 forthcoming	 domestic	 new	 build	 programme	 has	 changed	 the	
direction	of	the	nuclear	industry	in	the	UK	from	one	entirely	focussed	on	
gradual	 run-down	 and	 closure	 to	 one	 that	 aims	 at	 long-term	growth.”	
(BIS	&	DECC	2013d:	8)	
“Long-term	 growth	 for	 the	 UK	 nuclear	 industry	 relies	 on	 a	 significant	
contribution	 being	made	 by	UK	 industry	 to	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 domestic	
new	 build	 [up	 to	 16	 GW	 by	 2030],	 and	 to	 the	 ongoing	 waste	
management	 and	 decommissioning	 programme.	 Achieving	 this	 will	
develop	capability	and	capacity,	ensure	 long-term	competitiveness,	and	
provide	a	springboard	to	expand	into	international	markets	(particularly	
in	new	build)	–	UK	industry	needs	strong	Government	support	to	achieve	
this.”	(BIS	&	DECC	2013d:	46)	
26	March	2013	was	 a	memorable	day	 for	 the	nuclear	 industry	 in	Britain.	 The	
detailed	 industrial	 strategy	 was	 revealed	 in	 collaboration	 of	 the	 Nuclear	
Industry	 Association	 (NIA),	 DECC,	 BIS,	 and	 various	 industry	 companies	 (BIS	 &	
DECC	 2013a,	 2013b,	 2013c,	 2013e;	 DECC	&	 BIS	 2013).	 Among	 these	was	 the	
Nuclear	 Industrial	 Vision	 Statement	 outlining	 the	 “re-establishment	 and	
strengthening	of	the	 industry”	(BIS	&	DECC	2013d:	2).	 In	the	 last	decades,	the	
nuclear	 industry	 has	 substantially	 shrunk	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 nuclear	
constructions	and	discontinuation	of	a	domestic	 reactor	design,	 together	with	
the	 fragmentation	of	 the	 capabilities	 after	 privatisation.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 rebuild	
both	 UK	 capabilities	 and	 capacities	 to	 become	 part	 of	 the	 supply	 chain	 of	
overseas	 nuclear	 vendors,	 like	 Hitachi,	 investing	 in	 Britain.	While	 there	 is	 no	
capability	 in	 the	 UK	 to	 manufacture	 some	 key	 components,	 like	 reactor	
pressure	 vessels,	 there	 is	 for	 the	 remaining	 85-90%	of	 the	 value	 of	 a	 nuclear	
new	build	(BIS	&	DECC	2013d:	17).	The	challenge	is	thus	to	achieve	a	relatively	
high	proportion	of	 the	 investment	value	 to	be	generated	by	UK	companies	 in	
the	sector.	This	can	be	the	basis	for	not	only	future	nuclear	constructions	in	the	
UK,	 but	 also	 an	 export	 potential	 in	 the	wake	 of	 a	 global	 nuclear	 renaissance	
with	new	nuclear	entrant	countries	ordering	turn-key	power	plants.	The	key	to	
achieve	this	is	to	utilise	UK	strengths	in	certain	manufacturing	and	professional	
services	 areas	 (e.g.,	 pumps	 and	 valves,	 or	 project	management),	 and	 to	 build	
partnerships	 with	 overseas	 nuclear	 vendors	 before	 their	 supply	 chain	
consolidates	(UKTI	2015).	
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There	is	an	entire	set	of	direct	facilitative	actions	of	the	UK	government	for	the	
nuclear	new	build	programme	decided	 in	2013.	 These	actions	 focus	on	direct	
government	 intervention	 to	 develop	 the	 hinterland	 of	 the	 nuclear	 industry,	
namely	 in	 supporting	 R&D,	 supply	 chain	 development,	 and	 investment	 in	
engineering	 skills.	 This	 was	 part	 of	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 strategy	 with	 the	
nuclear	industry	(BIS	&	DECC	2013c,	2013d;	DECC	&	BIS	2013)	responding	to	the	
pressure	 from	 various	 bodies	 (Birmingham	 Policy	 Commission	 2012;	 HoHoL	
Science	 and	 Technology	 Committee	 2011).	 The	 long-term	 nuclear	 strategy	
ventures	beyond	the	current	nuclear	new	build	project	to	enable	future	nuclear	
technologies	 (BIS	 &	 DECC	 2013b).	 This	 included	 broadening	 the	 public	 R&D	
policies	 in	nuclear,	and	redirecting	 from	decommissioning	and	fusion	research	
to	the	areas	associated	with	the	new	build	programme	(BIS	&	DECC	2013a).	In	
2014,	 the	 Nuclear	 Innovation	 &	 Research	 Advisory	 Board	 (NIRAB)	 was	
established	 together	 with	 the	 Nuclear	 Innovation	 Research	 Office	 (NIRO)	 to	
coordinate	 funding	 on	 nuclear	 research,	 from	 advanced	 manufacturing	 to	
fusion	 research,	 and	 from	 waste	 and	 decommissioning	 to	 small	 modular	
reactors	(SMR).	
Hitachi	 made	 a	 commitment	 to	 aim	 to	 source	 60%	 of	 the	 value	 of	 Wylfa	 in	
Britain	 in	 exchange	 of	 the	 facilitative	 actions	 of	 the	 government	 discussed	
previously	 (Hitachi	 press	 release,	 2012),	 but	 no	 firm	 commitment	 about	 the	
percentage	 from	 North	 Wales.	 While	 key	 station	 items	 have	 to	 be	
manufactured	 outside	 of	 the	 UK,	 British	 companies	 have	 experience	 and	
capability	 in	 project	 management,	 the	 civil	 engineering	 works,	 the	 plant	 and	
equipment	 installation,	 and	 the	 supply	 of	 various	 mechanical	 and	 electrical	
equipment	(NIA	UK	2012).	
Politicians,	senior	civil	servants	and	industry	spokespeople	agree	that	a	critical	
point	 is	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 first	 station	 on	 time	 and	 budget,	 not	 to	mention	
fulfilling	 all	 relevant	 safety	 regulations.	 With	 the	 political	 and	 financial	
quandaries	 around	Hinkley	 Point	 C,	 however,	 there	 is	 an	 escape	 plan	 for	 the	
long-term.	There	is	a	push	to	develop	Small	Modular	Reactor	(SMR)	designs	and	
to	 make	 UK	 a	 leader	 in	 the	 commercialisation	 of	 SMR	 in	 the	 forthcoming	
decades,	with	 substantial	 government	 support	 and	 a	 potential	 demonstration	
reactor	at	Trawsfyndd.	
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5.9	GLOBAL	NUCLEAR	INDUSTRY:	UK	AS	A	SHOWCASE	FOR	REACTOR	VENDORS	
Different	companies	own	all	three	active	nuclear	construction	projects	in	the	UK	
to	deploy	their	respective	reactor	technologies.22	In	addition,	the	China	General	
Nuclear	 (CGN)	 aims	 to	 build	 their	 homegrown	 Hualong	 One	 nuclear	 reactor	
design	at	Bradwell	for	the	first	time	outside	of	the	country	(Ruddick	and	Phillips	
2016).	 The	 Russian	 Rosatom	 also	 intends	 to	 acquire	 a	 British	 Generic	 Design	
Assessment	 in	 the	 near	 future	 (Rosatom	 2014).	 This	 picture	 is	 in	 striking	
contrast	 with	 the	 initial	 plans	 of	 the	 nuclear	 programme	 to	 build	 all	 nuclear	
stations	 of	 the	 same	 standardised	 technology	 to	 maximise	 the	 construction	
experience	and	the	economies	of	scale	(see	previous	section).	These	 investors	
are	developing	new	 financing	models,	 contractual	 structures	and	construction	
techniques	to	demonstrate	that	their	technology	can	be	built	in	the	UK	on	time	
and	 on	 budget.	 A	 successful	 construction	 in	 the	 UK,	 or	 at	 least	 obtaining	 a	
license	 through	 the	 Generic	 Design	 Assessment,	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 ticket	 to	 build	
power	 stations	 elsewhere.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 show	 that	 the	 UK	 has	 become	 a	
showcase	for	global	nuclear	vendors.	
For	 an	 ethnographically	 driven	 geography	 research,	 it	 might	 seem	 a	 bit	
uncommon	to	discuss	with	changes	in	contractual	structures,	financing	models,	
or	 construction	 project	 management.	 Yet	 these	 are	 key	 characteristics	 to	
understand	the	challenge	of	a	nuclear	megainvestment.	The	industry	setting	of	
the	 current	 new	 nuclear	 programme	 is	 entirely	 different	 from	 all	 previous	
investments.	 This	 cannot	 be	 simplified	 to	 multinational	 private	 companies	
replacing	national	public	monopolies,	there	is	a	more	wide-ranging	shift	of	how	
the	nuclear	 industry	 is	 organised	globally	 and	 in	Britain.	Here	 I	 outline	briefly	
how	these	nuclear	investment	projects	are	organised.	
The	 contractual	 company	 structure	 of	 the	 previous	 nuclear	 programmes	
followed	 a	 certain	 pattern	 in	 the	 UK.	 The	 power	 plant	 operator	 (CEGB	 in	
England	 and	 Wales)	 commissions	 a	 consortium	 to	 deliver	 the	 key	 station	
elements	 (e.g.,	 reactor	pressure	vessel,	 turbine	generators,	etc.)	with	a	strong	
technical	 guidance	 from	 the	 UKAEA	 (Gwynedd	 County	 Council	 1978:	 10;	
Wearne	 2015;	Wearne	 and	 Bird	 2010).	 Currently	 there	 is	 not	 just	 a	 lack	 of	 a	
domestic	 reactor	design,	but	 the	overall	 contractual	 arrangement	 is	different.	
All	 three	 of	 the	 new	 build	 companies	 share	 ownership	 with	 their	 respective	
reactor	 manufacturers,	 they	 are	 essentially	 nuclear	 vendors	 with	 only	 EDF	
having	 operational	 experience. 23 	This	 contractual	 structure	 is	 not	 just	 a	
																																																						
22	EDF	using	EPR	design	at	Hinkley	Point	C,	Horizon	deploying	ABWRs	at	Wylfa	Newydd,	and	NuGen	using	
AP1000	reactors	at	Moorside.		
23	Toshiba	 is	60%	owner	of	NuGen	at	the	time	of	writing,	developer	of	the	Moorside	project	adjecent	to	
Sellafield,	 Cumbria.	 The	 provider	 of	 AP1000	 reactors	 is	Westinghouse	 Electric,	 member	 of	 the	 Toshiba	
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difference	in	the	arcane	issues	of	company	ownership	or	the	legal	contracts,	but	
in	 the	 centre	 of	 wide-ranging	 issues,	 including	 project	 finances,	 reactor	
technology,	 industry	 capability,	 or	 construction	 timeline	 and	 project	
management.	
The	following	quote	outlines	the	challenges	of	Horizon	nuclear	power:	
“Nuclear	 new	 build	 is,	 to	 say	 the	 least,	 a	 very	 demanding	 business,	
requiring	persistence,	determination,	a	very	 long-term	perspective	and	
extremely	 capacious	 pockets,	 among	 many	 other	 virtues.	 But	 for	 UK	
nuclear	plant	developer,	Horizon,	 there	are	 two	 further	 complications:	
introducing	 a	 technology,	 the	 boiling	 light	 water	 reactor,	 that	 is	
unknown	 in	 the	 UK;	 and	 the	 building	 from	 scratch	 of	 an	 entirely	 new	
nuclear	operating	company.	
Horizon,	originally	set	up	in	2009	as	a	joint	venture	of	two	utilities,	RWE	
and	E.On,	was	purchased	by	Hitachi	in	2012.	The	new	nuclear	operating	
company	would	 effectively	 become	 a	 client	 of	 reactor	 vendor	Hitachi-
GE,	 eventually	 owning	 and	 operating	 two	 1350MWe	 advanced	 boiling	
water	reactors	(ABWRs)	at	the	Wylfa	site	on	the	Isle	of	Anglesey,	off	the	
north-west	 coast	 of	 Wales,	 and	 subsequently	 two	 more	 planned	 for	
Oldbury	in	England.”	
(Nuclear	Engineering	International	2016)	
The	 sale	 of	 Horizon	 from	 RWE	 and	 EON	 to	 Hitachi	 was	 not	 just	 a	 change	 of	
ownership,	but	a	different	the	overall	strategic	aim	with	the	nuclear	new	build.	
The	 two	 German	 utilities	 were	 constructing	 the	 baseline	 generating	 capacity	
they	 needed	with	 a	mature	 expertise	with	 operating	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 at	
home.	The	nuclear	vendor	and	manufacturer	Hitachi,	however,	bought	Horizon	
to	create	a	market	for	 its	ABWR	technology.	A	construction	 in	the	UK	on	time	
and	 on	 budget,	 and	 meeting	 with	 the	 stringent	 safety	 regulations,	 is	
demonstration	of	technology	in	the	search	for	orders	worldwide.	Hitachi	has	no	
operation	experience	at	all,	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	utilities	that	commissioned	
all	 previous	UK	 nuclear	 constructions.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 outline	 how	 the	UK	 is	
becoming	a	showcase	for	global	nuclear	vendors	to	showcase	their	technology	
in	a	grave	need	for	contracts	globally.	
In	 the	 hearing	 of	 a	 parliamentary	 inquiry,	 the	 operations	 director	 of	 Horizon	
explained	 that	 the	 project	 has	 three	 stages:	 business	 development,	
																																																																																																																																																		
group.	It	should	be	noted	that	in	addition	to	Toshiba	and	Hitachi,	that	the	third	developer	EDF	is	also	in	the	
process	in	obtaining	majority	stake	in	the	nuclear	vendor	AREVA.	Both	EDF	and	AREVA	are	owned	by	the	
French	state.	
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construction,	 and	 operation	 (and	 then	 decommissioning)	 (HoC	 Welsh	 Affairs	
Committee	 2016).	 The	 current	 challenge	 is	 to	 build	 up	 an	 organisation	 from	
scratch,	 together	with	 a	 business	 case	 to	 invite	 other	 investors	 after	 detailed	
project	plans	are	developed,	consents	and	permits	are	acquired,	and	 financial	
guarantees	from	the	UK	government	(especially	the	strike	price	in	the	CfD)	are	
secured.	 After	 the	 final	 investment	 decision	 (FID),	 the	 challenge	 for	 the	
construction	 stage	 is	 to	 translate	 the	 successful	 construction	 experience	 in	
Japan	to	the	UK	context.	Given	the	differences	in	regulation	and	work	culture,	
the	 challenge	 for	 the	Wylfa	 Newydd	 construction	 to	 attract	 potential	 orders	
globally	is	to	demonstrate	that	ABWR	can	be	built	on	time	and	budget	outside	
of	Japan.	In	the	operation,	the	challenge	is	that	Hitachi	as	a	nuclear	vendor	does	
not	 have	 any	 experience	with	 operating	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 unlike	 utilities,	
such	as	EDF.		
The	 Royal	 Academy	 of	 Engineering	 summarises	 the	 industry	 challenges	 a	
developer	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	is	facing	as	follows.	
“Given	 the	 need	 for	 new	 base	 load	 electricity	 generation,	 a	 UK	
government	 commitment	 to	 support	 a	 nuclear	 contribution	 to	 the	
national	 electricity	 supply	 and	 a	 commitment	 to	 streamline	 the	 UK	
planning	 processes,	 the	 key	 determinants	 for	 a	 successful	 new	 build	
programme	 in	 the	UK	 are	 the	 financing,	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 build,	
and	 the	 risks	 associated	with	 licensing	 and	 construction	 (RAE	 2010:	 9,	
emphasis	added)		
In	 line	 with	 the	 points	 highlighted,	 in	 the	 following	 subsections	 I	 outline	 the	
issues	 of	 financing,	 supply	 chain	 development	 and	 industry	 capability,	 and	
finally	licensing	and	construction.		
5.9.1	FINANCING	
Nuclear	 power	 is	 a	 long-term	 investment	with	 vast	 upfront	 costs.	 The	 capital	
costs	accounts	for	60%	of	the	levelised	cost	of	the	electricity	generation	for	the	
lifetime	of	 the	plant,	 in	 sharp	contrast	with	a	CCGT	gas	plant,	 for	example.	 In	
other	 words,	 the	 construction	 is	 far	 more	 expensive	 than	 the	 subsequent	
operation	and	maintenance	(O&M),	and	fuel	costs.	Moreover,	 it	 takes	at	 least	
10	years	from	the	start	of	the	preparations	to	generate	electricity	for	the	first	
time,	 far	 more	 time	 than	 any	 other	 electricity	 generation	 technologies.	 In	
addition,	 nuclear	 constructions	 are	 much	 more	 prone	 to	 cost	 overruns	 and	
delays	 than	 other	 less	 complicated	 and	 less	 regulated	 technologies	
(Birmingham	Policy	Commission	2012).	Given	the	challenges	 the	Hinkley	Point	
project	has	been	facing	over	the	last	few	years	to	find	investors,	it	 is	apparent	
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that	“Raising	finance	remains	one	of	the	biggest	barriers	to	nuclear	new	build.”	
(HoC	Energy	and	Climate	Change	Committee	2013:	3)	
Where	 is	 the	 money	 coming	 from?	 Previous	 UK	 nuclear	 constructions	 were	
directly	 financed	by	 the	 state	 enjoying	 generally	 lower	 interest	 rates	 and	 less	
stringent	cost	controls.	Currently,	none	of	the	three	private	investor	companies	
in	the	UK	are	able	to	finance	the	full	capitalisation	of	a	nuclear	megainvestment	
on	 their	 balance	 sheet.	 Thus	 the	 challenge	 for	 the	 ‘technical	 partners’,	 such	
Horizon,	 is	 to	 build	 up	 a	 viable	 business	 case	 through	 building	 up	 a	 robust	
project	structure	and	obtaining	all	relevant	licenses	and	approvals	to	eventually	
attract	 other	 investors.	 EDF	 signed	 a	 contract	 with	 Chinese	 CGN	 nuclear	
company	 in	October	 2015	 to	 own	a	 third	 of	 the	Hinkley	 Point	 C	 project	 (BBC	
2015a).	According	to	the	latest	publicly	available	information,	Horizon	is	looking	
for	 investors	 to	 finance	 80%	 of	 the	 project	 value	 (HoC	 Energy	 and	 Climate	
Change	Committee	2013:	38).	The	current	developers	in	the	UK	cannot	finance	
a	nuclear	construction	on	their	own.	
The	Final	Investment	Decision	or	Financial	Investment	Decision	(FID)	is	probably	
the	most	important	milestone	for	a	privately	financed	nuclear	construction.	For	
publicly	 funded	 nuclear	 constructions,	 including	 all	 previous	 UK	 stations,	 the	
announcement	 of	 the	 construction	 already	 meant	 a	 financial	 commitment	
(Hannah	1982).	For	the	UK	nuclear	new	build	programme,	the	 investors	try	to	
keep	the	withdrawal	option	open	until	as	late	as	possible.	Thus	the	FID	is	made	
only	 when	 the	 financing	 is	 secured,	 all	 regulatory	 licenses	 and	 permits	 are	
granted,	the	reactor	design	development	is	completed,	preliminary	agreement	
is	made	with	top	tier	supply	chain	companies,	and	there	 is	a	detailed	timeline	
for	the	construction.	Currently,	a	Front	End	Engineering	Design	(FEED)	contract	
is	 signed	by	Horizon	with	Hitachi	GE	Nuclear	Energy	 (HGNE)	 in	preparation	 to	
the	 FID.	As	 the	 FID	 is	 taken,	 presumably	 in	 2019,	 this	will	 be	 replaced	by	 the	
more	 comprehensive	 Engineering,	 Procurement,	 and	 Construction	 (EPC)	
contract,	 presumably	 with	 a	 consortium	 of	 the	 newly	 established	 Hitachi	
Nuclear	 Energy	 Europe	 Ltd,	 Bechtel	 and	 JGC	 Corporation	 (Hughes	 2016).	 The	
final	 investment	 decision	 will	 be	 only	 taken	 when	 finances	 will	 be	 secured	
following	a	robust	business	case	and	the	regulatory	and	planning	process.		
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5.9.2	INDUSTRY	CAPABILITY	
The	 developer	 company	 only	 does	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 the	 actual	 construction	
works,	the	supply	chain	will	do	the	majority.	While	a	nuclear	vendor,	Hitachi,	is	
the	 owner	 of	Wylfa,	 only	 a	minority	 of	 the	work	will	 be	 done	 by	 the	 reactor	
supplier	HGNE	 and	 a	 further	 10-15%	directly	 or	 indirectly	 by	Horizon	Nuclear	
Power,	mainly	in	relation	to	project	organisation.	The	existing	UK	nuclear	plants	
were	 built	 by	 initially	 five	 consortia	 of	 British	manufacturing	 and	 engineering	
companies,	 as	 Chapter	 2	 discussed	 (Wearne	 2015;	 Wearne	 and	 Bird	 2010).	
Currently,	however,	 there	 is	not	only	an	absence	of	domestic	nuclear	vendor,	
but	 the	 industry	 capability	 has	 shrunk	 significantly	 (Birmingham	 Policy	
Commission	2012;	NIA	UK	2012).	As	opposed	to	national	champions	with	their	
own	reactor	designs,	now	there	is	a	global	competition	with	a	 limited	number	
of	 nuclear	 vendors.	 In	 the	 UK,	 there	 is	 no	 company	 with	 the	 capability	 of	
manufacturing	 specialised	 nuclear	 station	 elements,	 like	 turbine	 generators,	
ultra-large	 forgings,	 reactor	coolant	pumps,	not	 just	 the	very	 reactor	pressure	
vessel	(NIA	UK	2012).	
A	 nuclear	 construction	 involves	 thousands	 of	 companies,	 in	 a	 complex	
contractual	 structure.	 In	 the	 industry,	 companies	 are	 classified	 in	 different	
‘tiers’	 depending	 on	 number	 of	 contracted	 supply	 chain	 companies	 between	
the	tier	and	the	developer.	Tier	1	companies	are	the	‘delivery	partners’.	In	case	
of	Wylfa	Newydd,	Hitachi	 revealed	 that	 the	newly	established	Hitachi	Nuclear	
Energy	 Europe	 Ltd	 targets	 to	 form	 a	 joint	 venture	with	 the	US-based	 Bechtel	
and	 the	 Japanese	 JGC	 corporation	 (Hughes	 2016).	 In	 the	 Tier	 2,	 there	 are	
generally	 companies	 working	 in	 the	 nuclear	 business.	 Tier	 3-4	 companies	
typically	operate	outside	of	the	nuclear	sector	(Birmingham	Policy	Commission	
2012:	61),	local	Anglesey	companies	can	only	be	in	Tier	5-6.	
5.9.3	REACTOR	TECHNOLOGY	
The	 aim	 of	 Hitachi	 with	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 not	 to	 build	 a	 large	 generating	
capacity,	 but	 to	 showcase	 its	 Advanced	 Boiling	 Water	 Reactor	 (ABWR)	
technology.	The	four	ABWRs	in	Japan,	operational	since	the	1990s,	are	the	only	
Generation	 III	 design	 reactors	 that	 have	 operated	 globally	 as	 both	 Areva	 EPR	
(the	 design	 for	 Hinkley	 Point	 C)	 and	 Westinghouse	 AP-1000	 (the	 design	 for	
Moorside)	 reactors	 are	 only	 under	 construction.	 ABWR	 has	 evolved	 from	 a	
series	 of	 boiling	water	 reactors	 (BWR),	 originally	 designed	by	General	 Electric	
(GE)	in	the	US	in	the	1950s	(NNL	2013).	BWR	is	the	second	most	popular	design	
globally	after	pressurised	water	reactors	(PWR),	 like	AP-1000	and	EPR	designs.	
BWR	 is	a	 somewhat	 simpler	design	 than	PWR	as	 the	cooling	water	drives	 the	
turbines	 directly,	 not	 through	 an	 additional	 loop	 (NNL	 2013).	 The	 ABWR	
technology	 has	 been	 designed	 together	 by	 General	 Electric	 (GE),	 Hitachi,	
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Toshiba	and	other	companies	 in	 Japan.	Currently,	General	Electric	and	Hitachi	
have	two	joint	ventures.	The	Japan-based	Hitachi	GE	Nuclear	Energy	(HGNE)	is	
80.01%	 owned	 by	 Hitachi,	 and	 the	 US-based	 counterpart	 GE	 Hitachi	 (GEH),	
selling	 its	 Economic	 Simplified	 Boiling	 Water	 Reactors	 (ESBWR),	 is	 owned	
dominantly	by	GE.	Less	than	two	years	after	buying	Horizon,	Hitachi	established	
a	 Hitachi	 European	 Nuclear	 Research	 Centre	 (ENRC)	 opened	 in	 the	 UK	 for	
training	and	technical	assistance	to	ABWR	technology.	
Nuclear	 constructions	 are	 notorious	 for	 running	 over	 budget	 and	 over	 time.	
Both	 current	 constructions	 in	 Western	 Europe,	 Olkiluoto	 3	 in	 Finland	 and	
Flamanville	3	in	France,	have	trebled	their	initial	budget	and	are	in	8	and	6	years	
delay	 respectively.	 Several	 previous	 UK	 nuclear	 constructions	 had	 similar	
problems,	most	notably	Dungeness	B,	albeit	the	latest	Sizewell	B	is	an	exception	
(Birmingham	Policy	Commission	2012).	A	key	selling	point	of	BWR	is	that	it	was	
constructed	on	budget	and	time	in	Japan.	The	challenge	whether	the	same	can	
be	repeated	in	the	UK.	
“In	Japan	the	construction	period	has	been	less	than	four	years,	but	it	is	
unlikely	 that	 the	 process	 will	 be	 this	 fast	 in	 the	 UK	 (at	 least	 initially)	
because	there	are	differences	between	the	UK	and	Japan	that	it	will	take	
time	to	understand.”	(HoC	Energy	and	Climate	Change	Committee	2013:	
38)	
The	 challenge	 is	 that	 the	 construction	 is	 “quasi	 first	 of	 a	 kind”	 (FOAK)	 (HoC	
Energy	 and	Climate	Change	Committee	2013:	 11),	 or	more	precisely	 first	 in	 a	
country	(FIAC)	(WNA	2015:	5).	To	illustrate	the	issue,	the	design	developments	
of	 the	 first	 PWR	 station,	 Sizewell	 B,	were	£700m	out	of	 the	£2,030m	of	 total	
construction	 costs	 (Birmingham	 Policy	 Commission	 2012).	 First-of-a-kind	 and	
first-in-a-country	 constructions	mean	not	only	higher	estimated	 costs	 than	an	
nth-of-a-kind	 station,	 but	 these	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 cost	 escalations	 and	
substantial	delays	in	construction,	as	the	recent	EPR	examples	show	in	Olkiluoto	
and	Flamanville.	Hitachi	 is	developing	advanced	construction	techniques,	 such	
as	modularisation,	or	even	Open-top	and	Parallel	Construction	Floor	Packaging	
(HGNE	2013:	45-46;	see	also	IAEA	2011).	
As	 ABWR	 is	 currently	 undergoing	 the	 Generic	 Design	 Assessment	 (GDA).	 The	
reactors	 in	 Fukushima	were	 also	 earlier	 versions	 of	 the	 BWR	 design,	 but	 the	
proposed	technology	has	various	enhanced	safety	features	in	comparison.	From	
an	 operational	 perspective,	 ABWRs	 in	 Japan	 have	 a	 low	 load	 factor,	 in	 other	
words	the	plants	have	been	often	on	outage	(IAEA	2016).	The	technical	 issues	
of	 the	existing	ABWRs	plants	 connected	 to	 the	 turbine	blades	and	 the	off-gas	
system	are	claimed	to	be	improved,	however	for	the	new	plants	(NNL	2013:	12).	
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The	details	of	 financing	a	megainvestment	project,	building	a	 supply	chain,	or	
licensing	 a	 reactor	 design	 sound	 technical,	 but	 these	 show	 a	 changing	 global	
nuclear	industry.	The	former	national	champions	are	now	looking	for	contracts	
globally.	 These	handful	of	nuclear	 vendors	even	venture	 into	 the	building	 the	
reactors	 themselves	 as	 there	 are	 no	 orders	 coming	 from	utilities	 in	 the	 hope	
that	the	successful	construction	of	a	first-of-a-kind	reactor	can	provide	the	right	
credentials	for	prospective	contracts.	The	UK	has	become	a	global	showcase	for	
these	constructions.	
5.10	CONCLUSION	
This	 chapter	 highlighted	 the	 geographies	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 through	 the	
strikingly	 different	 ways	 the	 megainvestment	 is	 envisioned	 and	 made	 at	
different	 places	 and	 scales.	 In	 responding	 to	 RQ1,	 I	 showed	 the	 striking	
differences	between	how	Wylfa	is	envisioned	and	made	from	the	perspective	of	
local	communities,	 the	County	Council,	 the	Welsh	Government,	Whitehall	and	
the	global	nuclear	 industry.	The	chapter,	however,	 is	not	 just	a	register	of	the	
places	and	scales	where	Wylfa	 is	made.	These	places	are	 interconnected	with	
each	other,	not	isolated.		
This	 chapter	 outlined	 how	 Wylfa	 is	 negotiated	 through	 geographies.	 First,	 I	
outlined	 how	 landscape	 of	 the	 new	 build	 and	 other	 low-carbon	 installations	
across	the	island	are	negotiated	as	an	intrusion	or	a	addition	to	the	landscape,	
and	how	social	landscapes	of	the	energy	island	are	constructed,	challenged,	and	
familiarised.	 Then	 I	 addressed	 Cemaes	 changing	 with	 the	 power	 station	 as	 a	
Welsh-speaking,	 bilingual	 or	 multicultural	 place	 through	 patterns	 of	
outmigration	 and	 influx	 of	 workers.	 I	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	 spatial	
differences	 across	 Anglesey	 and	 beyond	 by	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	
boundaries	made,	and	how	these	boundaries	–	often	around	local	and	non-local	
–	are	challenged.	
In	the	 latter	part	of	 the	chapter,	 I	 focused	on	how	Wylfa	Newydd	 is	governed	
across	various	scales.	I	highlighted	the	different	visions	and	associated	political	
and	managerial	 practices	 associated	with	 the	 investment.	 The	 shape	of	Wylfa	
Newydd	 is	 negotiated	 between	 establishing	 governance	 on	 these	 scales	 and	
making	arrangement	between	these.	On	each	scale,	there	are	efforts	for	spatial	
integration	and	building	up	competence.	For	the	Anglesey	County	Council,	the	
Energy	 Island	 Programme	 is	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 a	 socioeconomic	 vision	 for	 the	
island.	 The	new	Wylfa	and	other	energy	 investments	mean	a	major	 strain	 for	
restructuring	 the	 work	 of	 the	 council	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 these	
investments	 in	 areas,	 like	 education	 provision,	 road	 maintenance,	 economic	
development.	 	For	 the	 Welsh	 Government,	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 can	 potentially	
provide	 a	 vehicle	 for	 the	 spatial	 integration	 of	 Wales	 and	 for	 a	 vision	 of	 a	
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modern	nation.	 In	practice,	however,	the	resources	have	been	fairly	restricted	
to	 achieve	 these	 ambitious	 goals,	 as	 the	 devolved	 government	 has	 rather	
limited	 powers	 over	 energy	 issues.	 	For	 the	 UK	 government,	 the	 rationale	
behind	 new	 nuclear	 build	 has	 shifted	 from	 the	 ambitious	 decarbonisation	
targets	 to	 reindustrialising	 the	economy	and	attracting	 investment	 in	 a	 global	
competition.	 After	 two	 decades	 of	 privatising	 and	 deregulating	 electricity	
generation,	a	new	framework	has	been	emerging	to	de-risk	private	investment	
based	 on	 centralising	 (‘streamlining’)	 the	 planning	 process,	 designing	 state	
subsidies	 and	 guarantees	 for	 investors,	 and	 focused	 interventions	 in	 R&D,	
education	and	supply-chain	management.	The	Wylfa	investment,	as	a	nationally	
significant	infrastructure	project	(NSIP),	is	seen	by	many	as	eventually	“done	in	
London”	as	a	part	of	reconfiguring	state	in	a	changing	era.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	
focus	on	 the	a	more	 complex	picture	of	 governance	by	 focusing	 collaborative	
platforms,	 knowledge	 and	 shifting	 boundaries	 of	 public	 and	 private	 by	 using	
case	studies	from	the	Energy	Island	and	the	now	defunct	Department	of	Energy	
and	Climate	Change.	
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CHAPTER	 6.	 A	 GOVERNANCE	 EXPERIMENT:	 THE	
COLLABORATIVE	MAKING	OF	NEW	NUCLEAR	
6.1	GOVERNING	A	MEGAINVESTMENT	IN	PRACTICE	
The	 construction	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 a	 novel	 way	 of	 governing	 large-scale	
investment	projects	with	the	involvement	of	the	public	sector.	The	governance	
of	Wylfa	Newydd	is	not	done	in	a	hierarchical	structure	but	as	a	collaboration	of	
heterogeneous	 public	 and	 private	 organisations.	 Collaborative	 platforms	 are	
central	 to	 governing	 the	 megainvestment	 well	 beyond	 organisations	 working	
together	on	a	contractual	basis.	Knowledge	production	is	integral	to	working	in	
partnership,	 especially	 the	 boost	 of	 specialist	 knowledge	 in	 non-statutory	
collaboration	 and	 in	 the	 build-up	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 statutory	 process.	
Collaborations	 do	 not	 dissolve	 organisational	 boundaries,	 but	 these	 are	main	
drivers	 behind	 the	 organisational	 transformations,	 as	 I	 will	 show	 with	 the	
examples	 of	 the	 Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	 and	 the	 recently	 abolished	
Department	 of	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change.	 This	 chapter	 draws	 on	 the	
foundation	laid	by	the	previous	chapter	highlighting	the	multi-level	governance	
of	Wylfa	Newydd	and	the	different	visions	and	practices	associated	with	Wylfa	
Newydd	across	different	places,	from	local	councils	to	Westminster	corridors.	
The	transitions	literature	has	addressed	governance	in	fairly	generic	terms,	such	
as	 reflexivity	 (Grin	 2010;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	 2010)	 or	 actor	 strategies	
(Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009;	Farla	et	al.	2012).	 In	Chapter	3,	 I	highlighted	that	
STS	 provides	 more	 in-depth	 perspectives	 on	 governance	 by	 addressing	 the	
practices	of	how	expert	knowledge	and	politics	are	intermingled	(Jasanoff	2007,	
2004;	 Mitchell	 2002).	 The	 public	 demonstrations	 of	 expert	 knowledge	 carry	
technopolitical	 agendas	 (Collins	 1988;	 Hilgartner	 2000;	 Jasanoff	 1994),	 which	
are	particularly	visible	in	knowledge	controversies	(Epstein	1998;	Sarewitz	2004;	
Wynne	1996,	1992a).	 The	production	of	 information	and	expert	 knowledge	 is	
central	to	the	governance	of	large	technological	projects	(Barry	2013;	Flyvbjerg	
2014;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Bruzelius,	 and	 Rothengatter	 2003).	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 show	
governance	as	an	emergent	learning	process	where	the	practices	of	production	
and	negotiation	of	knowledge	are	central.	
In	 addressing	 the	RQ3	 ‘How	 is	Wylfa	Newydd	governed	as	 a	megainvestment	
project?’,	 I	 use	 three	 case	 studies	 to	 highlight	 how	 public	 sector	 bodies	 are	
engaging	with	the	megainvestment	project	and	involved	in	the	governance	of	it.	
The	structure	of	this	chapter	is	the	following.	In	section	6.2,	I	highlight	how	the	
overall	governance	 is	an	experiment	which	goes	beyond	a	hierarchical	project	
structure	 and	where	 public	 bodies	 are	 finding	 novel	 ways	 to	 engage	with	 an	
investment	project	of	 this	 scale.	Then	come	the	 three	case	studies.	 In	 section	
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6.3,	 I	discuss	 the	 reorientation	of	 the	 Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council	 from	 its	
traditional	 service-provision	and	statutory	 functions	 through	working	 together	
with	 Horizon	 and	 other	 companies	 and	 stakeholders	 in	 particular	 under	 the	
Energy	 Island	 Programme	 framework	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	
megainvestment.	 In	 section	6.4,	 I	 address	 the	 statutory	engagement	between	
the	 Council	 and	 Horizon	 that	 resulted	 in	 a	 recalibration	 of	 the	 Council’s	
functions	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Planning	 Performance	 Agreement	 through	
which	the	developer	pays	the	expenses	of	the	Council	to	build	up	the	capacity	
to	 justify	 contested	 evidence	 in	 negotiating	 statutory	 benefits	 from	 the	
developer	to	the	local	authority.	In	section	6.5,	I	describe	the	efforts	of	the	now	
defunct	Department	of	Energy	and	Climate	Change	to	develop	commercial	skills	
capacity	 primary	 through	 industry	 secondments	 to	 engage	 with	 major	
developer	companies.	In	the	concluding	section,	I	draw	some	threads	together	
by	 highlighting	 the	 role	 of	 collaborative	 platforms,	 the	 sometimes	 porous	
boundaries	 between	 private	 and	 public	 sector	 working,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 co-
production	and	negotiation	of	knowledge	in	governing	new	nuclear.	
6.2	FACING	A	MEGAINVESTMENT:	A	GOVERNANCE	EXPERIMENT	
Fourteen	billion	pounds	sterling.	This	is	the	latest	estimate	for	the	construction	
of	the	new	power	plant	just	on	behalf	of	the	developer	company,	not	including	
many	of	the	additional	costs,	 like	the	transmission	lines	built	by	National	Grid.	
This	is	an	enormous	amount	of	money	compared	with	the	annual	budget	of	the	
Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council	or	the	now	defunct	Department	of	Energy	and	
Climate	Change.24	To	engage	with	a	megainvestment	like	Wylfa	Newydd,	public	
sector	 bodies	 do	 not	 merely	 integrate	 the	 engagement	 into	 their	 normal	
functioning,	but	radically	have	to	change	their	way	of	working.	An	analogy	can	
be	 made	 with	 the	 old	 proverb	 often	 attributed	 to	 economist	 John	 Maynard	
Keynes:	 “If	 you	 owe	 your	 bank	 manager	 a	 thousand	 pounds,	 you	 are	 at	 his	
mercy.	If	you	owe	him	a	million	pounds,	he	is	at	your	mercy”.	Building	a	nuclear	
power	 plant	 means	 that	 a	 developer	 company	 is	 not	 simply	 adapting	 to	 the	
planning	regulations,	but	the	government	and	the	 local	council	need	to	adjust	
their	 planning	 framework	 to	 the	 megainvestment.	 As	 the	 previous	 chapter	
highlighted	 (subsection	 5.8.2),	 the	 government	 ‘streamlined’	 the	 planning	
process	 for	 large-scale	 infrastructural	 investment	 (Planning	 Act	 2008)	 via	
designating	 those	 as	 Nationally	 Significant	 Infrastructure	 Projects	 (NSIPs)	 and	
establishing	National	 Policy	 Statements	 (NPSs)	 to	 justify	 these	 projects	 (DECC	
2011b,	 2011c).	 The	 Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	 also	 revamped	 their	 local	
development	plans	by	creating	a	Supplementary	Planning	Guidance	on	the	new	
																																																						
24	DECC	had	£126m	in	its	latest	budget	for	adminsitration	costs	(DECC	2016),	and	latest	annual	budget	for	
the	the	Isle	of	Anglesey	Council	is	£125m	(IACC	2016).	
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Wylfa	(IACC	2014c)	for	the	transitory	period	until	the	Joint	Development	Local	
Plan25	with	Gwynedd	County	on	the	mainland	becomes	effective	presumably	in	
2017.	The	challenge	of	not	being	left	behind	in	dealing	with	a	megainvestment	
means	finding	new	ways	of	working.	
	
Figure	 6.1.	 Comparison	 of	Ownership	 Relationships	 and	 Contract	 Structure	 in	 a	 Consortium	 (during	 the	
previous	nuclear	programmes).	Source:	Wearne	(2015:	2)	
The	literature	on	governing	megainvestments	is	concentrating	on	the	successes	
and	 failures	 of	 delivering	 a	 construction	 project	 on	 time	 and	 budget	 through	
multi-organisational	co-operations	 (Ahola	et	al.	2014;	Brady	et	al.	2006;	Brady	
and	Davies	2010;	Flyvbjerg	2014;	Flyvbjerg,	Bruzelius,	and	Rothengatter	2003;	
Ruuska	et	al.	2011;	Sovacool	and	Cooper	2013).	The	current	nuclear	new	build	
projects	 will	 be	 built	 very	 differently	 than	 all	 previous	 nuclear	 constructions.	
Historical	 construction	had	hierarchical	project	 structures	 (Ruuska	et	al.	2011;	
Wearne	2015),	centred	on	a	consortium	of	engineering	companies	(see	Figure	
6.1).	Upon	the	government	decision,	the	Central	Electricity	Generating	Board	as	
prospective	operator	contracted	the	construction	consortium	by	using	technical	
designs	 of	 the	 UK	 Atomic	 Energy	 Authority	 (Hannah	 1982;	 Wearne	 and	 Bird	
2010).	 The	 member	 companies	 formed	 a	 consortium,	 where	 decisions	 were	
made	 collectively.	 All	 key	 decision-making	 was	 centralised	 in	 the	 consortium	
team,	which	was	 responsible	 to	deliver	 the	 turn-key	 contract	 signed	with	 the	
nationalised	utility	 (CEGB	 in	 England	and	Wales).	 In	 terms	of	project	delivery,	
the	 consortium	 team	 contracted	 the	 member	 companies	 to	 supply	 key	
components	 (e.g.,	 reactor	 pressure	 vessel,	 boiler,	 civil	 engineering)	 as	 Tier	 1	
contractors,	who	often	further	subcontracted	work	to	lower	tiers.	This	resulted	
in	 a	 hierarchical	 project	 delivery	 and	 decision-making	 structure,	 though	
member	companies	were	both	owners	of	the	consortia	and	Tier	1	contractors	
(Wearne	 2015;	Wearne	 and	 Bird	 2010).	While	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	
Department	 of	 Energy,	 the	CEGB,	UKAEA	were	 intricate	 and	 sometimes	 quite	
																																																						
25 	See	 details	 of	 the	 JLDP	 process	 on	 http://www.anglesey.gov.uk/planning-and-waste/planning-
policy/joint-local-development-plan-anglesey-and-gwynedd/	(Accessed	on	27-09-2016)	
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complicated,	not	 to	mention	the	conflicts	between	member	companies	of	 the	
consortia	(Hannah	1982;	Wearne	2015;	Wearne	and	Bird	2010;	Williams	1980),	
nuclear	 constructions	 were	 carried	 out	 in	 a	 relatively	 clear	 organisational	
hierarchy.	
In	 contrast,	 the	 ongoing	 two	 nuclear	 constructions	 in	 Europe,	 Olkiluoto	 3	 in	
Finland	and	Flamanville	3	in	France,	serve	as	an	example	of	how	Wylfa	Newydd	
will	 be	 built.	 These	 projects	 show	 that	 “there	 should	 be	 a	 shift	 from	 viewing	
multi-firm	 projects	 as	 hierarchical	 contract	 organizations	 to	 viewing	 them	 as	
supply	 networks	 characterized	 by	 a	 complex	 and	 networked	 organizational	
structure”	(Ruuska	et	al.	2011:	647),	and	thus	there	should	be	a	similar	“shift	in	
the	emphasis	of	the	predominant	modes	of	governance,	market	and	hierarchy	
towards	 novel	 governance	 approaches	 that	 emphasize	 network-level	
mechanisms	such	as	self-regulation	within	the	project”	(Ruuska	et	al.	2011:	647)	
to	 approach	 the	 current	 nuclear	 megaprojects.	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 one	 key	
Anglesey	 stakeholder	 summarised	 that	 partnerships	 between	 different	
organisations	are	central	to	constructing	Wylfa	Newydd:	
“Most	 civil	 engineering	 companies	 have	 moved	 away	 from	 this	 old	
contraction	kind	of	 ‘there	 is	 a	 specification,	we	will	 give	 it	 to	 you,	 you	
give	us	a	price	for	building	it,	go	ahead	and	build	it’	and	at	the	end	of	the	
day,	whatever	 [issue]	 has	 not	 gone	properly	 they	 gonna	have	 a	 claim.	
And	you	didn’t	build	this	and	that	right	and	you	are	over	time	on	that.	
[Instead]	 what	 they	 turned	 now	 is	 partnership	 agreements	where	 the	
idea	is	to	make	the	development…shaped	together.”	
(Interview	21)	
This	 chapter,	 however,	 has	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 political	 understanding	 of	
governance	 than	project	governance.	26	This	chapter	 is	not	on	how	the	overall	
contours	 of	 the	 megainvestment	 are	 shaped	 by	 private	 and	 public	 sector	
organisations,	 not	 just	 on	 how	 supply	 chain	 organisations	 work	 together	 on	
successfully	 constructing	Wylfa	Newydd.	 In	 particular,	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 how	
key	public	sector	bodies	are	engaging	with	the	nuclear	new	build	programme.	
The	UK	nuclear	programme	has	an	ambiguity.	It	is	a	state	programme	to	comply	
with	 statutory	 decarbonisation	 targets	 (DTI	 2007),	 but	 it	 is	 also	 a	 private	
investment	of	 (multinational)	companies.	 In	the	previous	chapter	 I	highlighted	
how	UK	government	is	deeply	involved	in	new	nuclear	programme	through	‘de-
																																																						
26	Please	note	that	throughout	the	thesis	 I	am	also	using	a	wider	sense	of	governance	compared	to	how	
most	of	stakeholder	informants	and	interviewees	used	the	term,	especially	council	officials.	This	academic	
sense	of	governance	is	more	about	how	different	actors	work	together,	while	for	practitioners	defined	it	
more	as	a	means	to	achieve	certain	aims	by	putting	appropriate	structures	and	policies	in	place.	
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risking’	 the	 investments	 of	 private	 companies	 through	 streamlining	 planning	
and	 regulation,	 providing	 financial	 guarantees,	 and	 direct	 involvement	
especially	 in	 R&D,	 education	 and	 training.	 Similarly,	 I	 addressed	 how	 public	
sector	 bodies,	 from	 the	 local	 community	 councils	 to	 the	Welsh	 Government,	
struggle	to	build	up	capacity	to	engage	with	the	investment	of	this	scale.	In	this	
chapter,	 I	 address	 how	 public	 bodies	 are	 involved	 in	 governing	 the	
megainvestment.		
Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 an	 experiment	 of	 working	 together.	 The	 governance	 of	 the	
megainvestment	 is	a	 learning	process	across	various	organisations	and	places.	
There	are	ongoing	changes	in	the	form	of	partnerships	and	in	the	organisations	
themselves	 to	 reflect	 a	 learning	 process.	 In	my	 interviews,	 public	 and	 private	
stakeholders	often	emphasised	this	learning,	on	the	organisational	level	as	well	
as	on	the	personal	level.	Working	together	often	focuses	on	learning	from	each	
other,	and	there	are	deliberate	efforts	of	learning	from	each	other.	While	there	
is	no	blueprint	of	this	governance	experiment	–	the	specific	organisation	forms	
of	 working	 and	 especially	 working	 together	 are	 changing	 –	 there	 are	 some	
broad	 characteristics	 of	 this	 new	 governance	 model	 emerging	 similar	 across	
various	geographic	scales	and	places.	
This	 chapter	 does	 not	 aim	 to	 provide	 an	 overarching	 account	 of	 how	Wylfa	
Newydd	is	governed	in	the	broad	sense	but	some	insights	of	how	public	sector	
bodies	 are	 involved	 through	 three	 case	 studies.	 First,	 the	 Energy	 Island	
Programme	of	the	county	council	marks	a	shift	from	the	statutory	and	service	
provider	 approach	 to	 a	 ‘project	 management’	 approach	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
needs	 of	 crucial	 investors	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 local	 spending	 cuts.	 Second,	 the	
statutory	 community	benefits	was	a	driver	 to	 recalibrating	 the	 county	 council	
and	 stacking	up	evidence	 funded	by	Horizon	 through	a	Planning	Performance	
Agreement	to	pressure	the	same	company.	Third,	the	now	defunct	Department	
of	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change	 has	 been	 cultivating	 specialist	 skills	 primarily	
through	 secondments	 to	 engage	 with	 large-scale	 energy	 investments	 and	 to	
work	closely	with	industry.	These	studies	highlight	different	aspects	of	how	the	
change	 in	 public	 sector	 organisations	 is	 connected	 to	 engagement	 with	
investors,	learning	how	to	work	with	industry,	and	building	expert	knowledge.	
6.3	 ISLE	OF	ANGLESEY	COUNTY	COUNCIL	AND	THE	ENERGY	 ISLAND	PROGRAMME:	
RESHAPING	FUNCTIONING	TO	ATTRACT	PRIVATE	INVESTMENT	
Engaging	with	the	Wylfa	Newydd	megainvestment	has	profoundly	changed	how	
the	 Isle	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	 operates,	 particularly	 through	 the	 novel	
Energy	Island	Programme.	The	council	 is	changing	from	a	service	provider	and	
statutory	authority	functioning	to	project	management	approach	responding	to	
the	needs	of	investors,	Horizon	in	particular.	This	shift	can	be	understood	in	the	
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context	of	how	local	authorities	are	changing	across	Britain	in	the	wake	of	cuts	
in	 local	 spending	 by	 looking	 for	 contributions	 from	 industry	 to	 maintain	
services.	The	novel	approach	of	Anglesey	to	work	with	private	investors	is	to	a	
great	 extent	 a	 model	 for	 other	 North	 Wales	 county	 councils	 in	 the	 age	 of	
austerity	(Interview	14).	This	section	provides	an	overview	of	how	this	approach	
has	developed,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	Energy	Island	Programme,	which	
is	 widely	 promoted	 as	 a	 best	 practice	 (CREW	 Regeneration	Wales	 2014;	 J.	 I.	
Jones	2013;	LCEE	2014;	RTPI	Cymru	2013).		
The	Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council	has	increasingly	been	relying	on	developer	
companies	to	keep	public	services,	especially	in	the	wake	of	the	recent	cuts	in	
local	authority	spending.	The	problem	is	rooted	in	a	decades-long	history.	The	
economy	 of	 Anglesey	 has	 largely	 been	 dependent	 on	 a	 handful	 of	 few	 big	
employers	following	the	white	heat	of	industrialisation	after	the	war,	especially	
on	the	northern	side	of	the	island.	In	addition	to	the	existing	Holyhead	port,	this	
wave	of	industrialisation	included	the	expansion	of	the	RAF	Valley	airbase,	the	
Octal	bromine	works	at	Amlwch,	Anglesey	Aluminium	near	Holyhead,	the	Wylfa	
plant	 near	 Cemaes,	 and	 finally	 the	 Shell	 oil	 receiving	 station	 at	 Amlwch	 and	
adjacent	 depot	 at	 Rhosgoch.	 These	 were	 results	 of	 government	 policies	 and	
industry	 decisions,	 local	 councils	 did	 not	 have	 active	 policies	 to	 attract	 these	
investments.	Following	the	1970s	recessions,	however,	economic	development	
has	become	a	prominent	function	for	local	authorities	across	the	UK	in	finding	
ways	 to	 promote	 local	 economic	 growth	 (Monaghan,	 North,	 and	 Southern	
2016).	On	Anglesey,	there	was	already	an	economic	development	officer	in	the	
1980s	 (Interview	 3).	 Economic	 development	 was	 established	 as	 a	 different	
approach	 than	 traditional	 planning,	 it	 aimed	 to	 actively	 attract	 investors	 to	
industrial	 estates	 –	 now	 preferably	 called	 business	 parks	 –	 by	 offering	 local	
infrastructure	and	financial	incentives.	Following	the	Anglesey	independence	of	
Anglesey	 council	 from	 Gwynedd	 in	 1996,	 an	 independent	 Economic	
Development	Unit	(EDU)	was	established.	
In	the	last	two	decades,	however,	the	expectation	towards	the	industries	on	the	
island	has	changed	with	the	swell	of	community	benefit	contributions.	It	was	no	
longer	enough	to	provide	employment	and	pay	the	business	rates.	Recently,	the	
community	 benefit	 contributions	 from	 investors	 have	 become	 crucial	 in	
expectations	 towards	developers,	 and	an	 important	 source	of	 funding	 for	 the	
council	and	community	initiatives.	At	least	three	concurrent	processes	resulted	
in	 community	 benefit	 contributions	 becoming	 so	 central.	 First,	 Wylfa-owner	
Magnox	 put	 serious	 efforts	 into	 becoming	 a	 ‘good	 neighbour’,	 including	
establishing	 socioeconomic	 funds	 and	 sponsorship	 (Magnox	 2016),	 to	 rebuild	
support	 after	 the	Wylfa	B	 fiasco	 in	 the	 late	1980s	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	detail	 in	 the	
next	chapter.	Secondly,	the	Isle	of	Anglesey	Charitable	Trust	was	set	up	in	1990	
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by	 Shell	 to	 manage	 the	 legacies	 of	 the	 oil	 terminal	 at	 Amlwch	 and	 the	
associated	depot,	currently	disposing	over	£17	m	capital	fund	(Isle	of	Anglesey	
Charitable	Trust	2016).	 In	 the	 closure	of	existing	 industries,	 key	public-private	
co-operations	emerged	in	managing	legacy	facilities	and	redundant	employees,	
such	 as	 Anglesey	 Aluminium	 (Lateral	 Power	 and	 Ecopark,	 Land	 &	 Lakes,	 and	
Mon	Maintenance	 Services)	 and	 the	Wylfa	 plant	 (Shaping	 the	 Future	 Project)	
(Menter	Mon	 2015).	 Thirdly,	 and	most	 importantly,	 community	 benefit	 funds	
became	 the	 established	 model	 for	 wind	 turbine	 developers	 on	 Anglesey,	
together	with	the	rest	of	the	country	(Cass,	Walker,	and	Devine-Wright	2010)	as	
wind	 farms	 started	 to	 scatter	 around	 the	 island.	When	 the	 first	wind	 farm	 in	
Wales,	Rhyd-y-Groes	between	Cemaes	and	Amlwch,	was	established	in	1992,	it	
provided	 no	 community	 benefit	 contributions	 (Renewable	 UK	 Cymru	 2013).	
Support	 for	 wind	 turbines	 deteriorated	 across	 the	 island	 with	 the	 sobering	
realisation	 that	 these	 investments	make	 good	money	 to	 investors,	 but	 hardly	
any	jobs	for	local	people	or	extra	income	to	the	council.	To	gain	support	locally,	
community	benefit	 schemes	became	an	 integral	 for	new	 turbine	 installations,	
and	 later	 solar	 farms.	 This	 coincided	 with	 the	 austerity	 politics	 after	 the	
financial	 crisis,	 especially	 under	 the	 coalition	 government	 (Lowndes	 and	
Pratchett	2012).	These	community	contributions	became	essential	to	get	extra	
funding	 for	 councils	 to	 maintain	 local	 services	 and	 to	 make	 investment	 in	
community	 facilities	 (Interviews	13,	14,	16,	26).	As	a	senior	 local	 intermediary	
between	the	public	and	private	sectors	summarised	 it,	“at	 the	 local	authority,	
there	 is	 quite	 a	 lot	 of	 emphasis	 on	 community	 benefits	 from	 these	 industry	
developments.”	 (Interview	 25).	 Community	 benefits	 from	 investors	 have	
become	the	holy	grail	of	the	County	Council	and	many	community	councils	alike	
(Interviews	3,	14,	16).		
The	 formation	of	 the	Energy	 Island	Programme	 in	2010	aimed	 to	create	 long-
lasting	economic	benefits	for	the	island,	especially	from	the	Wylfa	new	build.	It	
marked	 a	 strategic	 approach	 to	 the	 harvesting	 the	 potential	 in	 lavish	
community	benefit	contributions	and	job	creation	opportunities	as	opposed	to	
the	earlier	ad	hoc	engagement	with	potential	 investors	 (Interview	13).	A	 local	
stakeholder	summarised	it	the	following:	
“One	of	the	first	things	the	public	sector	has	to	do	is	to	understand	the	
expectations	and	needs	of	public	developers.	It’s	only	by	knowing	what	
their	 expectations	 and	 concerns	 are	 that	 you	 can	 get	 the	 best	 out	 of	
them	 in	 terms	of	economic	and	community	benefits.	 […]	 It’s	a	big	 job.	
The	 Energy	 Island	 Programme	 has	 been	 established,	 and	 establishing	
these	targets	and	has	been	looking	at	routes	for	these	critical	paths,	and	
I’m	hoping	they	will	be	given	the	resources	to	progress	it.	But	it	leads	a	
team	taking	a	project	management	view.”	(Interview	25)	
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As	 the	 previous	 chapter	 highlighted,	 the	 low-carbon	 energy	 sector	 was	
identified	to	attract	the	investors	the	island	desperately	needed,	especially	the	
expected	new	nuclear	project.	The	Energy	Island	aimed	to	be	a	more	systematic	
vehicle	to	engage	with	investors	in	the	low-carbon	energy	sector,	like	the	Wylfa	
Newydd	project	by	Horizon,	the	Celtic	Array	offshore	wind	farm	or	the	Marine	
Current	Turbines	tidal	project	at	the	Skerries.	
As	a	key	EIP	official	summarised	this	new	approach:	
“The	programme	had	credibility	once	the	developers	were	part	of	 it.	 It	
wasn’t	 something	 that	 the	 public	 sector	 set-up,	 it	 was	 aspirational.	 It	
wasn’t	a	set	of	high-level	objective	with	which	the	public	sector	came	up	
with	and	 looked	around	 ‘how	do	we	deliver	these?’.	 It	was	set	up	as	a	
partnership	from	the	start	to	which	Anglesey	Council	and	the	developers	
on	the	island	and	everybody	come	along.	Because	they	understand	they	
got	a	role	where	the	influence	is.“	(Interview	13)	
The	Council	 is	restructuring	its	activities	by	adopting	a	new	approach	primarily	
in	 response	 to	 the	 needs	 of	Wylfa	 Newydd.	 The	 Energy	 Island	 Programme	 is	
central	to	this	new	approach	when	the	Council	 is	pioneering	an	organisational	
change.	The	Energy	Island	Programme	is	a	changing	and	learning	initiative.	My	
conversations	with	the	council	officials	involved	in	EIP	often	arrived	to	the	topic	
of	understanding	how	the	private	and	public	sectors	work	(Interviews	3,	10,	13,	
14,	15).	Probably	 the	main	 learning	point	 for	 the	EIP	 team	was	 to	understand	
the	 needs	 of	 developers,	 and	 learn	 how	 to	 respond	 those.	 As	 one	 former	
economic	development	officer	summarised	it:	
“Part	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 [economic]	 development	 officer	 is	 to	 be	 an	
interpreter:	to	interpret	business	needs	and	business	ways	of	thinking	to	
other	 departments	 of	 the	 council,	 and	 to	 interpret	 the	 work	 of	 other	
departments	of	the	councils	to	business.”	(Interview	3)	
This	resonated	with	the	director	of	the	Energy	 Island	Programme	as	their	 first	
challenges	after	the	programme	was	established.	
We	went	from	a	situation	when	it	was	a	matter	of	talking	to	developers,	
making	 them	 feel	 comfortable,	 to	 actually	 establishing	 ourselves	 as	 a	
programme,	 as	 a	 brand.	 Establishing	 workstreams	 and	 start	 talking	
about	 things	 like	 planning	 issues,	 and	 supply	 chain	 issues.	 (Interview	
15a)	
The	 function	of	 the	 Energy	 Island	workstreams	 is	 to	 provide	 “one	 stop	 shop”	
(Interview	15a,	16),	platforms	where	public	and	private	sector	representatives	
can	discuss	issues.	Council	officials	are	keen	to	understand	the	needs	of	private	
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investors.	The	EIP	workstreams	provide	“an	opportunity	to	get	first-hand	from	
the	developers	what	their	needs	are	and	how	the	public	sector	in	a	coordinated	
way	 can	 respond	 to	 that,	 from	 education,	 skills	 training,	 business	 support,	 IT	
issues,	Welsh	language	issues”	(Interview	10).	The	challenge	for	council	officials	
and	 politicians	 is	 to	 understand	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 investors	 and	 to	 respond	 to	
those,	especially	in	relation	to	planning	consents,	while	successfully	promoting	
their	 aims	 to	maximise	 local	 content	 in	 the	 investment.	 As	 one	 Energy	 Island	
officer	summarised	it:	
“At	the	end	of	the	day	the	commercial	success	of	this	development,	the	
Energy	Island,	will	be	far	more	likely	to	happen	if	they	have	the	support	
and	 local	 people	 buying-working	within	 the	 development,	 rather	 than	
local	people	excluded	because	they	haven’t	got	the	right	skills	and	right	
abilities	 to	 take	 advantage.	 Even	 though	 we	 have	 different	 success	
criteria,	one	cannot	be	achieved	without	the	other.”	(Interview	13)	
The	most	striking	challenge	is	to	establish	a	‘project	management	approach’	in	
the	 local	 council,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 more	 traditional	 regulatory-statutory	
approach	 (Interview	 15a).	 This	 approach	 means	 being	 in	 line	 with	 the	
investment	 projects.	 The	 council	 should	 be	 able	 to	 respond	 quickly	 to	 the	
stretched	 schedule	 of	 Horizon	 for	 constructing	Horizon	Wylfa	Newydd.	While	
the	 2025	 construction	 deadline	 seems	 far	 away,	 the	 time	 delays	 and	 cost	
escalation	are	the	number	one	risk	for	the	developer	company,	as	explained	in	
the	previous	chapter.	Every	day	of	delay	can	cost	hundreds	of	thousand	pounds.	
Thus	the	planning	authorities	and	regulators	have	to	follow	an	agreed	timeline	
with	 the	 developer	 (HNP	 and	 IACC	 2011:	 13).	 Following	 the	 tight	 schedule	 of	
consenting	process	means	an	adaptation	of	a	project	management	approach	as	
opposed	to	just	applying	some	statutory	rules	and	internal	procedures.	As	a	key	
official	involved	in	EIP	summarised	it:	
“Remember	that	Energy	Island	Programme	operates	within	a	period	and	
matching	 its	 life-cycle	 of	 private	 sector	 projects:	 concepts,	 getting	
support,	 getting	 through	 the	 planning	 process	 and	 getting	 all	 the	
consents,	 and	 do	 some	 procurements,	 building	 on	 site,	 and	 after	
finishing	commissioning,	and	operation,	and	care	and	maintenance.	The	
Energy	 Island	 Programme	 mirrors	 the	 lifecycle	 of	 these	 projects.	 The	
Energy	 Island	 projects	 have	 their	 own	 life-cycles,	 for	 example	 Wylfa	
Newydd.	Otherwise	the	Energy	 Island	Programme	operates	 in	 isolation	
and	 disconnected,	 so	 what	 we	 had	 to	 do	 is	 the	 life-cycle	 of	 the	 big	
projects	move	 forward,	 we	 review	 our	 programme	 and	 our	 response.	
The	 EIP	 is	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	 day,	 the	 local	 authority’s	 response	 to	 the	
energy	 and	 inward	 investment.	 To	 make	 sure	 that	 our	 response	 is	
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appropriate,	 fit	 for	 purpose,	 and	 contributes	 in	 a	 positive	 way	 to	
maximising	 local	 benefits,	 and	 those	 expectations	 of	 jobs,	 and	
employment,	and	quality	life	for	local	people.	[…]	The	biggest	challenge	
for	the	programme	is	to	be	able	to	respond	to	the	progress	the	private	
sector	is	making,	and	not	to	be	left	behind.”	(Interview	13)	
Understanding	the	private	sector	was	ensured	through	seconding	people	from	
industry	backgrounds.	Anglesey	Energy	Island	Programme	by	the	time	I	did	my	
fieldwork,	was	directed	by	a	secondee,	the	socio-economic	manager	of	Magnox	
at	Wylfa.	Similarly,	the	Programme	Delivery	Manager	of	Major	Energy	Consents,	
also	 the	chair	of	 the	EIP	 Infrastructure	Developer	Forum,	was	on	 secondment	
from	the	Welsh	Government.	He	used	to	be	the	last	chief	executive	of	the	once	
influential	 Welsh	 Development	 Agency	 (WDA),	 with	 a	 substantial	 business	
experience.	 In	 the	 small	 EIP	 team	 there	 were	 several	 people	 from	 industry	
backgrounds,	 or	 seconded	 from	 commercial	 companies,	 like	 Magnox.	 As	 the	
director	of	the	programme	explained	to	me	his	secondment:	
“I	also	have	a	good	understanding	of	the	concerns	of	the	locality	[that]	
enable	me	to	act	as	a	middleman	in	some	ways,	in	terms	of	making	sure	
they	have	the	right	levels	of	conversation.	I’m	also	able	to	look	at	things,	
for	instance,	by	putting	myself	in	the	shoes	of	the	developer,	what	does	
the	 developer	want.	 But	 also	 to	 try	 and	 think	 about	 it	 what	 does	 the	
locality	want,	and	how	can	the	 locality	developer	help	the	 locality,	and	
the	developer	help	the	locality.”	(Interview	15a)	
The	 above	 experiences	 of	 adapting	 a	 project	 management	 approach	 in	
response	 to	 major	 developments	 are	 not	 just	 specific	 to	 the	 Energy	 Island	
Programme,	but	feed	back	to	the	overall	operation	of	the	Council.	Energy	Island	
as	a	case	study	and	best	practice	(CREW	Regeneration	Wales	2014;	LCEE	2014;	
RTPI	Cymru	2013).	As	one	officer	summarised	it:	
“But	 we	 have	 relatively	 embraced	 that,	 trying	 to	 take	 what	 we	 have	
learnt	from	the	project	management	office	[PMO,	see	next	subsection]	
and	 the	Energy	 Island	Programme,	and	 integrate	 it	 and	use	 it	 in	other	
elements	of	the	service	as	well.”	(Interview	14)	
The	 Energy	 Island	 approach	 was	 often	 positioned	 as	 the	 driver	 behind	 the	
changes	 in	 the	 council.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 changes	 in	 the	working	 of	 Isle	 of	
Anglesey	 County	 Council	 are	 far	 from	 isolated,	 albeit	 the	 Council	 is	 in	 many	
regards	 unique	 in	 dealing	 with	 £14bn	 new	 nuclear	 project	 among	 other	
investments.	 As	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 project	 has	 wide-ranging	 economic	
implications	for	other	North	Wales	councils,	the	Energy	Island	Programme	has	
gradually	 moved	 out	 from	 focusing	 only	 on	 Anglesey.	 Moreover,	 other	 local	
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authorities	have	also	 taken	up	 the	approach,	and	 the	Energy	 Island	became	a	
model	across	the	region	(RTPI	Cymru	2013).	For	example,	the	EIP	director	was	
appointed	 as	 the	 chair	 of	 the	 Snowdonia	 Enterprise	 Zone,	which	 also	 include	
the	 now	 decommissioning	 Trawsfynydd	 nuclear	 site.	 More	 importantly,	 the	
North	 Wales	 Economic	 Ambition	 Board	 (NWEAB)	 was	 set	 up.	 NWEAB	 is	 a	
collaboration	 of	 the	 six	 councils	 to	 promote	 investment	 opportunities,	 supply	
chain	openings,	and	skills	training	across	the	region,	by	strongly	building	on	the	
experience	of	the	Energy	Island	Programme.	Similarly,	local	authorities	at	other	
nuclear	 new	build	 sites	 have	 followed	 similar	 approach	 to	Anglesey,	 in	which	
the	New	Nuclear	Local	Authorities	Group	(NNLAG)	played	a	key	facilitative	role.	
For	 example,	 the	 Britain’s	 Energy	 Coast	 initiative	 in	 West	 Cumbria,	 home	 to	
Sellafield	and	the	new	Moorside	project,	was	very	much	the	model	for	Anglesey	
Energy	Island	(URS	2010).	
6.4	STATUTORY	ENGAGEMENT	AND	PLANNING	PERFORMANCE	AGREEMENTS:	THE	
BATTLE	OF	EVIDENCE	
The	statutory	side	of	working	together	between	the	Council	and	Horizon	draws	
attention	 to	 how	 organisational	 differences	 are	 articulated	 and	 expert	
knowledge	 is	as	much	contested	and	co-produced.	Here	 I	highlight	the	role	of	
statutory	 community	 benefit	 contributions,	 a	 ‘shopping	 list’	 to	 mitigate	 the	
adverse	 effects	 of	 the	 development.	 In	 negotiating	with	 Horizon,	 the	 Council	
has	 to	 set	proper	policies	 and	a	 solid	evidence	base	 to	establishing	a	need	 in	
this	blurry	area.	This	 led	 to	 the	 separation	of	 the	 statutory	and	non-statutory	
functions	of	the	Council.	The	evidence	base	of	the	council,	however,	is	financed	
through	Horizon	by	the	so-called	Planning	Performance	Agreement	in	exchange	
of	 expecting	 taking	 prompt	 planning	 decisions	 by	 the	 Council.	 Thus	 the	
evidence	can	be	used	to	contest	the	developer	company	to	shape	the	project	in	
a	way	more	beneficial	locally.		
In	the	statutory	process,	the	statutory	benefit	contributions	are	a	key	 issue	as	
distinct	 from	 voluntary	 benefits	 or	 corporate	 goodwill.	 Under	 current	
legislation,	 the	 local	 council	 is	 the	 planning	 authority	 on	 associated	
developments	 outside	 of	 the	 main	 construction	 (e.g.,	 road	 improvement,	
temporary	 workers’	 accommodation,	 logistics	 centre)	 and	 also	 for	 all	 works	
before	Horizon	gets	 their	planning	consent,	presumably	by	2019	 (e.g.,	 ground	
works,	site	office).	In	working	together	one	particularly	contentious	arena	is	the	
mitigation	 of	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 the	 environment,	 economies	 and	
communities,	 which	 is	 a	 statutory	 planning	 obligation	 set	 by	 the	 Town	 and	
Country	Planning	Act	 (TCPA)	2010.	These	mitigations	are	generally	 referred	as	
the	 statutory	 benefits	 to	 distinguish	 from	 corporate	 goodwill,	 which	 is	 also	
known	as	 voluntary	or	non-statutory	 community	benefit	 contributions	 (CBCs).	
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These	 statutory	 benefits	 can	 be	 both	 monetary	 and	 in-kind,	 like	 road	
improvements,	housing	provisions,	or	leisure	facilities	provided	by	the	investor.	
Statutory	benefits	are	negotiated	between	the	local	council	and	the	developer	
company	 when	 eventually	 a	 so-called	 Section	 106	 agreement	 is	 signed,	
referring	to	the	relevant	section	of	TCPA.	For	example	the,	the	Hinkley	Point	C	
S106	agreement,	offered	£64	m	to	 local	services,	 including	£7.2	m	community	
fund	 (West	Somerset	Council	and	Sedgemoor	District	Council	2012).	A	council	
official	 highlighted	 the	 importance	of	 these	 statutory	benefits	 in	 the	planning	
process:	
There	 is	 a	 danger	 that	 Horizon	 considers	 the	 planning	 process	 a	 little	
too…I	think	Horizon	sees	planning	as	a	ticket	to	production,	whereas	the	
local	 authority	 sees	 it	 as	 a	 crucial	opportunity	 to	help	 the	economy	of	
the	island.	And	there	is	a	big	gap	between	the	developer	interpretation,	
to	 have	 a	 ticket	 to	 go	 to	 the	 cinema,	 and	 the	 local	 authority	
interpretation	[that]	whilst	these	people	are	here,	let’s	get	more	roads,	
let’s	get	our	broadband	upgraded.”	(Interview	25)	
For	 Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council,	 the	expectations	towards	Horizon	 include	
improvements	 in	 local	 infrastructure	 and	 facilities,	 facilitation	 of	 local	
employment	 and	 supply	 chain	 involvement	 –	 via	 training	 courses,	 business	
readiness	 programmes,	 etc.	 –	 mitigation	 of	 adverse	 effects	 especially	 in	
connection	to	construction	disturbance	and	influx	of	workers,	and	to	provide	a	
substantial	pot	of	money.	In	conversations	with	local	public	stakeholders,	these	
“shopping	 lists”	and	“pot	of	money”	were	recurring	themes	(Interview	22,	26,	
29).	 The	 planning	 obligations	 are	 expected	 to	 be	 settled	 in	 the	 section	 106	
agreement,	 as	 the	 council	 is	 the	 planning	 authority	 on	 the	 associated	
investments	 and	 plays	 important	 roles	 in	 the	 Development	 Consent	 Order	
application	 on	 the	 main	 investment.	 In	 working	 with	 developers,	 there	 is	 a	
strong	strive	in	the	local	council,	as	well	as	community	councils,	to	maximise	the	
benefits	within	the	statutory	framework	
Negotiating	the	statutory	benefits,	however,	is	a	contentious	issue	and	reveals	
the	organisational	differences	between	the	Council	and	Horizon.	Collaborative	
platforms	align	organisational	 interests	towards	the	common	goal,	namely	the	
constructions	of	nuclear	power	plants.	Working	on	the	statutory	issues	reveals	
the	 organisational	 differences,	 and	 can	 be	 a	 contentious	 process,	 as	 I	 later	
show.	 There	 are	 differences	 between	 public	 and	 private	 sector	 organisations	
why	they	want	the	nuclear	station	to	be	constructed,	as	detailed	in	the	previous	
chapter,	 thus	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 how	 to	 build.	 As	 a	 key	 council	 official	
explained	to	me,	a	developer	company	such	as	Horizon,	requires	three	things,	
the	(1)	Grid	connection	provided,	(2)	consents	approved,	and	(3)	their	finances	
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secured.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 council	 looks	 for	 another	 three	 requirements,	 (1)	
setting	 up	 local	 infrastructure,	 (2)	 providing	 local	 employment,	 and	 (3)	 local	
supply	 chain	 opportunities	 by	 developers	 (Jones	 2013).	 The	 council	 sees	 the	
investment	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 do	 infrastructural	 improvements,	 build	
facilities	 with	 long-term	 legacies,	 and	 to	 provide	 long-term	 funding	 for	 the	
council.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 the	 council	 sees	 the	 statutory	 process	 as	 a	 leverage	
point	 with	 the	 consents	 Horizon	 needs,	 not	 necessarily	 by	 rejecting	 their	
applications,	but	by	delays	in	approvals.	
“If	 the	 developer	 says	 ‘no,	 I	 won’t	 pay	 for	 that	 to	 be	 done’,	 then	 the	
council	 says	 ‘fine,	okay,	 it	might	well	 result	 in	a	delay	 in	your	planning	
permission.’”	(Interview	15a)	
Another	 key	 council	 official	 summarised	 the	 difference	 between	 Horizon	 and	
the	council	like	this:	
“The	 key	 learning	 point	 for	 me	 is	 that	 the	 success	 criteria	 for	 the	
investor	is	different	than	the	success	criteria	to	us	as	a	council	and	as	a	
local	 community.	 They	want	 the	 development	 to	 happen,	 to	 generate	
electricity	 to	make	 them	profit.	We	want	 the	development	 to	happen,	
so	 that	 local	people	have	 jobs.	There	are	 two	different	 sets	of	 success	
criteria.”	(Interview	13)	
Statutory	benefits	need	to	be	based	on	clear	evidence	and	policies,	but	the	area	
is	sometimes	muddy	waters.	The	Council’s	own	guideline,	however,	admits	that	
it	is	often	difficult	to	prove	conclusively	whether	there	is	a	statutory	need	or	not	
for	a	community	benefit.	
“Attempts	 in	practice	 to	apply	 very	 rigid	distinction	between	 statutory	
community	 benefit	 and	 non-statutory	 community	 benefit	 before	 any	
discussion	on	the	issue	can	commence,	often	serve	neither	the	interests	
of	 a	 developer,	 nor	 of	 a	 local	 community.	 Demand	 that	 either	 a	
developer	 or	 decision	 maker	 or	 statutory	 consultee	 ‘proves’	 that	
community	benefit	is	required	will	often	lead	to	an	inability	of	a	decision	
maker	 to	 present	 a	 conclusive	 argument	 to	 that	 end,	 but	 at	 the	 same	
time	for	a	developer	to	similarly	be	unable	to	conclusively	prove	that	no	
harm	will	arise	from	this	development.”	(IACC	2014a:	16)	
The	 distinction	 is	 thin,	 and	 thus	 it	 means	 space	 for	 negotiations,	 especially	
because	 CBCs	 are	 defined	 as	 everything	 that	 is	 outside	 statutory	 benefits.	 A	
particular	issue,	where	there	was	a	disagreement	between	the	Council	and	the	
company,	was	 road	 improvements	 in	 the	area,	whether	 this	 is	a	mitigation	of	
the	increase	in	the	road	use	or	a	legacy	benefit	provided	to	local	communities	
(Interview	16).	While	planning	decisions	cannot	be	influenced	by	the	CBC	offer,	
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it	 is	 open	 for	 negotiation	 whether	 something	 counts	 as	 a	 statutory	 planning	
obligation	 or	 is	 subject	 to	 discretionary	 decision	 of	 the	 developer	 as	 to	 show	
goodwill	to	the	local	communities.	Nevertheless,	this	negotiation	does	not	save	
the	 effort	 of	 building	 up	 the	 evidence.	 As	 the	 Council	 Community	 Benefit	
Contribution	 Strategy	 guidelines	 state	 “The	 importance	 of	 IACC	 fully	
understanding	 its	 socio-economic	 needs	 and	 sensitivities	 cannot	 be	 over-
stressed	here,	 in	 terms	of	 substance	 that	will	 add	 to	 the	whole	 process	 […].”	
(IACC	2014a:	17).		
The	 crucial	moment	was	when	 the	 council	 activities	were	 recalibrated	by	 the	
separation	 statutory	 and	 non-statutory	 functions	 in	 2012	 in	 the	 strive	 to	
achieve	 substantial	 community	 benefits,	 (IACC	 2012b).	 Voluntary	 community	
benefits	 contributions,	 however,	 are	 formally	 independent	 from	 planning	
consents,	thus	officials	and	council	committees	working	on	these	should	not	be	
involved	 in	 statutory	 issues.	 In	 the	 same	year	 the	Project	Management	Office	
(PMO)	 was	 established	 as	 a	 “conduit	 between	 the	 planning	 service	 and	 the	
developers	with	 a	 very	much	project-oriented	 structure”	 (Interview	14).	 Later	
the	 office	 became	 the	 Major	 Energy	 Programme	 Management	 Office	 in	
recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	working	with	 other	 developers,	 not	 just	
Horizon,	 though	 it	 still	 mainly	 referred	 to	 PMO.	 While	 the	 PMO	 is	 on	 the	
statutory	 side,	 in	 practice	 it	 provides	 resources	 and	 conduct	 studies	 that	 are	
used	by	both	sides.	
“MF:	 “Is	 the	PMO	on	 the	statutory	 side	or	a	conduit	between	 the	 two	
[functional	sides	of	the	Council]?	
Interviewee:	 “Do	 you	want	 the	 theory	 or	 do	 you	want	 the	 reality?	 In	
theory	 it	 should	be	 separate.	 It	 should	be	a	 standalone…but	 given	 the	
nature	of	the	work	we	tended	to	do	more	of	the	work,	such	as	the	SPG.”	
[…]	
“The	PMO	 is	 to	 support	both	 sides,	and	 it’s	an	additional	 capacity	and	
capability	to	make	sure	the	authority	can	proceed	appropriately“.	
(Interview	14)	
After	 separating	 the	 statutory	 and	 non-statutory	 functions,	 various	 council	
policies	were	set	in	place	to	provide	a	basis	for	expectations	of	the	Council.	On	
the	 non-statutory	 side,	 a	 Community	 Benefit	 Contributions	 Strategy	 was	
published	 (IACC	 2014a).	 On	 the	 statutory	 side,	 the	 document	 Supplementary	
Planning	Guidance	(SPG)	for	the	new	Wylfa	was	issued	in	the	absence	of	a	valid	
local	plan	(IACC	2014c).	According	to	an	official	working	on	the	document	it	was	
“the	 most	 important	 document	 the	 authority	 has	 ever	 produced”	 (Interview	
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14).	The	SPG	outlines	33	guiding	principles	of	the	Council,	and	is	accompanied	
by	 ten	 topic	 papers	 and	 five	 key	 assessment	 documents	 (e.g.,	 Sustainability	
Appraisal,	Health	Impact	Assessment).	
Detailed	studies	are	needed	on	the	baseline	of	the	island	and	the	wider	region	
to	measure	the	changes	induced	by	the	construction	of	the	new	nuclear	station.	
The	Council,	however,	 lacks	the	necessary	resources,	especially	 in	the	wake	of	
austerity.	This	problem	was	addressed	by	the	Project	Performance	Agreement	
(PPA),	signed	between	the	Council	and	Horizon	Nuclear	Power	in	October	2011.	
The	PPA	is	a	significant	milestone	in	how	evidence	is	prepared	in	the	nexus	of	
the	council	and	the	developer	behind	the	obscure	title.	It	sets	the	framework	of	
the	 developer	 company	 paying	 for	 the	 additional	 costs	 and	 resources	 the	
Council	needs	to	deploy	to	perform	its	statutory	roles	in	assessing	the	planning	
applications.	
The	 above	 policies	 are	 carefully	 crafted	 legal	 documents.	 The	 council	 “have	
commissioned	a	 lot	of	 legal	advice”	 (Interview	13),	and	 lawyers	have	been	an	
integral	part	of	preparing	and	negotiating	these	documents,	especially	the	SPG:	
	“The	importance	of	lawyers	as	well.	I’m	getting	signed	off	on	anything,	
anything	is	referred	to	a	lawyer.	That’s	interesting	on	my	side	as	well.	I	
have	 done	 project	 development	 and	 management	 work	 and	 that	 has	
very	much	been	focused	on	what	we	are	trying	to	achieve	and	deliver.	In	
this	world	you	refer	to	a	lawyer.	If	lawyers	are	happy	then	we	go.	That’s	
an	interesting	one.”	(Interview	14)	
The	evidence	collected	by	in-house	experts	and	especially	consultants,	together	
with	 the	 documents	 crafted	 by	 lawyers,	 are	 important	 documents.	
Consultancies	 are	 also	 crucial,	 since	 specialist	 knowledge	 is	 often	 contracted,	
particularly	because	IACC	activities	are	 increasingly	based	on	programmes	and	
projects	and	less	on	permanent	functions	in	line	with	the	project	management	
approach.	 Horizon	 Nuclear	 Power	 conducted	 studies	 both	 on	 areas	 where	 it	
was	 a	 statutory	 requirement	 (e.g.,	 seismic	 hazards	 by	 ARUP)	 and	 other	 areas	
(Horizon	NP	2013c;	Jacobs	2013).	The	County	Council	has	framework	contracts	
in	 place	 with	 nuclear	 law	 firm	 Burgess	 and	 Salmon	 and	 multi-disciplinary	
engineering	consultant	AMEC	(Environment	Analyst	2012),	but	also	with	ARUP	
and	UBS	 (RTPI	Cymru	2013).	 The	 stacks	of	 documents	 are	 to	put	pressure	on	
Horizon	on	mitigating	local	impacts	and	generally	reflect	on	local	needs.	In	case	
of	 a	 disagreement,	 these	 can	 be	 even	 used	 to	 legally	 challenging	 Horizon	
(Interview	21).	
The	first	trial	of	evidence	was	the	pre-application	consultation	stage	1	(PAC1),	
the	 central	 topic	 of	 the	 next	 chapter	 from	 a	 participation	 point	 of	 view.	 The	
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Council	 has	 accepted	 the	 bulky	 Supplementary	 Planning	 Guidance	 (SPG)	
documentation	outlining	the	views	of	the	Council	on	Wylfa	Newydd	to	measure	
the	 PAC1	 documents	 against.	 When	 the	 PAC1	 consultation	 started,	 council	
departments	 worked	 hard	 on	 (Interview	 14,	 21),	 involving	 consultant	 advice.	
Council	officials	used	a	 traffic	 light	 scheme	to	 review	each	paragraph	and	 flag	
those	 accordingly	 with	 red,	 amber	 or	 green	 lights.	 During	 the	 consultation	
period,	various	officials	I	talked	to	expressed	their	disappointment,	particularly	
in	 connection	 with	 the	 alleged	 disregard	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 SPG	 and	 the	
general	 neglect	 of	 detail	 on	 some	of	 the	 key	 socioeconomic	 issues	 (Interview	
15,	21,	26).	Here	is	an	example	of	an	official	involved	in	the	process:	
	“What	have	tried	to	do	is	to	create	an	SPG.	If	the	developers	take	notice	
of	that	–	that	has	given	an	idea	for	them	how	we	want	them	to	develop	
–	and	if	they	totally	disregard	that	then	things	could	go	awry.	If	they	say,	
well,	we	didn’t	 even	bother	 looking	 at	what	 do	 you	want.	 That	would	
take	 you	 to	 quite	 a	 strange	 place,	 because	 we	 had	 this	 general	
acceptance	 and	 support	 from	 both	 the	 political	 arena	 and	 the	
professional	arena,	so	there	has	been	a	pretty	objective	support	for	the	
development	 of	 this	 size	 from	 the	 planners.	 But	 the	 planners	 start	
seeing	 [what]	 the	developers	 they	don’t	want	 [us]	 to	 see	–	what’s	 the	
word	-	disturbance.”	(Interview	21)	
The	official	response	of	the	Council	was	remarkable.	Their	 long	covering	letter	
concluded	with	the	following	paragraph:	
“In	 conclusion,	 overall	 the	 IACC	 is	 disappointed	 in	 the	 level	 of	
commitment	 and	 support	 shown	 by	 Horizon	 to	 Anglesey	 and	 its	
residents	 in	 this	 pre-application	 consultation.	 Given	 the	 positive	
relationship	between	Horizon	and	the	IACC	to	date	and	the	commitment	
shown	by	Anglesey	to	get	to	where	we	are	today,	the	Authority	would	
have	expected	to	see	a	greater	commitment	by	Horizon	to	the	people	of	
Anglesey	who	have	remained	faithful	and	supportive	of	the	new	nuclear	
build	 throughout.	 Such	 a	 commitment	 could	 have	 been	 given	 at	 this	
stage	irrespective	of	the	lack	of	detail	currently	available	as	this	is	seen	
as	 a	 matter	 of	 principle.	 This	 project	 has	 been	 in	 development	 for	 a	
number	of	years.	Against	this	background,	the	IACC	reasonably	expected	
a	 greater	 level	 of	 detail	 and	 commitment	 than	 that	 which	 has	 been	
provided.”	(Richard	Parry	Jones	2014:	9)	
The	long	list	of	complaints	and	disappointments	also	includes	suggestions	how	
to	work	together	in	the	future.	There	were	various	appendices	attached	to	the	
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letter,	 including	 a	 table	 commenting	 on	 every	 paragraph	 of	 the	 consultation	
documents	using	the	traffic	lights	system.27	
This	highlights	a	‘battle	of	evidence’,	that	expert	evidence	plays	a	crucial	part	in	
the	 legal	 process.	 The	 production	 of	 expert	 knowledge	 and	 credentials	 are	
tightly	 linked	 to	 the	 legal	 wrangles	 about	 shaping	 the	 project.	 The	 Council	
realised	that	 the	 ‘stick’	of	 legal	challenges	as	a	statutory	stakeholder	and	as	a	
local	 authority	 on	 the	 associated	 developments	 is	 probably	 as	 much	 of	 an	
effective	 ways	 to	 shape	 the	 megainvestment	 as	 the	 ‘carrot’	 approach	 of	
collaborating	with	Horizon	through	the	Energy	 Island	Programme	and	 in	other	
ways.	The	engagement	between	the	council	involves	both	aligning	interests	and	
visions,	 but	 also	 preparing	 to	 push	 Horizon	 in	 a	 hearing	 of	 the	 Planning	
Inspectorate.	As	the	director	of	the	Energy	Island	Programme	summarised	it:	
“And	 potentially	 Horizon	 may	 already	 have	 done	 this	 work,	 but	 not	
sharing	 it,	 I	 don’t	 really	 know.	Because	 it’s	 the	 issue	 is…when	all	of	us	
goes	to	the	planning	tribunal,	the	issue	of	[them]	as	Horizon	and	we	as	
the	Council,	how	much	we	agree	and	how	much	we	disagree,	really.”	
6.5	 DEPARTMENT	 OF	 ENERGY	 AND	 CLIMATE	 CHANGE:	 MAJOR	 PROJECTS,	
SPECIALIST	SKILLS	AND	INDUSTRY	SECONDMENTS	
The	 short-lived	Department	of	 Energy	 and	Climate	Change	was	established	 in	
2008	 with	 the	 remit	 of	 delivering	 the	 ambitious	 decarbonisation	 targets	
(Climate	 Change	 Act	 2008;	 DECC	 2009)	 and	 the	 corresponding	 energy	 policy,	
including	 the	 new	 nuclear	 programme	 (BERR	 2008;	 DTI	 2007).28	In	 July	 2016,	
Theresa	 May	 abolished	 the	 department	 and	 integrated	 energy	 policy	 into	
Department	 of	 Business	 and	 Industry	 (BIS)	 forming	 Department	 of	 Business,	
Energy	 and	 Industry	 (BEIS).	 Before	 the	 abolishment,	 however,	 the	ministerial	
																																																						
27 	All	 documents	 included	 in	 the	 response	 of	 Council	 to	 PAC1	 is	 available	 on	
http://www.anglesey.gov.uk/empty-nav/news/press-releases-2014/december-2014/anglesey-responds-
to-horizon-consultation/124583.article	(Accessed	28-09-2016)	
28	The	working	of	a	ministerial	department	is	challenging	to	study.	There	is	hardly	any	academic	research	
on	the	everyday	running	of	public	bodies,	especially	below	the	ministerial	 level	(Rhodes	2005;	Wilkinson	
2011;	Wilkinson,	 Lowe,	 and	Donaldson	2010).	As	 I	mentioned	 in	Chapter	 4,	 I	 did	not	manage	 to	 secure	
access	 to	 ethnographically	 study	 DECC	 as	 a	 seconded	 researcher,	 so	 I	 relied	 mainly	 on	 documentary	
sources	in	writing	this	chapter.	The	publicly	available	internal	reviews	(DECC	2014a,	2012b,	2011a,	plus	the	
annual	reports	and	staff	surveys)	and	Cabinet	Office	capability	reviews	(Cabinet	Office	2013,	2012)	provide	
some	insights	to	understand	the	everyday	operation	and	the	challenges	of	the	department.	In	addition,	I	
found	 the	 FOI	 requests	 available	 from	 the	 DECC	 homepage	 particularly	 useful	 in	 exploring	 the	 more	
controversial	 aspects	 of	 the	operation	 (e.g.,	 secondments,	 hospitality,	 and	meetings	with	 stakeholders).	
Writing	this	case	study	was	trying	to	put	pieces	scattered	across	documents	and	the	internet	together	to	
at	 least	 partially	 solve	 the	 puzzle	 of	 what	 DECC	 is	 doing	 in	 practice	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 new	 nuclear	
projects.	
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department	was	already	struggling	to	act	as	the	prime	driver	behind	large-scale	
investments	 in	 low-carbon	 energy	 generation.	 The	 operating	 budget	 of	 DECC	
was	drastically	reduced	in	the	latest	round	of	the	Spending	Review	(BBC	2015b;	
Green	Alliance	2015),	and	the	new	nuclear	programme	was	seemingly	managed	
from	the	Treasury	 (EDIE	2016;	HM	Treasury	2016,	2014)	with	a	 strong	 role	of	
the	freshly	created	National	Infrastructure	Commission	(NIC	2016;	Oliver	Tickell	
2016).	
When	it	existed	DECC	was	the	second	smallest	ministerial	department,	with	the	
second	widest	and	complex	portfolio	in	delivering	£100+	bn	low-carbon	energy	
investment	 (Cabinet	 Office	 2012).	 There	 were	 well	 over	 a	 thousand	 people	
working	at	DECC,	around	twenty	of	them	as	policy	officers	in	the	internal	Office	
for	Nuclear	Development.29	This	 is	a	substantial	staff	compared	to	the	handful	
of	people	working	 in	 the	Energy	 Island	Programme.	Nevertheless,	DECC	 faced	
with	 the	 same	 challenge	 of	 not	 being	 up	 to	 date	 enough	 with	 multinational	
investor	companies.	 In	the	meantime,	the	changes	in	the	working	of	DECC	are	
strongly	connected	to	the	reforms	across	the	civil	service	(Cabinet	Office	2013;	
HM	Government	2012).	
Initial	 challenges	were	mainly	 a	 result	 of	 setting	 up	 a	 large	 organisation	with	
new	 and	 challenging	 portfolio	 (NAO	 2009a).	 As	 the	 ministerial	 department	
matured,	more	specific	challenges	arose	(Cabinet	Office	2012).	As	I	outlined	in	
the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 UK	 government	 policy	 focused	 on	 large-scale	 low-
carbon	infrastructural	investments.	The	delivery	was	tasked	with	DECC,	at	least	
until	the	recent	weakening	of	the	department.	In	order	to	achieve	these	task	an	
internal	review	identified	the	directions	of	change	the	following	way:	
• 	“Skilled	 -	 with	 more	 specialists	 and	 generalists	 more	 literate	 in	
economics,	science	and	commercial	skills.	The	Department	will	continue	
to	 strengthen	 its	 use	 of	 evidence,	 making	 the	 best	 use	 of	 multi-
disciplinary	evidence	to	test	the	strategic	merit,	design	and	deliverability	
of	all	of	its	policies.	
• Focused	–	with	resource	and	efforts	concentrated	on	the	 'big	fish'	that	
will	make	the	biggest	difference.	
• Project	 based	 –	 with	 resources	 deployed	 in	 a	 better	 planned,	 more	
flexible,	multi-disciplinary	approach.	
• Joined	up	–	with	more	coordination	across	DECC	and	arms	length	bodies	
so	 that	 we	 speak	 with	 a	 single	 voice	 to	 our	 stakeholders,	 use	 and	
manage	our	knowledge	and	information	better	across	the	Department,	
and	 continually	 strive	 to	 develop	 our	 capability,	 to	 ensure	 that	 we	
																																																						
29	Source:	http://reference.data.gov.uk/gov-structure/organogram	(Accessed	16/12/2013)	
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develop	our	 people,	 systems,	 process	 and	 infrastructure	 in	 a	way	 that	
enables	us	to	deliver	our	business	objectives	efficiently	and	effectively.”	
(DECC	2012b:	3)	
The	 efforts	 of	 the	 department	 were	 “focused”	 on	 engaging	 with	 the	 big	 fish	
low-carbon	 investors	 through	 adapting	 to	 their	 “projects”	 needs	 in	 a	 “joined	
up”	approach	through	getting	“skilled”	in	understanding	commercial	decisions.	
Here	 I	 focus	 primarily	 on	 the	 first	 and	 foremost	 change,	 namely	 how	 the	
department	 identified	 expert	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 as	 the	 primary	 means	 to	
engage	with	major	investment	projects.	The	excerpt	below	is	an	example	of	the	
role	DECC	 imagined	 in	 engaging	major	 investors,	 particularly	 through	building	
up	commercial	skills.	
“DECC	 needs	 strong	 commercial	 skills	 to	 ensure	 that	 projects	 that	
interact	with	the	market	have	the	capability	to	incentivise	investment	in	
energy	 and	 low	 carbon	 technology,	 whilst	 minimising	 costs	 to	
consumers.	Since	2011,	when	DECC’s	portfolio	transitioned	to	delivering	
a	 portfolio	 of	Major	 projects,	 the	 Department	 has	 sought	 to	 increase	
commercial	capability	by	recruiting	commercial	specialists	and	providing	
training	for	existing	staff.	Continued	development	of	commercial	skills	is	
a	 priority	 for	 the	 Department,	 and	 as	 part	 of	 the	 drive	 to	 build	
commercial	 skills	 announced	 in	 the	 Budget	 in	 March	 2013,	 we	 are	
working	 with	 Infrastructure	 UK	 to	 establish	 an	 Infrastructure	 Capacity	
Plan.”	(DECC	2013:	101)	
The	 Civil	 Service	 has	 long	 been	 characterised	 as	 populated	 by	 generalists,	
especially	in	top	positions	(Snow	2012).	While	governing	complex	technological	
issues,	like	nuclear	power,	meant	a	gradual	rise	of	‘technocrats’	(Massey	1988;	
Williams	 1980),	 the	 Civil	 Service	 was	 seen	 until	 recently	 as	 a	 domain	 of	 Sir	
Humphreys,	 the	 permanent	 secretary	 from	 the	 popular	 1980s	 comedy	 series	
Yes	Minister.	Currently,	however,	specialised	skills	have	become	essential	in	the	
civil	 service,	 especially	 commercial,	 digital,	 and	 project	 management	 skills	
(DECC	2014a:	21).	In	the	words	of	the	Civil	Service	Reform.	
“The	old	idea	of	a	Civil	Service	‘generalist’	is	dead	–	everyone	needs	the	
right	 combination	 of	 professionalism,	 expert	 skills	 and	 subject	 matter	
expertise.”	(HM	Government	2012:	23)	
Commercial	 skills	 are	 especially	 relevant	 as	 these	 are	 viewed	 essential	 in	
delivering	complex	projects	(NAO	2009b),	and	to	understand	the	needs	of	large	
investors.	 There	 is	 an	 ongoing	 commercial	 awareness	 programme	 at	 the	
department	 (DECC	2014a:	14).	As	an	example	of	 these	commercial	awareness	
activities	 in	 DECC	 is	 the	 5-day	 programme	 event	 on	 Financial	 Investment	
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Decision	Making	&	Risk	Appraisal	in	and	around	Energy	Markets,	which	was	the	
only	mention	of	the	department	in	the	pan-Whitehall	Capabilities	Plan	(Cabinet	
Office	2014).	
What	 makes	 specialist	 knowledge	 so	 central	 in	 governing	 megaprojects?	 In	
other	 words,	 does	 specialist	 knowledge	 play	 a	 different	 role	 than	 in	 the	
previous	programmes	of	nuclear	 constructions?	 Studies	 show	 that	 the	 lack	of	
coordination	 between	 major	 project	 partners	 are	 often	 the	 cause	 of	
construction	 delays	 (Birmingham	 Policy	 Commission	 2012;	 HoC	 Energy	 and	
Climate	Change	Committee	2013;	RAE	2010).	Across	industry	and	government,	
there	 is	 an	 intense	 work	 on	 these	 ‘lessons	 learnt’	 and	 on	 boosting	 project	
management	 expertise	 (Cogent	 and	 NSAN	 2010;	 NIA	 UK	 2012).	 While	
construction	delays	and	escalating	costs	have	always	been	the	Achilles	heel	of	
nuclear	 power	 investments,	 currently	 the	 problem	 is	 further	 exacerbated.	
Namely,	nuclear	power	technology	is	dissimilar	to	most	other	technologies	with	
its	 negative	 learning	 curve;	 meaning	 nuclear	 constructions	 are	 getting	 more	
expensive	 over	 the	 decades.	 Due	 to	 higher	 safety	 standards	 and	 quality	
requirements,	 nuclear	 designs	 are	 getting	 more	 complex	 with	 built-in	
redundancies,	 stricter	 quality	 standards,	 and	 enhanced	 safety	 systems.	
Commercial	 skills,	 commercial	awareness	 in	particular,	are	 regarded	as	crucial	
for	 both	 successful	 coordination	 with	 industry	 companies	 by	 understanding	
their	 perspectives	 and	 for	 the	 efficient	 programme	management	 of	 complex	
undertakings,	 like	 new	 nuclear	 build.	 The	 meeting	 notes	 between	 DECC	 and	
Hitachi	 before	 selling	 Horizon	 provide	 an	 example	 of	 the	 use	 of	 commercial	
awareness;	 these	notes	are	 full	of	 investment	banking	 terms	especially	 (DECC	
FOI	12/1718).	
How	to	acquire	this	specialist	expert	knowledge?	The	capability	review	of	DECC	
identified	that	the	‘delivery	capability’	needs	to	be	improved	by	addressing	the	
“[skills]	 gaps	 in	 project	 and	 programme	 management,	 commercial	 and	
engineering	skills	[…]	through	training,	recruitment	and	secondments”	(Cabinet	
Office	 2012:	 11).	 At	 DECC,	 secondments	 vastly	 overshadowed	 in-house	
recruitment	and	training.	There	were	at	least	160	incoming	secondees	between	
Jan	2010	and	Apr	2014,	and	at	least	37	outgoing	secondees	between	Jan	2010	
and	August	2013	(DECC	FOI	13/1149,	15/02666,	2015/04656).	The	homepage	of	
the	Office	 for	Nuclear	Development	 (OND)	 at	DECC	 stated	 that	 “[the]	OND	 is	
made	up	of	civil	servants,	and	staff	seconded	from	the	private	sector	including	
lawyers	 and	 industry	 experts”.30	These	 seconded	 positions	 at	 OND	 included	
policy	and	technical	advisory	roles,	and	even	the	Head	of	New	Nuclear	Business	
																																																						
30	See	https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/office-for-nuclear-development-ond	(Accessed	on	26	June	
2016).		
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Capability	 was	 seconded	 from	 Rolls	 Royce	 between	 Jan	 2013	 and	 Apr	 2014	
(DECC	 FOI	 15/02666).	 At	 OND	 there	 were	 secondees	 both	 coming	 from	 and	
going	 to	 Horizon	 Nuclear	 Power	 (DECC	 FOI	 13/1149).	 The	 core	 DECC	
department	paid	£5,485,000	for	consultancy	services	in	the	2014-2015	financial	
year,	and	£3,594,000	 to	 temporary	staff,	presumably	secondees	mainly	 (DECC	
2015b:	67).	The	overall	picture	shows	 that	 secondments	at	DECC	were	crucial	
ways	to	work	together	with	industry	and	to	obtain	specialist	expertise.	
Expert	knowledge	is	situated,	 it	also	means	working	together.	Collaboration	in	
DECC	 with	 the	 nuclear	 industry	 go	 well	 beyond	 the	 exchange	 of	 expertise	
through	secondments.	These	collaborations	between	civil	servants	and	industry	
representatives	include	many	formal	and	informal	platforms.	In	February	2014,	
for	 example	 the	 Nuclear	 Industry	 Council	 (NIC)	 replaced	 the	 previous	
government-industry	collaborative	platform	as	the	main	“partnership	between	
Government	and	industry	with	a	view	to	providing	high-level	strategic	direction	
to	the	UK’s	nuclear	industry”.31	NIC	is	jointly	chaired	by	the	secretary	of	state	at	
DECC,	 a	 shared	DECC	 and	 BIS	minister,	 and	 the	 chair	 of	 the	Nuclear	 Industry	
Association.	 It	 has	 various	 workstreams,	 and	 the	 secretarial	 services	 are	
provided	by	DECC.	The	Nuclear	 Industry	Council	 as	a	 collaborative	platform	 is	
strongly	linked	to	the	joint	production	of	the	Nuclear	Industrial	Strategy	by	the	
government	(BIS	&	DECC	2013c)	and	the	Nuclear	Industrial	Vision	Statement	by	
the	 industry	 (BIS	 &	 DECC	 2013d).	 NIC	 has	 similar	workstreams	 as	 the	 Energy	
Island	 Programme,	 but	 it	 coordinates	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 overall	 UK	 nuclear	
industry.	The	attendee	list	includes	high-profile	business	people	and	senior	civil	
servants,	and	it	is	co-chaired	by	the	Secretary	of	State	and	chair	of	the	Nuclear	
Industry	 Association	 (NIA).	 According	 to	 its	 official	 remits 32 	“The	 Nuclear	
Industry	Council	(NIC)	is	the	leading	partnership	forum	between	the	UK	nuclear	
industry	 and	 Government.	 The	 Nuclear	 Industry	 Council	 is	 one	 of	 the	 core	
concepts	of	 the	Nuclear	 Industrial	Strategy	and	highlights	 the	commitment	by	
Government	to	the	continued	success	and	growth	of	the	UK	nuclear	industry.”	
The	regular	personal	meetings	with	 industry	companies	complement	 industry-
wide	collaborative	meetings.	The	Head	of	New	Nuclear	and	Strategy	at	OND,	for	
example,	met	 at	 least	 on	 a	monthly	 basis	with	 nuclear	 new	build	 companies,	
EDF	Energy	in	particular.33	As	revealed	by	FOI	requests,	the	working	relationship	
																																																						
31	Source	https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/nuclear-industry-council	(Accessed	on	26	June	2016)	
32 	See	 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/nuclear-industry-council	 (Accessed	 on	 26	 September	
2016).	
33 Source	 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ministers-meeting-with-external-organisations	
(Accessed	28-09-2016)	
	 174	
between	 civil	 servants	 and	 government	officials	 have	 gone	 far	 beyond	 than	a	
regular	information	exchange.	Before	the	E.ON	and	RWE	pull-out	from	Horizon	
was	announced,	 the	published	email	 exchanges	with	DECC	officials	 reveal	 the	
coordinated	 efforts	 by	 officials,	 together	 with	 Westminster	 and	 Cardiff	 Bay	
politicians	 to	 mitigate	 the	 reputational	 damage	 (DECC	 FOI	 12/0558,	 see	 also	
Edwards	 2012).	 Previously,	 in	 their	 immediate	 response	 to	 the	 Fukushima	
accident,	 DECC	 also	 worked	 closely	 together	 with	 EDF,	 Areva,	Westinghouse,	
and	 Horizon	 to	 downplay	 the	 accident	 and	 to	 distance	 the	 Japanese	 events	
from	the	UK	new	nuclear	programme	(DECC	FOI	12/0041	and	12/1173,	see	also	
Edwards	 2011).	 The	 intimate	 personal	 relationship	 is	 also	 visible	 from	 the	
hospitality	 received,	 how	OND	 officials	 had	 “breakfast	 at	 the	 five-star	 Goring	
hotel,	 lunch	at	Ascot,	drinks	at	 the	Ritz”	with	 industry	representatives	at	 least	
on	 fifty	 occasions	 during	 the	 nuclear	 consultation	 (Rowell	 and	Cookson	 2008,	
see	 OND	 hospitality	 register	 at	 FOI	 12/1519).	 It	 shows	 that	 personal	
relationships	 are	 the	 very	 foundations	 of	 organisational	 collaborations	 and	
knowledge	production.	
6.6	CONCLUSIONS:	PUBLIC	SECTOR,	COLLABORATION	AND	KNOWLEDGE	
The	 above	 three	 case	 studies	 provide	 some	 key	 insights	 about	 how	
megainvestments	 are	 governed	 and	 how	 the	 public	 sector	 is	 reshaped	 by	
engaging	with	 large-scale	 infrastructural	 projects.	 This	 chapter	 does	 not	 have	
the	ambition	to	provide	a	fully	comprehensive	picture	about	the	governance	of	
Wylfa	Newydd	as	a	megainvestment.	As	a	conclusion,	however,	I	would	like	to	
find	 three	 common	 threads	 that	 potentially	 need	 further	 research	 to	
understand	more	in	depth.	These	are	rather	hypotheses	than	firm	conclusions	
due	to	the	limitations	in	my	empirical	understanding	about	the	whole	scope	of	
governing	Wylfa	Newydd.	
First,	 the	governance	of	a	megainvestment	 is	based	as	much	on	 informal	and	
formal	 collaborations	 themselves	 as	 on	 the	 private	 or	 public	 sector	 bodies	 as	
distinctive	 sector	 organisations.	 These	 collaborations	 facilitate	 governance	
between	organisations	across	various	geographic	scales.	Anglesey	Energy	Island	
is	 one	of	 these	 collaborative	platforms	by	 reaching	 from	primarily	 local	 up	 to	
Wales	 scales.	 For	 example,	 the	 skills	 and	education	workstream	encompasses	
organisations	 operating	 on	 the	 local	 (e.g.,	 County	 Council	 education	
department),	 to	 sub-regional	 (e.g.,	 Coleg	Menai),	 regional	 (e.g.,	 North	Wales	
Economic	 Ambition	 Board)	 and	 national	 levels	 (e.g.	Welsh	 Government).	 The	
Nuclear	Industry	Council	creates	a	platform	between	national	public	bodies,	key	
supply	 chain	 companies,	 multinational	 investors,	 but	 also	 stakeholders	
connected	to	various	sites,	 including	Wylfa	and	the	Energy	 Island	Programme.	
The	collaborations	go	beyond	formal	platforms	and	there	are	strongly	built	on	
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personal	 networks	 and	 trust.	 The	organisational	 differences,	 however,	 cannot	
be	neglected	as	manifested	by	the	battle	of	evidence	and	the	response	of	the	
Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council	to	the	PAC1	consultation	of	Horizon.	
Second,	 expert	 knowledge	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 aligning	 perspectives	 and	
negotiating	 the	 megainvestments.	 For	 DECC,	 commercial	 skills	 and	 generally	
industry	knowledge	were	 identified	to	be	the	key	to	be	 in	touch	with	 industry	
companies.	Commercial	skills	and	 industry	expert	knowledge	 is	often	acquired	
via	secondments,	especially	in	DECC	or	the	Energy	Island	Programme.	Technical	
knowledge	plays	 a	 key	part	 of	 governing	 these	 investment,	 as	 exemplified	by	
the	increased	role	of	consultancies	in	the	work	of	both	DECC	and	the	Anglesey	
County	 Council.	 The	 Planning	 Performance	 Agreements	 highlight	 how	 the	
county	 council	 is	 relying	 on	 the	 developer	 company	 to	 build	 up	 the	 expert	
capacity	to	shape	the	investment.	This	knowledge,	however,	plays	a	key	field	of	
contestation	 as	 exemplified	by	 the	battle	 of	 evidence.	 The	 co-production	 and	
negotiation	of	expert	knowledge	is	crucial	in	governing	the	megainvestment.	
Third,	 the	 differences	 between	 private	 companies	 and	 public	 bodies	 involved	
are	 getting	 obscure.	 While	 public	 sector	 bodies	 aim	 to	 understand	 large	
investors	and	to	emulate	their	operation,	private	 investors	are	expected	to	be	
involved	in	providing	public	services	and	community	benefits.	On	the	one	hand,	
public	bodies	aim	 to	 resemble	 to	private	 companies	 in	 their	operation.	When	
researching	 the	 County	 Council,	 DECC,	 and	 other	 public	 sector	 bodies,	 I	 have	
come	across	corporate	reports,	corporate	organograms	and	business	plans,	and	
the	overall	business	terminologies	were	proliferating	(DECC	2015b,	2012a;	IACC	
2013,	 2012a).	 This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 question	 of	 language.	 There	 are	 key	 efforts	
across	 public	 to	 emulate	 the	 operational	 efficiency	 of	 private	 companies	 by	
adopting	new	public	management	approaches	and	 recruiting	new	blood	 from	
the	 private	 sector,	 especially	 on	 the	 top	 level,	 through	 secondments	 and	
revolving	 doors.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 companies	 are	 expected	 to	 follow	 the	
‘public	 good’.	 On	 Anglesey,	 low	 carbon	 developer	 companies	 do	 not	 just	 do	
some	CSR,	but	try	to	position	themselves	with	a	vision	for	the	development	of	
the	island.	It	is	more	than	just	rhetoric,	even	if	the	amount	of	money	dedicated	
to	socioeconomic	development	at	Horizon	is	marginal	compared	to	the	overall	
construction	 budget.	 The	 maintenance	 of	 public	 services	 in	 the	 local	 area	 is	
increasingly	dependent	on	the	main	employers	and	investors,	either	directly	or	
indirectly	through	the	contributions	to	the	local	authority.	The	above	examples	
show	how	the	boundaries	between	public	and	private	organisations	are	getting	
blurred.	
In	 summary,	 the	 chapter	 addressed	 the	 changes	 in	 public	 sector	 bodies	 via	
engagements	with	Horizon	and	other	major	energy	 investors.	 	This	responded	
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to	RQ2	‘How	is	Wylfa	Newydd	governed	as	a	megainvestment	project?’	through	
three	 case	 studies.	 First,	 I	 outlined	 how	 the	 Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	
reshaped	 its	 functioning	 through	 establishing	 the	 Energy	 Island	 Programme,	
both	 a	 local	 economic	 development	 plan	 and	 novel	 facilitative	 platform	
between	 private	 and	 public	 sector	 bodies.	 In	 order	 to	 harness	 community	
benefit	contributions,	the	Council	has	adopted	a	project	management	approach	
to	 respond	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 prospective	 investors.	 Second,	 the	 statutory	
engagement	of	the	Council	with	Horizon	process	helped	the	former	to	develop	
its	 capacity	 and	 to	 gather	 evidence.	 	 Eventually	 this	 resulted	 in	 the	 battle	 of	
evidence	 over	 the	 socioeconomic	 impact	 of	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
megainvestment.	 Third,	 the	 now	 defunct	 Department	 of	 Energy	 and	 Climate	
Change	 (DECC)	 aimed	 to	 attract	major	 low-carbon	 investors	 through	 in-depth	
collaborations.	 The	 commercial	 skills	 to	 engage	 with	 these	 businesses	 were	
often	 acquired	 through	 industry	 secondments.	 The	 three	 case	 studies	
highlighted	some	key	threads	of	governing	Wylfa	Newydd	as	a	megainvestment,	
namely	 the	 proliferation	 of	 collaborations,	 the	 crucial	 role	 of	 expertise	 and	
evidence,	 and	 the	 blurring	 boundaries	 between	 public	 and	 private	 sector	
bodies.	 The	 above	 issues	 highlight	 that	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 a	 governance	
experiment	 through	 developing	 new	 forms	 of	 governance	 and	 transforming	
public	sector	bodies.		
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CHAPTER	7.	MAKING	THINGS	PRIVATE:	PUBLIC	ENGAGEMENT	
AND	DEMOCRACY	
7.1	DEMOCRATIC	POLITICS	AND	MUNDANE	PRACTICES	
On	every	third	Monday	of	the	month	between	2pm	and	7pm,	there	is	a	drop-in	
session	hosted	by	Horizon.	 It	 is	 called	 an	open	 surgery.	Most	 of	 the	 time	 the	
session	takes	place	in	Cemaes	Village	Hall,	often	alternated	with	the	Bull	Hotel	
in	Llangefni	and	the	Amlwch	Town	Hall.	The	sessions	are	advertised	in	the	local	
papers,	and	the	Horizon-sponsored	Cemaes	Voice	newsletter,	but	the	dates	and	
venues	are	also	available	online.	I	went	to	these	drop-in	sessions	every	month	
during	my	 fieldwork.	 The	 choreography	was	 quite	 similar.	 Upon	 entering	 the	
hall	 usually	my	name	and	 address	were	 taken.	 Some	 visitors	were	 greeted	 in	
Welsh,	 some	 in	English.	Usually,	 there	was	 five	 to	eight	Horizon	staff	present.	
Some	of	them	worked	at	the	local	Wylfa	site	office,	some	others	came	up	from	
Gloucester	 for	 the	 day.	While	 staff	 generally	 wore	 the	 same	 blue	 polo	 shirts	
with	 the	 Horizon	 logo,	 sometimes	 you	 could	 see	 who	 came	 from	 Gloucester	
from	the	fancier	shoes.	After	a	time	we	got	to	know	each	other	on	a	first	name	
basis,	 so	did	many	of	 the	 locals	who	came	regularly	 to	 these	sessions.	On	the	
tables	 there	 were	 custom-made	 maps	 of	 both	 the	 site	 and	 the	 area,	 often	
accompanied	with	some	information	brochures	or	large-scale	visuals.	One	could	
sit	down	with	a	member	of	staff	 to	receive	an	update	about	the	project	or	 to	
ask	 questions.	 While	 all	 staff	 was	 prepared	 to	 respond	 to	 frequently	 asked	
questions,	most	of	them	were	also	specialists	with	whom	visitors	could	discuss	
issues	 in	 detail,	 like	 the	 proposed	 road	 improvements	 or	 future	 supplier	
opportunities	 and	 requirements.	 I	 often	 talked	 to	 the	 local	 stakeholder	
manager.	 These	 sessions	generally	had	an	open	and	 friendly	atmosphere;	 the	
anti-nuclear	activists	only	very	rarely	came	to	drop-in	sessions.	
When	 the	 first	 round	 of	 the	 formal	 pre-application	 consultation	 (PAC1)	 took	
place	 in	 autumn	2014,	 there	were	other	events.	 The	key	events	were	 the	 so-
called	public	exhibitions,	which	were	similar	to	drop-in	sessions,	but	with	up	to	
15	 Horizon	 staff	 present,	mostly	 specialists.	 In	 these	 events,	 there	 were	 also	
information	 posters,	 3D	 computer	 animation	 about	 the	 site,	 and	 various	
consultation	 documents	 available.	 There	was	 a	 consultation	 package	 to	 bring	
home	 available	 for	 attendees,	 containing	 overview	 documents	 and	 a	
consultation	 feedback	 form.	 PAC1	 was	 the	 first	 time	 when	 stakeholders	 and	
members	 of	 the	 public	 received	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	 proposed	
megainvestment.	 Unlike	 the	 open	 surgeries,	 PAC1	 public	 exhibitions	 were	
statutory	 public	 engagement	 exercises.	 Upon	 examining	 the	 Development	
Consent	 Order	 (DCO)	 application	 for	 building	 the	 nuclear	 plant,	 the	 Planning	
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Inspectorate	would	not	only	examine	how	Horizon	responded	to	the	comments	
from	 members	 of	 the	 public	 and	 statutory	 stakeholders	 but	 also	 how	 the	
consultation	was	conducted.	
The	above	events	are	seemingly	mundane,	yet	they	mark	a	profound	change	in	
the	democratic	 politics	 of	 large-scale	 infrastructural	 projects.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	
address	 RQ3	 ‘How	 is	 democratic	 politics	 enacted	 in	 practice	 in	 the	 public	
consultations	 and	 engagement	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd?’	 by	 looking	 at	 public	
exhibition	events,	consultation	documents,	and	public	engagement	sessions.	To	
indicate	 the	novelty	of	 these	practices	of	democratic	politics,	 I	 contrast	 these	
with	the	historical	public	inquiries	of	the	‘white	elephant’	era.	
This	 chapter	 draws	 on	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	 participation	 in	 governing	
technoscience,	 multiple	 publics,	 and	 forms	 of	 public	 engagement	 outlined	 in	
section	3.5.3.	The	transitions	 literature	engages	with	the	Politics	of	transitions	
with	a	capital	P,	highlighting	 issues	around	the	asymmetries	of	human	agency	
and	power	(Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009;	Geels	2014;	Meadowcroft	2009;	Stirling	
2014).	 By	 addressing	 the	 consultations,	 this	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 a	 more	
mundane	politics	 found	 in	democratic	practices.	While	there	 is	no	widespread	
local	opposition	movement	against	Wylfa	Newydd,	nor	a	similar	political	charge	
in	the	national	discussions	about	nuclear	power	as	in	the	1980s,	the	democratic	
politics	 enacted	 in	 drop-in	 sessions,	 consultation	 documents,	 and	 stakeholder	
meetings	are	nevertheless	constitutive	to	the	current	era	of	megainvestments.	
There	are	the	three	key	elements	of	this	approach	following	politics	with	a	small	
p.	First,	I	approach	democratic	politics	as	a	cultural	practice	(Schudson	2001).	I	
am	 not	 looking	 at	 the	 public	 sphere	 against	 the	 ideal	 of	 rational	 debate	
(Habermas	1991,	1985),	but	as	a	kind	of	historically	and	culturally	specific	place	
where	issues	about	the	narrower	or	wider	political	communities	are	articulated.	
Second,	 I	 am	 particularly	 interested	 in	 the	 materiality	 of	 democratic	 politics	
(Barry	2013;	Braun,	Whatmore,	and	Stengers	2010;	Latour	2005a).	Democratic	
politics	 is	 not	 just	 a	 discussion	 of	 ideas	 and	 arguments,	 but	 it	 has	 an	 often-
overlooked	material	aspect.	The	physical	venues	of	discussion,	the	materialities	
of	 consultation	 documents	 (e.g.,	 visual	 representations)	 are	 crucial	 in	 how	
democratic	 politics	 is	 conducted	 (Laurent	 2011;	 Marres	 2012;	 Marres	 and	
Lezaun	2011).	Third,	democratic	politics	is	a	spatial	phenomenon,	which	is	often	
neglected	in	traditional	political	theories	(Brenner	et	al.	2008;	Howell	1993).	It	is	
important	 to	 understand	 the	 places	 where	 politics	 is	 done,	 and	 the	 spatial	
relations	 enacted	 with	 democratic	 politics	 (Barnett	 2007;	 Mahony,	 Newman,	
and	Barnett	2010).	In	this	sense	public	sphere	is	hardly	an	abstract	notion,	nor	
is	the	geographic	scale	of	politics,	such	as	the	nation	state	(Anderson	2006).		
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The	 structure	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 7.2,	 I	 set	 the	
context	with	an	outline	of	the	transformation	from	public	inquiry	framework	to	
public	 consultations	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	 planning	 reform	 in	 the	UK.	 In	 section	
7.3,	 I	 reflect	on	questions	of	 fragmenting	publics	and	displacing	politics	 in	 the	
above	transformation.	Then	I	move	in	section	7.4	to	the	central	argument	of	the	
chapter	by	analysing	 in	detail	 into	 the	very	experience	of	public	 consultations	
from	 an	 ethnographic	 perspective.	 In	 subsection	 7.4.1,	 I	 address	 the	
customisation	of	issues	in	the	public	events,	modelled	on	private	consultations,	
where	the	title	‘making	things	private’	comes	from.	Subsection	7.4.2	specifically	
looks	at	the	architectures	of	consultations,	from	town	halls	to	social	media.	 In	
subsection	 7.4.3,	 I	 analyse	 information	 in	 consultations	with	 special	 focus	 on	
questions	 of	 physicality	 and	 accessibility,	 representation	 of	 evidence,	 and	
attaching	 significance.	 In	 section	7.5,	 I	 address	 the	broader	question	of	public	
engagement	with	nuclear	 industry	on	Anglesey,	 focusing	on	Anglesey	political	
culture,	the	history	of	Wylfa	A	becoming	a	‘good	neighbour’	and	the	circles	of	
stakeholder	 public	 engagement	 by	Horizon.	 In	 section	 7.6,	 I	 briefly	 reflect	 on	
the	concepts	of	democratic	politics	manifested	in	the	above	practices.	Finally,	I	
draw	 some	 conclusions	 about	 the	 wider	 implications	 of	 the	 findings	 of	 this	
chapter	in	section	7.7.	
7.2	 STREAMLINING	 THE	 PLANNING	 PROCESS:	 FROM	 PUBLIC	 INQUIRIES	 TO	 PUBLIC	
CONSULTATIONS	
The	 current	 public	 consultations	 framework	 of	 large-scale	 infrastructural	
projects	 is	rooted	in	the	transformation	of	arenas	of	democratic	debate	in	the	
UK	 in	 the	 last	 decades.	 This	 subsection	 elaborates	 on	 the	 issues	 raised	 about	
the	 role	 of	 public	 inquiries	 in	 three	 historical	 eras	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 and	 more	
specifically	about	the	‘streamlining	the	planning	process’	as	a	crucial	enabler	for	
the	current	new	nuclear	programme,	discussed	in	Chapter	5.	The	historic	public	
inquiries	 in	 the	 ‘white	 heat’	 era	 have	 resulted	 in	 academic	 works	 that	
highlighted	 flaws	 in	 the	democratic	 conduct,	especially	 the	culture	of	 secrecy,	
the	technocratic	arrogance	of	the	industry,	and	the	treatment	of	the	public	as	a	
homogenous	 mass	 (Johnstone	 2013;	 O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	 1988;	
Wynne	2011).	The	current	public	consultations	framework,	established	through	
NSIP	 framework,	 offers	 a	 sharp	 contrast.	 In	 this	 section,	 first	 I	 will	 provide	 a	
taster	 of	 the	 air	 of	 the	 historic	 public	 inquiries	 using	 archival	 material,	
particularly	 in	 relation	 to	Wylfa,	 and	 key	 social	 science	 accounts.	 Then	 I	 will	
outline	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 big	 public	 inquiry	 framework	 in	 the	 last	
decade	to	public	consultations	through	the	so-called	‘streamlining	the	planning	
process’	to	enable	large-scale	infrastructural	investments	in	the	UK.	
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The	 first	 public	 inquiries	 sprang	 up	 in	 the	 19th	 century	 as	 ad	 hoc	 procedures	
modelled	 on	 civil	 litigation	 between	 private	 parties	 (Wynne	 2011).	When	 the	
first	 nuclear	 programme	 started,	 the	 procedure	 was	 already	 an	 established	
vehicle	to	support	making	difficult	decision	in	the	state	administration	(Burgess	
2011).	When	the	first	nuclear	programme	was	established,	local	public	inquiries	
were	set	up	at	the	seven	designated	Magnox	sites	with	the	aim	to	“’inform	the	
ministers	mind’	about	the	local	application	of	policy	in	question.”	(Wynne	2011:	
76,	emphasis	 in	original).	The	Wylfa	 Inquiry,	 for	example,	was	held	 in	Amlwch	
Memorial	Hall	before	the	formal	consent	of	the	minister	(“Wylfa	Public	Inquiry”	
1961).	 The	 hearings	 lasted	 only	 four	 days	 between	 30	May	 and	 2	 June	 1961.	
Statutory	 organisations,	 amenity	 bodies,	 and	 some	prominent	 figures	 of	 local	
society	attended	the	inquiry	hearings.	While	local	newspapers	widely	reported	
about	 the	 events	 (Gwynedd	 Archives	 1961),	 there	 was	 no	 coverage	 in	 the	
national	printed	press	(Rough	2011:	39).	On	15	Jan	1964,	an	additional	inquiry	
session	was	organised	in	the	David	Hughes	Church	Hall	in	Cemaes	on	the	most	
controversial	element	of	the	package	at	the	time,	the	proposed	overhead	lines	
from	Wylfa	to	the	mainland	crossing	the	picturesque	Menai	Straits	(CEGB	1964).	
The	 importance	 of	 these	 early	 nuclear	 inquiries	 is	 that	 these	 were	 the	 first	
political	 platforms	 where	 controversy	 about	 the	 nuclear	 programme	 was	
articulated	 and	 the	 highly	 secretive	 nuclear	 decision-making	 was	 exposed,	
notwithstanding	 the	 limited	 scope	 and	 ineffectuality	 of	 these	 scrutinies	 on	
political	decision-making	(Rough	2011;	Welsh	2001).	
Public	 inquiries,	however,	evolved	into	major	political	spectacles,	despite	their	
legislative	status	was	still	 fairly	 limited.	 In	the	1970s	and	1980s,	some	notable	
inquiries	 on	 transport	 and	 electricity	 investments	 achieved	 key	 political	
significance.	In	this	process,	national	and	strategic	issues	started	to	overshadow	
local	 concerns,	 despite	 the	 remits	 of	 these	 inquiries	 were	 focusing	 on	 the	
specific	 investment	 projects.	 National	 organisations,	 like	 Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	
(FoE),	Royal	Society	for	the	Protection	of	Birds	(RSPB),	the	then	Council	for	the	
Protection	 of	 Rural	 England	 (CPRE)	 and	Wales	 (CPRW)	 became	 key	 players	 in	
various	 inquiries.	 The	 lengthy	 nuclear	 public	 inquiries	 were	 the	 centre	 of	
national	news,	especially	the	Windscale	(Kemp	1983;	Wynne	2011)	and	Sizewell	
inquires	 (Kemp,	 O’Riordan,	 and	 Purdue	 1984;	 O’Riordan,	 Kemp,	 and	 Purdue	
1988;	 Purdue,	 Kemp,	 and	 O’Riordan	 1984).	 Public	 hearings	 attracted	 large	
audiences,	and	the	key	arguments	of	the	opposing	camps	were	widely	reported	
even	 in	 the	national	 press.	An	 internal	 document	of	 the	Anglesey-based	 anti-
nuclear	 group	PAWB	 (Pobol	Atal	Wylfa	B	 in	Welsh,	People	Against	Wylfa	B	 in	
English)	summarised	public	inquiries	the	following	way:	
“A	Local	Public	Inquiry	(LOPI)	
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The	 type	 of	 statutory	 planning	 inquiry	 customarily	 held	 by	 the	
Government	 is	 known	 as	 a	 Local	 Public	 Inquiry	 […].	 […]	 At	 a	 LOPI,	 a	
Government	 appointed	 Inspector	 conducts	 public	 hearings.	 The	 public	
hearings	normally	take	the	following	form:	
a. Submission	 of	written	 arguments	 by	 both	 objectors	 and	
supporters;	
b. Submission	 of	 oral	 evidence	 at	 the	 Inquiry	 hearings	 by	
participants	(known	as	witnesses);	and,	
c. Cross	examination	of	witnesses	by	either	side,	as	well	as	
by	the	Inquiry	Inspector.”	
Planning	Inquiries	and	the	Wylfa	‘B’	Proposal.	A	briefing	note	for	PAWB	
members	(PAWB	1989b:	2)	
The	big	nuclear	public	inquiries	showcased	a	theatrical	clash	between	opposing	
factions	 in	 public	 hearings.	 Generally	 both	 camps	 formed	 a	 united	 front	with	
strong	cooperation	across	geographic	scales.	The	anti-nuclear	camp	was	led	by	
national	 environmental	 organisations	 with	 the	 resources	 and	 expertise,	 and	
worked	 together	with	 local	opposition	groups	and	other	grassroots	 initiatives.	
PAWB,	 for	 example,	 itself	 an	 umbrella	 organisation,	 was	 largely	 funded	 by	
Greenpeace	UK	(PAWB	1989a,	1988).	The	pro-nuclear	camp	was	represented	by	
CEGB	 and	 ministry	 officials	 with	 strong	 roots	 in	 the	 nuclear	 sites	 scattered	
across	the	country.	
Big	public	 inquiries	opened	up	an	arena	of	public	deliberation,	but	critics	also	
highlight	the	legal	limitations,	technocratic	conduct,	and	the	exclusion	of	‘non-
scientific’	 arguments	 (Grove-White	 1991;	 Kemp	 1985;	 Kemp,	 O’Riordan,	 and	
Purdue	 1984;	 Wynne	 2011).	 Johnstone	 (2013:	 68)	 argues,	 following	 Drapkin	
(1974)	 and	 Kemp	 (1985),	 that	 public	 inquiries	 helped	 adversarial	 groups	 to	
“blow	off	steam”.	As	a	consequence,	public	inquiries	kept	anti-nuclear	activism	
of	protests	and	direct	actions	low-profile	compared	to	other	countries,	such	as	
Germany	(Rudig	1994),	by	acting	as	a	container	to	limit	political	antagonism.	
The	above	issues	are	well	illustrated	by	the	dilemmas	of	PAWB	with	regards	to	
the	widely	expected	Wylfa	B	public	inquiry	in	1989:	
“The	 objectors	 complain	 that	 the	 terms	 of	 reference	 [of	 Local	 Public	
Inquiries]	 are	 invariably	 set	 too	 narrow	 or	 biased	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
developer.	That	the	odds	are	heavily	stacked	against	objectors	because	
of	a	gross	disparity	in	the	resources	available	to	the	two	sides	in	arguing	
their	case.	For	example,	developers	spare	no	money	in	buying	the	best	
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available	barristers	who	relish	using	their	courtroom	cross-examination	
skills	 to	 undermine	 the	 evidence	 of	 objectors	 (by	 such	 tactics	 as,	 for	
example,	 twisting	 the	meaning	 of	words	 as	 used	 by	 an	 objector,	 etc).	
[…etc.,	 like	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 LOPI	 process…]	 Overall,	 the	 LOPI	
process	is	decidedly	an	adversarial	forum.	[…]”	(PAWB	1989b:	2-3)	
The	 efforts	 committed	 to	 the	 preparation	 for	 the	 widely	 expected	 Wylfa	 B	
Public	 Inquiry	 indicate	 that	 it	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 primary	 platform	 to	 contest	 the	
arguments	for	and	against.	The	first	AGM	of	PAWB,	however,	was	loaded	with	a	
crucial	question:	to	attend	a	prospective	local	public	inquiry	or	to	boycott	that	
and	 to	 convene	 a	 non-statutory	 Alternative	 People’s	 Planning	 Inquiry	 instead	
(PAWB	1989b).	Eventually,	however,	there	was	no	public	inquiry	on	Wylfa	B	as	
the	 new	 build	 project	 was	 postponed	 due	 to	 unfavourable	 economics	 along	
with	Hinkley	Point	C	and	Sizewell	C.	
In	the	mid-2000s,	there	was	an	impeding	reform	of	the	planning	process	in	the	
wake	of	the	decarbonisation	agenda	and	the	revival	of	the	nuclear	programme.	
As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 public	 inquiries	 were	 identified	 by	 industry	 and	
government	as	key	obstacles	 for	 large-scale	 investments,	nuclear	new	build	 in	
particular,	 responsible	 for	 substantial	delays	and	cost	escalations	 (BERR	2008;	
DCLG	 et	 al.	 2007;	 DTI	 2007).	 As	 part	 of	 the	 Planning	 Act,	 a	 new	 regime	was	
established	 claiming	 to	 be	 both	 efficient	 and	 participatory	 (Johnstone	 2013).	
The	 so-called	 streamlining	 of	 the	 planning	 process	 rendered	 ‘national’	 and	
‘policy’	 issues	to	be	subject	to	the	National	Policy	Statements	 (NPSs)	and	only	
local	site-specific	 issues	 to	be	submitted	as	the	 individual	planning	application	
initially	 to	 the	 Infrastructure	 Planning	 Commission	 (IPC),	 now	 to	 the	 Planning	
Inspectorate	 (PINS).	 In	 addition,	 the	 main	 local	 consultation	 in	 the	 reformed	
system	 is	 conducted	by	 the	developer	company	as	part	of	 the	pre-application	
process,	not	by	an	independent	inspector.	
The	public	consultation	events	about	the	energy	NPSs	in	Cemaes	illustrate	how	
this	 new	 framework	 was	 established.	 The	 initial	 event	 took	 place	 on	 a	 cold	
Saturday	morning	 in	 the	Wylfa	 Sports	 and	Social	Club	on	9	 January	2011.34	In	
the	previous	days,	there	was	also	an	exhibition	in	the	building	on	site	with	the	
six	NPS	documents	available	accompanied	by	some	staff	to	ask	questions.	In	the	
event,	 first	 two	 senior	 officials	 from	DECC	 presented	 an	 overview	of	 the	NPS	
framework	 and	 the	 Wylfa	 site	 assessments	 respectively.	 The	 subsequent	
questions	from	the	floor	ranged	on	various	issues,	from	changes	in	the	land	to	
radioactive	waste	 disposal	 plans.	 The	 event	 ran	well	 beyond	 the	 official	 time	
																																																						
34 	The	 details	 of	 the	 Wylfa	 event,	 including	 a	 transcripton	 of	 the	 discussion,	 is	 available	 on	
http://web.archive.org/web/20100116121539/http://nuclear-nps-events.info/locations.aspx?loc=6	
(Accessed	on	21/05/2016).	
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limit.	 Much	 of	 the	 discussion	 was	 about	 clarifying	 the	 planning	 process	 and	
keeping	the	discussion	within	in	its	remits.	For	example,	the	officials	clarified	in	
their	opening	statement	that	 the	consultation	was	not	“about	the	principle	of	
whether	or	not	we	need	nuclear	in	the	energy	mix”	(DECC	and	Ubiqus	Reporting	
2010:	 3),	 already	 settled	with	 the	 consultation	 on	 the	 nuclear	white	 paper	 in	
2007-2008,	nor	about	 the	specificities,	as	 those	were	 later	 to	be	consulted	by	
the	 developer	 company	 in	 their	 planning	 applications.	 While	 many	 of	 the	
questions	raised	concerned	with	wide-ranging	topics,	the	NPS	consultation	was	
only	 about	 the	 details	 of	 the	 nuclear	 policy	 and	 the	 selection	 of	 Wylfa	 as	 a	
“potentially	suitable	site”.	
The	Wylfa	meeting	was	one	of	the	ten	‘Local	events’	around	the	proposed	new	
nuclear	sites	with	a	similar	event	schedule.	While	the	public	consultations	were	
about	 all	 six	 energy	 draft	 National	 Policy	 Statement	 papers,	 there	 was	 in	
addition	 only	 six	 ‘National	 events’,	 weekday	 midday	 meetings	 in	 major	 UK	
cities,	and	two	‘stakeholder	workshops’	at	the	BIS	Conference	Centre	in	London.	
In	 other	 words,	 somewhat	 ironically,	 the	 ‘local	 events’	 at	 nuclear	 sites	
dominated	the	consultation	on	the	six	National	Policy	Statements.	
Amid	 criticisms	 of	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 consultation,	 a	 second	 round	 was	
announced.	 The	 first	 consultation	 was	 seen	 to	 be	 susceptible	 to	 a	 legal	
challenge	by	using	the	terminology	‘suitable	sites’	before	a	formal	decision	was	
taken	 instead	 of	 ‘potentially	 suitable	 sites’.	 This	 nuance	 of	 wording	 indicates	
that	the	consultation	framework	was	established	rather	to	 justify	nuclear	new	
build	 against	 a	 legal	 challenge	 as	 to	 seek	 the	 views	 of	 the	 public.	 The	
consultation	 was	 rerun	 a	 year	 later	 with	 ‘national	 events'	 in	 London,	
Manchester	and	Bristol,	and	‘local	events’	around	seven	nuclear	sites,	including	
one	 in	 Cemaes	 on	 6	 January	 2011.35	The	 above	 picture	 of	 establishing	 of	 the	
NPS	 framework	 already	 foreshadow	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 that	 will	 become	
prominent	 in	 the	 established	 public	 consultations	 framework,	 such	 as	 the	
differentiation	between	 local	and	national	consultations,	 the	 fragmentation	of	
issues	 through	 step-by-step	 consultations,	 and	 the	 efforts	 to	 establish	
legitimation	against	the	prospect	of	legal	challenges.	The	next	two	sections	will	
elaborate	on	these	aspects	more	in	detail.	
	 	
																																																						
35 	The	 details	 of	 the	 events	 are	 available	 on	
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110302182042/https://www.energynpsconsultation.decc.go
v.uk/events/consultation_events	(Accessed	on	21/05/2016).	
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7.3	FRAGMENTING	PUBLICS,	DISPLACING	POLITICS	
The	Nationally	Significant	Infrastructure	Projects	(NSIPs)	framework,	set	by	the	
above	 planning	 reform,	 is	 a	 key	 to	 understand	 the	 subsequent	 consultation	
events	on	Wylfa	Newydd	specifically.	This	section	outlines	some	crucial	changes	
with	 the	new	 framework	before	 addressing	ethnographic	 experience	of	 these	
public	 consultations	 in	 the	 next	 section.	 The	 section	 builds	 on	 my	 fieldwork	
complemented	 by	 the	 existing	 but	 limited	 literature	 on	 the	 planning	 reform	
(Allmendinger	and	Tewdwr-Jones	2009;	Barry	and	Ellis	2015;	Cowell	and	Owens	
2010,	2006;	Johnstone	2014;	Johnstone	2010).	I	explore	two	closely	connected	
issues.	One	 is	 how	 the	 formal	public	 consultations	have	been	 rescaled,	which	
resulted	 in	 a	 fragmentation	 of	 publics.	 The	 other	 is	 how	 politics	 has	 been	
displaced	 from	 planning	 inquiries	 to	 legal	 wrangles	 and	 ‘boundary	 works’,	
sometimes	in	the	very	physical	sense	of	geographic	area	boundaries.	
First,	 the	 complex	 rescaling	 of	 the	 planning	 process	 and	 the	 resulting	
fragmentation	 of	 publics	 have	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 democratic	 politics.	 The	
geography	 and	 planning	 literature	 highlights	 the	 “rescaling”	 the	 planning	
process	across	geographic	scales,	such	as	national	and	local	levels,	in	the	wake	
of	 the	planning	 reform	 (Cowell	 and	Owens	2010,	 2006;	 Johnstone	2014).	 The	
underlying	idea	is	that	the	geographic	scale	of	an	infrastructural	development	is	
not	 naturally	 given,	 thus	 the	 designation	 of	 scale	 (e.g.,	 Nationally	 Significant	
Infrastructure	 Project)	 has	 a	 key	 importance	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 these	
infrastructural	 megainvestments.	 As	 patterns	 of	 support	 and	 objection	 vary	
with	 geographic	 scales,	 rescaling	 can	 be	 an	 instrument	 of	 manufacturing	
consent.36		
The	 new	 planning	 and	 regulatory	 framework	 results	 in	 a	 more	 complex	
rescaling	 process	 than	 the	 above	 sketch.	 The	 planning	 process	 is	 fragmented	
into	a	series	of	separate	issues,	designated	on	different	scales.	Table	7.1	shows	
the	 key	 consultation	 stages	 in	 getting	 a	 green	 light	 for	Wylfa	 Newydd,	 from	
establishing	the	national	need	of	nuclear	power	and	justifying	site	selection	to	
consenting	 specific	 aspects	 of	 the	 development	 (e.g.,	 reactor	 design,	
																																																						
36	There	 are	 various	 examples	 of	 the	 facilitation	 support/rejection	 patterns	 through	 rescaling	 from	 UK	
infrastructure	planning.	One	example	is	the	controversy	of	siting	the	Geological	Disposal	Facility	(GDF),	the	
government’s	preferred	way	 for	 long-term	disposal	of	higher-activity	nuclear	waste.	A	 few	months	after	
the	rejection	of	Cumbria	County	Council	to	site	the	GDF	within	its	jurisdiction,	the	decision	was	reallocated	
to	lower	levels,	to	the	two	West	Cumbrian	borough	councils,	where	there	is	a	majority	support	due	to	the	
proximity	 of	 Sellafield.	 Similarly,	 albeit	 currently	 all	 power	 stations	 above	 50MW	 are	 designated	 as	
Nationally	 Significant	 Infrastructure	 Projects,	 the	 current	 government	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	 refer	 onshore	
wind	power	to	local	planning	authorities.	As	locally	there	is	often	controversy	about	onshore	wind	farms	
than	on	the	national	level,	this	decision	predictably	makes	getting	planning	permissions	more	difficult	for	
large	onshore	wind	developers,	 in	 line	with	the	government	policy,	which	does	not	favour	onshore	wind	
developments.	
	 185	
transmission	 connection,	 associated	 developments).	 The	 contrast	 cannot	 be	
sharper	 with	 the	 public	 inquiries,	 which	 discussed	 all	 issues	 on	 the	 same	
platform.	This	fragmentation	of	the	issues	means	a	fragmentation	of	publics.	In	
other	words,	the	megainvestment	project	is	broken	up	into	disjointed	issues	by	
drawing	 geographic	 boundaries,	 and	 by	 segregating	 nuclear	 (e.g.,	 GDA)	 and	
non-nuclear	 components,	 together	with	 technical	 and	 generic	 concerns.	 Thus	
multiple	disjointed	publics	are	instituted.		
The	 fragmentation	 of	 publics	 along	 issues	 has	 two	 key	 implications	 for	 how	
democratic	 politics	 is	 done.	 First,	 the	 designation	 of	 different	 publics	 implies	
designing	 who	 and	 how	 to	 consult	 with	 on	 various	 issues.	 For	 example,	 the	
nuclear	 technology-related	 issues	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 (local)	 Pre-Application	
Consultation	(PAC)	as	a	settled	issue	(Horizon	NP	2014f:	8),	but	of	the	(national)	
Generic	Design	Assessment	(GDA)	of	the	ABWR	reactors.	The	GDA	is	designed	
as	 a	 technical	 issue,	 so	 the	 formal	public	 engagement	 is	 based	on	a	 technical	
commenting	process	and	not	a	public	consultation.	In	consequence,	the	publics	
designated	 behind	 GDA	 are	 nuclear	 technology	 experts	 submitting	 specialist	
technical	 comments,	 while	 behind	 PAC	 rather	 local	 residents	 and	 statutory	
stakeholders	responding	to	the	consultation	questionnaire.	As	the	stakeholder	
manager	explained	to	me	on	the	first	day	of	the	stage	1	of	the	pre-application	
consultation	(PAC1):	
“What	people	get	now	 is	 all	 [inaudible]	documents,	600	and	whatever	
pages,	plus	300	pages	of	supplementary	reports.	But	essentially	what	we	
are	saying	is	[that]	in	the	last	18	months	we	have	been	working	on	the	
plans	 for	 developing	 the	 power	 station	 site	 and	 associated	
developments	we	 need	 over	 there,	 road	 improvements,	 P+R	 facilities,	
and	all	the	other	stuff.	We	want	people’s	views.	[…]	We	have	completed	
our	surveys	of	road	improvements	to	the	point	we	can	share.	Our	kind	
of	 initial	 thoughts	 on	 potential	 bypasses,	 we	 actually	 want	 people	 to	
comment	on	those.	We	have	identified	what	could	be	used	as	possible	
locations	for	temporary	working	accommodation,	 logistics	centres,	P+R	
facilities.	 […]	So	we	say	 that	 these	are	 the	options	we	have	before	we	
develop	 this	 part	 of	 the	project,	what	 do	 you	 think?	Do	 you	have	 any	
other	 comments	 you	 would	 like	 to	 [put	 in]?	 It	 could	 be	 if	 we	 put	 a	
bypass	 in	 and	 a	 roundabout	 in,	 they	 might	 be	 saying	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
shifted	50	meters,	because.	It	will	be	looking	at,	and	if	it’s	right,	we	say	
‘oh,	yeah,	great,	thanks	for	doing	that’.	
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The	 important	 thing	 about	 the	 consultation	 is	 that	 it’s	 really	 is	 not	 a	
consultation	 about	 people	 agree	 with	 nuclear	 or	 not.	 That	 decision	 is	
made	by	UK	government	[in	particular	in	the	National	Policy	Statements	
EN-1	 (DECC	2011c)],	 and	nuclear	 is	 seen	as	 an	essential	 part	of	 a	 low-
carbon	energy	mix	going	forward.	That	decision	has	been	made	and	the	
government	has	nominated	this	site	to	be	one	of	the	power	stations	[in	
particular	 in	 the	 National	 Policy	 Statement	 EN-6	 (DECC	 2011b)].	What	
we	 are	 saying	 is	within	 those	 guidelines	 these	 are	 our	 plans,	what	 do	
you	think	about	them.”	(Interview	16)	
Therefore	 the	public	envisioned	by	 the	Pre-Application	Consultation	 (PAC)	are	
the	concerned	local	residents	in	the	area	who	can	raise	specific	issues,	such	as	
the	location	and	layout	of	the	by-passes	on	the	road.	For	this	public,	there	was	
no	ways	to	address	the	need	of	nuclear	power,	at	 least	at	that	stage,	because	
that	has	already	been	settled	by	 the	NSP	consultations	before	 the	specifics	of	
the	projects	were	known.	
Second,	 the	 ‘consultation	 fatigue’	was	 not	 only	 a	 recurring	 complaint	 of	 local	
residents	 and	 anti-nuclear	 activists,	 but	 even	 statutory	 stakeholders	 (e.g.,	
Interview	15).39	As	one	of	 the	 respondents	of	 Johnstone	 (2014:	705)	 from	the	
Nuclear	Consult	Group	summarised	the	issue:		
“DAD—Decide	 Announce	 Defend	 may	 be	 partially	 over,	 but	 it	 seems	
that	UNCLE—	Unlimited	Consultation	Leading	to	Exhaustion	may	be	the	
new	trend	…	the	way	that	policy	is	divided	into	separate	parts	like	this,	
makes	it	extremely	difficult	to	engage—it	is	a	full	time	job	to	do	so.”		
The	 lack	 of	 resources,	 both	 in	 time	 and	 expertise,	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
consultations	 was	 a	 recurring	 complaint	 from	 PAWB	 and	 other	 oppositional	
organisations	 (Interviews	5,	6,	30),	 statutory	bodies	 (Interviews	8,	14,	21,	29),	
let	alone	local	residents.	As	a	researcher	who	studied	the	Wylfa	Newydd	project	
full-time,	 it	was	 a	 challenge	even	 for	me	 to	 read	 the	 consultation	documents	
thoroughly	 and	 to	 provide	 meaningful	 responses	 (see	 my	 PAC1	 response	 in	
Appendix	 7).	When	 I	mentioned	 the	 number	 of	 ongoing	 consultations	 to	 the	
director	of	EIP,	he	explained:	
“You	 know,	we	 joke	 about	 it,	 but	 one	 of	 the	 concerns	 people	 have	 is	
consultation	 fatigue.	Horizon	 is	doing	 this	PAC1	stuff,	when	 is	 the	Grid	
																																																						
39	At	 the	 pre-application	 consultation	 of	 Hinkley	 Point	 C,	 local	 parish	 council	 representatives	 raised	 the	
same	issues.	„They	felt	at	times	they	were	being	bamboozled	by	the	large	number	og	technical	documents	
that	were	produced	by	EDF	as	part	of	the	planning	process.”	(HoC	Energy	and	Climate	Change	Committee	
2013:	24)	
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starting	 to	 talk	 about	 and	 so	 on…then	 somebody	 else	 wants	 to	 talk	
about	something	else...”	(Interview	15c)	
The	second	issue	is	the	displacement	of	politics	from	being	prominently	staged	
in	 public	 inquiries,	 especially	 in	 public	 hearings,	 to	 legal	 and	 geographic	
wrangles	 in	public	 consultations.	There	 is	a	widespread	claim	 in	 the	 literature	
about	the	post-politicisation	of	decision-making,	especially	in	the	broad	area	of	
sustainability	 (Allmendinger	 and	 Haughton	 2012;	 Swyngedouw	 2010).	
Moreover,	 Johnstone	 (2013)	 identifies	 post-politicisation	 as	 crucial	 to	
understand	the	overhaul	of	the	planning	process	and	the	establishment	of	the	
consultation	 framework	 in	 relation	 to	 large	 infrastructural	 projects,	 more	
specifically	nuclear	power	 investments.	 Post-politicisation	means	 the	 silencing	
of	political	difference	and	disagreement	under	the	umbrella	of	often	broad	and	
fuzzy	 consensual	 goals	 (e.g.,	 sustainability)	 by	 the	 means	 of	 technocratic	
decision-making.	The	concept	of	post-politicisation	is	strongly	connected	to	the	
literature	 on	 radical	 democracy	 and	 the	 celebration	 of	 agonistic	 politics	
(Allmendinger	 and	 Haughton	 2012;	 Swyngedouw	 2010).	 Johnstone	 (2013)	
claims	that	politics	of	nuclear	power	is	displaced	from	public	inquiries	into	other	
areas,	 most	 notably	 to	 protests	 and	 direct	 actions	 at	 nuclear	 sites,	 like	 the	
blockade	of	Hinkley	Point	C	entrance	on	3	October	2011,	and	to	 legal	actions,	
like	 the	 2007	 judicial	 review	 initiated	 by	 Greenpeace	 claiming	 the	 Energy	
Review	consultation	in	the	previous	year	to	be	“seriously	flawed”.40		
In	 searching	 for	 controversy,	 I	 found	politics	 displaced	 in	 legal	 and	 regulatory	
controversies,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 and	 the	 corresponding	 geographies	
and	 other	 ‘boundary	 works’,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	
conclusions	of	Johnstone	(2013)	in	relation	to	Hinkley	Point	C,	however,	direct	
action	and	protest	activities	have	been	fairly	limited	in	case	of	Wylfa	Newydd	at	
least	until	the	submission	of	the	thesis.	There	was	a	protest	in	support	of	a	local	
farmer	 refusing	 to	 sell	 his	 Caerdegog	 farm	 to	 Horizon.	 On	 12	 January	 2012,	
there	were	around	300	participants	in	the	county	town	Llangefni,	organised	by	
PAWB,	 Greenpeace,	 and	 Cymdeithas.41	Similarly,	 there	 was	 a	 three-day	 long	
PAWB	camp	with	a	handful	of	participants	 in	August	2015	 close	 to	 the	Wylfa	
																																																						
40	Johnstone	 (2013:	 233)	 also	 briefly	 mentions	 that	 political	 action	 at	 alternative	 scales,	 such	 as	 the	
European	(Union)	level.	The	saga	over	the	EU	state	aid	regulations	has	of	key	importance	for	the	financial	
viability	 of	 the	Hinkley	 Point	 C	 project.	 At	 the	 time	 of	writing,	 the	 Austrian	 government,	 together	with	
various	 small	 utilities,	 launched	 a	 legal	 challenge	 against	 the	 approval	 decision	 of	 the	 European	
Commission.	As	this	sets	a	precedent	with	the	strike	price	for	UK	new	nuclear	programme,	the	decision	is	
highly	relevant	for	Wylfa	Newydd	investment	as	well.	
41	Horizon	Nuclear	Power,	however,	has	been	preparing	for	this	prospect.	One	of	the	property	owners	who	
refused	to	sell	her	land,	located	within	the	NPS	site,	was	offered	a	contract	instead	by	Horizon	in	order	to	
refrain	from	hosting	any	mass	gathering	on	her	land	(Personal	communication	with	landowner).		
	 189	
site,	but	not	trespassing	to	Horizon	land,	in	addition	to	their	annual	Fukushima	
protests	at	the	Menai	Suspension	Bridge.	
7.4	PRE-APPLICATION	CONSULTATION:	AN	ETHNOGRAPHIC	ACCOUNT	
The	Pre-Application	Consultation,	especially	the	Stage	1	(PAC1)	held	during	my	
Anglesey	 fieldwork,	 provides	 an	 illustration	 how	 these	 public	 consultations	
work	 in	 practice.	 Based	 on	 the	 participation	 in	 PAC1	 events	 and	 on	 the	
interviews	 on	 the	 consultation	 process,	 I	 address	 what	 kinds	 of	 democratic	
politics	 is	 practiced,	 and	 how	 and	 what	 kind	 of	 publics	 are	 generated	 at	 the	
consultation.	 As	 I	 have	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 there	 is	 some	
literature	on	streamlining	the	planning	process	in	the	UK	claiming	fundamental	
implications	 of	 democratic	 politics	 (Cowell	 and	Owens	 2006;	 Johnstone	 2014,	
2013).	 The	 empirical	 accounts	 of	 public	 consultations	 of	 low-carbon	 energy	
developments,	 such	 as	 offshore	 and	 onshore	 wind	 farms	 or	 new	 nuclear	
facilities,	are	much	more	limited	(Barnett	et	al.	2012;	Bickerstaff	2012;	Butler	et	
al.	 2015;	 Haggett	 2008).	 In	 addition,	 these	 empirical	 studies	 address	
consultations	 through	 interviewing	stakeholders	about	 their	experiences	post-
consultation,	not	by	studying	 the	actual	consultation	sessions.	The	aim	of	 this	
section	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 in-depth	 ethnographic	 account	 of	 the	 public	
consultations	 around	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 changing	 overall	
framework,	outlined	in	the	previous	two	sections.	
The	atmosphere	of	historical	public	 inquiries	becomes	live	suddenly	when	one	
reads	the	transcriptions	of	the	public	hearings.	These	accounts	show	the	thrill	of	
the	opposing	positions	wrangling	with	each	other	with	twists	and	turns	 in	 the	
arguments,	 interrupted	by	 laughs,	 applause	and	 shouts	 from	 the	audience.	 In	
contrast,	 however,	 there	 is	 no	 such	 way	 to	 understand	 public	 consultations.	
Only	 the	 dates	 and	 venues	 of	 the	 consultation	 events	 are	 available	 online,	
together	with	materials	like	the	consultation	documents,	and	subsequently	the	
consultation	 feedback	 report.42	There	 are	 no	 transcriptions	 for	 most	 of	 the	
consultations	in	the	absence	of	public	hearings	chaired	by	an	inspector	or	other	
kinds	 of	 public	 meetings.	 The	 only	 way	 to	 understand	 these	 events	 is	 to	 go	
there.43		
																																																						
42 	For	 the	 pre-application	 consultations	 of	 Horizon	 Nuclear	 Power,	 see	
http://consultation.horizonnuclearpower.com/	(Accessed	on	24-08-2016)	
43	The	 exceptions	 are	 the	 previously	 quoted	 transcripts	 of	 the	 public	meetings	 in	 the	 NPS	 consultation	
(DECC	and	Ubiqus	Reporting	2010;	DECC	and	Wyn	Jones	2011).	In	the	pre-application	consultations,	there	
were	no	public	meetings	for	Hinkley	Point	C	(EDF	Energy	2011),	Wylfa	Newydd	or	Moorside	(NuGeneration	
2015).	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 Planning	 Inspectorate	 is	 expected	 to	 hold	 public	 hearings	 on	 the	
submitted	application	in	the	examination	phase,	but	consultations	without	transcribed	public	meetings	or	
hearings,	such	as	the	pre-application	consultations,	are	dominating	the	overall	process.	
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In	 the	 planning	 reform,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 pre-application	 stage	 of	 the	
planning	process	was	a	key	element	(BERR	2008;	DCLG	2015;	DCLG	et	al.	2007).	
This	enabled	developers	to	engage	with	the	public	and	statutory	stakeholders,	
including	 the	 regulators	 and	 the	 Planning	 Inspectorate	 (previously	 the	
Infrastructure	 Planning	 Commission),	 before	 the	 formal	 submission	 of	 their	
planning	application.	The	promised	benefit	is	that	effective	public	consultations	
prior	 to	 submission	 can	 lead	 to	 applications	 “better	 developed	 and	 better	
understood	by	the	public”,	which	in	turn	allow	for	“shorter	and	more	efficient	
examination”	 by	 the	 inspector	 (DCLG	 2015).	 Importantly,	 this	 offers	 an	
enhanced	 democratic	 engagement	 by	 consulting	 issues	 upfront.	 Also,	
developers	 are	 provided	 opportunities	 to	 understand	 the	 expectations	 of	
regulators	and	the	public	before	developing	their	proposals	in	detail,	and	to	test	
their	 initial	 proposals	 before	 the	 formal	 application	 is	 set	 in	 stone.	 This	 also	
means	a	shift	of	the	burden	of	consultation	from	the	inspector	to	the	developer	
company.	 In	 this	 framework,	 the	 pre-application	 consultations	 conducted	 by	
the	developer	are	the	primary	public	engagement	exercise,	and	not	the	public	
hearings	of	the	Planning	Inspectorate,	which	are	seen	more	as	safety	assurance.	
As	 pre-application	 consultations	 are	 statutory	 requirements	 for	 Nationally	
Significant	 Infrastructure	 Projects,	 the	 assessment	whether	 the	 PAC	 has	 been	
properly	 conducted	 is	 part	 of	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 planning	 application,	
called	the	Development	Consent	Order	(DCO),	by	the	Inspectorate.	
The	Pre-Application	Consultation	Stage	1,	commonly	referred	as	just	PAC1,	was	
a	 major	 milestone	 for	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 project.	 Upon	 visiting	 the	 Horizon	
drop-in	sessions	during	the	spring	and	summer	of	2014,	 I	have	often	received	
the	 response	 that	 the	 issue	 in	 question	would	be	discussed	 in	 the	 impending	
PAC1	documents.	I	was	not	the	only	one	who	anxiously	waited	for	the	launch	of	
the	 consultation	 on	 29	 September	 2014.	 At	 the	 Public	 Liaison	 Group	 (PLG)	
meeting	 two	 days	 later,	 there	was	 a	 large	 turnout	 of	 stakeholders	who	were	
excited	to	see	the	preview	of	the	coming	public	exhibitions,	the	main	platforms	
for	the	public	and	stakeholders	to	engage	with	the	project.	
The	first	public	exhibition	was	held	in	Cemaes	Village	Hall	on	3	October.	There	
were	about	15	Horizon	staff	there,	more	than	the	double	than	at	the	monthly	
open	 surgeries.	 Most	 of	 them	 were	 experts	 in	 specialist	 areas,	 like	 road	
improvements,	 supply	 chain,	 or	 reactor	 technology.	 There	 were	 information	
boards	 around	 the	 hall	 presenting	 the	 key	 aspects	 of	 the	 project,	 plus	 a	 3D	
visual	 of	 the	 proposed	 site	 and	 a	 teaser	 video	 on	 large	 flat	 screens.44	There	
were	 various	 consultation	 documents	 available,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 consultation	
																																																						
44	The	video	is	available	on	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fEGLs0qnvM0	(Accessed	on	20/05/2016)	
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package	distributed	to	participants.	As	a	company	representative	explained	the	
first	public	exhibition	in	Cemaes	a	few	days	before	the	event:	
“What	 we	 have	 are	 public	 events,	 so	 the	 first	 public	 event	 is	 on	 this	
Friday	 in	 the	 Village	Hall	 in	 Cemaes,	 between	 2-7.	 So	 it’s	 a	 bit	 like	 an	
open	surgery,	except	there	will	be	about	a	12-15	staff	there.	And	rather	
than	just	being	sat	down	with	a	pop-up	and	a	map	on	the	table,	there	is	
gonna	 be	 consultation	 materials,	 there	 is	 gonna	 be	 videos,	 there	 is	
gonna	 be	 pictures,	 lots	 of	 documents.	 So	 there	 is	 lots	 of	 stuff	 to	 see,	
there	 is	 lots	 of	 staff	 gonna	 be	 there	 who	 has	 expertise	 on	 different	
areas,	for	example,	environmental	project	development.	The	director	of	
site	development	gonna	be	there.	There	is	gonna	be	experts	there	from	
the	Neighbourhood	Support	Scheme,	which	may	or	may	not	be	operate.	
We	will	have	experts	there	from	the	road	improvements.	 It’s	gonna	be	
different	than	just	a	public	engagement	session,	which	is	what	the	open	
surgeries	 are,	 not	 consultations.	 Now	we	will	 be	 able	 to	 say	 ‘All	 right	
guys,	 this	 is	 what	 we	 got	 in	 our	 shop	 window,	 these	 are	 our	 plans’	
Hopefully	 most	 people	 who	 will	 come,	 will	 have	 looked	 through	 the	
documents	 that	are	online	 from	 today.	They	will	 come	 in	with	 specific	
questions	and	concerns	that	we	can	note.	They	might	be	happy	to	fill	in	
the	feedback	forms.	We	can	talk	to	them	in	further	depth	to	make	sure	
they	 understand	 exactly	 what	 is	 said	 in	 the	 documents.	 So	 there	 is	 a	
number	of	things	that	we	can…it’s	a	proper	consultation	event,	not	just	
a	‘come	in	and	ask	questions’,	like	come	and	see	what	we	got.	Come	and	
have	a	look	at	our	plans.”	(Interview	16)	
In	addition	to	the	eleven	public	exhibitions	across	Anglesey	and	the	mainland,	
there	 were	 twelve	 much	 smaller	 consultation	 drop-ins	 with	 around	 two	
members	 of	 staff	 available	 on	weekdays	 for	 two	 hours	 at	 lunchtime.	 Several	
public	libraries	in	Anglesey,	Gwynedd	and	Conwy	held	the	full	set	of	documents,	
and	many	of	them	hosted	an	unstaffed	information	point	for	a	week	during	the	
10	weeks	consultation	period	(Horizon	NP	2015b).		
The	second	stage	of	consultation	(PAC2)	was	expected	a	year	 later,	but	 it	was	
delayed	with	a	year	until	September	2016.	In	the	meantime,	however,	various	
smaller	consultation	events	were	held.	In	July	2016,	there	were	summer	events	
with	further	clarification	of	the	options	on	associated	developments	(e.g.,	road	
improvements,	temporary	worker	accommodation,	logistics	centre).	In	January-
March	 2016,	 there	 was	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 project	 update	 with	 more	
clarified	proposals	and	further	consultation	events.	In	May	2016,	another	small	
consultation	 was	 held	 on	 site	 preparations	 and	 clearance	 and	 on	 the	
improvements	of	the	A5025	road.	
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7.4.1	PRIVATE	CONSULTATIONS?	CUSTOMISING	ISSUES,	MAKING	THINGS	PRIVATE	
The	 public	 consultation	 events	 are	 essentially	 one-to-one	 opportunities	 to	
discuss	 issues	with	Horizon’s	 informed	staff,	 customised	to	 the	 interest	of	 the	
visitor.	 The	 public	 exhibitions	 and	 the	 published	 information	 materials	 are	
focusing	on	individual	concerns,	similarly	to	the	monthly	open	surgeries.	During	
the	 consultation,	 there	 were	 no	 public	 meetings	 or	 hearings	 organised	 by	
Horizon	or	another	stakeholder	body,	 like	the	Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council.	
The	 surgeries	 and	 consultations	 are	 indeed	more	 like	 a	 doctor’s	 appointment	
than	a	contentious	public	hearing.	
The	customisation	of	issues	is	a	key	aspect	in	the	private	character	of	the	public	
consultation	 event.	 In	 the	 public	 exhibitions,	 there	 are	 various	 issue	 experts	
available.	 Someone	 who	 lives	 next	 to	 the	 A5025	 road	 between	 Cemaes	 and	
Valley,	 for	 example,	 can	 have	 an	 in-depth	 conversation	 with	 the	 responsible	
civil	 engineer	 about	 the	 road	 improvements	 and	 bypasses,	 the	 potential	
construction	 traffic,	or	 the	proposed	mitigation	measures.	Similarly,	an	owner	
of	 a	 bed	 and	breakfast	 in	 the	 area	 can	have	 a	 discussion	with	 a	 supply	 chain	
manager	of	 the	company.	Albeit	all	members	of	 staff	are	prepared	 to	answer	
most	 questions,	 many	 of	 them	 are	 also	 specialist	 experts	 who	 are	 more	
knowledgeable	on	issues,	like	the	potential	storage	on	site,	the	socioeconomic	
benefit	 contributions,	 redirection	 of	 public	 footpaths,	 the	 company’s	 Welsh	
language	 policy,	 or	 the	 prospective	 training	 opportunities	 available	 for	
apprentices.	 The	 quote	 below	 summarises	 how	one	 can	 imagine	 a	 discussion	
with	a	Horizon	staff	member:	
“[PAC1]	is	about	our	initial	plans	for	feedback	about	Wylfa	Newydd,	and	
about	how	the	power	station	is	gonna	look?	How	it’s	gonna	impact	the	
local	environment?	What	we	are	gonna	do	to	mitigate	against	that?	So	
local	people	 can	now	see	 the	plans,	 and	 say	 ‘actually	 you	 can	put	 this	
here,	[but]	my	[house	is]	here,	I	want	to	sell!’	So	we	say,	‘have	you	read	
our	neighbourhood	support	scheme?’	So	we	can	sit	down,	and	talk	them	
through.	It	could	be	that	the	road,	the	new	road	is	going	to	affect	you.	
There	is	noise	and	traffic,	so	‘you	got	double	glazing?’	So	we	can	look	at	
a	bundle	of	things	we	can	do,	once	you	have	filled	in	the	form	[to	apply	
for	double	glazing].	So	we	can	look	around	and	do	double	glazing	to	your	
house.”	(Interview	15)	
The	 ambivalence	 of	 this	 customisation	 of	 public	 consultation	 is	 that	 while	 it	
embraces	differences	in	publics,	it	essentially	renders	issues	to	private	concern	
rather	 than	 public	 affairs.	 On	 the	 one	 side,	 the	 customisation	 of	 one-to-one	
discussions	is	built	on	the	appreciation	of	differences.	These	events	are	not	one-
size-fits-all	 platforms,	 and	 built	 on	 the	 recognition	 that	 people	 have	 different	
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interests	 and	 social	 positions.	 Probably	 only	 a	 fraction	 of	 the	 visitors	 of	 the	
events	are	 interested	 in	 issues	 like	compensation	 for	property	prices	adjacent	
to	 the	 construction	 site,	 the	 evacuation	 plans	 from	 the	 island,	 or	 job	
opportunities	 for	 current	 Wylfa	 A	 staff,	 but	 those	 few	 might	 have	 a	 vital	
interest.	
On	the	other	side,	 the	 format	of	consultations	 facilitates	a	 framing	of	private,	
individual	issues,	and	not	of	a	public	shared	concern	of	the	communities	in	the	
localities	 and	 beyond.	 This	 taps	 onto	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 issues	 in	 various	
consultations,	 discussed	 in	 the	previous	 section.	 Public	 consultations	not	 only	
fragment	publics,	but	also	cultivate	the	making	of	isolated	private	individuals	by	
transforming	issues	from	public	affairs	into	private	concerns.	This	resonates	of	
the	academic	discussions	on	post-politicisation	and	the	displacement	of	politics,	
raised	in	the	previous	section.	
But	 how	 are	 public	 meetings	 seen	 as	 platforms	 of	 democratic	 politics?	 In	
discussions,	 Horizon	 staff,	 council	 officials	 and	 local	 politicians,	 often	 recalled	
previous	public	forums	as	 ‘shouting	matches’	where	a	minority	of	anti-nuclear	
activists	 disrupted	 constructive	 discussion.	 A	 particularly	 well-remembered	
recent	 occasion	 was	 the	 25	 January	 2012	 event	 organised	 by	 the	 Office	 for	
Nuclear	Regulation	about	 the	effects	of	 the	Fukushima	disaster	at	 the	nearby	
Bangor	 University	 on	 the	 mainland.	 As	 one	 disappointed	 prominent	 local	
resident	said	“[the	event]	got	taken	over	to	a	rant,	that	people	wanted	to	ask	
questions	hostile	to	nuclear	power”	(Interview	8c).	As	the	stakeholder	manager	
of	Horizon	talked	about	public	meetings:	
“We	 [as	 industry,	 not	 as	 company]	 have	 tried	 them	 in	 the	 past,	 open	
meetings,	and	 it	was	a	disaster.	Because	you	have	people	coming	 in	 in	
groups,	 who	 are	 opposed	 to	 certain	 things,	 and	 they	 just	 setting	 to	
chaos.	The	anti-nuclear	people,	they	wouldn’t	 let	people	talk.	They	are	
shouting	about	how	[big	news?]	it	was,	[inaudible]	and	people	shouldn’t	
even	be	talking	to	Horizon.	There	 is	gonna	be	debacle.	That’s	what	we	
tend	 to	 do	 not,	 do	 the	 open	 surgeries,	 where	 there	 are	 people	 who	
really	 got	 concerns.	We	 have	 opened	 up	 so	many	 different	 routes	 for	
people	to	contact	us.”	(Interview	16)	
Correspondingly,	 the	 interviewed	 PAWB	 activists	 saw	 public	 events	 as	 an	
opportunity	to	“give	a	hard	time”	to	proponents	of	nuclear	power	(Interview	6).	
With	 the	 lack	of	public	meetings,	however,	PAWB	 rather	organised	 their	own	
public	talks	for	their	crowd	of	people	than	to	go	to	public	consultation	sessions.	
PAWB	 members	 are	 a	 rare	 sight	 at	 consultation	 events	 and	 open	 surgeries.	
Activists	 saw	 these	 events	 as	 platforms	where	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 be	 heard	 by	 a	
larger	 audience,	 not	 spaces	where	 the	 project	 can	 be	 actually	 influenced.	 As	
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one	prominent	PAWB	activist	 summarised	his	 experiences	of	 drop-in	 sessions	
“My	 experience	 with	 Horizon	 is	 very	 frustrating.	 You	 can	 ask	 questions,	 and	
even	if	you	do	not	get	that	searching,	you	do	not	get	answers.”	(Interview	30)	
7.4.2	TOWN	HALLS	AND	SOCIAL	MEDIA:	ARCHITECTURES	OF	MULTIPLE	PUBLICS	
Public	exhibitions	are	mostly	sited	in	late	19th	century	representative	buildings,	
like	 town	halls	 (e.g.,	 Cemaes	Village	Hall,	 Amlwch	Town	Hall)	 and	hotels	 (Bull	
Hotel,	Llangefni).	What	kind	of	publics	do	these	buildings	represent	in	this	era?	
The	contrast	is	striking	with	the	kind	of	public	and	democratic	politics	inscribed	
in	the	design	of	these	buildings.		
Cemaes	Village	Hall	is	on	the	top	of	Cemaes	High	Street,	a	bit	secluded	from	the	
busy	lower	section	with	numerous	small	shops	and	cafés	closer	to	the	harbour.	
It	 is	 named	 after	 David	 Hughes,	 a	 local	 lad	 who	 made	 his	 fortune	 by	
constructing	 of	 thousands	 of	 terraced	 houses	 in	 Liverpool	 –	 and	 named	 the	
streets	 after	 local	 Anglesey	 landmarks,	 like	 Cemaes,	Wylfa,	 and	 the	 Skerries.	
Upon	his	retirement,	he	donated	the	village	hall	to	the	community	and	built	his	
manor	 house	 on	 Wylfa	 Head,	 which	 building	 was	 demolished	 less	 than	 a	
century	 later	when	the	first	power	station	arrived	causing	some	local	stir.	The	
village	hall	 initially	contained	the	main	hall,	a	 library	and	a	 reading	room.	The	
latter	 was	 later	 converted	 to	 a	 committee	 room.	 Recently,	 the	 building	 was	
refurbished,	 including	some	donation	from	Magnox.	Currently,	the	hall	 is	used	
for	 the	 Tuesday	 ping-pong	 sessions,	Welsh	 classes,	 the	meetings	 of	 the	 local	
history	 society,	 not	 to	 mention	 bigger	 events,	 like	 RNLI	 fundraisers	 or	 the	
Flower,	 Craft	 and	 Produce	 Show.	 The	 old-fashioned	 ‘educated	 public’	 of	
gentlemen	 smoking	 their	 pipes	 and	 cigars,	 discussing	 the	 newspapers	 and	
debating	have	long	gone.	
The	Cemaes	open	surgeries	of	Horizon,	as	well	as	various	consultation	events,	
are	generally	held	 in	 this	building.	 The	public	 these	meetings	attract	 is	 rather	
the	 older	 generation.	 The	 county	 council	 was	 particularly	 aware	 that	 these	
buildings	 do	 not	 feel	 ‘representative’	 for	 younger	 people	 in	 particular.	 A	
recurring	issue	in	stakeholder	conversations	was	how	to	reach	different	kind	of	
publics,	as	illustrated	by	the	quote	below:	
MF:	“Where	is	the	public,	the	people	of	Anglesey,	in	this	picture?	
“Interviewee:	Very	informal	in	the	way	they	engage.	We	can	hold	public	
meetings,	and	hold	events	in	community	town	halls,	until	the	[inaudible]	
gone	home.	You	will	get	a	small	proportion	of	the	population	that	turns	
up.	What	we	 have	 to	 do	 is	 to	 use	 social	media	much	more…embrace	
social	 media	 in	 a	 far	 more	 effective	 manner	 in	 order	 to	 engage,	
communicate	shared	information,	and	receive	feedback	from	the	people	
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of	 Anglesey	 on	 some	 of	 these	 issues.	 Because	 that’s	 how	 people	
communicate	these	days,	people	don’t	go	out	 in	the	evening	to	attend	
meetings.	 Young	 people	 stay	 [in	 front	 of	 their	 screens]	 all	 night.	 So	
rather	 than	sending	 text	messages	 to	 their	 friends,	why	shouldn’t	 they	
sending	the	council	a	message	something	to	say	what	they	make	about	
Wylfa	Newydd.	So	they	are	not	gonna	turn	up	in	a	public	meeting	at	the	
town	hall,	aren’t	they?	So	we	have	to	respond	and	change	our	ways	to	
be	on	the	same	wavelength	and	almost	to	speaking	the	same	language	
and	using	the	same	communication	mechanisms	the	people	are	using	in	
their	social	lives.”	
(Head	of	Economic	Development	Unit,	 Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council,	
Interview	13)	
In	 preparing	 the	 statutory	 Statement	 of	 Community	 Consultation	 by	 the	
developer	 company	 (Horizon	 NP	 2016b),	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 so-called	 ‘hard-to-
reach	 groups’	 become	 the	 central	 topic	 in	 the	 negotiations	 with	 the	 council	
(Interview	 16).	 The	 Maximising	 Inclusion	 Strategy	 was	 more	 specific	 in	
identifying	 these	 groups,	 especially	 younger	 people,	 and	 the	 ways	 to	 attract	
them	(Horizon	NP	2014a).	Social	media	was	a	particular	concern,	and	Horizon	
launched	a	Twitter	and	a	YouTube	account	along	with	the	PAC1	consultations,	
but	not	a	Facebook	one.		
Around	the	middle	of	the	PAC1	consultation	period,	there	was	an	 invitee-only	
breakfast	 meeting	 to	 assess	 the	 first	 experience	 of	 how	 the	 consultation	
attained	hard-to-reach	groups.	It	was	organised	by	Horizon	for	various	first	and	
third	sector	organisations	who	provided	advice	earlier	during	the	preparation	of	
the	Maximising	 Inclusion	 Strategy	 (Horizon	NP	2014a).	An	 in-depth	discussion	
emerged	 about	 how	 to	 get	 hard-to-reach	 groups	 involved	 in	 PAC1.	 Public	
exhibitions	 in	representative	buildings	were	seen	as	 ‘old-fashioned’	and	 it	was	
suggested	 to	 reach	 more	 actively	 for	 people	 where	 they	 are	 (supermarkets,	
pubs,	 etc.),	 rather	 than	expect	 them	 to	 come	 into	 robust	 buildings	with	 thick	
walls.	Also,	the	communication	towards	young	people	in	the	area,	who	will	live	
with	 the	 new	 Wylfa	 for	 most	 of	 their	 lives,	 was	 seen	 as	 more	 than	 just	
announcing	news	on	the	Horizon	Twitter	account,	but	to	engage	more	in	social	
media	(e.g.,	active	Facebook	page).	These	suggestions	are	especially	relevant	as	
Horizon	eventually	received	only	424	responses	to	PAC1	in	total	from	statutory	
and	 non-statutory	 respondents	 (Horizon	 NP	 2015b).	 These	 insights	 are,	
however,	 also	 a	 challenge	 how	we	 think	 about	 public	 sphere	 and	 democratic	
politics.	 Local	 community	 groups	 highlighted	 something	 relevant	 for	 political	
theorists	 that	 public	 spheres	 are	 in	 a	 flux.	 The	 architectures	 of	 democratic	
politics	designed	 for	 the	19th	century	publics	are	probably	not	sufficient	 to	be	
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appropriated	 to	 the	 early	 21st	 century	 publics,	 but	 the	 material	 and	 virtual	
spaces	of	a	modern	democratic	politics	are	more	in	juxtaposition	with	places	of	
private	consumption	and	often	generational	subcultures.	
Nevertheless,	there	was	an	explicit	differentiation	of	how	to	engage	people	 in	
PAC.	The	efforts	to	engage	with	certain	groups,	however,	were	mainly	based	on	
general	 demographic	 and	 socioeconomic	 characteristics,	 which	 were	 not	
successful	 in	 sparking	 local	 publics	 into	 being.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
emphasise	 again	 that	 these	 public	 consultations	 indicate	 a	 break	 with	 the	
notion	of	a	homogenous	and	monolithic	public	through	differentiating	between	
different	groups	of	people.	
This	 subsection	 elaborates	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 are	 material	 and	 virtual	
architectures	 facilitating	 the	 making	 of	 certain	 publics,	 yet	 far	 from	
deterministically.	Architectures	designed	for	a	certain	notion	of	publics	can	be	
appropriated	by	other	ways	of	making	publics.	Similarly,	creating	publics	is	not	
always	a	successful	exercise,	as	indicated	by	the	example	of	engaging	with	hard-
to-reach	groups,	especially	younger	generations	through	social	media.	
7.4.3	INFORMATION	AND	REPRESENTATION	–	DIALOGUE	BY	DESIGN	
Interviewee:	 “The	 PAC1	 documents,	 those	 are	 deliberately	 hiding	 the	
important	issues”	
Marton:	“Did	you	also	look	at	the	documents	with	this	eye	as	well?”	
Interviewee:	 “Yes.	 The	 documents	 deal	 in	 great	 lengths	 with	 many	
things,	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 those	 things	 are	 not	 things	 that	 really	 concern	
people.	The	things	that	really	concern	people	are	not	as	prominent,	and	
dealt	with	such	detail.	That’s	definitely	true.	And	that’s	reflected	in	the	
questionnaire	as	well,	that	there	are	all	sorts	of	things	that	people	don’t	
care	about.	The	things	they	[the	local	people]	really	care	about	are	only	
in	one	or	two	places	[in	the	documents],	and	that’s	true.	[…]	
But	 clearly	 information	management	 is	 going	 on	 in	 those	 documents,	
and	they	are	deliberately	bulky.	You	cannot	say	that	[Horizon]	withheld	
anything,	 but	 it	 has	 provided	 so	much	 that,	 it’s	 very	 difficult	 to	 work	
through	those	documents,	and	memorise	lots	of	it	and	deal	with	it.	And	
if	 a	 group,	 like	 the	 community	 council	 are	 asked	 to	 deal	 those	 things,	
maybe	 you	 read	 through	 one	 of	 the	 abbreviated	 documents	 and	 scan	
through	that…and	then	on	the	strengths	of	maybe	an	hour	or	two	hours	
discussion	come	up	with	a	response	[to	the]	whole	thing.	It’s	impossible	
almost.	But	 then	 it’s	not	 the	developer…I	suppose	you	have	to	ask	the	
question,	and	it	should	ask	question	of	how	robust	has	the	consultation	
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been.	 You	 cannot	 deny	 that	 the	 developer	 made	 the	 information	
available,	but	has	it	done	in	a	way	the	public,	the	lay	public	-	people	non-
technical,	people	not	used	to	be	dealing	big	documents,	like	that	–	has	it	
been	presented	 in	a	way	that	they	can	assimilate	and	respond	to?	And	
that	question	is	a	valid	one,	I	think.	I	don’t	think	they	have.”	
(Interview	8c,	emphasis	added)	
What	 is	 striking	 in	 the	 above	 quote	 from	 this	 prominent	 local	 community	
councillor,	 otherwise	 favourable	 to	 the	 project,	 that	 it	 is	 as	much	 about	 how	
information	 is	 arranged	 and	 how	 the	 documents	 are	 read,	 as	 about	 the	 very	
content	of	the	documents.	In	this	section	I	am	not	focusing	on	the	contents	of	
the	 consultation	 documents	 per	 se,	 but	 rather	 on	 the	 materialities	 of	
information	and	on	the	practices	of	producing	and	using	‘evidence’.	This	section	
analyses	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	 in	 the	 quote	more	 in	 detail.	 Consultation	
materials	 are	 representations,	 thus	 the	 materiality	 is	 integral	 to	 how	 these	
represent	 states	 of	 affairs,	 project	 schemes	 and	 changes.	 The	 content	 is	
inseparable	 from	 the	 format.	 There	 are	 three	 aspects	 of	 information	
representation	 I	would	 like	 to	highlight:	 first	physicality	and	accessibility,	 then	
representation	of	‘facts’,	and	finally	ordering	of	importance	and	unimportance.	
First,	 the	 physicality	 of	 information	 channels	 how	 and	 who	 uses	 the	
information,	 and	 subsequently	 who	 and	 how	 gets	 consulted.	 Access	 is	 more	
than	 simple	 availability,	 as	 highlighted	 in	 the	 introductory	 quote.	 Ahead	 of	
PAC1,	 33,000	 local	 households	 received	 a	 special	 issue	 of	 the	 Horizon	
newsletter	 inviting	 them	 to	 visit	 consultation	 events	 and	 the	 dedicated	
homepage	 (Horizon	 NP	 2014c),	 along	 with	 advertisements	 in	 the	 local	 press.	
Attendants	of	consultation	sessions	received	a	consultation	package	consisting	
of	 the	 feedback	 form,	 a	 consultation	 overview	 document	 (Horizon	 NP	 2014f)	
and	 a	 non-technical	 summary	 of	 the	 Preliminary	 Environmental	 Information	
(PEI)	 report	 (Horizon	 NP	 2014d),	 either	 in	 English	 or	 in	Welsh.	 Hardcopies	 of	
two	 comprehensive	 documents	were	 also	 available	 for	 reading	 at	 the	 events	
and	 in	 local	 libraries,	 called	 the	 Preliminary	 Environmental	 Information	 (PEI)	
report	 in	 two	 volumes	 (Horizon	 NP	 2014g,	 2014h)	 and	 the	 Consultation	
Document	(Horizon	NP	2014e).	The	latter	were	a	few	hundred	pages.	All	these	
documents	 were	 also	 available	 on	 the	 consultation	 website	 in	 pdf	 format.	
Stakeholders	 also	 received	 a	 USB	 stick	 containing	 these	 documents,	 and	
hardcopies	 were	 sent	 out	 upon	 request.	 Documents	 were	 available	 in	 large-
print	for	those	with	reading	difficulties.	
Does	 the	 opportunity	 to	 access	 information	 mean	 actual	 reading	 of	 the	
documents?	 In	 practice,	 there	 was	 an	 ambiguity	 between	 abundance	 and	
difficult	access	to	information.	The	summary	consultation	documents	provided	
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a	 good	 overview,	 but	 the	 devil	 of	 the	 consultation	 materials	 is	 often	 in	 the	
details.	 The	 two	 more	 comprehensive	 documents,	 however,	 were	 in	 several	
separate	 high-res	 pdf	 files	 online,	 which	 were	 too	 bulky	 to	 read	 online45,	 let	
alone	to	print	out	in	black-and-white.	Those	were	made	to	be	read	in	print,	but	
only	a	few	people	had	those	copies.	While	all	information	is	available	online,	it	
is	 a	difficult	 reading	without	obtaining	 the	hardcopies	 from	Horizon.	Thus	 the	
physicality	 of	 information	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 certain	 publics,	 those	 local	 residents	
who	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 visit	 the	 public	 consultation	 sessions	 and	 those	
stakeholders	 who	 often	 had	 a	 long-established	 personal	 relationship	 with	
Horizon	staff.	As	representation	was	not	optimised	to	read	online,	certain	other	
people,	 like	 anti-nuclear	 campaigners	 and	 generally	 people	 outside	 of	 the	
locality,	 found	 difficult	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 consultation.	 In	 sum,	 the	 very	
physicality	 of	 consultation	 materials	 facilitated	 engagement	 with	 certain	
publics,	and	hindered	others.	
Second,	 the	 representation	 of	 ‘facts’	 is	 not	 a	 neutral	 process,	 as	 I	 also	
highlighted	 in	 Chapter	 3	 (section	 3.3).	 An	 illustrative	 example	 is	 the	 obscure-
sounding	 Volume	 II	 of	 the	 Preliminary	 Environmental	 Assessment	 (PEI),	 the	
document	containing	various	maps	and	visuals	of	 the	proposed	development.	
Landscape	and	visual	 impact	assessments	are	now	statutory	parts	of	planning	
applications	 for	 low-carbon	 developments.	 Visual	 representations	 are	 well-
established	 parts	 of	 planning	 applications,	 e.g.,	 offshore	 and	 onshore	 wind	
turbine	installations	(Haggett	2008).	The	process,	however,	of	the	production	of	
these	visuals	and	maps	as	facts	was	‘black	boxed’.	The	distance,	the	angle,	the	
resolution	 of	 the	 photograph	matters	 as	much	 as	 the	 time	 of	 the	 day	 or	 the	
weather	conditions.		
A	 recurring	 complaint	 of	 the	 locals	 was	 that	 these	 images	 are	 prettied	 up	
showing	 a	 “Welsh	 Disneyland”	 (Interview	 36).	 If	 the	 pictures	 were	 not	 taken	
from	the	“most	advantageous	places”	 (Interview	19),	 the	site	would	 look	very	
different.	 With	 regards	 to	 the	 construction,	 “[local	 residents]	 find	 that	 the	
surrounding	area	will	be	nothing	alike	what	at	the	consultation	[Horizon]	people	
say	it’s	gonna	be”	(Interview	15).	For	example,	the	aerial	images	and	projected	
mappings	offer	a	very	different	perspective	compared	to	how	the	people	living	
around	 experience	 the	 area.	 The	 demolition	 of	 entire	 drumlins,	 small	 hills	
characteristic	 to	 the	 North	 Anglesey	 coast,	 with	 the	 removal	 of	 10	 million	
tonnes	of	soil	is	difficult	to	see	in	those	consultation	materials.	The	importance	
of	 these	 issues	 is	 illustrated	 by	 how	 landscape	 consultancy	 has	 become	 an	
																																																						
45	The	 PAC1	 consulatation	 documents	 available	 on	 http://consultation.horizonnuclearpower.com/stage-
1/consultation-documents	(Accessed	on	20/05/2016)	
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established	 expertise	 with	 debates	 between	 consultants	 as	 usual	 part	 of	 the	
planning	of	infrastructural	projects.	
Another	aspect	of	how	representation	is	done	is	how	‘facts’	are	disjointed	from	
social	 meanings	 and	 implications.	 A	 local	 prominent	 nuclear	 industry	
representative	 put	 it	 in	 the	 following	 way:	 “The	 consequences	 of	 the	
construction	 and	 operation	 are	 ‘socially	 unclear’.	 What	 is	 [the	 new	 Wylfa]	
gonna	be	 like	and	 feel	 like?”	 (Interview	36).	There	 is	 some	 information	 in	 the	
consultation	that	some	workers	will	be	coming	from	other	places,	but	there	is	
not	 much	 about	 how	 Cemaes	 High	 Street	 might	 look	 like,	 or	 a	 pub	 on	 the	
evening	of	payday,	or	a	school	class	with	duplication	of	children	from	one	year	
to	 another,	mainly	non-Welsh	 speakers	 and	 in	 some	 cases	probably	not	 even	
English-speaking.	
Third,	 the	 ordering	 of	 information	 in	 the	 consultation	 documents	 creates	
absences	 and	presences.	 The	 relevance	 and	 importance	of	 the	 questions	was	
probably	 the	 most	 crucial	 issue	 in	 talking	 about	 the	 consultation	 with	 local	
stakeholders	and	key	residents.	In	other	words,	the	question	is	not	just	what	is	
included	somewhere	in	these	bulky	documents,	but	what	is	not,	or	often	where	
something	is	featured	in	the	documents.	There	was	a	repeated	concern	that	the	
consultation	was	about	“a	 lot	of	 trivia,	questions	to	me	which	do	not	matter”	
(Interviewee	11)	and	with	“[a]	lot	of	insignificant	things	in	the	PAC1	documents”	
(Interviewee	36),	which	was	deliberate	in	“drowning	people	with	information”	
(Interviewee	19).	For	example,	there	is	much	in	detail	 in	the	documents	about	
the	 effect	 on	 the	 local	 ecology,	 and	 the	mitigation	 efforts,	 like	 building	 a	 bat	
house	 for	 the	 protected	 bat	 species	 that	 previously	 lived	 in	 the	 old	 buildings	
recently	 demolished	 by	 the	 company	 (Horizon	 NP	 2014e,	 2014g).	 The	
socioeconomic	aspects	were,	however,	 relatively	 short	 in	 comparison,	despite	
this	 being	 the	 key	 interest	 of	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 people	 coming	 to	 the	
consultations.	Similarly,	a	recurring	concern	was	that	while	the	PAC1	feedback	
form	had	questions	on	issues,	 like	the	preferred	colour	of	the	buildings	or	the	
redirection	of	public	footpaths,	not	on	issues,	like	spent	fuel	and	nuclear	waste	
storage	on	site	or	broader	socioeconomic	impacts	of	the	investment.	
All	 in	 all,	 the	 argument	 of	 this	 section	 is	 that	 the	 how	 information	 is	
represented	 is	as	much	 important	as	what	 the	 information	 is.	To	produce	 the	
consultation	 documents	 is	 a	 meticulous	 process,	 involving	 in-house	 experts,	
consultancies,	 and	 legal	 consultants.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 Horizon	
‘manipulates’	 the	 facts	 they	 consult	 upon,	 but	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 no	
objective	facts,	and	it	is	probably	more	rewarding	to	look	at	how	information	is	
re-presented,	what	kind	of	publics	 it	creates,	what	kind	of	consultations	there	
are.	The	PAC	together	with	other	consultations	in	the	new	nuclear	programme	
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is	 done	 together	 with	 a	 contracted	 consultancy	 company,	 called	 Dialogue	 by	
Design.	I	found	the	very	name	useful	to	highlight	that	public	engagement	is	not	
just	up	in	the	air,	but	a	designed	process.	
7.5	BEYOND	CONSULTATIONS:	PUBLIC	ENGAGEMENT	ON	ANGLESEY	
The	 Pre-Application	 Consultation	 (PAC1	 in	 particular)	 does	 not	 happen	 in	 a	
vacuum.	 The	 literature	 also	 highlights	 the	 overemphasis	 in	 the	 focus	 on	 the	
invited	 consultations	 (Wynne	 2007)	 or	 in	 vitro	 engagements	 (Chilvers	 and	
Kearnes	 2015a)	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	broader	public	 engagements,	 and	 that	 the	
broader	 context	 of	 political	 culture	 and	 democratic	 institutions	 should	 be	
addressed	(Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015a;	Felt	and	Fochler	2010;	Marres	2012).	In	
this	 section	 I	 take	 a	 step	 back,	 and	 look	 at	 the	 pre-application	 consultation	
(PAC1)	in	the	context	of	broader	issues,	namely	the	political	culture	of	Anglesey,	
the	 decades-long	 efforts	 of	Wylfa	 A	 to	 become	 a	 “good	 neighbour”,	 and	 the	
broader	public	and	stakeholder	engagement	of	Horizon	Nuclear	Power	beyond	
the	statutory	consultations.		
7.5.1	THE	ANGLESEY	WAY,	OR	HOW	POLITICAL	CULTURES	MATTER	
“The	 people	 of	 Anglesey	 need	 a	 council	 composed	 of	 elected	 members	
whose	 primary	 loyalty	 is	 to	 the	 people	 of	 their	 community,	 not	 a	 political	
party.	 Local	 politics	 is	 about	 getting	 things	 done	 by	working	 together	 and	
listening	to	the	people;	it’s	not	about	playing	at	being	a	mini	Cardiff	Bay	or	
Westminster.	
I	don’t	believe	that	party	politics	are	relevant	in	local	councils.”		 	
(Introduction	to	Anglesey	Independent	Manifesto	(Ieuan	Williams	2013))	
	
Anglesey	 is	 the	 only	 local	 council	 in	 the	 UK	 with	 a	 majority	 of	 independent	
candidates.	 Similarly,	 IACC	 is	 the	 only	 council	 in	 the	UK	 to	 have	 its	 executive	
functions	suspended	in	the	2011	decision	of	the	Welsh	Government.	These	are	
not	institutional	deviations	from	other	UK	councils,	but	the	tip	of	the	iceberg	of	
a	definitive	political	culture,	which	can	be	called	the	“Anglesey	way”	(Interview	
4).	 Anglesey	 is	 a	 constituency	 of	 four	 successive	 politicians	 from	 all	 different	
parties	 representing	 it	 in	Westminster,	 as	 a	 sign	 that	 embeddedness	 in	 local	
communities	seems	to	be	a	more	of	a	success	factor	than	party	affiliation.	
The	makeup	of	the	council	is	mainly	independent	candidates,	and	decisions	are	
formed	through	informal	dealings	especially	between	independent	councillors.	
As	 most	 candidates	 are	 elected	 not	 based	 on	 a	 party	 manifesto	 but	 on	 the	
vague	promise	of	putting	the	interest	of	their	electorate	first,	council	politics	is	
based	on	bargains	between	different	fractions	and	strong	personalities.	Certain	
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“strong	personalities”	(Interview	3)	have	traditionally	dominated	the	council.	As	
one	prominent	local	resident	summarised	it:	
“A	broader	Welsh	way	of	doing	things	[on	Anglesey]	is	more	about	who	
you	know.	It’s	less	about	procedures,	but	more	about	who	you	know	in	
all	 political	 levels,	 the	 very	 corridor	management.	 Decisions	 are	made	
not	at	meetings,	but	outside	meetings.”	(Interview	4)	
Among	 these	 strong	 personalities,	 including	 former	 leaders	 of	 the	 council,	
several	had	strong	ties	to	the	existing	Wylfa	station	as	mid-level	employees	at	
least	 since	 the	 1980s	 (Interview	 3,	 4,	 6,	 36).	 As	 the	 current	 council	 leader	
explained	to	me	that	the	“two	leading	councillor	of	the	time	actually	worked	in	
the	power	station”	and,	as	the	Private	Eye	reported,	they	were	“given	sign	off	
work	 and	 lobby	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 nuclear	 industry”	 (Interview	 21).	 After	 the	
independent	 Isle	 of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council	 was	 established,	 these	
connections	played	an	important	part	in	the	‘what’s	good	for	Wylfa	is	good	for	
Anglesey,	 and	 vice	 versa’	 attitude.	 It	 also	 highlights	 that	 the	 dealings	 of	 the	
power	station,	at	 least	 locally,	were	embedded	in	the	peculiar	political	culture	
associated	with	Anglesey	and	to	some	extent	Wales.	
7.5.2	BECOMING	A	GOOD	NEIGHBOUR	
“We	know	you	[as	 local	 resident]	are	supportive,	we	know	you	want	a	
new	power	station	here.	You	are	the	local	community,	we	[the	existing	
nuclear	 plant]	 are	 good	 neighbours.	 We	 need	 you	 to	 go	 out	 and	
convince	 councillors	 and	 your	 neighbours	 in	 the	 neighbouring	
communities	 to	 spread	 that	word	and	 to	engage.	Go	 to	 schools	 to	get	
the	young	kids	–	many	of	which	whose	parents	worked	at	Wylfa	–	to	say	
that	this	is	an	area	where	we	can	aspire	with	STEM	subjects.”	
Former	station	director	(Interview	36,	emphasis	added)	
The	 expectations	 towards	 the	 “new”	 Wylfa	 are	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	
experiences	 from	 the	 decades-long	 local	 engagement	 of	 the	 now	
decommissioning	 “old”	 Wylfa	 station.	 This	 experience	 is	 crucial	 for	
understanding	 local	 politics	 and	public	 engagement	of	Wylfa	Newydd.	 First,	 a	
relatively	 strong	 public	 support	 has	 been	 built	 up	 behind	 nuclear	 power	 on	
Anglesey,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	and	Wylfa	Newydd	is	seen	as	a	new	nuclear	
site	 with	 one	 of	 the	 most	 favourable	 local	 support.	 Second,	 there	 is	 an	
established	 public	 engagement	 approach	 developed	 by	 Wylfa,	 which	 shapes	
local	 expectations	as	well	 as	 informs	Horizon,	 the	Council	 and	other	 key	 local	
stakeholders	in	developing	their	own	approach.	
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Until	 the	 1980s	 local	 support	 for	Wylfa	was	 taken	 for	 granted.	 The	 knock-on	
effects	of	well-paid	employment	of	Wylfa	 staff	and	other	benefits	 in	 the	area	
(e.g.,	 local	 events	 and	 activities	 in	 the	 Sports	 and	 Social	 Club)	 seemed	 to	 be	
enough.	 The	widespread	 local	 and	 regional	 opposition	 towards	Wylfa	 B	 plans	
was	 rooted	not	 only	 in	 the	 growing	 anti-nuclear	 sentiments	 of	 the	 era,	 but	 a	
sense	that	Wylfa	was	 just	a	CEGB	outpost	on	Anglesey	(Interview	15).	Being	a	
good	employer	was	not	enough.	At	this	time,	a	decades-long	strategic	process	
started	to	gain	local	public	support	by	becoming	a	“good	neighbour”.	This	often	
repeated	expression	 (see	quote	above)	means	 far	more	than	 just	being	 ‘nice’.	
Being	a	good	neighbour	 is	 rather	 to	practically	embed	 the	power	plant	 in	 the	
micro	 capillaries	 of	 local	 communities.	 I	 would	 like	 to	 highlight	 four	
interconnected	 strategic	 efforts	 of	 the	 power	 station	 to	 become	 a	 good	
neighbour.	 Some	 of	 these	 were	 connected	 to	 national-level	 efforts	 across	
various	sites,	while	some	others	grew	up	from	local	initiatives.	
First,	 Wylfa	 workers	 were	 recognised	 to	 be	 ambassadors	 of	 the	 plant.	 In	
Cemaes,	for	example,	most	of	the	people	get	informed	of	the	ongoing	affairs	of	
the	plant	by	talking	to	their	relatives,	neighbours	and	friends	who	work	 in	the	
plant.	As	workers	are	scattered	around	the	 island	and	beyond,	this	provides	a	
wide	reach	to	Wylfa	through	personal	contacts.	In	the	management,	there	was	
recognition	that	the	good	salaries,	even	a	career	for	life,	are	not	enough	to	turn	
workers	to	ambassadors	of	the	plant.	As	a	former	station	director	explained	to	
me,	the	key	was	to	“start	socialising	nuclear	in	a	way	that	haven’t	done	before”	
(Interview	36).	While	the	programmes	at	the	Sports	and	Social	Club	was	already	
central	 to	 staff	 cohesion	 and	 the	 social	 life	 of	 the	 immediate	 vicinity,	 further	
initiatives	started.	 In	1992,	 for	example,	a	charity	of	Wylfa	employees	was	set	
up	 for	 local	 community	 initiatives,	 called	 Wylfa	 21,	 and	 the	 Pride	 of	 Wylfa	
award	was	 established	 to	 reward	 and	 demonstrate	 the	 involvement	 of	Wylfa	
employees	 in	 community	 organisations.	 In	 the	 meantime	 the	 organisational	
culture	changed.	There	was	an	effort	to	promote	Welsh-speakers	to	managerial	
and	 engineering	 positions,	 and	 to	 cultivate	 the	 language	 (bilingual	 signs,	
language	training	opportunities	to	English-speaking	staff).	This	coincided	from	a	
shift	 from	a	 formal	hierarchical	organisational	culture	 to	a	milieu	where	 the	–	
still	mainly	 English-speaking	 –	managers	were	more	 accessible.	 Instead	 of	Mr	
Station	Director	they	have	become	Nick	or	Greg	who	take	pride	in	living	in	the	
closeby	communities,	not	the	affluent	Bangor	and	Menai	Bridge	areas.	
Second,	 various	 means	 were	 established	 to	 inform	 local	 communities,	 like	 a	
biweekly	 newsletter,	 reestablishment	 of	 the	 visitor	 centre	 as	 an	 ‘information	
centre’,	 schools	 engagement	 and	 other	 information	 campaigns.	 In	May	 1987	
the	fortnightly	two-page	bilingual	 ‘Wylfa	News’	was	set	up	to	 inform	staff	and	
stakeholders	 about	 station	performance,	 incidents,	 and	 station	activities	 from	
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refuelling	to	staff	changes.	This	evolved	to	the	Wylpower,	which	became	more	
of	 a	 magazine	 with	 reports	 on	 company	 events,	 staff	 member	 profiles	 and	
socioeconomic	activities.	In	1991,	the	outdated	visitor	centre	was	redesigned	as	
an	 Information	 Centre	 (CEGB	 1990).	 It	 was	 no	 longer	 just	 a	 rainy	 day	
programme	for	holidaymakers,	but	efforts	were	made	to	make	it	a	local	hub	for	
the	 engagement	 programme.	 The	 schools	 outreach	 programme	 started,	 from	
promoting	 STEM	 awareness	 in	 different	 age	 groups,	 from	 primary	 schools	 to	
work	 placements	 for	 sixth-formers	 and	 leavers	 (Daily	 Post	 1994).	 The	 schools	
outreach	served	both	promoting	the	plant	by	reaching	local	families	and	turning	
local	children	into	employees	of	the	future.	
Third,	the	financial	support	from	the	socioeconomic	scheme	of	Wylfa	is	seen	as	
the	 driver	 behind	 the	 revitalisation	 of	 the	 communities.	 In	 local	 community	
groups	the	approach	to	fund	projects	is	to	“ask	Wylfa”,	from	Cemaes	in	Bloom	
competition	to	new	time-and-tide	bell	on	the	beach.	These	small	contributions	
are	the	life	support	for	local	groups,	and	often	for	community	councils,	too,	in	
the	face	of	austerity.	One	community	councillor	summarised	in	a	meeting	“[if]	
no	 community	 benefit,	 no	 community	 support	 [for	 local	 industries	 and	
investments]”.	 In	2008,	a	Welsh-speaking	engineer	was	appointed	as	 the	new	
socioeconomic	manager	of	the	plant,	he	later	became	the	head	of	Energy	Island	
Programme.	
Fourth,	attention	was	paid	to	severe	the	ties	with	 local	stakeholders.	A	crucial	
milestone	 was	 when	 the	 Local	 Community	 Liaison	 Council	 was	 set	 up	 in	
February	1989	to	inform	local	councillors,	non-governmental	groups	and	public	
bodies	 about	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 plant,	 often	 with	 detailed	 technical	
information.	 It	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 Site	 Stakeholder	 Group,	 a	 quarterly	
statutory	 meeting	 with	 an	 independently	 elected	 chair.	 It	 has	 a	 scrutiny	
function,	 so	 the	 online	 available	 meeting	 minutes	 and	 agenda	 are	 mainly	
reports	of	the	station	director,	the	ONR	site	inspector,	etc.		
The	above	were	crucial	to	build	up	local	public	support	for	lifetime	extension	of	
the	operating	plant	and	 for	 the	new	build	project.	As	 the	plant	has	started	to	
reach	the	end	of	its	lifetime,	there	was	however	less	need	for	these	activities.	In	
2012,	 for	 example,	 the	 WylPower	 newsletter	 of	 the	 site	 was	 replaced	 by	
Magnitude,	 a	 magazine	 across	 the	 twelve	 Magnox	 sites,	 now	 all	
decommissioning.	 Similarly,	 both	 the	 visitor	 centre	 and	 the	 Sports	 and	 Social	
Club	are	about	to	close	down	their	doors.	The	limelight	now	is	on	Horizon	and	
the	 new	 build.	While	 initially	 under	 the	German	 ownership	 there	were	 some	
local	concerns	(e.g.,	boarding	up	and	subsequent	demolition	of	local	buildings,	
lack	 of	 communication	 with	 neighbouring	 property	 owners	 and	 locals),	
especially	 under	 Hitachi	 ownership	 more	 strategic	 efforts	 were	 made	 to	
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become	a	good	neighbour	from	the	very	beginning.	The	message	of	becoming	a	
good	 neighbour	 is	 also	 central	 for	 the	 new	 build,	 together	with	 some	 of	 the	
means.	
7.5.3	CIRCLES	OF	PUBLIC	ENGAGEMENT	
The	 recurring	 phrase	 of	Horizon	Nuclear	 Power	 communications	 is	 the	 “open	
and	honest”	approach	to	public	engagement	(Interview	16).	To	understand	this	
approach	 in	 practice,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 look	 at	 the	 various	means	 and	 groups	
engaging	with	 publics	 and	 stakeholders.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 try	 to	 identify	 how	
certain	means	of	 communication	and	engagement	are	 connected	 to	 circles	of	
people,	 namely	 local	 communities,	 near	 neighbours,	 (statutory)	 stakeholders,	
supply	chain,	wider	(national)	public,	and	anti-nuclear	activists.	
First,	 the	 local	 communities	 are	 a	 key	 for	 public	 support,	 both	 on	 Northern	
Anglesey	 and	 further	 in	 northwest	Wales.	 In	 November	 2013,	 the	 new	 build	
project	 was	 formally	 named	 to	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 from	 Wylfa	 B	 (Horizon	 NP	
2013b).	This	 showed	both	a	commitment	 to	 local	 communities	by	making	 the	
power	station	more	Welsh,	and	also	break	with	the	calamitous	memory	of	the	
first	Wylfa	B	campaign	 in	 the	1980s	 (and	some	early	hiccups	of	 the	RWE-EON	
venture	before	 selling	 to	Hitachi).	 The	opportunities	 to	 get	 informed	are	 very	
visible.	There	is	a	quarterly	bilingual	newsletter	to	all	Anglesey	households,	the	
monthly	open	surgeries,	a	freephone	lines	and	email	address	in	both	languages,	
not	 to	 mention	 a	 regular	 presence	 at	 major	 local	 events	 (e.g.,	 Anglesey	
Agricultural	 Show),	 advertisements	 and	 articles	 in	 the	 local	 press,	 a	 regular	
section	 in	 the	 Cemaes	 Voice	 newsletter,	 also	 sponsored	 by	 Horizon.	 Upon	
visiting	 these	 open	 surgeries,	 I	 found	 these	 sessions	 more	 informative	 than	
expected.	In	fact,	the	in-depth	and	informative	discussion	at	the	open	surgeries	
I	attended	during	my	exploratory	visit	to	the	island	was	a	key	factor	to	choose	
Anglesey	 as	 a	 fieldwork	 site.	 There	was,	 however,	 an	 interesting	 ambiguity	 in	
these	events	and	other	one-to-one	engagement	activities.	There	was	not	much	
information	 available	 in	 writing	 in	 advance	 of	 PAC1,	 except	 for	 some	
newsletters,	 press	 releases	 and	 Public	 Liaison	 Group	 meeting	 minutes,46	in	
sharp	contrast	with	the	informative	responses	to	my	questions	verbally	at	open	
surgeries.	 By	 chance,	 I	 also	 became	 aware	 that	 there	 was	 a	 preparatory	
document	 available	 for	 Horizon	 staff	 to	 prepare	 for	 the	 consultation	 session,	
which	was	simply	not	publicly	available	and	staff	was	not	even	allowed	to	show	
that	 to	 the	 public.	 Thereby,	 one	 can	 get	 the	 answers	 if	 asking	 the	 right	
questions.	 The	 information	 is	 not	 just	 “there”.	Apparently,	 there	 is	 a	 learning	
																																																						
46	Newsletters,	however,	are	not	archived	online,	only	the	most	recent	one	is	available.	Similarly,	one	has	
to	wait	for	long	months	until	the	formal	minutes	of	stakeholder	meetings	become	publicly	available.	
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process	involved	to	get	to	know	about	relevant	issues.	You	do	not	ask	questions	
about	issues	you	do	not	know	about,	and	it	is	not	in	the	interest	of	consultation	
staff	to	expose	their	weak	points.	As	one	council	official	working	closely	on	the	
project	summarised	it:	
“I	 think	 people	 are	 a	 little	 bit	 apathetic	 about	 [Wylfa	Newydd].	 If	 you	
want	 to	 find	out	 [information],	 you	can	go	 to	 the	drop-in	 sessions.	 It’s	
about	whether	there	is	any	change	in	the	information	you	receive.	Is	 it	
just	the	same	story	on	and	on?	But	I	think	if	you	actually	want	to	actually	
look	for	information,	you	could.”	(Interview	14)	
Anglesey	 is	 a	 small	 place,	 however,	 with	 informal	 channels	 of	 information.	
Albeit	there	was	only	a	handful	Horizon	staff	at	the	local	site	office	at	the	time	
of	my	 fieldwork,	 there	were	a	number	of	contractors	working	 for	 the	security	
firm,	the	ground	investigation	company,	or	doing	studies	in	the	area.	In	a	place	
where	 there	 is	 a	 culture	 of	 ‘everybody-knows-everybody’,	 talking	 to	 these	
people	plays	such	an	 important	role	as	the	organised	 information	sessions.	As	
one	local	small	business	owner	put	it	(Interview	31):	
“[…]	If	I	want	to	find	out	what’s	really	happening	there	[at	Wylfa]	I	go	to	
the	pub	and	talk	to	the	lads.	 I	go	to	the	pub,	and	talk	to	the	local	 lads,	
who	work	at	Wylfa.	 I	 can	 find	out	more	about	what’s	happening	 from	
them,	what	 I	can	not	from	any	drop-in	sessions.	[…]	 I	am	talking	about	
the	lads	who	are	working	at	the	existing	Wylfa,	they	tell	me	more	about	
the	new	build,	than	I	get	from	the	drop-in	session.	[…]	So	I	suppose	what	
those	drop-in	 sessions	are	doing	 is	 that	 they	are	 telling	you	what	 they	
want	you	to	hear.	They	are	telling	you	what	they	thought	they	wanted	
you	 to	 hear,	 rather	 than	 some	 hard	 facts,	 which	 –	 if	 you	 are	 a	
businessperson,	 you	 have	 a	 business	 to	 run,	 you	 want	 a	 plan	 –	 is	
frustrating.	 It’s	 so	 frustrating	when	you	cannot	get	answers.	So	yeah,	 I	
make	a	point.	At	least,	once	in	every	two	weeks,	I	go	to	the	[local	pub],	
have	 a	 pint	 with	 the	 lads	 and	 find	 out	 what’s	 going	 on.	 They	 all	
volunteer,	they	are	all	in	the	pub,	they	want	to	talk	about	it,	but	if	I	ask	
them,	they	tell	me.	So	what	I	am	saying	here,	that	I	find	out	more	from	
talking	the	lads	who	are	working	there,	than	from	the	drop-in	sessions,	
so	we	stopped	going	to	drop-in	sessions.”	
Attendance	to	open	surgeries	vary.	In	general,	interest	decreases	with	distance	
from	 the	 site.	 While	 the	 Cemaes	 sessions	 are	 probably	 the	 most	 visited	 on	
average,	there	was	one	occasion	when	a	drop-in	event	in	Bangor	attracted	only	
one	visitor	in	total.	Similarly,	there	is	generally	more	attendance	when	there	is	
consultation	 or	 another	 important	milestone	 in	 the	 project.	 The	 timescale	 of	
the	 project	 was	 particularly	 challenging	 to	 communicate.	 While	 Horizon	 was	
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already	an	established	company	in	2009,	the	whole	investment	is	still	in	paper.	
The	first	nuclear	concrete	will	be	poured	around	2019,	and	the	station	will	not	
operate	 before	 2025.	 Thus	 the	 feeling	 of	 nothing	 is	 happening	 and	 the	
goalposts	 are	moving	 (Interview	 4,	 23,	 31)	was	 an	 often	 heard	 driver	 behind	
passivity	of	locals,	but	probably	recoiled	as	the	formal	consultations	accelerated	
with	PAC1.	
To	become	a	good	neighbour,	Horizon	also	builds	on	the	foundations	that	the	
current	Wylfa	 station	 established	 in	 the	 area.	 There	 is	 a	 sponsorship	 scheme	
established	(Horizon	NP	2014b),	and	it	is	already	taking	over	the	role	of	Magnox	
as	 the	 main	 fund	 for	 local	 community	 initiatives	 and	 events,	 like	 the	 annual	
Copperfest	 in	 Amlwch.	 Also,	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 STEM	 engagement	 and	
education	 programme	 started	with	 the	 late	 2014	 appointment	 of	 a	 company	
officer,	building	on	the	experiences	by	the	Wylfa	A	station.	
Second,	 the	 near	 neighbours	 of	 Horizon	 are	 different	 than	 the	 local	 public.	
Land-	 and	 homeowners	 within	 or	 adjacent	 to	 the	 NPS	 site	 are	 statutory	
consultees.	 Thus	 Horizon	 organises	 closed	 information	 events	 for	 these	
neighbours,	 but	 also	 establishes	 a	 one-to-one	 relationship	 to	 them.	
Negotiations	about	selling	properties	to	the	company	are	done	in	full	discretion.	
Horizon	 also	 launched	 a	 targeted	 consultation	 about	 their	 Neighbourhood	
Support	 Scheme	 simultaneously	 with	 PAC1.47	The	 current	 plan	 is	 to	 form	 a	
Neighbourhood	 Liaison	 Strategy	 and	 to	 establish	 a	 Neighbourhood	 Liaison	
Group.	
Third,	Wylfa	Newydd	is	better	understood	as	a	stakeholder	collaboration	rather	
an	investment	of	a	single	company,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	There	
are	dedicated	stakeholder	platforms,	such	as	the	Public	Liaison	Group	(PLG)	or	
the	Statutory	Working	Group	 (SWoG)	of	Horizon,	not	 to	mention	 the	working	
groups	 and	 Strategic	 Forum	 of	 the	 Energy	 Island	 Programme.	 Interestingly,	
while	there	are	no	forums	for	the	local	public,	there	are	discussion	platforms	for	
a	fairly	substantial	number	of	stakeholders.	While	the	publicly	available	meeting	
minutes	 indicate	 that	 critical	 questions	 are	 also	 asked,	 the	 attendees	 are	
broadly	 supporters	 of	 the	 project.	 In	 addition,	 various	 smaller	 meetings	 and	
informal	discussions	take	place	in	addition	to	the	main	meeting.	As	people	work	
together,	personal	 relationships	 are	built	 up	between	Horizon	 staff	 and	other	
stakeholder	 representatives.	 While	 for	 members	 of	 the	 public	 the	 extent	 of	
information	 depends	 on	 their	 effort	 and	 proactivity	 to	 ask	 questions,	
																																																						
47	See	details	on	http://consultation.horizonnuclearpower.com/stage-1/neighbourhood-support	(Accessed	
20/05/2016).	
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stakeholders	 got	more	 informed.	 As	 the	 previously	mentioned	 council	 official	
summarised:	
“MF:	Do	you	feel	you	are	informed	enough?	
Interviewee:	 As	 a…?	 Professionally,	 yes,	 we	 have	 two-ways	
communication.	 Weekly	 update	 of	 what’s	 happening	 on	 site	 emailed	
out.	We	share	the	newsletter,	there	are	regular	meetings.	 I’m	not	sure	
as	 a	 resident	 really	 […]	 whether	 the	 information	 [available]	 is	
[satisfactory].”	
Engagement	with	regulators	and	authorities	is	also	a	statutory	process.	In	case	
of	 formal	 meetings,	 Horizon	 often	 pays	 quite	 hefty	 hourly	 fees	 to	 talk	 with	
authority	 officials.	 The	 meetings	 with	 the	 Planning	 Inspectorate	 are	 also	
minuted.48	
Fourth,	 potential	 suppliers	 form	 a	 distinctive	 group	 to	 work	 together.	
Communication	 and	 collaboration	 in	 the	 supply	 chain	 is	 crucial	 in	 a	 nuclear	
construction.	 In	 numerous	 cases	 of	 nuclear	 constructions	 (e.g.,	 Olkiluoto,	
Flamanville),	a	key	cause	for	substantial	delays	and	cost	escalations	are	evolving	
conflicts	between	project	partners,	disputes	with	Tier	2	contractors,	or	the	lack	
of	 integration	 of	 the	 lower	 tiers	 of	 the	 supply	 chain.	 Currently,	 a	 register	 of	
potential	suppliers	is	built	up	together	with	the	Welsh	government.	Two	major	
supply	 chain	 meetings	 have	 been	 held	 with	 500	 and	 350	 of	 attendees	
respectively,	and	five	pilot	business	readiness	development	events	on	Anglesey	
with	Welsh	Government.	There	is	a	supply	chain	charter,	and	the	challenge	is	to	
communicate	the	robust	qualification	needs	to	assure	the	stringent	quality	and	
safety	 standards	 (e.g.,	 precision	 of	 welding)	 compared	 to	 other	 large	
constructions.	On	the	top	level,	the	Tier	1	consortium	was	officially	announced	
in	May	 2016,	 and	 a	 Joint	 Programme	Management	 Office	was	 established	 in	
Gloucester.	
Fifth,	 the	 wider	 publics	 beyond	 the	 region	 are	 hardly	 visible.	 Documents,	
consultations,	 and	 public	 surgery	 dates	 are	 available	 on	 the	 homepage,	 but	
Wylfa	 is	 not	much	 known	beyond	 the	 subregion	 and,	 to	 some	extent,	Wales.	
While	Hinkley	Point	C	has	been	a	recurring	item	in	the	national	media	over	the	
last	 few	 years,	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 hardly	 known	 at	 all.	 Going	 to	 academic	
conferences	 on	 energy	 in	 the	 UK,	 several	 other	 attendees	 expressed	 their	
surprise	that	there	are	other	new	nuclear	projects	than	Hinkley.		
																																																						
48 	Formal	 meetings	 with	 the	 Planning	 Inspectorate	 are	 available	 on	
http://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/projects/wales/wylfa-newydd-nuclear-power-
station/?ipcsection=advice	(Accessed	on	20/05/2016).	
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Sixth,	 the	 relation	with	anti-nuclear	activists	often	came	up	 in	discussion	with	
Horizon	people.	 It	was	 repeatedly	highlighted	 that	PAWB	does	not	attend	the	
platforms	provided	by	Horizon,	like	open	surgery	and	consultation	sessions	and	
the	Public	Liaison	Group	meetings	–	to	which	they	were	on	the	official	 invitee	
list.	They	were	not	only	seen	 ignoring	these	venues,	but	bypassing	proper	the	
democratic	 conduct	 by	 organising	 partisan	 media	 stunts	 or	 impeding	 civil	
discussion	in	past	meetings	(Interview	16).	
What	do	these	various	public	engagement	practices	 tell	about	 the	democratic	
politics	of	public	engagement,	 together	with	 the	ways	of	producing	and	using	
information	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section?	 This	 was	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
question	I	was	trying	to	grapple	every	time	I	went	to	open	surgeries	and	public	
exhibitions,	got	through	consultation	materials,	or	checked	the	Twitter	feed	for	
updates.	And	this	question	is	not	an	easy	one.	
7.6	A	REFLECTION	ON	DEMOCRATIC	POLITICS	
The	 practices	 of	 the	 emerging	 era	 of	 public	 engagement	 tap	 into	 the	 current	
debates	 on	 democratic	 politics	 in	 political	 theory	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	
deliberative	 democracy	 (Bohman	 and	 Rehg	 1997;	 Dryzek	 2000;	Gutmann	 and	
Thompson	 2009)	 and	 radical	 democracy	 (Laclau	 and	 Mouffe	 2001;	 Mouffe	
2000,	1999).	The	articulation	of	differences	is	a	particularly	interesting	question.	
As	 I	highlighted	 in	 the	previous	sections,	differentiation	of	publics	 is	crucial	 to	
consultations	 through	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 issues	 and	 customisation	 of	
consultation	events.	
Democracy	 is	 not	 a	 singular	 concept.	 There	 are	 different	 meanings	 of	
democracy	 inscribed	 in	 different	 practices.	 First,	 democracy	 as	 gaining	
legitimation	 and	 support	 for	 decisions	 is	 the	 underlying	 definition	 behind	 the	
design	and	conduct	of	the	consultation	process.	Publics	are	defined	in	relation	
to	 providing	 consent	 and	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 project	 as	 part	 of	 the	 planning	
process.	This	 is	also	 the	underlying	notion	 in	 the	practices	of	various	 levels	of	
government,	Horizon	and	other	key	stakeholders.	It	is	worth	mentioning	that	it	
is	close	to	classical	notions	of	democracy	by	ruling	by	consent.	
Second,	 democracy	 as	 revealing	 and	 challenging	 power	 relations	 is	 the	 driver	
behind	 the	 PAWB	 and	 activists	 in	 the	 organised	 anti-nuclear	 movements.	 A	
different	definition	of	 democratic	 politics	 is	 revealed	 through	 the	protest	 and	
media	practices	of	giving	a	 “hard	 time”	 (Interview	6)	 for	 the	 industry	and	 the	
state	 establishment	 compared	 to	 legitimisation.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 partisan	 or	
activist	publics	have	a	considerable	significance.	These	practices	correspond	to	
the	 agonistic	 politics	 by	 the	 multitude,	 advocated	 by	 radical	 democracy	
theorists.		
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Third,	democracy	as	a	means	to	uncover,	articulate,	negotiate	and	co-constitute	
differences	is	a	key	interest	of	this	chapter.	In	this	sense,	the	above	account	is	
not	 a	 neutral	 account	 of	 an	 objective	 researcher,	 but	 my	 subjectivities	 and	
interests	are	 integral	 to	my	writing.	The	 interest	of	 the	chapter	was	 that	how	
publics	 got	 co-constituted	 and	 how	 differences	 are	 channelled	 into	 the	
consultation	process.	Needless	to	say,	this	definition	is	somewhat	close	to	how	
some	deliberative	 and	difference	 democracy	 theorists	 understand	democratic	
politics.	
Is	democratic	politics	about	justifying	public	decisions	or	about	the	discussing	of	
issues	of	public	 importance?	49	This	duality	 is	 in	the	centre	of	this	chapter,	but	
the	 two	aspects	 are	not	easy	 to	disentangle.	 This	 leads	 to	 the	question	 ‘why’	
consultations	were	designed	the	way	I	described.	
7.7	CONCLUSION:	FROM	MASS	DEMOCRACY	TO	CUSTOMISED	DEMOCRACY?	
The	 chapter	 addressed	 the	 ongoing	 transformation	 of	 democratic	 politics	 of	
major	 infrastructural	 projects	 in	 the	 UK,	 nuclear	 power	 in	 particular.	 This	
responded	to	RQ3	‘How	is	democratic	politics	enacted	in	practice	in	the	public	
consultations	 and	 engagement	 of	Wylfa	 Newydd?’.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	
was	 on	 a	 much	 more	 mundane	 politics	 than	 the	 Politics	 in	 the	 transition	
literature,	 centred	 on	 agency	 and	 power.	 The	 approach	 of	 the	 chapter	
embraced	 aspects	 of	 political	 culture,	 materiality,	 and	 spatiality	 in	 studying	
public	engagement	and	consultations	outlined	by	the	relevant	STS	literature	in	
Chapter	3.	The	central	argument	of	the	chapter	was	that	the	streamlining	of	the	
planning	 process	 resulting	 in	 public	 consultations	 framework	 marked	 a	
substantial	shift	in	the	practice	of	democratic	politics	compared	to	the	historic	
public	inquiries,	which	provided	major	political	spectacles	of	opposing	camps.	A	
key	difference	is	the	displacement	of	politics	in	public	consultations	through	the	
fragmentation	of	publics	along	technical	and	non-technical,	 local	and	national,	
site-specific	 and	 general	 issues.	 The	methodological	 originality	 of	 the	 chapter	
was	the	ethnographic	study	of	a	major	public	consultation,	called	the	stage	1	of	
the	 Pre-Application	 Consultation	 (PAC1).	 This	 revealed	 the	 absence	 of	 public	
meetings	and	the	customisation	of	engagement	making	issues	private	concerns	
rather	than	public	affairs.	This	customisation	is	connected	to	a	differentiation	of	
publics	 (e.g.,	hard-to-reach	groups),	and	the	changing	architectures	of	publics,	
from	 town	halls	 to	 social	media.	 Also,	 various	means	were	 highlighted	of	 the	
practices	 of	 materially	 representing	 ‘facts’	 in	 consultation	 documents.	 The	
																																																						
49	Mitchells	 (2013:	9)	uses	a	similar	definition:	„The	term	’democracy’	can	have	two	kinds	of	meaning.	 It	
can	refer	to	ways	of	making	effective	claims	for	a	more	just	and	egalitarian	common	world.	Or	it	can	refer	
to	a	mode	of	governing	populations	that	employs	popular	consent	as	a	means	of	limiting	claims	for	greater	
equality	and	justice	by	dividing	up	the	common	world.”	
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consultation	was	situated	in	the	wider	context	of	nuclear	industry	engagement	
on	 Anglesey	 of	 ‘becoming	 a	 good	 neighbour’	 and	 designing	 circles	 of	
engagement.	At	 the	end	of	 the	 chapter,	 some	 reflections	on	 the	meanings	of	
political	practices	were	drawn	in	the	light	of	theories	of	democratic	politics.	
The	underlying	current	was	the	comparison	of	past	big	public	inquiries	with	the	
current	 public	 consultation	 framework.	 The	 academic	 reflections	 on	 public	
inquiries	 as	 a	 configuration	 of	 democratic	 politics	 were	 crucial	 in	 forming	 a	
distinctive	 literature	 on	 public	 engagement	 (Wynne	 2011).	 Several	 key	 terms	
were	continued	to	be	used	in	subsequent	debates	about	technological	issues	in	
Britain,	like	the	GMO	or	BSE	controversies.	There	is	an	argument	that	‘nothing	
has	 changed’,	 these	 debates	 exhibit	 the	 similarly	 technocratic,	 authoritarian,	
and	secretive	attitudes	on	behalf	of	 the	promoters	of	 the	 issues,	 just	under	a	
more	appealing	façade	and	with	more	spin.	 In	this	chapter	 I	argued,	however,	
that	 consultations	 enact	 a	 very	 different	 kind	 of	 politics	 and	 a	 very	 different	
kind	 of	 publics	 than	 the	 public	 inquiries	 a	 generation	 ago.	 It	 is	 striking	 to	
compare	the	public	inquiries	in	the	1980s	and	the	current	consultation	on	Wylfa	
Newydd.	 The	 issue	 is	 not	 secrecy	 and	 sometimes	 too	 little	 information,	 but	
often	 too	much	 information	 and	 too	many	 consultations.	Moreover,	 industry	
and	government	do	not	see	publics	as	a	homogenous	‘general	public’	anymore,	
but	 publics	 get	 fragmented	 through	 various	 consultations,	 and	 issues	
customised	 in	 a	 way	 they	 become	 rather	 private	 matters.	 The	 political	 is	
displaced	 from	 the	 arena	 of	 public	 inquiries	 to	 legal	 challenges	 and	 debates	
about	boundaries	and	geographies.	
I	have	used,	however,	a	single	case	study,	thus	the	question	 is	to	what	extent	
these	 findings	 can	 be	 generalised.	 Here	 I	 argue	 that	Wylfa	Newydd	 is	 not	 an	
isolated	case	and	my	fieldwork	resonates	with	a	broader	shift	of	moving	from	a	
‘mass	 democracy’	 to	 a	 ‘customised	 democracy’	 in	 relation	 to	 major	
infrastructural	 investments.	 The	 other	 new	 nuclear	 projects	 in	 the	 UK,	 use	
similar	 methods	 of	 public	 consultations,	 like	 public	 exhibitions,	 and	 similar	
terminologies,	 like	 good	 neighbour	 (EDF	 Energy	 2011;	 NuGeneration	 2015).	
Major	infrastructural	projects	are	often	addressed	together	(HM	Treasury	2016,	
2014),	 as	 signified	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 new	 National	 Infrastructure	
Commission	in	the	UK.	The	planning	reform	and	the	emerging	practices,	like	the	
rise	of	 landscape	 consultancy	and	 carefully	 crafted	visual	 representations,	 are	
relevant	 for	 all	 major	 infrastructural	 projects,	 well	 beyond	 energy	 or	 nuclear	
power.	 Reading	 the	 book	 ‘Material	 Politics’	 of	 Andrew	 Barry	 (2013),	 for	
example,	on	the	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	oil	pipeline	many	issues	resonate	with	my	
own	research.	Also,	this	 is	connected	to	wider	issues,	 like	to	the	weakening	of	
mass	protests	or	the	rise	of	social	media	as	a	political	platform.	The	next	step	of	
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this	research	would	be	to	try	to	understand	to	what	extent	these	findings	are	
relevant	to	other	recent	or	prospective	large	infrastructural	projects.	
	 	
	 212	
CHAPTER	8.	CONCLUSIONS	
8.1	INTRODUCTION	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 outline	 some	 conclusions	 based	 on	 previous	 chapters.	 In	
section	 8.2,	 I	 address	 the	 research	 aims	 and	 the	 three	 research	 questions	 on	
geographies,	 governance	and	democracy	 respectively.	 In	 section	8.3,	 I	 outline	
some	contributions	to	the	 literatures,	especially	 in	relation	to	the	geographies	
and	politics	of	transitions.	This	interdisciplinary	research	has	rather	a	number	of	
insights	than	a	few	clear	assertions	to	add.	Finally,	in	section	8.4,	I	reflect	on	the	
limitations	of	the	research.	
8.2	SUMMARY	OF	ARGUMENT	
In	 this	 section	 I	 provide	 a	 concise	 account	 of	 the	 overall	 research	 aim	 and	
responses	to	the	three	research	questions.	The	RA	sets	the	scene	for	the	more	
focused	research	questions.	 In	 responding	 to	 the	 three	questions	 I	 specifically	
refer	 to	 the	 conceptual	 approaches	 that	 supported	 me	 in	 addressing	 the	
questions.	 The	 research	 questions	 on	 the	multi-scalar	 geographies	 (RQ1),	 the	
governance	 (RQ2),	 and	 the	 public	 engagements	 (RQ3)	 of	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	
megainvestment	 broadly	 refer	 to	 the	 findings	 presented	 in	 Chapters	 5	 to	 7	
respectively.	
8.2.1	 RESEARCH	 AIM:	 CHARACTERISING	 THE	 CURRENT	 ERA	 OF	 NUCLEAR	
MEGAINVESTMENTS	THROUGH	WYLFA	NEWYDD	
The	 overarching	 aim	 of	 the	 research	 was	 to	 characterise	 the	 current	 era	 of	
nuclear	 constructions	 in	 the	 UK	 by	 using	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 as	 a	 case	 study.	 In	
setting	 the	 scene,	 I	 have	 developed	 a	 typology	 of	 three	 eras	 of	 nuclear	
constructions	in	the	UK	in	Chapter	2	(see	the	details	summarised	in	Table	2.1).	
First,	 the	 white	 heat	 era	 (1950s-1970s)	 showed	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 first	
nuclear	 stations	 with	 remarkable	 enthusiasm	 and	 a	 strong	 central	 steering,	
including	 the	 first	Wylfa	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 industrialisation	 programme	 of	
northwest	 Wales.	 Second,	 in	 the	 white	 elephant	 era	 (1950s-1970s)	 nuclear	
power	 was	 challenged	 both	 economically	 and	 politically,	 together	 with	 key	
elements	of	 the	post-war	 consensus,	which	 resulted	 in	a	backlash	against	 the	
Wylfa	B	plans	on	Anglesey.	Third,	the	white	paper	era	(2000s-2010s)	paved	the	
way	 for	 nuclear	 power	 through	 a	 series	 of	 government	 policy	 papers	 by	
reframing	 the	 climate	 change	 challenge	 in	 a	 liberalised	market,	 including	 the	
construction	of	Wylfa	Newydd.	
The	 thesis	 identified	 various	 broader	 changes	 in	 the	 current	 era	 that	 set	 the	
scene	for	the	new	nuclear	programme.	In	the	wake	of	climate	change	becoming	
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a	 key	 public	 concern,	 especially	 in	 the	 2000s,	 the	 industry	 reframed	 nuclear	
power	 as	 a	 ‘big	 fish’	 low-carbon	 solution	 (Doyle	 2011)	 with	 public	 opinion	
shifting	 towards	 a	 reluctant	 acceptance	 (Bickerstaff	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Corner	 et	 al.	
2011).	 Later,	 the	 nuclear	 programme	 became	 as	 much	 a	 reindustrialisation	
strategy	 as	 a	 decarbonisation	 one	 to	 attract	 large	 global	 investors	 and	
reinvigorate	 the	 shrinking	 (nuclear)	 construction	 and	 engineering	 sector.	 This	
government	 strategy	 resulted	 in	making	way	 for	 new	 nuclear	 projects	 by	 de-
risking	 private	 investments,	 as	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 through	 streamlining	
planning	and	 regulation,	 financial	 guarantees,	 and	direct	 involvement	 in	R&D,	
education	 and	 training.	 This	 coincided	 with	 global	 nuclear	 vendors,	 such	 as	
Hitachi,	endeavouring	to	showcase	their	technology	at	their	own	expense	 in	a	
grave	 need	 for	 contracts.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 there	 was	 a	 novel	 facilitative	
governance	 approach	 evolving	 nationally	 and	 locally,	 exemplified	 by	 the	
Anglesey	Energy	Island	Programme.	
8.2.2	RQ1	ON	THE	GEOGRAPHIES	OF	A	MEGAINVESMENT	
The	 question	 ‘How	 is	 the	Wylfa	 Newydd	megainvestment	made	 on	 different	
geographic	 scales?’	 was	 addressed	 through	 highlighting	 the	 differences	
between	how	Wylfa	Newydd	 is	 envisioned	 and	 forged	 across	 different	 places	
and	scales.	The	thesis	claims	that	 the	megainvestment	 is	 remarkably	different	
across	multiple	scales	and	places,	and	critical	challenges	to	Wylfa	Newydd	are	
often	 connected	 to	 its	 geographies,	 such	 as	 embeddedness	 in	 the	 local	 social	
and	 physical	 landscape,	 the	 spatial	 distributions	 of	 benefits	 and	 risks,	 or	 the	
relevant	territorial	scales	of	governance.	
The	case	study	is	situated	in	the	emerging	geographies	of	transitions	literature,	
highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 spatial	 embeddedness,	 multi-scalarity,	 and	
material	 landscapes	 (Becker,	 Moss,	 and	 Naumann	 2016;	 Bridge	 et	 al.	 2013;	
Coenen,	 Benneworth,	 and	 Truffer	 2012;	 Hansen	 and	 Coenen	 2015;	 Truffer,	
Murphy,	and	Raven	2015).	This	novel	research	field	provides	useful	insights	but	
only	 a	 relatively	 few	 empirical	 case	 studies	 so	 far,	 especially	 beyond	 cities	 as	
transition	 hubs	 (Hodson	 and	 Marvin	 2013;	 Späth	 and	 Rohracher	 2010).	 The	
recent	 discussions	 in	 human	 geography	 challenging	 fixed	 notions	 of	 place	
(Massey	 2010,	 2005),	 scale	 (Marston	 2000;	 Swyngedouw	 1997),	 region	 (Allen	
and	Cochrane	2007;	Paasi	2013,	2003)	and	nation	state	(Brenner	et	al.	2008)	are	
crucial	 in	 developing	 a	 language	 of	 understanding	 the	 geographies	 of	 Wylfa	
Newydd.	
The	geographies	of	Wylfa	Newydd	on	various	scales	were	outlined	in	Chapter	5.	
The	 embeddedness	 or	 intrusion	 to	 the	 social	 and	 physical	 landscape,	 for	
example,	is	a	key	challenge	for	the	new	power	plant	as	highlighted	by	the	story	
of	 the	 current	 Wylfa	 station	 and	 the	 opposition	 on	 Anglesey	 against	 wind	
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turbines	as	imposed	by	detached	investors.	In	the	Cemaes	area	the	hopes	and	
concerns	 with	 the	 new	 build	 are	 rooted	 in	 the	 lived	 experiences	 with	 the	
existing	 station,	 such	as	 cultural	 frictions	 centred	on	 the	 language,	 livelihoods	
and	 social	 connections.	 Consequently,	 local	 discussions	 on	 the	 new	 build	 are	
concentrated	 on	 mainly	 socioeconomic	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 number	 of	 local	
career	 prospects,	 the	 cultural	 challenge	 by	 transient	 workers,	 the	 stretch	 on	
local	infrastructures	and	facilities,	and	disturbance	of	the	megainvestment.	The	
distribution	 of	 risk	 and	 benefits,	 and	 the	 drawing	 of	 boundaries,	 such	 as	
between	 local	 and	 non-local	 are	 central	 to	 the	 contestations	 of	 the	
megainvestment	 on	 Anglesey	 and	 beyond.	On	 different	 levels	 of	 governance,	
Wylfa	is	envisioned	differently	and	shaped	through	different	means.	For	the	Isle	
of	 Anglesey	 County	 Council,	 the	 megainvestment	 is	 the	 centrepiece	 of	 the	
Energy	Island	Programme	as	a	novel	economic	development	plan,	in	which	the	
community	 benefit	 contributions	 are	 essential	 in	 the	 age	 of	 public	 spending	
cuts.	 The	 devolved	 Welsh	 Government	 struggles	 to	 make	 establish	 its	 state	
capacity	 and	 to	 territorially	 integrate	Wales	 as	 a	modern	 country.	 For	 the	UK	
government,	 the	 nuclear	 programme	 is	 framed	 as	 a	 policy	 response	 to	 the	
ambitious	decarbonisation	targets	(Climate	Change	Act	2008),	more	recently	to	
the	 shrinking	 industrial	base	of	 the	country.	The	government	 is	 finding	a	new	
role	by	attracting	global	investors	to	reindustrialise	the	country	in	a	liberalised	
energy	market	 through	de-risking	 investment.	For	 the	global	nuclear	 industry,	
the	UK	is	a	showcase	for	nuclear	technology	with	direct	involvement	of	nuclear	
vendors.	 These	 examples	 highlight	 that	 governing	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 a	
negotiation	 between	 distinctive	 visions	 and	 practices	 across	 different	 places	
and	scales.	
8.2.3	RQ2	ON	GOVERNANCE	
The	question	 ‘How	 is	Wylfa	Newydd	governed	as	a	megainvestment	project?’	
was	addressed	 through	outlining	 the	multi-level	governance	of	Wylfa	Newydd	
and	 by	 drawing	 three	 case	 studies	 of	 how	 public	 bodies	 engaged	 with	 the	
megainvestment.	 The	 thesis	 claims	 that	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 marks	 a	 governance	
experiment	characterised	by	novel	forms	and	practices	on	multiple	 levels.	The	
new	 nuclear	 programme	 is	 characterised	 by	 negotiating	 between	 different	
levels	 of	 governance,	 establishing	 facilitative	 and	 collaborative	 platforms,	
shifting	boundaries	between	public	and	private	sector	working,	and	a	key	role	
for	specialist	knowledge	as	co-produced	and	contested.	
While	 transitions	 literature	 often	 discusses	 the	 governance	 of	 transitions	 in	
fairly	 generic	 terms,	 reflexivity	 (Grin	 2010;	 Rotmans	 and	 Loorbach	 2010)	 or	
actor	 strategies	 (Avelino	and	Rotmans	2009;	Farla	et	al.	2012),	 the	geography	
literature	 on	multi-level	 governance	 and	 the	 STS	 literature	 on	 the	 politics	 of	
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knowledge	provided	a	more	useful	conceptual	language	to	answer	this	question	
(Barry	2013,	2001;	 Jasanoff	2007,	2004).	Geography	 literature	highlights	 there	
are	multiple	levels	of	governance	beyond	the	nation	state,	interconnected	with	
the	politics	of	scale	(Bulkeley	2005;	Jessop	2004;	Stubbs	2005).	
I	highlighted	that	the	Wylfa	Newydd	project	is	shaped	through	multiple	levels	of	
governance	 in	Chapter	 5.	 The	new	build	project	 is	 both	 an	 investment	of	 the	
global	nuclear	company	Hitachi	to	showcase	their	technology,	and	a	key	project	
in	 the	 UK	 new	 nuclear	 programme	 with	 a	 strong	 involvement	 of	 Whitehall	
through	de-risking	the	investment.	In	addition,	the	local	county	council	tries	to	
make	its	mark	through	the	Energy	Island	initiative.	As	I	outlined	in	the	response	
to	 RQ1,	 there	 are	 distinctive	 visions	 for	 Wylfa	 Newydd,	 deeply	 inscribed	 in	
relevant	practices,	on	different	scales	of	governance.	Governing	Wylfa	Newydd	
is	about	negotiating	these	visions	and	practices	where	key	organisations	try	to	
establish	themselves.	
Wylfa	 Newydd	 is	 a	 governance	 experiment	 on	 various	 levels,	 highlighted	 by	
Chapter	 6,	 based	 on	 informal	 and	 formal	 collaborations	 as	 well	 as	 specialist	
knowledge.	 The	 construction	 project	 is	 better	 understood	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 an	
organisational	 hierarchy,	 but	 as	 a	 multi-organisational	 network	 blurring	
boundaries	 between	 state	 and	 market.	 Collaborative	 platforms,	 such	 as	 the	
Energy	 Island	 and	 the	 Nuclear	 Industry	 Council,	 are	 crucial	 in	 aligning	
organisational	interests	and	co-producing	specialist	knowledge.	Engaging	with	a	
£14bn	 megainvestment	 means	 crucial	 organisational	 changes	 in	 the	 public	
sector.	The	 Isle	of	Anglesey	County	Council,	 for	example,	 is	restructuring	 itself	
from	the	traditional	service	provision	and	statutory	authority	model	to	a	project	
management	 approach	 responding	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 investors	 to	 attract	
community	benefits	in	times	of	austerity.	In	the	recently	abolished	Department	
of	Energy	and	Climate	Change,	the	focus	was	to	deliver	a	portfolio	of	major	low-
carbon	 investment	 projects,	 new	 nuclear	 in	 particular,	 through	 acquiring	
commercial	 and	 other	 specialist	 skills	 primarily	 via	 industry	 secondments	 and	
through	 close	 informal	 and	 formal	 engagements	 with	 key	 industry	 actors.	 In	
between	collaborating	partners,	however,	there	are	organisational	frictions	that	
are	 exemplified	 by	 the	 ‘battle	 of	 evidence’	 between	 the	 County	 Council	 and	
Horizon	in	the	statutory	process.	The	three	case	studies	highlight	the	increasing	
role	 of	 collaborative	 platforms,	 the	 blurring	 boundaries	 between	 private	 and	
public	 sector	 operating,	 and	 the	 crucial	 role	 of	 specialist	 knowledge	 in	
mediating	inter-organisational	relationships.	
8.2.4	RQ3	ON	DEMOCRATIC	POLITICS	
The	 question	 ‘How	 is	 democratic	 politics	 enacted	 in	 practice	 in	 the	 public	
consultations	 and	 engagement	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd?’	 was	 addressed	 primarily	
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through	 an	 in-depth	 account	 of	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 public	 consultation	 on	
Wylfa	 Newydd	 (PAC1).	 The	 thesis	 claims	 that	 there	 is	 a	major	 shift	 from	 the	
practices	 of	 the	 big	 public	 inquiries	 to	 the	 current	 public	 consultations	 by	
differentiating	 publics	 through	 fragmenting	 issues,	 customising	 consultation	
events,	and	lengthy	documentations	re-presenting	information.	
The	question	of	participation	 is	often	neglected	 in	 the	 literature	of	 transitions	
(Chilvers	 and	 Longhurst	 2016),	 or	 addressed	 in	 terms	 of	 legitimating	
sustainability	 transitions	 (Hendriks	 2009,	 2008).	 The	 chapter	 draws	 on	 STS	
perspectives	on	participation	 in	 technoscientific	 issues	highlighting	how	public	
engagements	 are	 orchestrated	 (Felt	 and	 Fochler	 2010;	 Stirling	 2008;	 Wynne	
2005).	 STS	 approaches	 challenge	 how	 taken-for-granted	 notions	 of	 expert	
knowledge	 and	 publics,	 but	 highlight	 the	 ways	 these	 are	 co-constructed	
(Chilvers	and	Kearnes	2015b;	Michael	2009;	Wynne	1996,	1992a).	STS	literature	
also	highlights	the	material,	spatial,	and	mundane	aspects	of	how	machineries	
of	 public	 engagement	 are	 orchestrated;	 with	 some	 important	 insight	 to	
understand	 the	 practices	 of	 formal	 public	 consultations	 (Asdal	 2008;	 Braun,	
Whatmore,	 and	 Stengers	 2010;	 Latour	 2005a;	 Laurent	 2011;	 Lezaun	 and	
Soneryd	 2007;	 Marres	 2012;	 Marres,	 Latour,	 and	 Weibel	 2005;	 Marres	 and	
Lezaun	2011).	
In	 Chapter	 7	 I	 used	 the	 mundane	 settings	 of	 drop-in	 sessions	 and	 public	
exhibitions	 to	 highlight	 a	 remarkable	 shift	 in	 the	 current	 practices	 of	 public	
engagement	compared	to	the	historical	big	public	inquiries.	In	streamlining	the	
planning	 process	 the	 political	 spectacles	 of	 public	 inquiries,	 enacting	 a	
technocratic	 practices	 and	 a	 general	 public	 (Wynne	 2011),	 were	 fragmented	
into	a	series	of	consultations	on	disjointed	issues.	Along	with	the	fragmentation	
of	 issues,	different	publics	are	created	and	contentious	politics	 is	displaced	 to	
wrangles	on	legal	issues	and	boundaries.	The	ethnographic	account	of	the	pre-
application	consultation,	stage	1	(PAC1)	in	September-December	2014	revealed	
that	consultation	events,	most	importantly	the	so-called	public	exhibitions,	are	
essentially	one-to-one	sessions	customised	to	the	interests	of	the	participant.	In	
the	absence	of	public	meetings,	these	sessions	were	designing	issues	as	private	
concerns	 rather	 than	 public	 issues.	 The	materiality	 of	 consultation	 document	
revealed	how	information	is	arranged	and	re-presented	in	a	designed	dialogue	
creating	absences	and	presences.	The	number	of	consultations	and	the	 length	
of	consultation	material	are	often	associated	with	a	‘consultation	fatigue’,	and	
the	 Unlimited	 Consultation	 Leading	 to	 Exhaustion	 (UNCLE)	 approach	 by	
developers	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 traditional	 Decide-Announce-Defend	 (DAD)	
approach.	 The	 overall	 public	 engagement	 beyond	 the	 formal	 statutory	
consultations	highlighted	the	context	of	Anglesey	political	culture,	the	industry	
efforts	 to	 make	Wylfa	 a	 ‘good	 neighbour’,	 and	 the	 differentiation	 of	 publics	
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through	circles	of	consultations.	The	public	consultations	on	Wylfa	Newydd	lead	
to	 the	 question	 of	 a	 wider	 shift	 from	 mass	 democracy	 to	 a	 customised	
democracy	in	relation	to	large-scale	infrastructural	projects.	
The	three	research	questions	were	 formed	as	 ‘how’	questions,	which	 leads	 to	
‘why’	 the	 geographies,	 governance,	 and	 public	 engagements	 of	 the	 Wylfa	
Newydd	project	took	shape	 in	the	ways	the	thesis	outlined.	On	the	one	hand,	
the	 descriptions	 of	 the	 thesis	 inevitably	 imply	 some	 interpretation	 or	 even	
explanation	 of	why.	 In	 discussing	 public	 consultations,	 for	 example,	 I	 showed	
that	there	were	deliberate	designs	to	manufacture	public	consent	in	legitimising	
and	 ‘streamlining’	 large	 infrastructural	 investments.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
however,	 I	 aimed	 to	 leave	my	 findings	open	 to	 interpretation.	 I	discussed	 the	
‘face	 value’	 drivers	 of	 the	 new	 nuclear	 programme,	 from	 decarbonisation	 to	
reindustrialisation,	 and	 left	 the	 underlying	 political	 interests	 and	 power	
struggles	underexplored.	Similarly,	 I	 identified	new	forms	of	governance,	 such	
as	 the	 in-depth	 collaborations	 between	 public	 bodies	 and	 industry,	 without	
asking	what	 interests	 these	 collaborations	 serve	 as	 a	 vehicle	 for	 and	without	
critically	challenging	the	aims	and	means	of	 the	new	nuclear	programme.	The	
‘why’	 questions	 are	 often	more	 relevant	 than	 the	 ‘how’	 questions.	 The	 ‘why’	
questions	necessitate	either	elevated	access	to	decision-making	circles,	which	I	
was	denied	to,	or	substantial	level	of	speculation,	which	I	denied	to	do.	At	this	
point,	 I	 leave	it	up	the	readers	of	the	thesis	to	give	their	answers	to	the	‘why’	
questions,	as	my	next	step	is	also	to	figure	out	these	‘whys’.			
8.3	CONTRIBUTIONS	TO	THE	LITERATURE	
This	 research	 is	 interdisciplinary,	 therefore	 resonates	 with	 different	 research	
fields,	 such	 as	 the	 existing	 bulk	 of	 social	 science	 research	 on	 nuclear	 power,	
transition	studies,	human	geography	and	STS.	There	 is	hardly	any	research	on	
megainvestments,	 especially	 beyond	 top-level	 decision-making	 (Barry	 2013;	
Flyvbjerg	2014;	Flyvbjerg,	Bruzelius,	and	Rothengatter	2003).	This	research	was	
exploratory	rather	than	focusing	on	some	clearly	defined	theoretical	questions.	
Therefore	 there	 is	 no	 one	 strong	 contribution	 to	 the	 literatures,	 but	 rather	
insights	 that	 can	 be	 followed	 on.	 To	 some	 extent	 I	 entered	 an	 unchartered	
territory	 with	 the	 research	 topic,	 and	 instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 one	 or	 two	 key	
issues	I	have	wandered	around	this	unchartered	territory.	These	insights	to	the	
literature	 are	 scattered	 around	 the	 thesis.	 In	 this	 section	 first	 I	 address	 the	
question	of	a	megainvestment,	then	I	draw	together	the	insights	that	might	be	
of	 interest	 to	 the	 social	 science	 literature	 on	 nuclear	 power,	 to	 transition	
studies,	to	human	geography,	and	to	STS	respectively.	
This	research	tried	to	engage	itself	with	the	concept	of	a	megainvestment	as	a	
topic	 worthwhile	 to	 research	 for	 social	 scientists.	 I	 did	 not	 provide	 an	 exact	
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definition	of	megainvestment,	but	aimed	to	translate	fourteen	billion	pounds	to	
social	 terms	and	highlighted	a	range	of	associated	 issues,	 from	the	amount	of	
materials	and	people	mobilised	to	the	geographic	reach	of	 investment	project	
through	 multi-scalarity,	 from	 the	 challenge	 of	 to	 public	 sector	 bodies	 to	 the	
shift	 in	public	engagement.	Megainvestments	 in	 the	 low-carbon	energy	sector	
and	beyond	are	hardly	addressed	in	social	sciences,	yet	just	in	the	UK	ongoing	
or	planned	projects	include	High-Speed	rail	2	(HS2),	Crossrail,	Hinkley	Point	C	or	
Wylfa	Newydd.	 I	hope	my	study	will	contribute	to	a	growing	understanding	of	
megainvestments,	and	the	new	nuclear	programme	in	particular.	
The	 contributions	 to	 the	 social	 science	 research	 on	 nuclear	 power	 aim	 to	 go	
beyond	 conventional	 topics,	 such	 as	 radiation	 risk.	 First,	 the	 exceptionality	 of	
nuclear	power	in	the	literature	is	based	on	the	uniqueness	of	radiation	and	risk	
potentials	 but	 nuclear	 power	 cannot	 be	 restricted	 to	 the	 risk	 perspective.	 In	
particular,	 my	 fieldwork	 revealed	 that	 socioeconomic	 prospects	 of	 the	
investment	 or	 the	 cultural	 conflicts	 associated	 with	 the	 Wylfa	 are	 as	 much	
salient	 issues	 locally	 as	 risks.	 Second,	 there	 is	 often	 a	 discrepancy	 between	
local,	 site-specific	 research	 and	 national	 or	 global	 perspectives	 on	 nuclear	
power	with	a	few	notable	exceptions	(Hecht	2012,	2009;	Schmid	2015).	Third,	
nuclear	 constructions	 are	 almost	 entirely	 ignored	 in	 the	 literature,	 especially	
beyond	 studying	 the	 top-level	 investment	 decisions,	 in	 contrast	 with	
operational	 plants	 and	nuclear	waste.	 Fourth,	while	 there	 is	 a	 new	uptake	 of	
interest	 in	nuclear	power	in	the	wake	of	Fukushima,	much	of	the	perspectives	
towards	nuclear	power	go	back	 to	previous	 revival	of	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 the	
late	1970s	 till	 the	1990s,	 such	as	 risk	and	authoritarian	state	 (Atsuji	and	Cook	
2011;	 Elliott	 2012;	 Sovacool	 2012).	 The	 question	 is	 whether	 new	 times	 need	
new	 responses	 with	 more	 focus	 on	 the	 ‘glocalised’	 geographies	 of	 nuclear	
power,	the	hollowing	out	of	the	nation	state	or	changing	public	sphere.	
The	 contributions	 to	 the	 transitions	 literature	 are	 centred	 on	 the	 politics	 and	
geographies	 of	 transitions.	 First,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 alternative	
conceptualisations	of	politics	of	transitions	beyond	actor	strategies,	agency	and	
power	 (Avelino	 et	 al.	 2016).	 Second,	 there	 is	 much	 need	 to	 address	
participation	 in	 sustainability	 transitions	 beyond	 instrumental	 terms.	 The	
transforming	 energy	 system	 is	 as	 much	 about	 democracy	 as	 about	
decarbonisation.	 Third,	 the	 case	 study	 offers	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 emerging	
field	 of	 geographies	 of	 transitions.	 Fourth,	 the	 contestations	 of	 low-carbon	
energy	 installations	 on	Anglesey	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 physical	 and	
social	landscapes	of	transitions.	Last	but	not	least,	the	case	study	demonstrated	
the	 need	 for	 in-depth	 ethnographic-minded	 research	 as	 opposed	 to	 national	
case	 studies	 based	on	mostly	 secondary	 sources	 (Raven,	 Schot,	 and	Berkhout	
2012a).	
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The	 contributions	 to	 human	 geography	 provide	 empirical	 orientations	 to	
address.	 First,	 the	 thesis	 indicated	 that	 understanding	 megainvestments	 can	
make	 important	contributions	 to	 the	 rising	 interest	 in	 infrastructures.	Second,	
Wylfa	orients	 attention	away	 from	cities	 as	networked	hubs	 to	highlight	non-
urban	 infrastructural	 hubs	 (Graham	 and	Marvin	 2001).	 Third,	 the	 case	 study	
contributes	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 local	 acceptance	 of	 low-carbon	 energies	
beyond	NIMBYism	(Devine-Wright	2015;	Welsh	1993).	Fourth,	the	ethnographic	
discussion	of	public	consultations	 fill	a	gap	 in	 the	 literatures	on	the	politics	of	
the	planning	reform	in	the	UK	(Cowell	and	Owens	2006;	Johnstone	2014).	
The	contributions	to	science	and	technology	studies	(STS)	mean	a	reorientation.	
First,	a	nuclear	power	plant	 is	not	 just	a	 ‘technological	object’.	This	 raises	 the	
questions	of	unopening	 the	black	box	and	situating	 the	 technology	 in	a	wider	
context.	 Second,	 this	 case	 study	 poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 STS	 by	 addressing	
socioeconomic	 ‘effects’	 or	 ‘consequences’	 without	 falling	 into	 technological	
determinism.	
8.4	VALIDATION	OF	FINDINGS?	CONSTRAINTS	AND	LIMITATIONS	OF	RESEARCH	
During	the	research	I	was	often	stretched	between	grasping	too	much	and	too	
little	at	the	same	time.	On	the	one	hand,	Wylfa	Newydd	is	a	megainvestment,	
and	 sometimes	 I	 felt	 I	 have	 bitten	 off	 more	 than	 I	 could	 chew.	 The	 seven	
months	Anglesey	fieldwork	was	a	taster	of	understanding	the	megainvestment	
but	 I	often	did	not	have	the	time	to	 follow	up	different	 threads	or	 faced	with	
doors	 shut.	 While	 the	 sheer	 complexity	 of	 the	 megainvestment	 was	 a	 key	
realisation,	 a	 PhD	 project	 seemed	 sometimes	 too	 short	 to	 grasp	 the	
interconnected	 issues.	The	expected	£14	billion	budget	 is	more	 than	a	million	
times	more	than	my	annual	PhD	scholarship.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	aim	of	the	research	was	to	provide	a	perspective	on	the	
unfolding	new	nuclear	programme	in	the	UK	and	I	have	yet	more	to	learn	about	
the	 generalisability	 of	 the	 findings.	 In	 researching	 the	 Wylfa	 new	 build	 was	
dominated	by	the	understanding	what	was	taking	place	in	the	very	locality,	and	
I	 spent	 definitely	 less	 time	 than	originally	 planned	 to	 reach	beyond.	 Probably	
the	biggest	regret	of	my	research	is,	that	I	did	not	engage	as	substantively	as	I	
initially	wanted	to	with	bureaucrats,	company	officials,	and	politicians	in	North	
Wales	 and	 beyond.	 It	 was	 particularly	 difficult	 to	 establish	 access	 to	 the	
‘national’	 level,	 thus	 my	 understanding	 and	 analysis	 is	 primarily	 based	 on	
document	analysis	and	secondary	literature.	
This	raises	the	question	of	the	generalisability	of	my	results.	I	addressed	Wylfa	
Newydd	as	a	representative	of	a	new	era	of	megainvestments.	To	the	extent	I	
followed	the	Hinkley	and	Moorside	projects,	there	were	similarities	in	how	the	
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pre-application	 consultations	 were	 conducted,	 or	 how	 the	 councils	 were	
preparing	 for	 the	 statutory	 and	 voluntary	 benefits.	 Britain’s	 Energy	 Coast	
programme	 in	West	 Cumbria	 is	 one	 example.	Nevertheless,	 I	 do	 not	 have	 in-
depth	understandings	of	these	projects,	and	have	not	even	visited	these	sites.	
The	generalisability	of	my	findings	needs	to	be	explored	more.	
8.5	A	FINAL	NOTE		
The	 supposedly	 final	 go-ahead	 for	 the	 flagship	 Hinkley	 Point	 C	 project	 was	
signed	 by	 the	 UK,	 French,	 and	 Chinese	 governments	 just	 a	 day	 before	 my	
submission	 (The	 Guardian	 2016).	 This	 is	 a	milestone	 for	 the	 UK	 new	 nuclear	
programme,	 including	 the	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 megainvestment.	 Throughout	 this	
thesis	 I	 tried	 to	 highlight	 how	 crucial	 these	 nuclear	 megainvestments	 are	 in	
configuring	 new	 ways	 of	 governance	 and	 democracy,	 not	 to	 mention	
transformations	 of	 living	 in	 places	 well	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 locality.	 Yet,	
these	projects	are	vulnerable.	Recently,	the	review	of	the	government	policy	on	
Hinkley	 Point	 C	 by	 the	 newly	 appointed	 Theresa	 May	 was	 just	 the	 newest	
instance	that	these	new	nuclear	megainvestments	are	not	100%	to	happen.	In	
case	of	Wylfa	Newydd,	Hitachi	also	signalled	that	the	fate	of	Hinkley	Point	C	has	
also	 consequences	 on	 them.	 It	 is	 not	 impossible	 that	 the	 new	 era	 of	
megainvestments	brought	to	life	through	white	papers	will	be	stillborn.	It	is	also	
not	 impossible	that	Wylfa	Newydd	will	become	the	flagship	nuclear	project	of	
the	UK	nuclear	programme	instead	of	Hinkley,	and	will	be	all	over	the	national	
and	international	news.	
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APPENDIX	1.	LIST	OF	INTERVIEWS	
	
Interview	
number	
Interview	type	
1	 Llanbadrig	
2	 Mechell	
3	 IACC	
4	 Llanbadrig	
5	 PAWB	
6	 PAWB	
7	 Llanbadrig	
8	 Mechell	
9	 IACC/Llanbadrig	
10	 Wales/IACC	
11	 Llanbadrig/Magnox	
12	 IACC	
13	 IACC	
14	 IACC	
15	 IACC/Magnox	
16	 Horizon	
17	 Magnox/Llanbadrig	
18	 Stakeholder	
19	 Magnox	
20	 Stakeholder	
21	 IACC	
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22	 Mechell	
23	 Llanbadrig	
24	 PAWB	
25	 Stakeholder	
26	 IACC	
27	 Wales/Stakeholder	
28	 Wales/Stakeholder	
29	 Llanbadrig	
30	 PAWB	
31	 Llanbadrig	
32	 Llanbadrig	
33	 Llanbadrig	
34	 Llanbadrig	
35	 Llanbadrig/Magnox	
36	 Magnox/Horizon	
37	 Wales	
38	 Wales	
39	 Wales	
40	 Wales	
41	 IACC	
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APPENDIX	2.	INTERVIEW	TEMPLATE	(CEMAES	RESIDENTS)	
Background	
• How	long	have	you	been	living	in	the	area?	
• What	is	your	professional	background?	
• What	is	your	connection	with	Wylfa?	
Nuclear	power	and	the	community	
• How	is	nuclear	power	part	of	the	village/area?	
• How	 has	 Wylfa	 changed	 the	 community?	 How	 would	 Cemaes	 be	
different	without	Wylfa?	
• What	 is	 special	 about	 Cemaes	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 parts	 of	
Anglesey	or	North	Wales,	especially	in	relation	to	nuclear	power?	
Stakeholders	
• How	has	Wylfa	 (CEGB,	BNFL,	Magnox	or	NDA)	been	engaging	with	 the	
community?		
• Do	 you	 follow	 the	 work	 of	 the	 community	 council?	 How	 would	 you	
characterise	it?	
• How	do	you	see	the	county	council?	Do	you	know	about	their	work?	
Wylfa	new	build	
• What	do	you	know	about	the	Wylfa	new	build?	
• What	are	your	views	about	it?	What	are	the	most	important	issues?	
• Have	you	ever	attended	any	drop-in	 session	or	 consultation	 related	 to	
any	 energy	 investment	 project?	 Why	 not/yes?	 What	 are	 your	
experiences?	What	were	 the	 issues	 your	 raised	or	 questions	 you	have	
asked?	
• Have	 you	 heard	 about	 the	 Energy	 Island	 Programme?	What	 are	 your	
views	on	it?	
• Do	you	think	you	are	informed	enough	about	the	Wylfa	new	build	or	the	
Energy	Island?	
• Do	 you	 think	 you	 or	 the	 people	 can	 have	 their	 voice	 on	Wylfa	 or	 the	
Energy	Island?	
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APPENDIX	3.	RESEARCH	PARTICIPANT	INFORMATION	SHEET	
	
THE	PEOPLE	BEHIND	NUCLEAR	NEW	BUILD	
	 ANGLESEY	ENERGY	ISLAND	CASE	STUDY	
RESEARCH	INFORMATION	SHEET	FOR	POTENTIAL	INTERVIEWEES	
	
You are being invited to participate in a research study. Before you 
decide whether to participate, it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and feel free to ask me for 
clarification or more details. Please also feel free to discuss this with 
colleagues, friends or members of your family. We would like to stress 
that you do not have to accept this invitation and should only agree to 
take part if you want to. 
Thank you for reading this, 
  Marton Fabok  
 
The research project 
The project is part of the EPSRC-funded Adaptation and Resilience in 
Coastal Energy Supply (ARCoES) research addressing the long-term 
challenges to energy infrastructure and nuclear power generation in the 
coastal regions of Britain. The current PhD project focuses on the social 
and political aspects of the transformation of the energy infrastructure. 
The construction of the new Wylfa nuclear station on Anglesey is used as 
a case study.  
The specific objectives of the research are the following: 
• How is nuclear power part of the culture and everyday life of the 
people of Anglesey, especially in the Cemaes Bay area? What are 
the attitudes towards the new Wylfa? 
• How do governments, local municipalities and industry companies 
cooperate in the new build project, especially under the Anglesey 
Energy Island Programme framework? 
• How do corporate and public stakeholders engage with the public? 
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Details of the interview 
You have been chosen as a key informant of the research. Participation 
is voluntary. Participants are free to withdraw at any time without 
explanation and without incurring a disadvantage.  
Interviews take place usually for 1-1.5 hours depending on your 
availability. The use of a voice-recording device depends on your 
consent, this can be withdrawn or suspend at any time. If you do not wish 
to provide your full identity, you can opt to speak anonymously at any 
time. In this case, appropriate measures will be done not to identify you 
from the answers provided. All data related to the interview (e.g., contact 
details, interview notes, voice recordings) will be stored securely, only 
accessible to the researcher and the research supervisor. 
Relevant contacts 
In case of any further question or query the researcher can be contacted 
at the following address: 
Marton Fabok 
PhD student, Department of Geography and Planning, School of 
Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool 
Roxby Building, Liverpool L69 7ZT, UK 
Email: marton.fabok@liverpool.ac.uk 
Mobile: 079511 87877 
Please do not hesitate to email or call me whenever you have a question 
or query! 
Also, in case you have any important questions, feel free to contact my 
research supervisor (P.J.North@liverpool.ac.uk) or the Research 
Governance Officer of the university (ethics@liverpool.ac.uk; 0151 794 
8290)!	
I look forward speaking to you!	
Best regards,	
Marton Fabok	 	
! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !  
1 
 
 
!
!
Committee!on!Research!Ethics!
!
 
PARTICIPANT!CONSENT!FORM! 
!
!
!
Title!of!Research!Project:!
The!people!behind!new!build!–!The!case!of!
Anglesey!Energy!Island!
! !
!
!
Please!
initial!box!
Researcher(s):!
Marton!Fabok!
!
!
1. I!confirm!that!I!have!read!and!have!understood!the!information!sheet!
for! the! above! study.! I! have! had! the! opportunity! to! consider! the!
information,! ask! questions! and! have! had! these! answered!
satisfactorily.! ! !
!
!
!
!
!
2. I!understand!that!my!participation!is!voluntary!and!that!I!am!free!to!
withdraw!at!any!time!without!giving!any!reason,!without!my!rights!
being!affected.!!In!addition,!should!I!not!wish!to!answer!any!particular!
question!or!questions,!I!am!free!to!decline.!!!
!
!
!
3. I!understand!that,!under!the!Data!Protection!Act,!!I!can!at!any!time!ask!
for!access!to!the!information!I!provide!and!I!can!also!request!the!
destruction!of!that!information!if!I!wish.!
!
!
4. I!agree!to!take!part!in!the!above!study.!!!
!
5. I! would! like!my! name! used! and! I! understand! and! agree! that!what! I!
have! said! or! written! as! part! of! this! study! will! be! used! in! so! that!
anything!I!have!contributed!to!this!project!can!be!recognised.!!
!
6. I! understand! that! unless! I! consented! the! previous! question! full!
confidentiality! and! anonymity! will! be! maintained! and! it! will! not! be!
possible!to!identify!me!in!any!publications.!
!
7. I!understand!and!agree!that!the!interview!will!be!voice!recorded!and!I!
am! aware! of! and! consent! to! your! use! of! these! recordings! for!
transcribing!the!interview!for!analysis.!
!
8. I! agree! for! the!data! collected! from!me! to!be!used! in! relevant! future!
research.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
  
! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !  
2 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !! !!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Participant!Name! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Date!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !Signature!
!!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!
!!!!!! ! Researcher!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Date!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Signature!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Principal!Investigator:! ! ! Student!Researcher:!
Dr!Peter!North! Marton!Fabok!
University!of!Liverpool! University!of!Liverpool!
Roxby!Building,!Liverpool!L69!7ZT,!UK! Roxby!Building,!Liverpool!L69!7ZT,!UK!
0151!794!2849! ! ! ! 0151!794!2863!
P.J.North@liverpool.ac.uk!! ! Marton.Fabok@liverpool.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX	5.	MEETINGS	ATTENDED50	
Nr	 Title	 Place	 Date	
2	 DECC	secondment	discussion	
London,	1-3	Whitehall	Place,	
DECC	offices	 16	January	2014	
3	 Horizon	Open	surgery	1	 Llangefni,	The	Bull	Hotel	 17	March	2014	
6	 PAWB	'Fukushima	-	Aftermath'	event	 Menai	Bridge,	Telford	Centre	 14	May	2014	
7	 GeoMôn	meeting	 Llandsadwrn	 16	May	2014	
8	 Horizon	Open	surgery	2	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 19	May	2014	
9	 Llanbadrig	Community	Council	AGM	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 19	May	2014	
11	 Llanbadrig	Community	Council	meeting	1		 Cemaes,	Library	 29	May	2014	
12	 RNLI	Strawberry	Tea	afternoon	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 14	June	2014	
13	 Horizon	Open	surgery	3	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 16	June	2014	
14	 Llanbadrig	Community	Council	meeting	2	 Cemaes,	Library	 16	June	2014	
15	 Rhyd-Y-Groes	windfarm	consultation	
Llanfechell,	School	
Community	Centre	 17	June	2014	
16	 Rhyd-Y-Groes	windfarm	consultation	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 19	June	2014	
17	 Cemaes	Partnership	meeting	1	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 26	June	2014	
18	 Llanfechell	Church	Fair	 Llanfechell,	Brynddu	 27	June	2014	
19	 Wales	in	Bloom	competition	 Cemaes	 03	July	2014	
20	 Cemaes	Partnership	meeting	2	 Cemaes,	Library	 07	July	2014	
21	 Horizon	Open	surgery	4	 Amlwch,	Memorial	Hall	 14	July	2014	
22	 Llanfechell	Community	Council	meeting	1	
Llanfechell,	School	
Community	Centre	 14	July	2014	
23	 Power	in	the	Land	art	group	meeting	1	 Llanfechell,	Brynddu	 18	July	2014	
25	 Horizon	Open	surgery	5	 Llangefni,	The	Bull	 21	July	2014	
26	 Llanbadrig	CC	meeting	3	 Cemaes,	Library	 28	July	2014	
27	
IACC	Extraordinary	meeting	on	the	New	
Wylfa	SPG	 Llangefni,	Council		 29	July	2014	
28	 Village	Fair	 Llanfechell,	Brynddu	 02	August	2014	
29	 Cemaes	Partnership	meeting	3	 Cemaes,	Library	 04	August	2014	
30	
Cemaes	FC	Management	Committee	
meeting	 Cemaes,	Football	field	 11	August	2014	
31	 Anglesey	Show	
Gwalchmai,	Anglesey	
Agricultural	Showground	 12	August	2014	
32	 RNLI	Lifeboat	Day	 Cemaes	 17	August	2014	
																																																						
50	This	table	does	not	contain	the	few	meetings	that	I	attended,	but	decided	not	to	involve	in	my	research	
data.	
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33	 Open	surgery	6	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 18	August	2014	
34	 RNLI	Flower,	Produce	&	Produce	Show	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 23	August	2014	
35	 Copperfest	 Amlwch	Port	 23	August	2014	
36	 Cemaes	Carneval	 Cemaes	 25	August	2014	
37	 CoRWM	Public	meeting	 Tre-Ysgawen	Hall	 04	September	2014	
38	 CoRWM	Open	plenary	 Tre-Ysgawen	Hall	 05	September	2014	
39	 Horizon	Wylfa	Newydd	PLG	meeting	1	
Llangefni,	Coleg	Menai,	
Energy	Centre	 01	October	2014	
40	 Horizon	PAC1	Public	exhibition	1	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 03	October	2014	
41	 Cemaes	Partnership	meeting	4	 Cemaes,	Library	 10	October	2014	
42	 Magnox	Schools	Outreach	 Wylfa	Visitor	centre	 9	October	2014	
43	 Skills	Cymru	-	Careers	Wales		 Llandudno,	Venue	Cymru	 08	October	2014	
44	 Public	talk	on	Wylfa	and	the	community	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 10	October	2014	
45	 Horizon	PAC1	Public	exhibition	2	 Llangefni,	The	Bull	 11	October	2014	
46	
Llanbadrig	Community	Council	Planning	
Committee	meeting	 Cemaes,	Library	 13	October	2014	
47	 Cemaes	Harbour	Committee	meeting	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 13	October	2014	
48	 Llanbadrig	Community	Council	meeting	4	 Cemaes,	Library	 20	October	2014	
49	 One	Voice	Wales	meeting	 Llangefni,	Old	Council	 21	October	2014	
50	 Horizon	PAC1	Consultation	drop-in	 Beaumaris,	Bulkeley	Hotel	 22	October	2014	
51	
IACC	Community	and	town	councils	
liaison	meeting	 Llangefni,	Council		 23	October	2014	
52	 Horizon	PAC1	Public	exhibition	3	
Caernarfon,	Celtic	Royal	
Hotel	 31	October	2014	
53	 Horizon	PAC1	Public	exhibition	4	 Bangor,	Pemrhyn	Hall	 01	November	2014	
54	 Power	in	the	Land	art	group	meeting	2	 Llanfechell,	Brynddu	 02	November	2014	
55	 Horizon	PAC1	breakfast	 Bangor,	Parc	Menai	 03	November	2014	
56	 Cemaes	Partnership	meeting	4	 Cemaes,	Library	 04	November	2014	
57	 Llanbadrig	Community	Council	meeting	5	 Cemaes,	Library	 06	November	2014	
58	 Mechell	Community	Council	meeting	2	
Llanfechell,	School	
Community	Centre	 10	November	2014	
59	
Nuclear	Institute	-	Illuminating	the	Future	
conference	 Bangor	University	 13	November	2014	
60	 Magnox	Wylfa	SSG	meeting	 Wylfa	Visitor	centre	 13	November	2014	
61	 Cwmni	Cemaes	AGM	 Cemaes	Village	Hall	 13	November	2014	
62	 Magnox	Wylfa	Engineering	Challenge	 Wylfa,	Sports	and	Social	Club	 18	November	2014	
63	 PAWB	Jonathan	Porritt	lecture	 Menai	Bridge,	Telford	Centre	 19	November	2014	
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64	 PAC1	Public	exhibition	5	 Wylfa,	Sports	and	Social	Club	 20	November	2014	
65	 Llanbadrig	CC	meeting	6	 Cemaes,	Library	 26	November	2014	
66	 Horizon	Wylfa	Newydd	PLG	meeting	2	 Wylfa	Visitor	centre	 03	December	2014	
67	 PAWB	meeting	 Menai	Bridge,	7	Chapel	St	 04	December	2014	
68	
Policy	Forum	for	Wales:	Energy	policy	in	
Wales	conference	 Cardiff,	The	Angel	Hotel	 15	December	2014	
69	 PAWB	Naoto	Kan	visit	 Llanfairpwll,	Carreg	Bran	 26	February	2015	
70	
‘Nuclear	energy	in	the	UK:	Priorities	for	
new	build,	funding	and	developing	the	
supply	chain’	conference	
London,	Royal	Society,	6-9	
Carlton	House	Terrace	 03	March	2015	
71	
From	Fukushima	to	Hinkley:	
Dismantling	the	nuclear	argument	for	a	
sustainable	energy	 London,	Europe	House	 05	March	2015	
72	
EDF	Energy	Torness	power	station	site	
visit	 Torness	 23	March	2015	
73	 Employability	event	:	Nuclear	sector	
Bangor	University,	Neuadd	
Reichel	 06	May	2015	
75	 Horizon	Summer	Event	 Holyhead,	Ucheldre	Centre	 13	July	2015	
76	 EIP	Strategic	Forum	
Llangefni,	Coleg	Menai,	
Energy	Centre	 28	July	2015	
	
	 	


In the post-war years, the expansion of the electricity supply 
industry faced a key problem. The landscape effects of the new 
power stations and high-voltage transmission lines sparked con-
troversies in various parts of the country. While on Anglesey 
there wasn't much public debate, let alone opposition, on       
constructing the Wylfa plant, the importance of the 'amenity' 
issue was immanent. 
In June 1962, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
launched a series of public exhibitions in Llangefni, called the 
'Pattern of Power', exploring the “choice over amenities:      
unspoilt countryside and a national decline or planned power and 
prosperity [?]”. The exhibition brochure envisaged the coming of 
the “new castles of North Wales”, the beacons of technological 
progress and prosperity at Trawsfynydd and Wylfa, as potential 
additions to the landscape. In his opening speech, however, the 
Marquis of Anglesey warned the island from becoming           
indistinguishable from the industrial landscapes of places like 
the Black Country or even Nagasaki. His concern was not only 
about the siting of a power plant on the beautiful Northern  
Anglesey coastline and spoiling the countryside with           
transmission pylons; he even accused CEGB of paying a mere   lip
-service and only “placing models of pylons at children’s      
breakfast tables and photographing them.” 
Nevertheless, CEGB took the issue seriously, and hired Dame 
Sylvia Crowe, a pioneering landscape designer. The original    
design of the power station outlined a modern building, standing 
out from the levelled down land. Her concept was different, 
building on her 1958 book The Landscape of Power. She was  
responsible for adding the artificial drumlins on the Cemaes 
side, and several other features to harmonise Wylfa more with 
the natural coastal environment. 
 
Nowadays, most of the people haven't seen the landscape    
without Wylfa. For some, it might be still a blot on the 
landscape, for some others the sight of the plant after a 
long    journey is a sign of almost arriving home. Has Wylfa 
become part of the landscape or is it an intrusion to that? 
I think it goes back more than the physical feature. Is 
Wylfa part of the local social fabric and a 'good neighbour' 
or a somewhat foreign and potentially dangerous 
installation? The power station   probably didn't become a 
'new castle' on the coast, but for the majority I talked to 
the plant become part of Cemaes and the area, at least 
more than the wind turbines, through the people working 
there, through the local stories, and through the      
salaries and community benefit contributions received. 
Now we are living in an era remarkably different from the 
time of nationalised industries and the “white heat of 
technology” back in the 1960s. A power plant can only be 
constructed after a long planning and consenting process, 
including detailed proposals and series of public 
consultations. The challenge, however, for the new 
electricity infrastructures is similar than half a century 
ago: to be accepted as part of the physical and social 
landscape of the area. 
Marton Fabok 
marton.fabok@liverpool.ac.uk 
By the time you have read this article, I have most 
probably moved away from Cemaes. It has been great to 
stay here, and I am thankful for the opportunity of being 
part of this welcoming community. I plan to continue 
writing my little article series, sharing some of my PhD 
research findings about Wylfa and the community, and will 
come back to visit in the New Year! 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 The landscape of Wylfa - Marton Fabok 
Employment is by far the most important benefit expected 
from the new Wylfa, at least for most of the people I          
interviewed during my research. It’s not just a good salary, 
not even just having a skilled profession. Many people see 
the investment as probably the only chance to keep the area 
prosperous and to provide prospects instead of leaving,   
especially for younger generations. 
 
In the 1960s Anglesey faced similar problems, the lack of 
prospects in a peripheral area, particularly for those without 
means. The construction of the plant in 1963-1971 provided 
opportunities for a lot of people in the area, not just       
labourers or skilled tradesmen. It was easy to get a job   
during the construction, and wages even tripled for some. As 
operation started, fewer employment opportunities           
remained. These were, however, well-paid, long-term        
positions, often more comfortable than working on the land 
or on sea, despite the fact locals rarely got to top          
managerial and engineering positions. The pattern of life of 
the  village changed for good. Working shifts in the plant 
became more important for many than the seasonality of 
agricultural work or the change of tide. 
The picture isn’t always rosy, however. A 1976 report of the 
Gwynedd County Council reveals some negative side-effects. 
First, most of the workers came in from other parts of the 
country or from Ireland, and some of them stayed on the 
island, often meeting a local girl, but with difficulty finding a 
job as the economic crisis kicked in during the early 1970s.  
 
 
Second, many new jobs were created at the expense of old 
ones. While some sectors, notably accommodation and food 
providers, benefited hugely from the construction and    
operation, others had hard times. Many businesses had to 
close down, because of the difficulty to attract workforce 
on the old salary levels. Many people who left their          
agricultural work for a well-paid construction job, however, 
found it difficult to get back to their old job as the        
construction finished. Thus the level of unemployed men   
before the construction (910 in 1961) was actually less than 
after (1590 in 1972).  
 
The completion of the plant coincided with the creeping  
crisis in the national economy. 
Work ‘then & now’ at Wylfa 
How can we prepare for the coming challenges? First, locals 
won’t get a job on a “come and work here, lad” basis this time. 
There are much higher standards now than fifty years ago, 
and one has to prove the right qualifications for the job, 
which locals don’t always have. Getting top-class qualifications 
and work experience is more important than ever. Second, 
short-term lucrative jobs do not necessarily mean long-term 
employment prospects. The experience of having a nuclear 
power plant help us to prepare for the effects on other     
sectors, like tourism or agriculture, and to cope with          
long-term effects of the incoming workforce. While the peak 
construction workforce in the 1960s was 2600, now it can go 
up to 8500. 
2014.  
 
Now I am writing up my findings, but really hope to get back 
to Anglesey for follow-up visits. Please contact me on 
marton.fabok@liverpool.ac.uk or 07951187787. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workman at Wylfa 
The first technicians at  Wylfa 
Originally, Anglesey wasn’t considered as a potential nuclear 
site. In 1957, only two sites were identified in North Wales 
suitable for nuclear power generation, Trawsfynydd in  
Snowdonia and Edern on the Llŷn peninsula. At Traws, site 
preparations started shortly, and the actual construction 
two years later. The plan was to gradually redirect the  
workforce to the Edern power station site. By this time, 
however, ‘amenity bodies’, like the National Parks            
Commission, the Countryside Council, started to nationwide 
campaign against the ambitious expansion plans of the     
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB).  
 
In various rural parts of Britain, construction of large power 
plants and especially transmission lines suddenly became a 
contested issue. While these nature conservation            
organisations aimed to preserve rural areas from the        
presumed spoiling effect of electricity pylons and power        
stations, planners and engineers imagined changes in the 
countryside as inevitable to the process modernisation,    
similarly how railways become part of the landscape a       
century before. Nevertheless, the CEGB had to embrace the 
‘amenity point of view’ in addition to the engineering        
considerations. Sir William Holford was appointed for this 
task as the foremost planner of the time. Among others, he 
designed seven basic principles for siting electricity pylons in 
order to minimise the amenity losses. After more then 50 
years, the Holford Rules are still used by National Grid,   
including their recent North Wales Connection consultation. 
 
With regards to North Wales, the Council for the        
Preservation of Rural Wales (CPRW) and other amenity    
bodies      favoured nuclear power plants to be build in the 
proximity of main industrial and population centres (e.g., 
Deeside), rather than remote locations as CEGB preferred.  
As a response, while Edern was already decided as a suitable 
site, further ground investigations started in February 1959 
on the northern coast of Anglesey, around Lligwy, Point 
Lynas, Wylfa, Carmel Head, and Trefadog. The island was 
probably chosen because of its stronger industrial heritage 
than the Llŷn peninsula (e.g., Holyhead port, Parys mountain).  
 
In July 1960, CEGB announced Wylfa as the proposed site 
for the new nuclear station. In this press statement, the 
then Caernarfonshire County Council was furious for      
dropping Edern due to “the influence of certain amenity 
forces”. 
The Story Behind Wylfa A 
In May 1961, a public inquiry discussed the Wylfa proposal 
with statutory bodies, including amenity bodies. In the     
four-day meeting in Amlwch Memorial Hall, the transmission 
cables become the most heated issue. Local planning          
authorities and other stakeholders preferred a submarine 
crossing of the transmission lines at the Menai Straits.  
In December, however, the Minister of Power announced the 
erection of overhead cables all the way from Wylfa to the 
mainland. In the following summer, four-day long public     
exhibitions took place in Llangefni, Caernarfon, Colwyn Bay 
and Connah’s Quay. The information material concentrated 
rather on the generic advantages of generating electricity, 
the ‘Pattern of Power’, than providing any specifics about the 
proposed power station and transmission lines. Upon his visit 
the exhibition, the Marquis of Anglesey noted “the apathy 
and lack of knowledge about the whole scheme and its effect 
on Anglesey”. It was a time when people from the area didn’t 
have much say in how Wylfa was decided, not even the local 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where is Wylfa? ‘Proposed nuclear sites with heavily populated areas’ 
in New Scientist, 2 Jan 1958 
 
At the moment, I am writing up the findings of my research 
on Wylfa and the community, but also try to get back to 
Cemaes for follow-up visits. Please contact me on              
marton.fabok@liverpool.ac.uk or 07951187787  
 
 
 
Please e-mail your contributions to  
Arwel Hughes: cemaes@outlook.com   
or drop them into Oriel Cemaes                 
by 9th June 2015 
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The world’s biggest nuclear power station of the time was 
built on Anglesey between 1963-1971. This was an enormous 
scale of undertaking. It is still breath-taking to see the vast 
array of colossal structures surrounded by at least half a 
dozen large cranes showcased by the documentary ‘Nuclear 
Cathedral’ by Granada Television showcases. It isn’t just the 
thousands of tonnes concrete and steel built into the station 
that is fascinating, but the sheer number of people          
summoned to this buzzing beehive. At the peak, around 2600 
people worked on site. (Gwynedd Planning, 1976; see also 
Wassink, 1987; and WD/21/7) The construction wasn’t just a 
key stage in many individual lives, but a crucial period in local 
history still remembered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commissioned by CEGB, Wylfa A was built by a consortium of 
companies specialised on different parts of the project. 
Among these, Taylor Woodrow employed the largest number 
of people, including the majority of locals, on the civil engi-
neering construction works. The workday for many sub-
contractors started at 8 am on site and finished at 6.15 pm 
with a 45 min lunch break. Every second weekend they 
worked both days from 8 am till 3.45 pm. (WCD/468/12) It 
was hard work, but well-paid. Hundreds of local men were 
able to get a job on the construction, many young labourers. 
Workers took pride in taking part in such a monumental    
project. Many families I have spoken to still have stories 
about the many Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotsmen coming 
to the construction. The majority lived in the work camp on 
site. At this time, the unions were central in organising the 
workers. Also, a number of chapels and churches were built 
on site and in the village for the different congregations. 
The Catholic priest summoning his not-always-sober fellow           
countrymen is particularly well-remembered in the area. 
Was the construction a heyday or a Wild West-like turmoil 
for the area? My interviews with people who remembered 
these times indicate that it’s not clear. On the one hand, the 
construction jobs were an alternative to outmigration of 
many young local lads. Even more, many families established 
their long-term future by opening a chippy or hosting a few 
caravans. Also, at least for some young people, this buzz was 
rather an excitement than a nuisance. Many local girls got 
married to workers coming from elsewhere, and later staying 
on Anglesey. On the other hand, many farms and other   
businesses on the brink couldn’t compete with the wages of 
the power plant. Each and every day, loud and dirty blue  
double decker buses rushed through the High Street (the 
A5025 by-pass was built just after the construction!).  
Constructing Wylfa A 
On many nights, the workers letting off steam took over the 
streets, thus making it difficult for residents to sleep. Many 
felt that the village and the area lost its quiet charm and the 
cohesion of the community together with a traditional       
pattern of life. 
While the construction half a century ago provides important 
lessons, the proposed Wylfa Newydd will be different in many 
aspects. The peak construction workforce might be triple 
compared to Wylfa A (even up to 8500), and many probably 
coming well beyond the British Isles, as recent UK and      
European construction projects of similar scale suggest.   
Horizon Nuclear Power and the County Council now put much 
more detailed preparations to cope with this influx of people,    
together with other socio-economic and environmental issues. 
There will be no large work camp on site, and the               
long-standing legacy of the proposed facilities around the 
island is a key consideration. While on the Wylfa A            
construction people worked in vertiginous heights without any 
protection, now very strict protocols will be proposed on 
health and safety, expected behaviour, quality assurance and 
other issues.   Nevertheless, the proposed construction will 
mean no less changes for the area.  
 
 
 
 
Marton Fabok 
Contact: maron.fabok@liverpool.ac.uk | 07951187787 
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introduced a Commercial     
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and individuals wishing to  
advertise on the website at a 
cost of £30.00 per year.   
 
 
This includes a third page advert, photo and link to your     
website and opportunities to promote late room promotions on 
the home page.  
  
For more information please contact: 
Arwel Hughes | cemaes@outlook.com | 01407 710004 
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your holiday  
accommodation? 
Construction work at Wylfa 
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APPENDIX	7.	HORIZON	PAC1	CONSULTATION	RESPONSE	
Marton	Fabok	
	
INTRODUCTION	
1. I	have	researched	the	Wylfa	Newydd	project	as	a	case	study	for	my	PhD	
research	 on	 the	 long-term	 future	 of	 nuclear	 power	 in	 the	 UK.	 My	
fieldwork	 on	 Anglesey	 has	 been	 ongoing	 since	 May	 2014.	 This	
consultation	 response	 is,	however,	a	personal	 feedback,	not	an	official	
response	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Liverpool,	 the	 School	 of	
Environmental	Sciences,	the	Department	of	Geography	and	Planning,	or	
the	ARCoES	research	project.	
2. As	 a	 researcher	 my	 aim	 is	 always	 to	 be	 impartial,	 and	 to	 try	 to	
understand	 the	 different	 perspectives.	Within	 this	 context,	 however,	 I	
aim	 to	 engage	 constructively	with	 and	 give	 feedback	 to	 stakeholders	 I	
talk	 to,	 including	Horizon	Nuclear	Power,	 rather	 than	 stay	as	a	neutral	
observer.		
3. In	my	response,	I	try	to	provide	some	constructive	feedback	for	Horizon	
Nuclear	Power	with	 regards	 to	 the	 future	development	of	 the	project,	
especially	with	regards	to	the	public	consultation	process.	This	response	
is	 informed	 by	 the	 conversations	 I	 had	 with	 various	 people	 and	
stakeholders	 during	 the	 consultation	 period	 and	 even	 before,	 but	 not	
representative	of	those	views.	
4. This	 consultation	 response	 is	 only	 very	 distantly	 connected	 to	 the	
content	 of	 my	 emerging	 PhD	 dissertation.	 This	 response	 focuses	 on	
certain	 practical	 issues	 within	 the	 remits	 of	 the	 consultation	 in	
somewhat	evaluative	terms,	while	the	dissertation	will	be	more	focusing	
on	 understanding	 a	 nuclear	 new	 build	 project	 in	 less	 evaluative	 and	
more	abstract	terms.	
5. I	 also	 want	 to	 thank	 all	 the	 Horizon	 Nuclear	 Power	 employees	 who	
answered	 my	 constant	 flow	 of	 questions	 with	 great	 patience	 and	
proficiency.	
1.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	GENERAL	COMMENTS	ABOUT	THE	PROJECT?	
1. A	 particular	 strength	 of	 the	 consultation	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 a	 sense	 of	
how	 the	 construction	 will	 take	 place,	 and	 how	 the	 operating	 power	
station	site	will	look.	This	is	an	important	step,	and	further	clarification	is	
needed	as	the	project	develops.	
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2. I	very	much	appreciate	the	work	on	the	project	so	far,	and	wish	the	best	
for	the	challenges	ahead.	
2.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	COMMENTS	ABOUT	THE	WAY	IN	WHICH	THE	CONSULTATION	IS	
BEING	CARRIED	OUT?	
	
Consultation	documents	
1. The	 consultation	 documents	 indisputably	 provide	 a	 substantial	
information	 base,	 and	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 PAC1	 consultation	 is	 an	
important	step	in	the	development	of	the	Project.	
2. The	 Consultation	 Overview	 Document	 and	 the	 PEI	 Non-Technical	
Summary	make	the	project	more	tangible	for	many	locals	I	have	talked	
to.	The	documents	showcase	key	elements	of	the	company’s	approach	
towards	the	project.	
3. It’s	a	welcome	decision	to	focus	in	more	detail	on	two	key	areas	of	local	
concern	 by	 conducting	 a	 separate	 Language	 Impact	 Assessment	 and	
Health	Impact	Assessment.	
4. The	 overall	 documentation	 (especially	 the	 PEI	 and	 the	 Consultation	
Document)	 is	 especially	 strong	 on	 some	 aspects	 (e.g.	 environment	
studies).	 Unfortunately,	 the	 socioeconomic	 impacts	 (e.g.	 road	 traffic,	
accommodation,	 education,	 employment,	 supply	 chain,	 disturbance	
during	 the	 construction)	 are	 not	 discussed	 in	 the	 same	 detail.	 As	 the	
project	 is	 in	 a	 relatively	 early	 stage,	 this	 is	 understandable.	 Hopefully,	
future	 communication	 (especially	 the	 PAC2)	 will	 provide	 more	 detail	
about	the	potential	effects	and	more	clarity	about	the	options	ahead.	
5. While	the	questions	of	the	consultation	seem	to	be	in	accordance	with	
the	statutory	requirements,	members	of	the	public	expressed	to	me	that	
they	 do	 not	 reflect	 enough	 on	 some	 key	 local	 concerns.	 In	 particular,	
issues	 like	 influx	 of	 workers	 (including	 their	 housing	 needs	 as	 well	 as	
effects	 on	 communities	 and	public	 services),	 increased	 road	 transport,	
employment	and	supply	chain	opportunities	seem	to	be	 ‘at	 the	end	of	
the	list’.	There	are	no	specific	questions	focusing	on	the	following	areas:	
disturbances	during	the	construction;	nuclear	safety;	nuclear	waste	and	
spent	fuel;	and	decommissioning.	
6. Also,	from	a	respondent’s	perspective,	the	consultation	questions	seem	
to	be	sometimes	too	broad	(e.g.	Questions	3	and	12).	It	would	be	useful	
for	 the	 future	to	add	more	specific	sub	questions	 (e.g.	“What	are	your	
views	on	using	the	proposed	Land	&	Lakes	development	on	the	Penrhos	
estate	for	temporary	accommodation	for	the	construction	workforce?”).	
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7. I	find	it	acceptable	and	honest	that	the	consultation	documents	are	clear	
about	 which	 issues	 are	 settled	 or	 largely	 settled,	 and	 where	 various	
options	 remain	 open.	 From	 a	 respondent’s	 perspective,	 however,	 I	
found	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 express	 a	well-grounded	 view	without	 having	
received	comprehensive	information	about	the	baseline	conditions	and	
an	elaborate	list	of	potential	options	(e.g.	existing	tourist	and	residential	
accommodation	stock,	potential	housing	types	and	sites).	The	questions	
on	 the	socioeconomic	 issues	 seem	to	be	 too	generic	 to	allow	 for	well-
grounded	answers.	I	would	suggest	outlining	the	baseline	conditions	and	
the	 potential	 options	 with	 more	 clarity	 and	 detail	 in	 future	
consultations,	especially	in	PAC2.	
8. Consultation	documents	were	quite	difficult	 to	 read	online,	or	even	 to	
print	 out,	 due	 to	 the	 too	 high	 resolution.	 I	 would	 suggest	making	 the	
contents	of	the	consultation	documents	available	online	in	html	format	
as	well	in	the	future.	
Consultation	events	
1. Consultation	 events	 were	 well-advertised	 in	 the	 local	 media	 and	
elsewhere.	
2. Information	materials	were	generally	sufficient.	
3. The	company	staff	at	the	consultation	events	were	generally	helpful	and	
represented	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 relevant	 expertise.	 They	 generally	
answered	 the	 questions	 in	 detail,	 or	 referred	 to	 more	 clarity	 in	 the	
future.	
4. The	 majority	 of	 events	 were	 held	 in	 representative	 historic	 buildings,	
and	 some	 of	 these	 (e.g.	 Celtic	 Royal	 Hotel	 in	 Caernarfon),	 were	 not	
necessarily	where	members	of	 the	public	would	otherwise	go.	 I	would	
consider	 instead	 locating	 some	 future	 consultation	 events	 in	 modern	
buildings	such	as	community	centres,	shopping	centres	and	other	public	
venues,	 where	 the	 event	 has	 greater	 visibility	 and	 is	 generally	 better	
linked	to	the	everyday	life	of	locals	(e.g.	high	street	shopping).	
5. Similarly,	some	events	were	held	in	rooms	in	the	back	of	a	building	(The	
Bull	Hotel	in	Llangefni).	In	the	next	consultations,	I	would	consider	using	
venues	 ‘just	 a	 step	 in’	 from	 busy	 outdoor	 areas,	 as	 well	 as	 actively	
promoting	the	event	outside	the	building	with	staffed	stands.	
6. Holding	consultation	events	at	the	workplaces	of	major	employers	in	the	
area	 (e.g.,	 the	 Isle	 of	 Angelsey	 County	 Council	 offices)	 was	 a	 good	
initiative.	 I	would	consider	expanding	this	approach,	and	to	proactively	
hold	 events	 (e.g.	 consultation	 stands)	 inside	 or	 in	 front	 of	main	 retail	
areas	or	leisure	facilities.		
	 286	
7. Several	people	expressed	their	concern	that	no	public	discussion	forums	
were	organised.	 In	 the	 next	 consultations,	 I	would	 consider	 organising	
events	 where	 Horizon	 Nuclear	 Power	 presents	 their	 proposals	 to	 the	
local	community	and	there	is	space	for	an	open	discussion	or	Q&A	under	
an	 independent	 chair	 (similarly	 to	 the	 PLG	meetings,	 but	 for	 the	 local	
community	 rather	 than	 for	 stakeholders).	 I	 would	 suggest	 to	 Horizon	
Nuclear	 Power	 that	 they	 proactively	 encourage	 local	 councils	 or	
regulatory	bodies	to	organise	open	discussion	forums,	and	provide	them	
with	 the	resources	 to	do	so;	alternatively	 they	might	commission	 third	
sector	organisations	or	specialist	companies	to	do	so.	
8. Engagement	with	younger	people,	the	generations	expected	to	live	with	
(or	 probably	 even	 work	 for)	 the	 power	 plant,	 is	 key.	 Establishing	 a	
twitter	 account	 was	 an	 important	 step,	 but	 I	 would	 suggest	 a	 more	
extensive	use	of	social	media	(e.g.	Facebook)	and	a	proactive	search	for	
platforms	to	engage	with	younger	generations.	
3.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	COMMENTS	RELATING	TO	THE	PRELIMINARY	ENVIRONMENTAL	
INFORMATION	REPORT	PRESENTED	BY	HORIZON?	
1. The	 PEI	 Report	 is	 a	 substantial	 document,	 providing	 information	 on	 a	
wide	array	of	issues.	I	would	suggest	in	future	consultations	to	develop	
more	specific	questions	on	certain	aspects	as	well	 rather	than	 just	one	
very	broad	question	encompassing	an	almost	full	scale	of	technical	areas	
which	might	help	to	elicit	the	views	of	the	respondents	more	effectively.	
2. A	 key	 issue	 in	 the	 local	 area	 is	 the	 combined	 effect	 of	 various	
disturbances	during	the	construction	period,	from	noise	effects	to	traffic	
safety.	 While	 the	 PEI	 Report	 provides	 a	 factual	 basis	 with	 regards	 to	
specific	 issues,	 it	 is	difficult	to	understand	the	overall	exposure	of	 local	
residents	experienced	on	 the	 very	personal	 level.	 I	would	 suggest	 that	
more	 information	 could	 be	 given	 by	 providing	 an	 everyday	 sense	 of	
these	 effects,	 through	 comparisons	 (especially	 to	 familiar	 effects	 and	
situations)	or	detailed	qualitative	descriptions.	
4.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 COMMENTS	 ON	 HORIZON’S	 COASTAL	 DEVELOPMENT	
PROPOSAL	 AT	 PORTH-Y-PISTYLL	 AND	 WYLFA	 HEAD,	 RELATING	 TO	 THE	 COOLING	
WATER	SYSTEM	(INCLUDING	BREAKWATERS)	AND	MARINE	OFF-LOADING	FACILITY?	
1. Horizon’s	preferences	 to	co-locate	 the	CW	intake	and	MOLF	structures	
behind	the	same	breakwater	structure	sounds	sensible.	
2. I	don’t	have	any	preferences	with	regards	to	the	fish	protection	systems,	
breakwater	design,	the	CW	outfall	options,	or	the	design	and	 layout	of	
MOLF.	
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5.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 COMMENTS	 ON	 HORIZON’S	 INDICATIVE	 LANDSCAPE	
PROPOSAL?	
1. The	 Dame	 Sylvia	 Crowe	 mounds	 are	 generally	 seen	 as	 successful	
mitigation	 factors	 of	 the	 visual	 effect	 of	 the	 existing	 plant.	 Using	 a	
similar	 approach	 towards	 landscaping	 is	 a	 welcome	 move.	 I	 would	
suggest	looking	at	the	original	proposals	of	Dame	Sylvia	Crowe	(e.g.	tree	
planting,	etc.)	in	developing	the	Landscape	and	Biodiversity	Masterplan.	
2. Some	 local	 residents,	 especially	 in	 Tregele	 and	on	 the	western	 side	 of	
Cemaes,	are	worried	about	the	new	mounds	looming	over	their	homes.	I	
would	 suggest	 providing	 more	 information,	 including	 visual	 images,	
specifically	with	regards	to	the	neighbouring	residential	areas	of	the	site.	
3. The	‘Landscape	and	Visual	Wireline	Photomontages’	(PEI	Report	Volume	
2.,	 19.1-19.6)	 are	 pictured	 with	 a	 broad	 perspective.	 Similarly,	 aerial	
images	give	a	 good	 impression	about	 the	overall	 development,	but	do	
not	 necessarily	 provide	 the	 perspective	 locals	 and	 residents	 will	
experience.	 I	 would	 suggest	 providing	 more	 ‘zoomed	 in’,	 indicative	
pictures	in	the	future,	to	give	a	more	realistic	impression	about	the	scale	
of	the	development	and	the	change	in	the	landscape.	
4. The	 draft	 principles	 for	 the	 Landscape	 and	 Biodiversity	 Masterplan	
sound	 sensible.	 I	 would	 add	 to	 the	 section	 on	 cultural	 heritage	 to	
enhance	 and	 mitigate	 the	 effects	 upon	 not	 only	 listed,	 or	 otherwise	
statutorily	protected,	 features,	but	also	features	 important	to	the	 local	
cultural	landscape.	
6.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 COMMENTS	 OR	 PREFERENCES	 ON	 WHETHER	 THE	 POWER	
STATION	 BUILDINGS	 SHOULD	 BE	 DESIGNED	 TO	 BLEND	 IN	 OR	 MAKE	 A	 STRIKING	
ARCHITECTURAL	FEATURE	IN	THE	LANDSCAPE?		
1. Personally,	 I	 appreciate	 the	 architectural	 design	 of	 the	 existing	 plant	
using	 bold	 colourings,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 blending	 in	 with	 the	
surrounding	coastal	landscape.	
2. Locals	 generally	 seem	 to	 favour	 blending	 the	 new	 power	 plant	 to	 the	
existing	 landscape;	 I	 personally	 would	 prefer	 more	 of	 a	 mixture	 with	
bold	architectural	elements.	
3. I	 would	 suggest	 providing	 some	 broad	 options	 for	 the	 architectural	
design	of	the	proposed	plant	site	in	PAC2.	A	real	or	computer	model,	or	
an	 overall	 visual	 image	 of	 the	 site,	 as	 well	 as	 various	 buildings	 from	
various	 angles,	 and	 some	 highlighted	 features,	 would	 be	 a	 great	 help	
from	a	respondent’s	point	of	view.	
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7.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 COMMENTS	 RELATING	 TO	 SKILLS	 AND	 TRAINING	 AND	 THE	
PROMOTION	OF	LOCAL	AND	REGIONAL	EMPLOYMENT?	
1. This	 is	a	key	 issue	as	the	main	vehicle	to	provide	potential	benefits	 for	
communities	locally,	regionally,	and	even	nationally.	More	clarity	on	this	
issue	is	vital.	At	the	moment,	the	new	build	project	is	in	the	initial	phase	
and	 it’s	 difficult	 to	 see	 what	 kind	 of	 scenarios	 are	 realistic	 and	 what	
overall	skill	improvements	can	be	achieved.	
2. The	ongoing	Cwmni	Prentis	Menai	apprenticeship	programme,	and	the	
plans	 for	 future	 education	 and	 skills	 programmes,	 have	 important	
potential.	
3. In	 the	 Jobs	 and	 Skills	 Strategy,	 I	 would	 suggest	 providing	 a	
comprehensive	baseline	assessment	of	the	existing	workforce	profile	in	
relevance	 to	 the	 construction	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 overall	 Wylfa	
Newydd	Development.	 This	 should	 also	 include	 a	 specification	of	 skills	
and	 geographical	 distributions	 locally,	 regionally	 and	 nationally	
(including	the	workforce	of	the	Wylfa	and	Trawsfynydd	nuclear	stations	
under	 decommissioning).	 Similarly,	 I	 would	 suggest	 providing	 a	
comprehensive	account	of	the	job	and	skills	profiles	during	the	different	
phases	 of	 construction	 (depending	 on	 working	 hours)	 and	 during	
operation,	with	which	the	baseline	assessment	can	be	compared.	
4. In	 the	 Jobs	 and	 Skills	 Strategy,	 I	 would	 suggest	 developing	 easy-to-
understand	scenarios	quantifying	the	number	of	employees	in	the	whole	
supply	 chain	 coming	 from	 the	 local	 (Travel	 to	 Work)	 area,	 from	 the	
North	Wales	 region,	 from	Wales	 and	 from	 the	UK.	 I	would	 suggest	 at	
least	 three	 scenarios,	 including	 a	 business-as-usual	 scenario,	 elicited	
from	 the	 baseline	 data,	 and	 scenarios	 imagining	 a	 ‘moderate’	 and	 a	
‘maximum’	skills	and	education	programme.	
8.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	COMMENTS	RELATING	TO	HORIZON’S	ENGAGEMENT	WITH	THE	
SUPPLY	CHAIN	AND	PROPOSALS	FOR	BUYING	FROM	LOCAL	AND	REGIONAL	SUPPLIERS	
AND	BUSINESSES?	
1. Setting	the	aim	of	spending	60%	of	 the	Wylfa	Newydd	Project	value	 in	
the	 UK	 is	 an	 upfront	 and	 ambitious	 initiative.	 In	 the	 near	 future,	
probably	in	the	Supply	Chain	Charter	or	in	PAC2,	I	would	suggest	setting	
a	 similar	 aim	 for	 the	 spending	 on	 the	 local	 (Travel	 to	 Work	 Area),	
regional	(North	Wales),	and	probably	national	(Wales)	level.	
2. In	 order	 to	 achieve	 its	 targets,	 I	 would	 suggest	 specifying	 which	
measures	 Horizon	 will	 establish	 in	 the	 Supply	 Chain	 Charter,	
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procurement	 policy,	 etc.	 to	 ensure	 the	 provision	 of	 jobs	 for	 local,	
regional	and	UK	residents.	
9.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	COMMENTS	ON	HORIZON’S	DRAFT	INTEGRATED	TRAFFIC	AND	
TRANSPORT	STRATEGY	(ITTS)	PRINCIPLES?	
1. The	 draft	 ITTS	 principles	 all	 sound	 sensible.	 I	 wonder	 whether	 it’s	
possible	 to	 outline	 in	 the	 final	 version	 of	 the	 ITTS	 principles	 which	
principles	enjoy	priority	when	there	is	a	tension	between	two	or	more	of	
them.	Without	a	transparent	mechanism	of	weighting	between	different	
principles,	 the	 ITTS	 principles	 can	 lose	 their	 potential	 for	 practical	
applicability.	
10.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	COMMENTS	ON	HORIZON’S	SEA	TRANSPORT	PROPOSALS?	
1. The	issue	is	also	discussed	under	Question	4,	see	my	responses	there.	
11.	DO	YOU	HAVE	ANY	COMMENTS	ON	HORIZON’S	ROAD	TRANSPORT	PROPOSALS?	
1. The	Designed	Freight	Route	is	well-explained	and	sensible.	In	the	future,	
probably	 some	more	clarification	about	what	proportion	of	 the	 freight	
of	 construction	materials	 and	 general	 items	will	 be	 delivered	 this	way	
would	 be	 welcomed,	 as	 well	 as	 how	many	 HGVs	 it	 means	 during	 the	
whole	construction	time,	per	day	on	average,	per	day	during	peak	time,	
and	per	peak	traffic	hour.	
2. The	need	for	the	four	by-passes	along	the	A50525	between	Valley	and	
Wylfa	is	well-argued.	I	don’t	have	any	preference	with	regards	to	the	by-
pass	options.	
3. A	 key	 question	 is	 the	 travel	 profile	 of	 the	 construction	 workers,	
especially	those	who	will	stay	scattered	around	the	island	(and	beyond),	
as	only	a	minority	will	be	housed	at	a	purpose-build	Temporary	Worker	
Accommodation.	I	would	suggest	publishing	some	model	calculations	of	
which	roads	the	construction	workers	will	use	(including	the	Pentraeth-
Amlwch-Wylfa	section	of	A5025	as	well	as	small	roads	in	the	middle	of	
the	island)	under	different	scenarios	(e.g.	different	P+R	locations).	
4. The	combined	use	of	Park	and	Ride	facilities	together	with	frequent	bus	
services	is	a	forward-looking	initiative.	The	challenge	is	how	the	system	
will	work	if	a	large	number	of	workers	still	try	to	use	their	car	because	of	
convenience	or	shorter	journey	time,	even	if	they	are	advised	not	to.	In	
the	future	I	would	provide	more	information	on	how	long	it	would	take	
for	workers	 to	get	 to	 the	construction	 site	 from	different	geographical	
locations	of	the	island,	including	drive	to	the	P+R	facilities,	waiting	time,	
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bus	journey	time,	etc.,	and	what	mechanisms	will	ensure	workers	won’t	
drive	and	park	either	at	the	site	or	in	the	nearby	area	(e.g.	Tregele).	
12.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 COMMENTS	 ON	 THE	 BROAD	 AREA	 OF	 SEARCH	 OR	
SUGGESTIONS	FOR	SITES	HORIZON	COULD	DEVELOP	FOR	PARK	AND	RIDE	FACILITIES,	
LOGISTICS	CENTRES,	OR	TEMPORARY	WORKER	ACCOMMODATION?	
1. Identifying	the	Broad	Area	of	Search	is	a	key	initial	step.	The	criteria	to	
define	the	area	sound	sensible.	
2. I	 would	 suggest	 publishing	 –	 probably	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Worker	
Accommodation	 Strategy	 or	 PAC2	 –	 an	 assessment	 of	 how	 the	
construction	 workforce	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 distributed	 across	 different	
housing	options	(Travel	to	Work	Area	residents,	tourist	accommodation,	
private	 rented	 property,	 purchase	 of	 existing	 property,	 Temporary	
Worker	 Accommodation)	 with	 specific	 focus	 on	 the	 housing	 type	 (?)	
(e.g.	number	of	bedrooms)	and	geographical	distribution.	 In	addition,	 I	
would	 suggest	 providing	 some	 model	 calculations	 on	 the	 estimated	
changes	 in	 property	 prices,	 and	 the	 potential	 crowding	 effects	 on	
tourists	and	tenants.	
3. Among	 the	 local	 residents,	 the	 number	 of	 the	 construction	 and	
operation	workforce	 bringing	 their	 family	with	 them	 to	 the	 island	 is	 a	
key	 question.	 Similarly	 important	 is	 the	 number	 of	 workforce	 coming	
from	a	non-Welsh-speaking	background	and	outside	of	the	UK.	I	would	
suggest	 providing	 information	 on	 this	 issue,	 and,	 if	 not	 quantitative	
estimates,	at	least	some	information	on	the	experiences	in	other	nuclear	
new	 build	 projects,	 especially	 in	 Europe	 (e.g.,	 Olkiluoto	 3	 and	
Flamanville	3	constructions).	
4. The	Consultation	Document	mentions	(10.103)	that	Horizon	has	already	
identified	potential	sites.	I	would	suggest	sharing	information	on	the	key	
characteristics	of	on	these	potential	sites	with	some	key	characteristics	
in	order	to	receive	a	more	meaningful	response	in	PAC2.	
13.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 COMMENTS	 OR	 SUGGESTIONS	 FOR	 LONG-TERM	 LEGACY	
BENEFITS	OR	COMMUNITY	FACILITIES?		
1. The	 construction	 and	 operation	 of	 Wylfa	 Newydd	 will	 substantially	
transform	 everyday	 local	 life,	 especially	 on	 Anglesey.	 Issues	 like	
healthcare	 provision,	 schooling,	 leisure	 and	 community	 facilities	 are	 a	
key	issue.	There	is	a	recognition	in	the	documents	on	behalf	of	Horizon	
of	 these	 issues,	 and	 a	 commitment	 to	 mitigate	 strain	 and	 to	 provide	
benefits.	 I	 would	 suggest	 providing	 a	 more	 detailed	 understanding	 of	
these	 issues,	 the	coming	changes	and	the	measures	 in	place	 in	PAC2.	 I	
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think	 it’s	 especially	 important	 to	 approach	 the	 question	 from	 the	
personal	point	of	view	of	the	people	living	in	the	area:	how	will	it	change	
their	everyday	life?	
14.	 DO	 YOU	 HAVE	 ANY	 ADDITIONAL	 COMMENTS	 ON	 HORIZON’S	 PROJECT	
PROPOSALS?	
1. As	 far	as	 I	understand,	 issues	of	nuclear	 safety,	and	 to	 some	extent	of	
nuclear	waste	and	spent	 fuel	and	decommissioning	are	not	an	 integral	
part	 of	 the	 consultation	 as	 the	 UK	 ABWR	 Generic	 Design	 Assessment	
(GDA)	 process	 is	 still	 ongoing.	 These	 issues	 are,	 however,	 a	 cause	 for	
local	 concern,	 and	 I	 would	 suggest	 providing	 more	 information	 and	
specific	consultation	questions	with	regards	to	these	issues.	
2. I	 am	 specifically	 interested	 in	 what	 “Decommissioning	 does	 not	 form	
part	of	this	Wylfa	Newydd	Project”	(Consultation	Document,	7.61,	p.	93)	
means.	
	
